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ABSTRACT 
Uganda, like many African countries in the 1990s, adopted decentralisation as a state reform 
measure after many years of civil strife and political conflicts, by transferring powers and 
functions to district councils. The decision to transfer powers and functions to district councils 
was, in the main, linked to the quest for democracy and development within the broader 
context of the nation state. This thesis’ broader aim is to examine whether the legal and policy 
framework of decentralisation produces a system of governance that better serves the greater 
objectives of local democracy, local development and accommodation of ethnicity. 
Specifically, the thesis pursues one main aim: to examine whether indeed the existing legal 
framework ensures the smooth devolution process that is needed for decentralised governance 
to succeed. In so doing, the study seeks, overall, to offer lessons that are critically important 
not only for Uganda but any other developing nation that has adopted decentralisation as a 
state-restructuring strategy. The study uses a desk-top research method by reviewing 
Uganda’s decentralisation legal and policy frameworks. In doing so, the thesis assesses 
decentralisation’s ability to deepen democracy, its role in encouraging development and its 
ability to accommodate diversity. After reviewing the emerging soft law on decentralisation, 
the thesis, finds that Uganda’s legal framework for decentralisation does not fully enable 
district councils to foster democracy, facilitate development and accommodate diversity. The 
thesis argues that the institutions that are created under a decentralised system should be 
purposefully linked to the overall objective of decentralisation. Giving a historical context of 
Uganda’s decentralisation, the thesis notes that institutional accommodation of ethnic 
diversity in a decentralised system, particularly so in a multiethnic state, is a vital peace 
building measure. It is argued the exclusion of ethnicity in Uganda’s decentralisation is 
premised on unjustified fear that ethnicity is potentially a volatile attribute for countries 
immerging from conflict. It maintains that the unilateral creation of many districts, the 
adoption of a winner-takes-all electoral system, the absence of special seats for ethnic 
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minorities as well as the vaguely defined district powers and functions do not serve the overall 
objective of decentralisation. The thesis also finds that district councils are overregulated, 
with little respect for their autonomy, a phenomenon that is highly nostalgic of a highly 
centralised state. The thesis therefore calls for immediate reforms of Uganda’s 
decentralisation programme. 
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1. CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Background to the study 
This thesis describes the policy, constitutional and legislative framework of decentralisation 
in Uganda. The analysis of the institutional architecture is situated within the context of a 
normative and international discourse on decentralisation, the examination of which will form 
part of the study. 
The thesis examines the history of district councils in Uganda and the latent features of both 
district councils and central government, beginning with the Buganda Agreement in 1900 
with the British colonial government and the introduction of indirect rule across the country.  
It explores current trends towards decentralisation and local government in Africa by 
describing and analysing international instruments on decentralisation. On the basis of these 
norms in the international legal framework, the study proceeds to establish its theoretical 
framework on decentralisation.  
Thus, the thesis’s description of the legal reforms introduced by the 1995 Ugandan 
Constitution is against the backdrop of the normative framework flowing from the emerging 
international ‘soft’ law on decentralisation. 
2. Statement of the problem 
For many African countries, decentralisation has been predicated on three important factors: 
the quest by local citizens for democracy; respect for human rights; and the pressure exerted 
by requirements that countries restructure themselves as a precondition for receiving financial 
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assistance from developed countries and the World Bank.1 Decentralisation is also associated 
with sustainable development, democratic governance, the promotion of diversity, and 
political stability; essentially, it is meant to lead to improved accountability and transparency.  
As stated, the thesis studies the policy, constitutional and legislative framework of Uganda’s 
system of decentralisation, several features of which make it an attractive case study. First, as 
one of the first of Africa’s large-scale decentralisation projects, it was adopted after a long 
spell of political instability and civil war. Second, whereas many less developed countries 
were forced to decentralise because structural adjustment programmes were a precondition for 
further financial assistance from the World Bank and/or the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Uganda’s decentralisation process was a ‘home-grown’ initiative. Consequently, the 
‘voluntary’ nature of Uganda’s decentralisation implies that its constitutional and legal 
institutions were nurtured by local conditions that gave it better prospects for success than 
those in other countries. 
3. Research objectives 
While much has been written about decentralisation in Uganda from a development-studies 
and public-management perspective, no study has been conducted yet on the legal design of 
Africa’s first large-scale decentralisation project. This thesis aims to examine whether the 
                                                 
1 World Bank 1992: 2. The World Bank Study on Uganda’s District Management focused on the Structural 
Adjustment Programme as a means for macroeconomic management of the national economy; the Programme 
operated on the assumption that the country’s public sector was too large and required an enabling environment 
for a market economy. The Study recommended that the decentralisation programme in Uganda had to focus on 
supporting macroeconomic reform in order to ensure management efficiency, popular participation at the local 
level, and improved financial performance through increased revenue generation and rational expenditure 
decisions. See also Makara 2009: 27. 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
legal and policy framework of decentralisation produces a system of governance that better 
serves the greater objectives of local democracy, local development and accommodation of 
ethnicity. 
The inquiry into the structure of Uganda’s district councils and the powers and functions that 
devolve thereto pursues one main aim: to examine whether indeed the existing legal 
framework ensures the smooth devolution process that is needed for decentralised governance 
to succeed. In so doing, the study seeks, overall, to offer lessons that are critically important 
not only for Uganda but any other developing nation that has adopted decentralisation as a 
state-restructuring strategy. 
4. Methodology 
The study uses a desk-top research method in that its primary sources of information are the 
1995 Constitution, different Acts of Parliament, Ministerial Declarations, case law, books, 
conference papers and articles in law journals. Relevant historical materials such as the 
Buganda Agreement of 1900, the 1962 Constitution, the 1967 Constitution, the Odoki 
Commission Report, and Constituent Assembly (CA) debates are examined. Where foreign 
constitutional or legislative provisions are cited, this is done with minimal comparative 
intention but for the purpose of explaining the best practices in other jurisdictions. Likewise, 
where foreign case law is cited, this has been done not for comparative purposes but in order 
to aid interpretation of certain constitutional and statutory provisions in Uganda that are 
similar to ones found in other jurisdictions, an approach taken especially in situations where 
no relevant jurisprudence exists locally. 
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5. Structure 
Chapter Two examines policy debates surrounding the system of decentralisation, and, in 
turn, reviews the different declarations that have been made both globally as well as in Africa 
on the subject of decentralisation. The review points to a growing international trend towards 
state decentralisation and provides the basis for assessing the main features of a decentralised 
system. 
Chapter Three identifies six primary features for a good decentralised system of government, 
namely, the integrity of local government institutions; functional local government authority; 
adequate fiscal autonomy; administrative autonomy; equitable intergovernmental transfers; 
and sound intergovernmental relations. These features provide a basis upon which to examine 
the history of Ugandan decentralisation (discussed in Chapters Four and Five) as well as to 
critique the post-1995 constitutional and legal institutional architecture (undertaken in 
Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine). 
Chapter Four traces Uganda’s local government from the historical perspective of the 
Buganda Kingdom and its role in British indirect rule, providing the background for the post-
1995 local government reform. Chapter Five reviews the constitution-making process, the 
establishment of Uganda as a constitutional state, and the role courts play as the ultimate 
arbiters of legal and constitutional conflicts; it also highlights the constitutional guarantees of 
the local government institutions, the recentralisation of Kampala City and the proposed 
establishment of the Regional Governments.  
Chapter Six describes the institutional design and governance structures of the district 
councils, in the process raising the question of whether they are suitable for democracy, 
sustainable development and the accommodation of ethnic diversity. 
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Chapter Seven deals with the powers and functions that are devolved to the district councils. 
The chapter examines legislative powers of the district councils, and in turn questions the 
intrusive role of the central government in the exercise of the district councils’ legislative 
autonomy. The Chapter also examines the administrative autonomy of district councils as 
well as the appointment and disciplining of senior district council managers. It is argued that 
the recentralisation of district council senior managers not only undermines the political 
autonomy of district councils but places their development preferences under the central 
government’s control. 
Building on the assessment in Chapter Seven, Chapter Eight examines the nature of district 
council finances. In doing so, the chapter illustrates not only the narrow revenue raising 
discretion that vests in the district councils, but also discredits the intrusive role of the central 
government in the fiscal transfer system.  
Chapter Nine highlights the nature of intergovernmental relations (IGR) in Uganda and draws 
a distinction between less and more intrusive IGR. District councils are generally over-
regulated and the spaces afforded to them in their interaction with central government 
inadequate. The conclusion of this chapter is that Uganda emphasises the more intrusive or 
‘hard-edged’ forms of IGR, whereas an appropriate decentralised system should favour ‘soft-
edged’ IGR. 
Chapter Ten concludes the thesis by pointing out that the existing constitutional and legal 
environment does not foster a democratic and responsive decentralised system.  
6. Definition of key terms 
Six key terms are deployed in this study: decentralisation; subsidiarity; deconcentration; 
delegation; devolution; and fiscal decentralisation. Their conventional meanings are defined 
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in the discussion below, after which a working definition is set out in order to indicate the 
way in which their interrelationship is understood for the purposes of this thesis. 
6.1 Decentralisation 
Writers define the term ‘decentralisation’ differently. Some define it with reference to the 
transfer of powers and responsibilities. These powers generally include the power to plan, the 
power to manage, and the power to mobilise and distribute resources. According to Work, 
decentralisation focuses on the transfer of authority to deliver services from central 
government to other orders of government, representatives or field offices.2 This, therefore, 
means that the power formerly vested in the central government and its agencies goes to the 
lower orders of government. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines 
decentralisation as: 
the restructuring of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between 
institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the principle 
of subsidiarity, thus increasing the overall quality and effectiveness of the system of 
governance, while increasing the authority and capabilities of sub-national levels.3 
Decentralisation is primarily about transfer of political power. Accordingly, in this thesis the 
working definition is that decentralisation is the transfer of political power and authority from 
the central government to sub-national levels of government. 
                                                 
2 Work 2000: 5. 
3 The UNPD 2002:7.  
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6.2 Subsidiarity 
Decentralisation is grounded in the principle of subsidiarity, which is the notion that central 
governments should be limited to a subsidiary role and act only where a more immediate local 
level is unable, or fails, to do so.4 Emphasising the advantages of institutional efficiency,5 
postmodern proponents of subsidiarity regard the devolution of powers to local communities 
as forming part of the principle. Unlike decentralisation, which acknowledges that power that 
is devolved from the central government to local governments, the principle of subsidiarity 
rests on the legal and philosophical reasoning that local governments’ powers naturally vest in 
them on the basis of preference for smaller orders of government.6 
6.3 Deconcentration 
Unlike decentralisation, ‘deconcentration’ means that, while the existing hierarchy is retained, 
authority and responsibility are distributed to more than one level of government, with a 
certain level of discretion being vested in civil servants as field agencies.7 Deconcentration 
aims to improve service delivery by minimising directly central roles in the performance of 
certain tasks and thereby reducing inefficiency and underperformance.8 It is hence a means by 
which the central government retains direct control over policy and finance while leaving the 
                                                 
4 Bermann 1994: 336. 
5 De Visser 2010: 18. 
6 Føllesdal 1998: 196-202. 
7 Work 2000: 6. De Visser 2005: 14. 
8 Work 2000: 6. 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
actual tasks in the hands of national civil servants who act as its agents at the lower order of 
government.9 
6.4 Delegation 
Delegation is the mechanism or system of transferring responsibility for a particular defined 
task to institutions that exist outside the parameters of the central government.10 In other 
words, tasks are transferred to institutions that ordinarily do not form part of the delegating 
principal authority, namely, the central government.11 The delegation of tasks is at its 
discretion; by implication, it has the power to prescribe the specific delegated power. 
In theory, once a power has been delegated, the central government is barred from exercising 
that power.12 In practice, however, the delegation of power and responsibility does not of 
itself take away the principal authority’s legal obligation to perform. The principal authority 
may, for example, perform a delegated task once a delegated agency has failed to perform or 
has acted illegally in the exercise of its delegated power or responsibility.13 
6.5 Devolution 
Devolution is a process in which there is full transfer of responsibility to a public authority at 
local level; the latter must be autonomous of the authority that has devolved the power.14 Key 
to devolution is the legal recognition of the autonomy of devolved orders of government from 
                                                 
9 Azfar, Kahkonen, and Meagher 2001: 13. 
10 De Visser 2005: 14. 
11 Rondinelli 1983: 14; Work 2000: 7. 
12 De Visser 2005: 14. 
13 Reynolds 1996: 159. 
14 Rondinelli 1983: 24; Work 2000: 7. 
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the original ‘power’, typically the central government.15 To emphasise the autonomy of a 
lower order of government, the members thereof are usually elected, although this is not a 
criterion for their autonomous existence.16 
6.6 Fiscal decentralisation 
Fiscal decentralisation refers to the system of allocating revenue resources to lower levels of 
government. Revenue allocation is usually negotiated between central and local authorities, 
and based on a number of factors that include interregional equity, availability of revenue at 
all levels of government, and local fiscal management capacity.17 Fiscal decentralisation has 
its origins in a classic argument of fiscal federalism according to which sub-national 
government is seen as the most appropriate vehicle for matching public goods and services to 
preferences.18 
6.7 Working definition 
Within the discourse on decentralisation, it is held that where power is merely deconcentrated 
or delegated, the ultimate decision remains with the centre. Given that some decentralised 
regimes evince both deconcentration and delegation, it is better to consider the latter pair as 
being distinct from decentralisation. Devolution, as distinguished from both deconcentration 
and delegation, describes the extent to which a lower order of government autonomously 
exercises power. The preferred definition of ‘decentralisation’ in this thesis is one that 
includes deconcentration and delegation of powers and responsibilities. This definition 
                                                 
15 De Visser 2005: 15. 
16 Work 2000: 7. 
17 Singiza & De Visser 2010: 12-16. 
18 Azfar, Kahkonen & Meagher 2001: 24. 
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includes, furthermore, the devolution of authority thorough fiscal autonomy, on the basis of 
the principle of subsidiarity. In other words, ‘decentralisation’ is the umbrella concept that 
integrates all the above terms. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter gives the background of the study, states the problem to be addressed and 
emphasises the overall research objective to be pursued. The chapter also demarcates the 
methodology and scope to be adopted in addressing the problem. In doing so, the chapter 
aims to establish clear research parameters. It is argued that a clearly conceptualised research 
topic together with a narrowed scope helps in succinctly addressing the overall stated research 
gaol. It is also noted that the six terms defined in this chapter are in turn employed to examine 
and to investigate the issues under discussion.  
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2. CHAPTER TWO 
DECENTRALISATION: INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL AND 
POLICY CONTEXT 
1. Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two broad areas. The first part of the chapter explores the 
ideological debates that surround the topic of decentralisation, while the second part reviews 
international ‘soft’ law on decentralisation. Evaluating decentralisation in terms of an 
international normative framework is important since doing so serves to establish benchmarks 
that may be used in reforming weak decentralised governments. The chapter restates the 
theories on decentralisation, locates good governance as the driving motive for 
decentralisation, and identifies sustainable development, grassroots democracy and 
accommodation of ethnicity as key pillars on which the theory of decentralisation is 
predicated. This lays the ground for examining features that are crucial to the success of 
systems of decentralisation, particularly those in multi-ethnic developing countries. 
2. Ideological background to the debate on decentralisation 
2.1 Introduction 
During the Cold War, many socialist scholars considered market economies as antithetical to 
social transformation because of their focus on profit maximisation. However, the alternative 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Chapter 2: Decentralisation: International, Political and Policy Context 
to a market economy was a strong, centralised, planned economy which, in many developing 
countries, left little room for grassroots democratic input in decision-making.1 
2.2 The debate about the nature of the post-colonial state: ‘African socialism’ 
Most post-colonial leaders in Africa argued that the absence of a strong industrial base meant 
that the state had to play a dominant role as the engine for development, a conception of 
social organisation broadly known as ‘African Socialism’.2 
Development was viewed as a common good not to be left in the hands of individuals.3 In this 
regard, local government’s role as a partner in development was a remote consideration. Most 
African countries looked to the Soviet Union and China as good models for development, 
preferring these command economies to the capitalist mode of production dominant in the 
West. The desire for a more centralised government was precipitated by the fact that many 
African central governments did not want to be restrained by independent institutions such as 
local governments.4 By the same token, any articulation of democracy was rejected with the 
forceful claim that no country could have democracy where poverty, illiteracy, poor health 
and starvation prevailed. Thus, until African countries were ‘liberated’ from these ills, 
democracy remained shelved, with no institution of government capable of limiting the 
powers of central government.5 
                                                 
1 Pieterse 2003: 5. 
2 Kanyeihamba 2002: 120.  
3 Nyerere 1968: 12.  
4 Nkrumah 1963: 166. 
5 Nyerere 1968: 12.  
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2.3 The change in the ideological debates 
In the 1990s many African countries adopted structural adjustment programmes and 
privatisation as key strategies for undoing former state intervention in the economy.6 While 
the free market doctrine was not disputed in the discourse on development, the requirement 
that markets ought not to lead to economic disparity was then a more favoured approach in 
the discourse on decentralisation for development.7 
2.4 The World Bank 
The World Bank’s approach to development has undergone significant changes over time. 
Initially, its stance towards underdevelopment was to extend loans for reconstruction and 
development.8 In the 1960s and 1970s, the Bank’s philosophy widened to include ‘growth 
with equity’ through anti-poverty human development projects,9 which included support for 
sectors such as education, agriculture, health and nutrition, and rural development. The debt 
crisis that faced most developing and less developed countries in the 1980s and 1990s led the 
Bank to re-focus its strategies of relying on the field of macroeconomic structural-adjustment 
lending.10 Thus, small government and fiscal discipline were conditions for further financial 
assistance.11 
                                                 
6 Pieterse (2003). 
7 Trubek 2007: 235. 
8 Carreau (1994).  
9 Blanco 1999: 111-12. 
10 Blanco & Carrasco 1999: 81. 
11 Carrasco & Kose 1996: 29-31. 
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This economic model did not escape the criticism of academics and policy analysts, who 
argued that the Bank had ignored risks associated with macroeconomic discipline, such as 
hunger and unemployment.12 Hence the design of the present World Bank development 
model: known as the Comprehensive Development Framework which aims at addressing 
previous development challenges. This framework ‘advocates that the Bank and its country-
clients pay more attention to the structural, social, and human side of development, and that 
development actors increase their co-operation in their efforts to eliminate poverty’.13 Access 
to resources in order to address poverty is one of the core assumptions of micro-development 
theory.14 
The World Bank takes the view that the obstacles to accessing resources are a result of power 
relations. Thus, according to the World Bank, in order to confront these power imbalances, 
development should be a continuous process.15 Moreover, people on the fringes of 
development have a duty to organise themselves so as to ‘overcome the obstacles to their 
social, cultural, and economic well-being’.16 In this regard, poor communities must 
‘participate fully not only in identifying common problems, setting priorities, and designing 
strategies and programs, but also in carrying out project activities and distributing the 
benefits’ so that other players can only respond to their efforts as partners.17 
                                                 
12 Carrasco 1999: 124-6; See generally Adepoju (ed) (1993). 
13 Cameron Blake 2000: 159. 
14 James & Dias 1986: 65. 
15 James & Dias 1986: 65-6. 
16 Kleymeyer 1991: 38.  
17 Kleymeyer (1991); Stiles 1987: 3.  
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The changes in the World Bank’s strategies for Africa from 1969 until now are testimony that 
economic models alone cannot address poverty and underdevelopment. In fact, there has not 
been evidence that reliance on strict fiscal economic austerity measures significantly reduce 
poverty.18 There ought to be a multiplicity of approaches that are sustainable and result-
oriented to ensure development. In the discussion below, local development is examined 
through the prism of good governance. 
3. Decentralisation for development 
This part of the thesis discusses the main arguments surrounding decentralisation. The 
discussion has three components: the link between decentralisation/local government and 
development; the link between decentralisation/local government and democracy; and the link 
between decentralisation/local government and the accommodation of diversity.19 
3.1 Economic arguments  
3.1.1 Efficiency 
In the discourse on devolution of power, the benefits and dangers of decentralisation are 
usually examined from an economic point of view.20 First, decentralisation is important in 
helping the distribution of income, the maintenance of a stable economy, and the efficient 
allocation of resources. Devolution of power is permissible as long as it reduces costs, 
                                                 
18 Ebel &Yilmaz 2001. 
19 Blank (2006: 11) argues that local communities have become transmitters, and enforcers, of international 
standards and thus ought to be considered as vehicles of transformation and economic empowerment. He argues 
further that local communities play a critical role in enhancing democracy and economic stability. 
20 Loughlin 1986: 1-4. 
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promotes efficient production, and does not disrupt macroeconomic policy and stability.21 
From a political-economy point of view, support for decentralisation considers both economic 
and political power as crucial in the devolution of powers and functions. Thus, devolution of 
power to lower orders of government must relate to the institutional capacity of lower orders 
of government to utilise that power.22 
It is argued that support for decentralisation emanates from economic efficiency theory that is 
grounded in the fiscal federalism theory.23 The economic efficiency argument acknowledges 
that the central government can produce the same goods as local governments would, but at 
lower costs because of economies of scale.24 However, the economic efficiency argument 
supports the view that local government’s ability to match goods to local preferences is better 
than that of the central government’s.25 For instance, a study by Akin, Hutchinson, and 
Strumpf reveals that sub-national governments tend to provide the goods for which citizens 
reveal a preference.26 Thus, decentralisation ensures that development priorities better match 
local preferences. 
The above proposition is supported on a number of grounds. First, as already argued, local 
governments are generally better suited to assess local needs and conditions than central 
governments. In this case, fiscal autonomy gives local governments the discretion to identify 
                                                 
21 Loughlin 1986: 1-4. 
22 Botchway 2001: 31. 
23 Shah 1997: 13 See generally Oates (1972) 
24 Loughlin 1986: 1-3.  
25 Shah 1997: 13; Azfar 2006: 228. 
26 Akin, Hutchinson, & Strumpf (2001), cited in Azfar 2006: 229. 
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the services to be delivered and possible sources of revenue to be generated.27 Secondly, local 
democracy implies that local citizens have a say in how resources should be used and how 
they, the citizens, should be taxed. Thus, local government fiscal autonomy increases the 
chances for accountability and participation. For example, support for leaders depends on 
whether local revenues are spent according to local residents’ priorities. In this regard, the 
fear of losing political support from local citizens ought to ensure that elected local leaders 
spend local revenues efficiently.28 
Support for decentralisation is also based on the classic argument of public choice theory. It is 
argued that if an individual voter lives in a sub-national unit that has poorer economic 
opportunities than another, then he or she will vote with his or her ‘feet’ by moving to another 
sub-national unit.29 
3.1.2 Accountability for development 
Accountability is crucial to public management in that it ensures that elected political leaders 
constantly have to justify their actions to citizens: it implies a duty to offer explanations and 
justifications of actions taken by those charged with delivering services.30 Accountability 
should not be viewed in terms of control, sanctions and punishment. As Callahan argues, such 
a view is simply the traditional negative approach to accountability, which centres on 
enforcement of rules and regulations so as to limit bureaucratic power.31 Rather, modern 
                                                 
27 The World Bank, World Development Report 1997: 120 cited in Devas 2008: 13. 
28 Devas 2008: 13. 
29 Tiebout 1956: 416-24 
30 Callahan 2007: 110. 
31 Callahan 2007: 113 
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accountability is understood in broader terms that incorporate the legal constraints that 
minimise public administrators’ discretion, fiscal constraints that reflect fiduciary 
responsibility, and political constraints through voting.32 
The latter two aspects of accountability are especially relevant to decentralisation for 
development. Particularly in the case of fiscal responsibility, the principle should be that local 
governments spend only what they have. The assumption is that, because local governments 
generate the revenue themselves from local citizens, they may spend money with a higher 
degree of discipline that minimises waste.33 As Shah argues, separating decisions about 
spending from decisions about taxing negatively affects fiscal discipline in the entire public 
sector.34 
The further assumption is that when duty-holders constantly have to justify their actions to 
citizens, the result is improved service delivery which in turn advances development. Thus, 
whenever locally elected leaders fail to honour their electoral pledges to the local citizens, at 
the next election they are likely to face the wrath of voters or even a recall.35 It is also argued 
that the expansive understanding of the term accountability includes the ‘upward 
accountability’ in that local governments must justify their actions to a senior level of 
government as long as the upward accountability is measured and proportional.  
                                                 
32 Callahan 2007: 113. 
33 De Visser 2005: 25. 
34 Shah 1998: 30. 
35 Azfar 2006: 239. 
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3.1.3 Distributive local government 
Local governments play a vital role in distributing incomes to local communities. A common 
narrative is that central government is better positioned than the local government to effect the 
income redistribution that is key for development.36 This is because strong fiscal 
decentralisation can compound regional inequity.37 The counter-argument is that regional 
inequity can be countered with equalisation grants .38 
According to Sewell, however, there is evidence that a centralised system of government does 
not support regional balances through income redistribution.39 Arguably, latent discrimination 
against minority groups or the suppression of ethnic interests by the central government can 
result in inequalities in service-distribution.40 Indeed, De Visser cites studies which have 
compared the performance of centralised governments and federalised countries to reveal that 
centralised governments’ performance in distributing wealth amongst their citizen is poor 
compared to that of federal systems of government.41 
It is true that local governments’ dependence on intergovernmental fiscal transfers may 
undermine their ability to tailor service delivery to local needs and remain accountable to 
local communities. It is, however, also true that intergovernmental transfers, if well designed, 
can promote equitable local development.42 In fact, it is argued that, in fragmented or 
                                                 
36 De Visser 2005: 27. 
37 Peirce, 1993: 17. 
38 Bird 1994: 311-312; Sewell 1996: 144. 
39 Sewell 1996: 144. 
40 Shireletso 1997: 141-7. 
41 De Visser 2005: 28. 
42 Bird 1994: 311-12; Sewell 1996: 144. 
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ethnically diverse societies, central government transfers are a form of political bargaining 
and a means to share state resources and sovereignty.43Against this, it is argued that in many 
countries central government transfers to local governments are instead a form of political 
appeasement to ease local political pressures. Central government transfers are, that is to say, 
a kind of ‘political glue’ that keeps the country together.44 In this regard, the peace-building 
potential of the central government transfers in fragmented societies is significant.45 
The conclusion is that while redistribution is generally better performed at national 
government level, this does not imply that decentralisation cannot foster redistribution of 
incomes altogether. 
3.1.4 Corruption 
Pessimists argue that decentralisation leads to ‘decentralisation’ of corruption without 
improving service delivery.46 Indeed, some studies show that decentralisation may breed 
corruption as a result of the connivance between local bureaucrats and local interest groups,47 
making local government vulnerable to political capture by the wealthy elites.48 De Visser 
argues that rather than blame corruption on decentralisation, the evidence suggests that 
corruption in local governments manifests a failure in the proper execution of decentralisation 
programmes.49 It is argued that decentralisation fosters transparency in decision-making. 
                                                 
43 Bird 1994: 311-12. 
44 Breton 1978: 11. 
45 Prud’homme 1994: 202 
46 Azfar 2006: 234. 
47 Prud’homme 1994: 10-11. 
48 Bahl 2004: 4 cited in De Visser 2005: 29. 
49 De Visser 2005: 29. 
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Byanyima takes the view that ‘[t]ransparency is a great disinfectant’ against corruption and a 
precursor to sustainable development.50 Indeed, unless there are mechanisms to sufficiently 
limit corruption and abuse of power, decentralisation has little or no economic benefit at all. 
The existence of corruption in decentralisation merely points to the need to put in place 
measures to fight corruption at every level of government. Thus, establishing institutions of 
control and accountability at municipal/local government level creates a buffer against the 
‘fear’ of corruption that may result from decentralisation.51 In a nutshell, decentralisation does 
not breed corruption but the high prevalence of corruption does nevertheless point to the need 
for adequate corrective measures. 
3.2 Decentralisation for democracy 
3.2.1 Introduction 
It is argued below that it does not matter whether decentralisation is based on public 
management theory or economic efficiency theory. What is important is to point out that good 
governance through decentralisation leads to development in practice. It is argued that 
democratic local government ensures that development priorities are made after consultation 
with the local populations. In this respect, voting is an essential feature of local government 
democracy.52 
                                                 
50 See W, Byanyima, ‘To Sustain High Growth Rates, Africa Must Have Inclusive Policies in Place, The Daily 
Monitor 9th, May 2013, available at http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Commentary/To-sustain-high-growth-
rates--Africa-must-have/-/689364/1844162/ /11d3idb/-/index.html. 
51 Loughlin 1986: 1. See also Work (2002).  
52 Golooba-Mutebi 2000: 22-3. 
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Dahl defines the term ‘democracy’ by listing its determinants,53 arguing that eight 
institutional guarantees are important determinants of democracy. These are: freedom to form 
and join organisations; freedom of expression; the universal right to vote; eligibility for public 
office; the right to compete for support and votes; alternative sources of information; free and 
fair elections; and governmental institutions’ policies based on votes and other expressions of 
preference. 
Democracy may be direct,54 as in the case, for example, of referenda, where voters are asked 
to vote directly on certain contentious issues of national importance; it may also be indirect, 55 
as in the case of a motion of censure, where Parliament passes a motion of disapproval against 
a sitting president, prime minister or MP on behalf of the electorate. It is noted that most, if 
not all, democratic systems are a combination of both representative and participatory 
democracy. 
3.2.2 Democracy through traditional leadership in Africa 
The debate in many African countries when decentralisation was rolled out as a policy 
initiative concerned the transformation of states from ones characterised by political 
instability, dictatorship, nepotism and corruption to ones that were more democratic, 
developmental and inclusive.56 The traditional local institutions of governance were placed on 
the periphery of the debate on state reconstruction, notwithstanding the critical role of 
                                                 
53 Dahl 1971: 3, cited in Reynolds 1999: 20. 
54 Callahan 2007: 154. 
55 Callahan 2007: 154. 
56 Oomen 2005: 110. 
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traditional institutions of leadership to this debate. It is argued that there is a strong correlation 
between democracy and traditional leadership, especially on the African continent.57 
In many African local communities, legitimacy emanates from age-old traditional institutions 
that were headed by chiefs and whose relation to the community is often described as being of 
a ‘symbiotic, patron-client type’.58 British indirect rule in many African countries, and indeed 
in other British spheres of influence, relied on chiefs as to exert their rule on the native 
communities. Pre-colonial traditional leaders were regarded as the keepers of community 
values and practiced a ‘a high level of participatory democracy through assemblies of men’.59 
Arguably, the advent of colonial rule changed the traditional institutional arrangements and 
reduced traditional leadership to agents of colonial rule 60 and instruments of coercion and 
subjugation. Colonial rule created what Mamdani describes as ‘decentralised despotism’.61 In 
other words, post-traditional leadership institutions, having acquired a new blend of colonial 
authority, became tools of oppression. If traditional leadership is viewed as a shared value of a 
certain ethnic group, then liberal democracy, which emphasises competitive election, takes 
away that legitimacy. True traditional leadership is controversial, given that that leadership is 
hereditary and thus exclusionary. However, the exclusionary nature of leadership in 
traditional institutions may also play out in Western democracies that are dominated by the 
political elite class. It is true that the exclusionary nature of traditional institutions is simple 
                                                 
57 See Marry Morgan ‘Can Democracy Deliver for Africa?’ Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-24228425 accessed on 25 September 2013. 
58 Golooba-Mutebi 2007: 108. 
59 Rugege 2003:172-3. 
60 Mamdani 1996: 114. 
61 Mamdani 1996: 23, 53, 58. 
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while the exclusionary nature of democracies is a result of subtle factors such as power and 
class relations. However, some democracies have leadership positions that are dominated by 
one family or one racial group or gender.62 
Democracies have term limits which traditional institutions do not. One could argue that even 
if a leader in a liberal democracy attempts to undermine the existing institutions that are 
supposed to limit his powers, the possibility of losing an election (if he or she does not rig that 
election) is a strong mitigating factor. However, traditional leaders also face a real possibility 
of abdication from the throne in a case of blatant abuse of power. In that regard, the leader can 
in theory lose power in the same way that Western democracy changes its leadership. There 
are, in fact, examples in Africa where traditional leaders have abdicated.63 Moreover, in a 
Westminster system, where there are no term limits, a bad leader can remain at the helm as 
long as his or her party is popular.64 
                                                 
62 For example, since the declaration of American independence, the USA had been led only by male whites 
until the election of Barack Obama in 2008. Similarly, the UK has had only one female prime minister, with no 
non-Caucasian Prime Minister.  
63 For example, Markakis 2006: 30 writes that the secret conversion of Emperor Za Dengel of Ethiopia in the 
Horn of Africa in 1603-4 (he became a Jesuit) led to a violent rebellion. His successor, Susneyos (1607-32), 
who openly confessed Catholicism and forcibly converted his subjects to profess the Catholic faith, was forced 
to abdicate in favour of his son, Fasiladas. 
64 For example, Margret Thatcher, referred to as the ‘Iron Lady’, served as the British Prime Minister for more 
than 15 years. She only left office when her popularity within the Conservative Party plummeted; had her party 
not replaced her with a fellow Tory, she might have remained in office a few more years. 
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It is argued that traditional institutions of leadership that focus on communitarian values 
counter the inadequacies of democratic systems.65 
3.2.3 The contribution of decentralisation to democracy 
Decentralisation creates spaces for democracy to flourish. Briffault argues that local 
governments must be looked at as potential hatcheries for democracy.66 The evidence is that 
local communities learn about the essence of democracy (trade-offs and compromises) at 
local level better than at national level,67 notwithstanding the possibility that in some cases 
local government structures may be prone to capture by elite groups. In this regard, local 
elections are an important feature for local democracy to flourish. 
In the section below, the link between local elections and democracy is examined within the 
context of a broader multi-ethnic nation state. 
3.2.4 The value of elections at local level 
By its nature, local democracy may produce different outcomes in different jurisdictions. Yet, 
after elections, local political leaders, irrespective of their political or ethnic affiliations, will 
be ‘forced’ to work together under the broad umbrella of the nation state. The consensus-
building nature of local elections therefore promotes co-operation and respect across the 
political spectrum. In that sense, multiparty democracy is learned. For example, South Africa 
and Ghana (two countries that previously experienced political instability) used local elections 
as a means of forging national political consensus over and above racial and ethnic 
                                                 
65 See Morgan (2013). 
66 Briffault 1996: 1124.  
67 Briffault 1993: 339. 
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differences.68 It is argued that the recognition of differences in local elections fosters 
democracy, development and tolerance across the social and political spectrum. Thus, 
contrary to some views that support monolithic politics,69 multiparty politics has a more 
fertile ground for growth in a decentralised system of government than in a centralised one.70 
4. Accommodation of diversity 
4.1 Introduction 
This section addresses the debate on the politics of identity and the role of ethnicity in 
decentralisation. It will be argued that accommodation of ethnic identity has peace-building 
potential in a multi-ethnic national state and is vital to the success of a decentralised system.71 
Ethnic groups in many African states were suppressed immediately after gaining 
independence from their colonial masters.72 This had negative consequences: poverty, 
political despondency, alienation and civil strife. It also resulted in various ethnic groups 
directly challenging the legitimacy of those states.73 Often a large number of people (in most 
cases minority and vulnerable groups) are politically and economically discriminated against 
and therefore outside the realm of the nation state. Thus, where an ethnic group has been 
                                                 
68 Nohlen, Krennerch & Berhard 1999: 4-15. 
69 Museveni 2000: 15. 
70 Asbjørn 2002: 64. 
71 Banks 2005: 1. 
72 Kanyeihamba 2002: 1; Museveni 2000: 34-5. 
73 See generally Mamdani (1983). 
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alienated politically at a national level, an ethnically-based system of decentralisation 
guarantees their political participation.74 
The word ‘diversity’ connotes a multiplicity of groups or categories of things or people. As a 
sociological term, the word presupposes the existence of different identifiable groups of 
people. The term ‘diversity’ acknowledges the existence of different groups which, taken 
individually, share unique and identifiable characteristics distinct from those of other groups 
or categories. Thus, the term relates to the uniqueness of a group’s identity.75 
Identities have evolved around different interests. For example, there are religious identities, 
in terms of which Islamists, Hindus, Buddhists, African traditionalists, Christians, atheists and 
pagans emerge as different identities. Even within these religious identities there are further 
subgroups such as Catholics, Protestants or Orthodox Christians. In Islam, too, there are 
subgroups such as the Sunnis or Shiites. Identities have also emerged along racial, gender and 
sexual lines. In most cases an identity is a construction in terms of which a dominant group is 
established as the ‘norm’ and a non-dominant group as its ‘abnormal’ other.76 With this in 
mind, the next section focuses on ethnicity, given that the debate on decentralisation in multi-
ethnic states revolves more strongly around questions of ethnic identity than it does around 
those to do with gender, religion and/or race. 
A number of questions arise from this. What order of government is appropriate to 
accommodate ethnic interests? Should ethnic interests be accommodated at the regional level 
or in lower orders of government? In this thesis it is argued that, depending on the territorial 
                                                 
74 Kymlicka 2004: 27. 
75 Kaplan 2008: 32-33. 
76 Bernstein 2005: 49-50. 
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manifestation of ethnicity, smaller orders of government may be appropriate to accommodate 
ethnic interests. The reasons are that, first, there is a lesser risk of secession from the rest of 
the nation state at smaller levels of government; and, second, smaller orders of government 
help to accommodate minorities within minorities.77 
4.2 Why accommodation is important 
Most states in Africa can hardly consider themselves as ‘nations’. Instead, they are an 
amalgamation of different ethnic nationalities which were fused together at the time of 
colonisation and given ‘legitimacy’ on independence.78 It is argued that accommodating 
ethnicity in lower orders of government may lead to additional political dividends in a given 
national state. That is to say, rights such as non-discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin 
become part of the new political debate by virtue of tolerance of differences. The assumption 
here is that previous social and political prejudices within an autonomous cultural group may 
disappear with the passage of time, given that acceptance of differences is the common value 
for all groups that were previously marginalised. 
The question that arises is how to share state power among different ethnic groups, some of 
which may be numerically as well as economically stronger than others. 
4.3 Benefits and dangers of territorial accommodation through 
decentralisation 
Ethnic diversity can be accommodated through territorial or non-territorial means. Territorial 
accommodation of ethnicity refers to the granting of self-government or autonomy to a 
specific ethnic minority group. Good examples are Quebec’s asymmetric federalism in 
                                                 
77 Siegle & O’Mahony 2006: 49. 
78 Kanyeihamba 2002: 1 
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Canada or Zanzibar’s greater political autonomy in Tanzania. Arguably, the territorial 
accommodation of ethnicity is different from decentralisation in that it is asymmetrical and of 
a unique kind.79 By contrast, non-territorial accommodation of ethnicity entails devolving 
political power to ethnic groups irrespective of where they live. Here, the sole aim is to ensure 
that the ethnic minorities that may be in an area populated by major ethnic groups are not 
politically discriminated against.80 According to Kymlicka, 
[s]elf-government claims … typically take the form of devolving political power to a 
political unit substantially controlled by members of the national minority, and substantially 
corresponding to their historical homeland or territory.81 
Self-government rights ensure that powers and functions are devolved to lower orders of 
government in the interests of particular social groups. For instance, devolving power to an 
indigenous people’s self-governing political unit helps the group to tailor its services to local 
preferences. A political unit which is substantially controlled by indigenous people may help 
such communities determine their educational curriculum and language of instruction in 
schools. The protection of ethnically-based rights such as language may enhance the level of 
political participation of a given community in the affairs of the government.82 In addition, as 
Mitra and Bhattacharyya argue, once ethnically-based rights are politically accommodated, 
the real questions of how to share the national ‘pie’ replace narrow identity issues. Ultimately, 
the risk of freezing ethnicity in a nation state is averted.83 
                                                 
79 Miller 1998: 66. 
80 Asbjørn (2002). 
81 Kymlicka 1995: 30. 
82 Howard 1983: 479-80. 
83 Mitra & Bhattacharyya 2000:130. 
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The following questions thus present themselves: 
• Should ethnic interests be accommodated territorially or culturally? 
• What institutional guarantees are needed to accommodate ethnic diversity as a 
key consideration in a decentralised system? 
Preference is usually given to non-territorial cultural autonomy, given its ability both to 
protect minorities who might be living in a given territory and to protect inherited borders 
within which many other ethnic groups have lived historically.84 However, where devolution 
of power is aimed at protecting a particular ethnic group with a unique history, territorial 
autonomy or asymmetrical decentralisation is preferred. It is argued that the accommodation 
of ethnicity is attained if it becomes a major consideration in the overall decentralisation 
scheme.85 
Accommodation of ethnicity in the process of devolution of powers is usually rejected for the 
wrong reasons. For example, opinions abound to the effect that ethnic or regional autonomous 
governance and identity would override national development interests.86 In this respect, 
ethnicity is viewed as a retrogressive notion undesirable in the context of attempts to achieve 
a country’s developmental goal.87 Thus, the argument goes, strong autonomous lower orders 
of government may exacerbate ethnic tensions and national disintegration.88 Ethnic identity is 
only a small part of what makes one a citizen and a member of a nation. As the American 
                                                 
84 Asbjørn (2002). 
85 Singiza 2010: 8-9. 
86 Howard 1991: 418-19. 
87 Howard 1983: 482. 
88 Bayart 1993: 41-59. 
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president Barack Obama succinctly put it, ‘None of us wants to be defined by one part of 
what makes us whole.’89 
It may be argued that recognising the different ethnic identities is risky in that certain ethnic 
groups may question the legitimacy and existence of the nation state.90 In fact writers such as 
Smith express the fear that the use of decentralisation to accommodate ethnicity may backfire. 
The risk is that in multi-ethnic societies, decentralisation may lead to discrimination against 
‘minorities’ within minorities. The argument is that decentralisation creates an artificial 
majority in local communities. In turn, the new ‘majority’ may discriminate against those who 
become minorities within local governments.91 
It could be counter-argued that, even when the real risk associated with secession in 
ethnically-based decentralisation is not far-fetched, the devolution of state power to strong 
and autonomous local governments helps to accommodate ethnic identities without 
compromising national identity. The argument is that the devolution of state power through a 
decentralisation process that takes into account ethnic diversity is an incentive for peace and 
apolitical stability,92 and can never threaten the wider nation state’s identity.93 
In order to accommodate ethnic diversity, in a decentralised system, institutions of local 
governments should be designed through a boundary demarcation process that takes into 
account indigenous people’s rights. It also means that preferential treatment may be given in 
                                                 
89 See President Barack Obama’s address to the Gay Rights Group, Washington 10t October 2009, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-human-rights-campaign-dinner 
90 Erk 2010: 37. 
91 Smith 2007: 113. 
92 Siegle & O’Mahony 2006: 49. 
93 Stauffer & Topperwien 2000: 48. 
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the design of the electoral system to ensure that indigenous peoples access political offices 
through free and fair elections. Finally, it means that the central government fiscal transfer 
system may take into the account the special needs of indigenous peoples as a form of 
affirmative action. 
Having discussed the arguments on which decentralisation is based, the thesis now turns to 
the international law context of decentralisation, a review of which is discussed below. 
5. Manifestations of decentralisation in international law 
5.1 Introduction  
International law can generally be divided into two parts: ‘hard’ law and ‘soft’ law.94 The 
focus in this chapter is on international ‘soft’ law. 
International ‘soft’ law refers to standards that emanate from declarations, diplomatic 
conferences and the resolutions of international organisations. The intention of these 
instruments is to serve as guidelines for the conduct of states; on their own, however, they do 
not enjoy the position and status of law.95 According to Romero, ‘“[s]oft law” … refers to sets 
of standards, principles or guidelines, and codes of conduct which may be useful for 
governments to incorporate into their national law, coupled with a plan or agenda of action’.96 
For Craik, ‘[w]hile there is no generally accepted definition of soft law, its essential 
characteristic is that ... soft law does not create formally binding obligations’.97 Dugard argues 
                                                 
94 Brownlie (1998). 
95 Dugard 2007: 38-9. 
96 Romero 2005: 532.  
97 Craik 1998: 573.  
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that with the passage of time such declarations, or ‘soft’ international law, may be turned into 
customary international law.98 
A number of questions are raised in this chapter. The first is whether there is, within 
international law, a right to local government. As shall be discussed, the answer is clearly in 
the negative; it is argued, however, that a relationship exists between decentralisation and the 
right to participate in government. Moreover, the consensus in the emerging international 
‘soft’ law is that local governments are appropriate institutions for the provision of social 
services to local communities. Various declarations about decentralisation also emphasise the 
need to bring every social group into the realm of the state. As a result, the chapter highlights 
the role of decentralisation in protecting the rights of special interest groups such as women, 
ethnic minorities, and those with disabilities. 
The second question is: is there an international obligation on states to devolve power through 
decentralisation? The answer, again, is no. Nevertheless, there is a trend, discernible through a 
flurry of statements, made particularly in Africa, that links decentralisation to sustainable 
development. While it is acknowledged that ministerial declarations do not amount to 
international law and are little more than expressions of the political wishes of government 
functionaries, one can argue that the seemingly unrelenting succession of declarations 
indicates all the same that a vital role is being accorded to decentralisation and that this may 
create the momentum for driving forward an evolving debate on decentralised governance. 
Ministerial declarations are a statement of intent upon which future international ‘hard’ law 
regarding the practice of local government may develop.  
                                                 
98 Dugard 2007: 38-9. 
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This section demonstrates that there is an emerging trend at the regional level towards 
decentralisation, one which is manifested in international ‘soft’ law. An array of legal 
instruments is reviewed below.  
The first set of instruments deals with the emerging worldwide effort to promote 
decentralisation through a charter on which ‘the theory of decentralisation’ as a system of 
government could be based. The second set of instruments concerns the United Nations’ 
attempt to adopt a charter on local government. The third set of instruments examines the 
adoption by members of the British Commonwealth of guidelines on local government. The 
fourth set addresses the European-specific trend on local government and the adoption of a 
European charter. Against this backdrop, the last set of instruments reviews the trend towards 
decentralisation in Africa, as manifested in the flurry of statements referred to earlier. 
While the last set of instruments relates to Anglophone countries or have been adopted in 
British Commonwealth African countries, they are nevertheless similar to those instruments 
that have been applied in other, non-Anglophone African countries. 
5.2 World-Wide Declaration of Local Self-Government 
5.2.1 Background 
In 1993 the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), a council of local-government 
associations, adopted the World-Wide Declaration of Local Self-Government (WWDLSG).99 
Preceded by numerous declarations on the subject,100 it gave fresh momentum to the debate 
                                                 
99 Available at http://www.bunken.nga.gr.jp/siryousitu/eturansitu/charter/iuladecltxt.html. 
100 Hoffschulte 2008: 113. 
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on local governments.101 The WWDLSG perhaps marked the start of the development of 
many similar declarations on local government. The WWDLSG represents the global thinking 
on decentralisation that emerged at a time when centralised systems of government in Africa, 
Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and the Far East had collapsed.102 It amounts to a 
renewed effort to emphasise the importance of democratic local self-government in view of its 
‘critical role in securing social, economic and political justice for all citizens of every 
community in the world’.103 
5.2.2 Status of the WWDLSG in international law 
The WWDLSG was adopted by the IULA. The declaration makes reference to other 
international instruments such as the UN Conference on Environment and Development; 
article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which calls for respect of 
the ‘will of the people’; and the ECLSG adopted by the Council of Europe.104 A meeting of a 
council of associations of local governments cannot legally commit nations in international 
law. Members of local- government associations are typically mayors, administrators, 
councillors and the like; however, ministers of foreign affairs, heads of states and 
governments, and/or ambassadors are the only legally recognised state representatives in 
international law. At best, the WWDLSG can be considered as international soft law on local 
government. 
                                                 
101 Hoffschulte 2008: 109. 
102 Hoffschulte 2008: 114. 
103 See para. 5 of the Preamble to the WWDLSG. 
104 See paras. 4, 7 and 8 of the Preamble to the WWDLG. A detailed discussion of the ECLSG is provided in 
this chapter. 
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5.2.3 Rationale for, and role of, local government under the WWDLSG 
The WWDLSG places a premium on representative democracy as an underlying value for 
local government105 and an alternative to failed totalitarian regimes.106 The WWDLSG is 
intended to serve as 
a standard to which all nations should aspire in their efforts to achieve a more effective 
democratic process, thereby improving the social and economic well-being of their 
populations.107 
The WWDLSG considers local authorities as integral parts of governments and, owing to 
their proximity to the people, as better positioned in decision-making.108 It affirms the role 
that decentralised systems of government play in creating harmony among communities as 
well as in nurturing democratic and efficient governments for sustainable development.109 
The WWDLSG also regards local government as a catalyst for responsive democratic 
governance and a stimulant of local initiative.110 
5.2.4 Democracy 
With regard to democracy, the WWDLSG asserts that ‘[l]ocal self-government denotes the 
right and the duty of local authorities to regulate and manage public affairs under their own 
                                                 
105 See paras. 7 and 10 of the Preamble to the WWDLSG. 
106 See para. 3 of the Preamble to the WWDLSG. 
107 See para. 12 of the Preamble to the WWDLSG. 
108 See para. 6 of the Preamble to the WWDLSG. 
109 See para. 9 and10 of the Preamble to the WWDLSG. 
110 See para. 11 of the Preamble to the WWDLSG. 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
Chapter 2: Decentralisation: International, Political and Policy Context 
responsibility and in the interests of the local population’.111 This provision underscores the 
need for legal frameworks that protect local authorities. Thus, reiterating the need to protect 
the integrity and legitimacy of local authorities, the WWDLSG calls for representative 
democracy to be ensured by means of free elections held ‘on a periodical basis by equal, 
universal suffrage’.112 
5.2.5 Local government finances 
The WWDLSG calls for adequate local government financial autonomy. Its criterion for local 
government autonomy in general is that allocation of resources to local governments should 
be commensurate with their devolved functions.113 Dealing with financial autonomy in 
particular, the WWDLSG states that local government resources should be regularly allocated 
in order not to disrupt public service delivery and planning.114 It takes the view that, to 
achieve a sustainable revenue base, local governments should be vested with the discretion to 
levy and determine rates for taxes, fees and charges.115 
In order to protect the financial autonomy of local governments, the WWDLSG states that the 
taxes to which local governments are entitled have to be ‘of a sufficiently general, buoyant 
and flexible nature to enable them to keep pace with their responsibilities’.116 It also 
recognises the role of central government transfers through a system of financial equalisation 
                                                 
111 Article 2(1) of the WWDLSG. 
112 Article 2(2) of the WWDLSG. 
113 Article 8 (1) of the WWDLSG. 
114 Article 8 (2) of the WWDLSG. 
115 Article 8 (3) of the WWDLSG. 
116 Article 8 (4) of the WWDLSG. 
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and block grants.117 The WWDLSG calls for local government to be involved in drafting the 
rules of revenue-sharing118 and to ensure that block grants do not justify unnecessary 
interventions by the central government.119 In addition, it calls for local governments to enjoy 
discretion in spending revenue ‘within the framework of their powers’.120 
5.2.6 Recognition of local governments 
The WWDLSG provides that constitutional recognition of local government is foundational 
to the system of local government.121 It requires constitutional recognition of local 
governments, a requirement that in turn calls for an elevation in their status and which stands 
in contrast to the usual practice wherein local governments are merely creatures of statute. 
Crucially, the WWDLSG affirms the importance of a boundary-demarcation process that is 
transparent, lawful and which promotes public consultation and participation.122 
The WWDLSG needs to be contextualised within its history. As a response to the poverty, 
under-development and dictatorship that characterised much of the developing world in the 
twentieth century, it aims to reform state institutions by devolving responsibilities to lower 
orders of government. The WWDLSG makes a case for regarding local governments as an 
appropriate means for achieving the objectives of the democratisation process as well as 
efficient structures for sustainable development, provided they are adequately resourced. 
However, the WWDLSG is limited in application in that it does not give any guidance on the 
                                                 
117 Article 8 (5) and (7) of the WWDLSG. 
118 Article 8 (6) of the WWDLSG. 
119 Article 8 (7) of the WWDLSG. 
120 Article 8 (1) of the WWDLSG. 
121 Article 1 of the WWDLSG. 
122 Article 4(2) of the WWDLSG. 
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nature of the powers that should be vested in lower orders of government in order to ensure 
that they can execute their responsibilities. 
5.2.7 Local government’s powers and functions 
According to the WWDLSG, devolution of functions to lower orders of government is 
justified because they produce goods for which local voters express preference than central 
government.123 The WWDLSG emphasises that there should be local discretion in decision-
making. As such, it conceives of local governments as endowed with 
a general right to act on their own initiative with regard to any matter which is not 
exclusively assigned to any other authority nor specifically excluded from the competence 
of local government.124 
It is argued that this provision reflects the principle of subsidiarity. Essentially, the 
WWDLSG adopts a ‘shared rule’ dimension in the allocation of finances to local 
government.125 For example, if central government decides to allocate finances to local 
governments, according to the WWDLSG, the local government should be afforded an 
opportunity to participate in the process of deciding how much money is to be allocated and 
for what purposes. The WWDLSG therefore calls for the local government’s participation in 
the central government decision-making process whenever those decisions affect local 
governments financially. 
                                                 
123 Article 3 (1) of the WWDLSG. 
124 Article 3 (2) of the WWDLSG. 
125 Article 3 (6) of the WWDLSG provides: ‘Local authorities shall have a reasonable and effective share in 
decision-making by other levels of government which has local implications.’  
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Furthermore, the WWDLSG calls for the ‘full and exclusive’ exercise of local government 
powers.126 The phrase ‘full and exclusive’ means that the governance tools that are transferred 
to local government should be clear and capable to executing their mandate. 
5.2.8 Intergovernmental relations  
The WWDLSG regards good intergovernmental relations (IGR) as crucial for the system of 
local government,127 and calls for supervision. The latter is divisible into two categories: 
supervision by regulation and supervision by intervention. 
5.2.9 Supervision by regulation 
The WWDLSG calls for the regulation of ‘basic’ local government responsibilities, requiring 
that there should be clearly laid-out constitutional and legal parameters for altering these 
responsibilities.128 The words ‘basic’129 and ‘prescribed’130 invite an interpretation that 
requires the central government to regulate only the general framework of responsibilities, 
with the power to implement the specific details of responsibilities vesting in the local 
governments. The WWDLSG also calls for supervision as a constitutionally and statutorily 
recognised tool for IGR,131 and rationalises supervision as a means to ensure compliance with 
                                                 
126 Article 3 (4) of the WWDLSG. 
127 Articles 4 & 5 of the WWDLSG. 
128 Article 3 (3) of the WWDLSG. 
129 Kavanagh (2000: 91) defines the word ‘basic’ as ‘forming an essential foundation; fundamental’. 
130 Kavanagh (2000: 923) defines the word ‘prescribe’ as ‘to state authoritatively that (an action or procedure) 
should be carried out’. 
131 Article 7 (1) of the WWDLSG. 
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the law.132 It is argued that no supervision for performance or policy-related reasons is 
envisaged here. In terms of the WWDLSG any supervision not aimed at ensuring compliance 
with the law, or which has the effect of undermining local government’s constitutional 
autonomy, is implicitly undesirable. 
5.2.10 Supervision by intervention 
The WWDLSG also calls for intervention as a form of supervision. The WWDLSG further 
calls for dissolution of local governments should an intervention fail to address problems for 
which an intervention was intended. As a safeguard against the erosion of local governments’ 
constitutional autonomy, it states that even where supervision permits dissolution of local 
governments, the procedure must be in accordance with ‘due process of law’.133 Moreover, 
the WWDLSG demands that the restoration of the local government’s institutional autonomy 
should occur within the shortest time possible.134 
5.3 UN Draft Guidelines on Decentralization (Vancouver Draft) 
5.3.1 Background 
In spite of resistance from other world powers,135 the UN Governing Council Habitat Section 
(UNGCHS) requested that the Advisory Group of Experts on Decentralisation (AGRED) 
                                                 
132 Article 7 (2) of the WWDLSG. 
133 Article 4 (1) of the WWDLSG. 
134 Article 4 (1) of the WWDLSG. 
135 Opposition to the UN efforts towards creating a UN charter on local government mainly came from China 
and US, two of the five permanent members of the Security Council. 
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formulate policy guidelines on local government,136 the result of which is the UN Draft 
Guidelines on Decentralisation (UNDGD) – the first attempt by the United Nations to adopt a 
charter on decentralisation.137 However, as the term ‘draft’ implies, no such charter has been 
adopted yet by a formal resolution.138 For example, the subsequent resolutions of the 
UNGCHS no. 23/12 of April 2011 and Resolution 24/1 of April 2013 merely placed emphasis 
on the coordinated implementation of the guidelines on decentralisation and strengthening of 
local authorities, with no indication that the UN has ever made any substantive resolution on 
the UNDGD.139 
                                                 
136 See the UNGCHS Resolution 19/12 of 9 May 2003. The draft guidelines were made by the members of the 
AGRED. The full citation of the draft guidelines is ‘Draft Guidelines on Decentralisation and the Strengthening 
of Local Authorities’ 3 HSP/GC/21/2/Add.2, hereinafter referred to as the UNDGD. 
137 Hoffschulte 2008: 114 
138 Hoffschulte 2008: 114-16. Writers on the development of the international discourse on local governments 
place emphasis on the correlation between the ECLSG and the UN efforts to adopt a charter on local 
government. The correlation between the ECLSG and the UN’s efforts for a charter on local government is that 
the UNDGD were published after the ratification of the ECLSG by a substantial number of European countries. 
In fact, it is now acknowledged that ratification of the ECLSG was one of the benchmarks for countries that 
sought to join the European Union. It is argued that the success of the ECLSG served as an inspiration for UN 
efforts to adopt a world charter on local government.  
139 See the 24th session of the Draft Proceedings of the UNGCHS (Nairobi, 15–19 April 2013) available at 
http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/12289_1_595226.pdf, accessed on 26 January 2014. 
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5.3.2 Status of the UNDGD 
The UNDGD focus is on members states of the UN.140 The fact that the UNDGD were 
drafted following a request by the UNGCHS does not make them resolutions of the UN.141 
The legal status of the UNDGD in international law is uncontested, as no claim is made that 
they form a UN blueprint for local government and decentralisation.142 The position in 
international law is that only resolutions of the UN’s political organs may form international 
custom.143 It can be argued that even if the UNGCHS is not a recognised political organ of the 
UN, it forms part of the political body of the UN.144 Thus, the resolutions of the UNGCHS 
can create an international customary law obligation for UN member states only when 
repeatedly adopted and acted upon by the UN General Assembly. 
5.3.3 Rationale for, and role of, local government under the UNDGD 
The main value of the UNDGD is that, unlike previous declarations on decentralisation, they 
link sustainable human settlement development to effective decentralisation.145 They conceive 
of decentralisation both as essential for good governance and a means of expressing 
                                                 
140 Article 3 of the Charter of the United Nations states: ‘The original Members of the United Nations shall be 
the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San 
Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, sign the present 
Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110’. 
141 See para. 4 of the Introduction of the UNDGD. 
142 See para. 5 of the Introduction of the UNDGD. 
143 Dugard 200: 34. 
144 See Article 7 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
145 See para. 1 of the Introduction of the UNDGD. 
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‘democratic practice and effective and efficient public administration’.146 The UNDGD 
amplify the role of elected local officials as key actors in the democratic and governance 
process. The point of departure is that a direct relationship is held to exist between sustainable 
development and decentralisation based on the proximate and representative nature of 
institutions of decentralisation for local communities.147 
5.3.4 Democracy 
According to the UNDGD, decentralisation, as a component of democracy, should entail both 
representative and direct democracy.148 
The Guidelines call for indirect democracy by highlighting the importance of an inclusive and 
representative democratic decision-making process. As underlying principles of local 
democracy, inclusiveness and empowerment of citizens are seen as crucial elements in 
decision-making,149 and the UNDGD acknowledge the role civil society plays in ‘[its] 
progressive development of … communities and neighbourhoods’.150 The Guidelines thus call 
for local governments to have the discretion to regulate the manner in which popular 
participation and civil engagement take place. Further, the Guidelines call for the promotion 
of the representation of the socially and economically weaker sections of society, ethnic and 
gender groups and other minorities.151 The Guidelines call for direct democracy by 
encouraging citizens’ direct engagement in the democratic process. For example the UNDGD 
                                                 
146 See para. 2 of the Introduction of the UNDGD. 
147 See para. 3 of the Introduction of the UNDGD. 
148 The UNDGD para. A1.1. 
149 The UNDGD para. A1.2. 
150 The UNDGD para. A1.3. 
151 The UNDGD para. A1.4. 
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list a number of institutions that are considered appropriate forums for local democracy, 
including ‘neighbourhood councils, community councils, e-democracy, participatory 
budgeting, civil initiatives and referendums’.152 Placing an emphasis on women, the 
Guidelines provide that participation of women and consideration of their needs is a ‘cardinal 
principle’ that should be incorporated in all local initiatives.153 The UNDGD also make a case 
for participation by calling for the mentoring of young people through ‘school council’ 
initiatives;154 in addition, they highlight the value of accountability,155 maintaining that access 
to information should be an important element of local democracy.156 
5.3.5 Local governments’ powers and functions 
The UNDGD call for the application of two principles in the allocation of local government 
powers and functions: that of subsidiarity and of incremental action. 
5.3.6 Subsidiarity 
Before the UNDGD, no international legal instrument had directly called for the application 
of the principle of subsidiarity. The UNDGD proposes to do so for the first time, and 
enshrines the principle as a constitutive element underlying the process of decentralisation.157 
According to the Guidelines, applying the principle of subsidiarity is justified both by the 
proximity of local governments to citizens and the need for effective delivery of public 
                                                 
152 The UNDGD para. A1.7. 
153 The UNDGD para. A1.8. 
154 The UNDGD para. A1.9. 
155 The UNDGD para. A1.10. 
156 The UNDGD para. A1.14. 
157 The UNDGD para. B1.1. 
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services by local governments.158 In other words, the devolution of power to lower orders of 
government is justified because local governments are more efficient in delivering services 
tailored to local communities’ needs. 
5.3.7 Incremental action 
The UNDGD enjoin that powers should be devolved to local governments on the basis of 
subsidiarity, but this recommendation comes with a warning. According to the Guidelines, it 
is meaningless to devolve tasks to local governments unless local governments have the 
ability to exercise those functions.159 Hence, for a policy of decentralisation to be effective, 
tasks should be devolved to local governments in an incremental manner to allow for 
adequate capacity-building over time.160  
5.3.8 Intergovernmental relations (IGR) 
Examination of the UNDGD reveals two main types of IGR: supervision and co-operation. In 
relation to supervision, they emphasise regulation and intervention; in the case of co-
operation, the emphasis is on integrated development planning (IDP). 
5.3.9 Supervision 
The UNDGD specify that due process161 and respect for local government autonomy162 are 
essential to the way in which central governments should exercise supervisory powers over 
                                                 
158 The UNDGD para. B1.1. 
159 The UNDGD para. B 2.7. 
160 The UNDGD para. B 2.8. 
161 The UNDGD para. C 3.10. 
162 The UNDGD para. C 3.11. 
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local governments. The due-process doctrine states that all state actions should be justifiable 
on the grounds that they serve ‘a legitimate governmental purpose’.163 The rule that can be 
derived from it runs as follows: where supervision diminishes respect for, and the autonomy 
of, local government, then it is invalid.164 
5.3.10 Regulation 
While the UNDGD acknowledge that the central government may set standards in respect of 
service provision, their preference is that the principle of subsidiarity should inform the 
process by which those standards are determined and that local governments should hence be 
consulted about, and involved in, law-making.165 
As with the WWDLSG, the UNDGD call for the ‘full and exclusive’ exercise of local 
government autonomy and discretion, a phrase which was discussed in relation to the 
WWDLSG.166 According to the UNDGD, it is not right for the central government to over-
regulate local governments since the result might undermine, limit or impede the exercise of 
the local government’s autonomy and/or discretion.167 
                                                 
163 Hilliard 1996: 106. 
164 The UNDGD para. C 3.11. 
165 The UNDGD para. B 3.12. 
166 Rosen 2010: 1111; Wheare 1963: 75; Kelly 2010: 729. 
167 The UNDGD para. C.2.6. 
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5.3.11 Intervention 
The UNDGD states that failure to fulfil local government’s defined functions is the essential 
rationale for central government intervention in local government affairs.168  
The UNDGD also provide the criteria for the dissolution of the local government political 
representatives by the central government. According to the UNDGD, any dissolution of local 
government political representatives by the central government has to be based on clear legal 
grounds for intervention.169 There also has to be a time period within which a local 
government’s authority is re-established. 170 In all instances, according to the UNDGD, the 
suspension or dissolution of the local government by the central government should follow 
due process.171 Unlike the WWDLSG which merely allows an intervention only when based 
on legal compliance, the UNDGD goes further by calling for a time frame for restating the 
authority of a dissolved local government, over and above the legal compliance of an 
intervention. 
5.3.12 Co-operation 
The UNDGD do not specifically call for co-operative government as a form of IGR. 
However, the UNDGD introduce ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ approaches as mechanisms for 
the provision of services.172 
                                                 
168 The UNDGD para. B.2.10. 
169 The UNDGD para. C.3.12. 
170 The UNDGD para. C.3.13. 
171 The UNDGD para. C.3.14. 
172 The UNDGD para. C.3.12. 
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On the one hand, the ‘bottom-up’ approach demands that before policies and decisions are 
made for the provision of services, the views of the intended service-beneficiaries should be 
sought and considered first through their local authorities. The ‘top-down’ approach, on the 
other hand, requires that local governments comply with national plans so as to align national 
plans with local demands.173 
The relationship between the central government and local governments becomes one that is 
based on ‘support’ and ‘assistance’ from the central government to ensure that local 
governments’ plans comply with national standards.174 
In a clear case for co-operative governance, the UNDGD provide for the need by the central 
government to consult local governments in respect of legislative processes that affect local 
governments.175 
5.4 Commonwealth Principles on Good Practice for Local Government 
5.4.1 Background 
The Commonwealth Principles on Good Practice for Local Government, or the Aberdeen 
Principles, provide a blueprint for local government in 53 countries around the world. The 
principles were proposed by the General Meeting of the Commonwealth Local Government 
Forum, a meeting comprising more than 500 delegates from 46 countries and including more 
than 20 ministers of local governments.176 The Aberdeen Principles were later endorsed by 
                                                 
173 Lambright 2011: 68. 
174 The UNDGD para. C.2.7. 
175 The UNDGD para. C.2.8. 
176 CLGF 2005: 3 para. 1. 
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the heads of states and governments of the British Commonwealth in 2005. Thus, within the 
British Commonwealth, the Aberdeen Principles enjoy the status of customary international 
law. 
The Commonwealth Principles on Good Practice for Local Government (or the Aberdeen 
Principles)177 are the first set of principles that points towards the creation of a British 
Commonwealth standard for local government. The Aberdeen Principles are not 
fundamentally different from ideals relating to local government that have been proposed 
elsewhere.178 In particular, the principles take cognisance of the role of local democracy in the 
implementation of UN strategies on poverty eradication.179 
5.4.2 Geographical focus 
The Aberdeen Principles apply only to members of the British Commonwealth, which 
consists mainly of countries that are former colonies of the British Empire.180 A pilot project 
to turn the guidelines into performance indicator measures has been carried out in Uganda.181 
                                                 
177 CLGF (2005). 
178 See for example, the UNDGD, the WWDLSG, and the ECLSG.  
179 CLGF 2005: 3 para. 7. 
180 See the Commonwealth Secretariat website at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/191086/191247/the 
commonwealth/, accessed at 20th February 2012. It is an ‘association of 54 countries that support each other and 
work together towards shared goals in democracy and development’. Many sub-Saharan African countries are 
members of the Commonwealth. In fact, some sub-Saharan countries which were never colonised by Britain, for 
instance, Rwanda, Mozambique and Cameroon, are members. This is evidence of the open nature of the 
Commonwealth’s values and beliefs. 
181 See workshop in Kampala on 3-4 October 2007 hosted by the Uganda Local Government Association 
(ULGA) and the Ugandan Ministry of Local Government and supported by the Commonwealth Secretariat and 
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Hence, the guidelines are already in use as a mirror with which to self-examine compliance 
within the British Commonwealth. 
5.4.3 The rationale for, and role of, local government under the Aberdeen 
Principles 
The Aberdeen Principles assert that ‘effective, elected local government is an important 
foundation for democracy’.182 The Aberdeen Principles call on member states to adhere to 
democracy, the rule of law, good governance, freedom of expression, and the protection of 
human rights as core common values.183 The Aberdeen Principles proceed from the premise 
that local democracy and good governance, community empowerment and effective 
decentralisation are important vehicles for poverty reduction and necessary tools in the 
implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals.184 In addition, the Aberdeen 
Principles regard local democracy as indispensable in mitigating reconstruction challenges in 
less developed countries that are prone to natural disasters.185 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, available at 
http://www.clgf.org.uk/index.cfm/pageid/12/type/Archive/view/128/Ugand 
a+pilots+local+democracy+review+system, accessed on 01-03-2009.  
182 CLGF 2005: 3 para. 2. 
183 CLGF 2005: 3 para. 4. 
184 CLGF 2005: 3 para. 6 and 9. 
185 CLGF 2005: 3 para. 11. 
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5.4.4 Constitutional recognition 
The Principles call for local governments’ enjoyment of the ‘constitutional and legal 
recognition … as a sphere of government’.186 They take the view that constitutional and legal 
recognition is fundamental to the protection of the principles of local democracy and that 
‘respect of this protection ensures institutional security for local democracy’.187 
5.4.5 Democracy 
The Aberdeen Principles link democracy to local elections, public participation, 
accountability, transparency, openness to scrutiny and inclusiveness. 
5.4.6 Elections 
The Aberdeen Principles consider the ability of local communities to elect their local 
representatives in conditions of political freedom as crucial to local democracy.188 The 
Principles establish important criteria for local elections to pass the test of ‘conditions of 
freedom’. First, local elections must be able to produce leaders that reflect the communities 
they serve. Second, the local elections should be regular and timely, open and inclusive.189 
The Principles do not specify a preferred electoral system. 
                                                 
186 CLGF 2005: 6, Principle no 1 para. 1. 
187 CLGF 2005: 6, Principle no 1 para. 2. 
188 CLGF 2005: 6 Principle no 2 para. 1. 
189 CLGF 2005: 6 Principle no 2 para. 2. 
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5.4.7 Participation 
The Aberdeen Principles call for citizens’ active participation in the local democratic 
process,190 requiring that active participation should include the freedom of citizens to take 
part in decisions that are relevant to community needs. Thus, effective consultation is an 
essential criterion for meaningful engagement with communities in the decision-making 
process. Proactive engagement between the local political leaders and communities is seen as 
central to grassroots democracy and sustainable development.191 
5.4.8 Accountability 
The Aberdeen Principles emphasise that a ‘commitment to downward accountability is critical 
to citizen engagement’.192 The Aberdeen also regard local leaders’ accountability to local 
communities as crucial for local democracy,193 and call for it to be developed within the 
established legal and policy framework.194 The Principles also call for strong independent 
regulatory bodies to be put in place to fight corruption, mismanagement and the inappropriate 
use of resources by politicians and officials in local government.195 The Principles recognise 
civil society as an important ally in promoting a participatory budgeting process as a tool for 
enhancing accountability.196 
                                                 
190 CLGF 2005: 7 Principle no 5 para. 1. 
191 CLGF 2005: 7 Principle no 5 para. 3. 
192 CLGF 2005: 8 Principle no 9 para. 4. 
193 CLGF 2005: 7 Principle no 6 para. 1. 
194 CLGF 2005: 7 Principle no 6 para. 2. 
195 CLGF 2005: 7 Principle no 6 para. 3. 
196 CLGF 2005: 7 Principle no 6 para. 4. 
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5.4.9 Transparency 
The Aberdeen Principles also call for openness and transparency as important benchmarks for 
measuring the quality of any local decision-making process,197 holding that the essence of 
transparency in local decision-making processes is that decisions should be clear and easily 
communicated to the communities. Thus, transparency entails that local councils adopt a clear 
way of disseminating information through relevant media to the entire local community.198 
5.4.10 Inclusiveness 
According to the Aberdeen Principles, the local democratic process should be inclusive.199 
Inclusiveness means there should be a relationship between the decisions taken and the needs 
of the communities.200 Implicitly, local communities and other stakeholders should be granted 
an opportunity to engage with local government policies before they are implemented.201 The 
Principles place particular emphasis on disadvantaged groups such as women, youth, minority 
ethnic groups, and people with disabilities. 202 
                                                 
197 CLGF 2005: 7 Principle no 7 para. 1. 
198 CLGF 2005: 7 Principle no 7 para. 2. 
199 CLGF 2005: 8 Principle no 9 para. 1. 
200 CLGF 2005: 8 Principle no 9 para. 2. 
201 CLGF 2005: 8 Principle no 8 para. 2. 
202 CLGF 2005: 8 Principle no 9 para. 3. In fact the Aberdeen Principles state that 30% of the decision-making 
process in local government should be undertaken by women. 
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5.4.11 Finances 
Adequate financial resources are important for a responsive local government.203 They 
determine whether local governments can execute their mandate with a significant amount of 
discretion. The Aberdeen Principles recognise the significance of adequate financial resources 
in the delivery of essential services.204 They state that an independent and secure revenue base 
is key to sound management of resources, and included in this is the predictability and 
adequacy of financial transfers from central to local government in terms of timelines and 
amount.205 
According to the Aberdeen Principles, central government transfers ought to be based on the 
following criteria: first, the transfers should be free from political bias; second, they should be 
mutually agreed upon by both the central government and the local governments, within a 
clear legal framework;206 and third, in the entire process of central government transfers, local 
governments should be viewed as part and parcel of the broader public sector system in the 
delivery of important public services.207 
5.4.12 Intergovernmental relations (IGR) 
The Aberdeen Principles envisage both co-operation and regulation. According to them, the 
relationship between the different orders of government should be one of co-operation or 
                                                 
203 CLGF 2005: 8 Principle no 10 para. 1. 
204 CLGF 2005: 8 Principle no 10 para. 2. 
205 CLGF 2005: 8 Principle no 10 para. 3. 
206 CLGF 2005: 8 Principle no 10 para. 3. 
207 CLGF 2005: 8 Principle no 10 para. 3. 
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partnership.208 In essence, effective realisation of local democracy demands mutual respect 
between the different orders of government. The idea of co-operation or partnership, 
according to the Aberdeen Principles, means that, for the proper provision of services to local 
communities, the competencies that are allocated to an individual order of government should 
never be diminished by the other order of government.209 
The Principles regard regular dialogue and co-operation between the different orders of 
government as crucial in the alignment of the central, regional and local government 
priorities. 
They emphasise two terms in their call for the regulation of local government powers: 
‘appropriate’ and ‘subsidiarity’.210 In this context, ‘appropriate’ means that the powers vested 
in local governments should be fit for the purpose and value of local governments.211 The 
term ‘subsidiarity’ considers the essential role of smaller orders of government in the 
provision of services on account of their proximity to local communities and their efficiency 
in providing these services.212 Thus, in regulating local government powers, consideration 
should be given to smaller orders of government because they are better suited than central 
government to the delivery of certain cervices. 
                                                 
208 CLGF 2005: 6 Principle no 3 para. 1. 
209 CLGF 2005: 6 Principle no 3 para. 2. 
210 CLGF 2005: 6 Principle no 4 para. 1. 
211 Kavanagh 1995: 49. 
212 Shah & Thomas 2004: 2. 
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Furthermore, the Aberdeen Principles call for clearly defined powers to ensure that 
‘communities can shape their livelihoods’.213 
5.5 The European Charter of Local Self-Government 
5.5.1 Background 
The European Charter of Local Self-Government (ECLSG)214 addresses the status of local 
governments by postulating democracy and development as the main rationale for 
decentralisation.215 It is arguable that the adoption of the ECLSG by the Council of Europe 
influenced the formulation of the Aberdeen Principles (which are applicable only to members 
of the British Commonwealth). 
5.5.2 Legal status 
The ECLSG it is not self-executing.216 The ECLSG relies on the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe as a treaty body for monitoring the application of the Charter in individual 
state parties. Under the ECLSG, there is an obligation on member states to furnish the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe with information regarding the extent of 
compliance with the ECLSG provisions.217 It is argued that these mechanisms help to ensure 
that any changes in the law or policies of member states which may limit the institutional 
autonomy of local authorities are brought to the attention of the Secretary General of the 
                                                 
213 CLGF 2005: 6 Principle no 4 para. 2. 
214 The European Charter on Local-Self Government, available at http://www.google.com/search?ie=UTF-
8&oe=UTF-8&sourceid=navclient&gfns=1&q=European+charter+on+local+government.  
215 Hoffschulte 2008: 114. 
216 See para. 1of the Preamble to the ECLSG. 
217 Article 14 of ECLSG. 
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Council of Europe.218 There is no evidence so far that the mechanism has any serious legal 
consequences for member states.219 
Nevertheless, the ECLSG has not only been a source of inspiration on the international scene 
but has also led to the recognition of the role of local governments in the promotion of 
grassroots democracy in Europe.220 Some writers argue that the ECLSG is an ‘instrument of 
some moral and social force but of rather limited legal effect’.221 Be that as it may, the 
contribution of the ECLSG to the development of the international discourse on local 
government is solid.222 
                                                 
218 See explanatory Report of ECLSG, available at http://conv entions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Report 
s/Html/122.htm.  
219 See also VNG vs Staat LJN: BA3438, High Court of The Hague 4.3. Cited in De Visser 2010: 100. 
220 Blank 2006: 921. 
221 Andrews 1986: 180. This pessimism finds support in the jurisprudence dealing with the application of the 
ECLSG so far. For instance, the Netherlands, a signatory to the ECLSG, upon enacting a law that apparently 
limited the contribution of property rates as a source of revenue of local government, was sued by the Dutch 
Association of Municipalities, in the case of VNG v Staat. VNG vs Staat LJN: BA3438, High Court of The 
Hague at para. 4.3, cited in De Visser, 2010. The main contention was that removing the property rates as a 
source of local government revenue was inconsistent with Art 9(3) of the ECLSG, which provided for taxes and 
charges forming a part of the local government revenue. Whereas the High Court did not disagree with the 
argument that removing the property rates violated the ECLSG, it nonetheless held that the enforcement of 
compliance with the ECLSG takes place within the confines of the Council of Europe. The decision of the High 
Court therefore limited the applicability of the ECLSG in the Dutch courts. 
222 Hoffschulte 2008: 114. 
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5.5.3 Geographical focus  
There are two reasons why it is important to exercise caution in drawing comparative lessons 
from the ECLSG provisions and applying them to the African legal landscape. First, the 
ECLSG applies only to members states of the Council of Europe; it is, in other words, not 
even applicable to the entirety of Europe, making its relevance to Africa remote.223 Second, 
by and large members of the ECLSG are economically developed and possess a firmer 
foundation of democracy and respect of human rights than many African countries. That 
being said, there is no harm in seeking to learn from it, and, what is more, the ECLSG is the 
first ‘hard law’ of its kind in the world. 
5.5.4 Rationale for, and role of, local government  
The ECLSG224 sees local government as contributing to the greater purpose of achieving 
European unity and thereby protecting the ideals and principles that are held to be common to 
all European people.225 
It places a premium on local governments as foundational to democratic governance226 by 
characterising local governments as avenues for ‘the right of citizens to participate in the 
conduct of public affairs’.227 Thus, according to the ECLSG, local governments are means 
through which enshrined democratic principles common to ‘all member States of the Council of 
                                                 
223 See Article 15(1) of the ECLSG. 
224 The European Charter on Self-Local Government, available at http://www.google.com/search?ie=UTF-
8&oe=UTF-8&sourceid=navclient&gfns=1&q=European+charter+on+local+government.  
225 See para. 2 of the Preamble to the ECLSG. 
226 See para. 4 of the Preamble to the ECLSG. 
227 See para. 5 of the Preamble to the ECLSG. 
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Europe’228 are realised. Lending support to the ‘allocative efficiency’229 theory as a 
developmental ideal, the ECLSG provides that ‘the existence of local authorities with real 
responsibilities can provide an administration which is both effective and close to the 
citizen’.230 
5.5.5 Democratisation 
The ECLSG calls for the protection of local governments as important pillars in the 
construction of a Europe based on the principles of democracy and decentralisation of 
power.231 Furthermore, the ECLSG espouses democracy as a principle of governance in its 
call for autonomous and democratically constituted decision-making bodies.232 
According to the ECLSG, local authorities should have the discretion to regulate and manage 
a larger part of public affairs on the grounds that they are better able to identify the 
communities’ common good than central governments.233 Words and phrase such as ‘right 
and the ability’, ‘regulate’ and ‘manage’ are used in para. 8 of the Preamble to the ECLSG, in 
connection with local governments’ political and economic autonomy.234 It is argued that the 
phrase ‘right and the ability’ relates to a lawful power or legal existence. The words ‘regulate’ 
and ‘manage’ imply that the purpose of calling for local authorities to have greater power is to 
ensure that local priorities are identified, and local tasks executed, in a democratic manner. 
                                                 
228 See para. 5 of the Preamble to the ECLSG. 
229 Shah 1998: 14. 
230 See para. 7 of the Preamble to the ECLSG. 
231 See para. 8 of the Preamble to the ECLSG. 
232 See para. 8 of the Preamble to the ECLSG. 
233 See para. 8 of the Preamble to the ECLSG. 
234 Article 3(1) of the ECLSG 
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5.5.6 Resource autonomy 
The ECLSG calls for local governments’ fiscal autonomy within the national economic policy 
framework. According to the ECLSG, the discretion to spend local revenue within the 
framework of its powers is an indicator of the adequacy of a local government’s financial 
autonomy.235 
The ECLSG further provides that local government finances must be commensurate with their 
responsibilities.236 For instance, the framework for taxes and charges should permit local 
governments to exercise discretion in determining the local rates.237 The ECLSG further calls 
for a wide local tax base that is of a ‘sufficiently diversified and buoyant nature’ to enable 
local governments to perform their functions.238 
The ECLSG acknowledges the role of the central government’s grants to weaker local 
governments as a corrective measure for unequal distribution of sources of revenue. However, 
the ECLSG warns that the existence of a system of financial transfers should ‘not diminish the 
discretion local authorities may exercise within their own sphere of responsibility’.239 
Accordingly, it appeals for adequate provision for consultation with local government in 
systems of financial transfers to local governments.240 In order to protect the autonomy of local 
                                                 
235 Article 9(1) of the ECLSG. 
236 Article 9(2) of the ECLSG. 
237 Article 9(3) of the ECLSG. 
238 Article 9(4) of the ECLSG. 
239 Article 9(5) of the ECLSG. 
240 Article 9(6) of the ECLSG. 
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governments in these systems, the ECLSG warns against any ‘earmarks’ in financing special 
projects of local governments.241 
5.5.7 Local governments’ powers and responsibilities 
The ECLSG calls for constitutional and legislative recognition of local government,242 as well 
as for ‘purposeful’ constitutional or statutory regulation of local governments’ powers by 
central governments.243 The word ‘purposeful’ should be understood in the context of the 
overall objective of decentralisation whose broader aim is to support local democracy, local 
development and accommodation of ethnicity. 
The ECLSG calls for ‘clear and full powers’ of local authorities which should be exclusive, 
with minimal interference from central government except as provided by the law.244 
According to the ECLSG, 
[p]ublic responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities 
which are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority should 
weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy.245 
Some writers have argued that this provision reiterates the principle of subsidiarity as an 
important attribute in the devolution of powers and functions.246 
                                                 
241 Article 9(7) of the ECLSG. 
242 Article 2 of the ECLSG. 
243 Article 4(1) of the ECLSG. 
244 Article 4(4) of the ECLSG; Laione 2008: 226.  
245 Article 4(3) of the ECLSG. 
246 De Visser 2010); Carozza 2003: 97.  
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5.5.8 Local government boundaries 
The ECLSG envisages a system of boundary demarcation that is not open to manipulation by 
the central government. In this regard, it appeals for democratic consultation with local 
communities about any changes in local government boundaries, going so far as to require 
that referenda be held on these matters; by implication, no local government boundary may be 
altered unless local communities have been involved directly.247 
5.5.9 Intergovernmental relations 
The ECLSG calls for two types of IGR: supervision and co-operation. It recognises the 
importance of central government supervision through regulation248 and supervision of local 
government powers.249 
According to the ECLSG, central government supervision of local governments should be 
based on a clear constitutional and legal criterion.250 In principle, it enjoins respect for the 
status and autonomy of local governments, even in cases where supervision through 
intervention by the central government is justified. In order to protect the integrity and 
autonomy of local governments, the ECLSG provides that the supervision of local governments 
should be proportional ‘to the importance of the interests which it is intended to protect’.251 In 
                                                 
247 Article 5 of the ECLSG. 
248 Article 4(1) of the ECLSG. 
249 Article 8 of the ECLSG. 
250 Article 8 (1) of the ECLSG. 
251 Article 8 (3) of the ECLSG. 
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other words, supervision that is disproportionate to its intended objective is unnecessary and 
ultimately illegal.252 
The ECLSG places emphasis on co-operative governance by appealing for consultation with 
local governments in ‘due time and in an appropriate way in the planning and decision-
making processes for all matters which concern them directly’.253 It also calls for co-operative 
governance through the formation of associations of local governments so as ‘to form 
consortia with other local authorities in order to carry out tasks of common interest’.254 
6. Declarations on local government 
A number of commitments, declarations, and ministerial statements in Africa address 
decentralisation; the discussion below focuses on those adopted in Anglophone and/or 
Commonwealth African countries, specifically the Victoria Falls Declaration and the Kigali 
Declaration,255 both of which are broadly representative of the debate on local government in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
                                                 
252 Article 8 (3) of the ECLSG. 
253 Article 4(6) of the ECLSG. 
254 Article 10(1) (2) of the ECLSG. 
255 Besides the Victoria Falls and the Kigali Declarations, numerous African summits on local government have 
taken place. These include the 2nd Africities Summit held in Windhoek, Namibia, 2000; the 3rd Africities 
Summit held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, 2003; the Eastern African Ministers of Local Government Conference on 
Decentralization and Local Development held in Mombasa, Kenya, 2004; the Conference on Decentralization: 
the new Dimension of Peace, Democracy and Development, held in Florence, Italy, 2004; the Eastern African 
Ministers for Local Government Consultative Meeting held in Nairobi, Kenya, 2004; the Arusha Conference on 
the Foundation of the Eastern Africa Local Government Association held in Arusha, Tanzania, 2005; the 4th 
Africities Summit held in Nairobi, Kenya, 2006; the Ministerial Conference on Participatory Planning and 
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6.1 The Victoria Falls Declaration 
6.1.1 Background 
The adoption of the VFD shows the growing importance of decentralisation in many African 
countries, reflecting a ‘vision’ and intent to establish common principles around local 
democracy and decentralisation on the continent. The VFD calls on African continental and 
regional bodies to place decentralisation on their agendas so as ‘to promote awareness and 
commitment and facilitate ownership of the shared vision by the member states’.256  
6.1.2 The legal status of the VFD 
The VFD was adopted by ministers and heads of delegations from Botswana, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.257 Other than Ethiopia, the delegates were from 
countries that were either colonised by Britain or under its influence.258 The conference was 
                                                                                                                                                        
Budgeting for Effective Local Level Delivery of Services held in Maseru, Lesotho, 2006; and the African 
Governance Conference, on the theme ‘the Capable State for Poverty Reduction in Africa’, held in 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 2007. See para. 1 of the Preamble to the Yaoundé Communiqué on Leadership 
Capacity Building for Decentralized Governance and Poverty Reduction in Africa, 30th May 2008. See also 
para. 1 of the Kigali Declaration. 
256 Second Commitment (a) of the VFD. 
257 See para. 1 of the preamble to the VFD. 
258 Ethiopia and Liberia are the only two African countries that were never colonised by European powers. It is 
also noted that after the Second World War, Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika) was placed under British 
‘trusteeship’ by the League of Nations. 
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attended by the Acting President of Zimbabwe.259 Other than the Acting President of 
Zimbabwe, none of the other participants in the VFD conference were state representatives in 
international law.260 
6.1.3 The rationale for, and role of, the VFD 
The preface to VFD deals with three issues that concern local government. First, it notes that 
local government had so far received significant support from many African governments.261 
Second, since service delivery takes place at local levels, decentralisation is a significant 
component of good governance.262 Third, the VFD calls ‘for a shared vision of the basic 
principles of decentralisation, which recognises the specific needs and conditions of the 
African continent’.263 
                                                 
259 The Conference was also attended by local government practitioners comprising senior government officials, 
mayors, town clerks, academics and researchers. Also in attendance were the President of the African Union of 
Local Authorities (AULA); the President of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA); 
representatives of national associations of local authorities; and representatives of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), and the World 
Bank Institute.  
260 The conference took place on 20-24, September 1999, under the theme ‘Challenges Facing Local 
Government in Africa in the 21st Century’. The participants were Ministers and Heads of Delegations from 
Botswana, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
261 See para. 4(i) of the Preamble to the VFD. 
262 See para. 4(ii) of the Preamble to the VFD. 
263 See para. 4(iii) of the Preamble to the VFD.  
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6.1.4 Democracy 
The VFD regards devolution of power and responsibility to lower orders of government, and 
the promotion of local democracy and good governance, as prerequisites for economic and 
social transformation.264 Hence, democracy, according to the VFD, is an important basis for 
decentralisation. Accordingly, lower orders of government should be representative of, and 
accountable to, the local citizens, including all marginalised and disadvantaged groups.265 In 
addition, decentralisation is viewed as a pillar of effective community participation.266 
Underlining the role of democracy, the VFD calls for a participatory planning and budgeting 
process in local governments.267 
6.1.5 Powers and functions 
The VFD calls for powers to be granted to smaller orders of government on the grounds that 
they are better suited to provide certain services than the central government.268 It calls for the 
transfer of powers and functions to local government on the grounds that local communities 
may manage local resources better and more sustainably than central government.269 
                                                 
264 First Commitment (a) of the VFD. 
265 First Commitment (b) of the VFD. 
266 First Commitment (c) of the VFD. 
267 See Resolution on the ‘Local Government Financial Management’ para. 2 of the VFD. 
268 First Commitment (c) (i) of the VFD. 
269 First Commitment (c) (iii) of the VFD. For instance, it is the local communities who experience floods, water 
pollution and drought as a result of over-exploitation. The assumption is that communities who are more likely 
to suffer the consequence of unsustainable use of resources will guard against unnecessary resource exploitation 
and waste. 
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Furthermore, support should be given to local governments to strengthen their institutional 
capacity. The VFD justifies the need for local government capacity building on the basis that: 
local governments are potential engines of development, and therefore … capacity building 
programmes [should] be intensified to enable local government structures meet new and 
extra challenges posed by decentralization.270 
There is no separate provision in the VFD that recognises the potential role of local 
governments in peace-building. However, the VFD links the possible peace-building role of 
local governments to their ability to promote social and economic cohesion at different orders 
of government. The VFD states that ‘peace, stability and national unity are fundamental to 
sustainable economic and social development’.  
6.1.6 Local government resources 
On the question of local government finances, the VFD makes a case for identification of 
innovative sources of local government revenue.271 In this regard, it considers land and 
property taxes important sources of local government revenue.272 In order to address the 
challenge of dependence on central government transfers, the VFD calls for the establishment 
of legal mechanisms for revenue-sharing.273 
Emphasising the need for macroeconomic discipline at local levels, the VFD states that local 
government financing and management practices should be consistent with national 
                                                 
270 See Resolution (a) of the VFD titled ‘Local Authorities as Engines of Development’. 
271 See Resolution on the ‘Local Government Financial Management’ para. 3 of the VFD. 
272 See Resolution on the ‘Local Government Financial Management’ para. 4 of the VFD. 
273 See Resolution on the ‘Local Government Financial Management’ para. 1 of the VFD. 
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macroeconomic policies.274 This provision shows that, notwithstanding the need for local 
government financial autonomy, overall national fiscal stability is of paramount importance. 
6.1.7 The VFD on intergovernmental relations (IGR) 
Under the VFD, two tools of IGR stand out: supervision through monitoring, and co-operative 
government. 
6.1.8 Supervision through monitoring 
The VFD calls for appropriate institutions for auditing and monitoring.275 It is argued that 
institutions for auditing and monitoring should not be viewed as institutions of central 
government control. Rather, the VFD’s call for institutions for auditing and monitoring should 
be viewed as necessary for the oversight role of the central government over local 
governments, and crucial to the success of any decentralisation initiative.276 For example, 
auditing and monitoring institutions may give guidance on how best to comply with modern 
accounting and financial management rules without necessarily controlling the actual 
accounting and financial management processes of local governments. 
6.1.9 Recognition of local government 
The VFD views ‘inappropriate legal provisions’ and ‘lack of legal provisions’ as part of the 
challenges facing decentralisation.277 Where local governments are not constitutionally and 
                                                 
274 See Resolution on the ‘Local Government Financial Management’ para. 6 of the VFD. 
275 See Resolution on the ‘Local Government Financial Management’ para. 7 of the VFD. 
276 Wheare 1963: 14. 
277 See Key Challenge (c) paras. 1 and 2 of the VFD.  
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legally recognised, they become inferior orders of government which can be suspended at any 
time by the central government.278 
The VFD’s approach is that, given its protective value, recognition of decentralisation in the 
Constitution is foundational to the development of local governance.279  
6.2 The Kigali Declaration 
6.2.1 Background 
The last declaration to be examined in this chapter is the Kigali Declaration (KD). Adopted 
six years after the VFD,280 it focuses on the elimination of poverty through local government. 
6.2.2 The legal status of the KD 
In order to examine the legal status of the KD, it is important to begin by looking at the 
number and nature of the participants. Ten ministers of either local government or ministries 
related to urban authority attended the meeting. They were accompanied by senior civil 
                                                 
278 Barron 1999: 552. 
279 First Commitment (g) of the VFD calls on countries to enshrine the basic institutions of decentralisation in 
the Constitution. Arguably, the VFD’s call for the constitutional recognition of local government in relation to 
decentralisation is discernible from the use of two key words, namely ‘basic’ and ‘enshrined’. Kavanagh et al. 
(2000: 91, 384) define the word ‘basic’ as ‘forming an essential foundation; fundamental’ and the word 
‘enshrine’ as ‘[to] preserve (a right, tradition, or idea) in a form that ensures that it will be respected’. 
280 See the introduction to the KD, available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021571.pdf, accessed on 20 June 2009. 
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servants, chairpersons and secretaries-general of national associations of local governments 
who represented different countries in sub-Saharan Africa.281 
Clearly, the latter are not the usual legal state representatives in international law, and it 
cannot be said that ten ministers accompanied by technocrats may lawfully commit a state by 
signing a document of intent. However, the fact that the Declaration was a direct follow-up to 
eight previous and similar declarations on the same subject matter demonstrates the 
importance that is attached in Africa to decentralisation as a means of achieving socio-
economic development.282 
6.2.3 Geographical focus 
The KD was adopted by delegates ‘representing different countries of sub-Saharan Africa’.283 
The delegates came from Angola, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.284 While the majority hailed from Anglophone countries, 
some were from French-, Portuguese- and Arab-speaking countries. Notwithstanding the fact 
that delegates came from only ten African countries, the KD is more geopolitically 
representative of the African continent than the VFD. 
                                                 
281 See the annexure listing of the participating ministers of the KD. 
282 Para. 1 of the Preamble to the KD. The KD’s support by the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (UNDESA), United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) attests to the importance attached to decentralisation in Africa by the 
international community. 
283 See para. 1 of the KD. 
284 See list of delegates of participating countries annexed to the KD. 
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6.2.4 The rationale for, and role of, local government under the KD 
The KD focuses on the relationship between decentralised governance and local economic 
development for poverty eradication.285 It considers decentralisation as a tool for good 
governance and economic transformation,286 and therefore, a practical measure for mobilising 
communities around the Millennium Development Goals.287 
According to the KD, the ability of decentralisation to serve its objectives hinges on the 
institutional capacity of local governments.288 
6.2.5 Democracy 
According to the KD, decentralisation is an instrument that may be used to nurture democracy 
and economic development. The KD calls on governments to use decentralisation as a means 
to mitigate gender inequality by improving the welfare of local communities, especially those 
affected by HIV/AIDS.289 Nevertheless, it may be noted that the KD does not spell out 
exactly the link between local democracy and socio-economic transformation. 
6.2.6 Resource autonomy 
The KD calls on governments to ensure that local government exercise discretion to raise and 
spend revenue. The KD’s call for local government discretion to raise and spend revenue is 
justified on the grounds that local governments are able to use local resources efficiently and 
                                                 
285 Para. 4 of the Preamble to the KD. 
286 Part II of the KD para. 4. 
287 Part II of the KD para. 5. 
288 Para. 6 of the Preamble to the KD. 
289 Part II of the KD para. 4. 
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sustainably.290 Further, the KD calls on governments to supplement local government revenue 
with a system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers which could enable local governments to 
access the resources that are needed for decentralisation to succeed.291 
6.2.7 Constitutional recognition 
The KD makes a case for legal institutional frameworks for decentralisation that are based on 
clear principles and objectives.292 According to the KD, such frameworks are a precondition 
for ‘a genuine and effective process of decentralisation’.293 Without clarifying the nature of 
legal recognition of decentralisation, it notes that the means through which decentralisation is 
legally protected determines the success of a decentralisation agenda.294 
6.2.8 Intergovernmental relations (IGR) 
The KD calls for the sharing of powers between ‘spheres’ of government.295 The use of the 
word ‘spheres’ in any legal framework for decentralisation connotes the distinctiveness of 
local government as an autonomous order of government.296 Given the distinct nature of local 
government, the approach of the KD to IGR is one that espouses co-operation between orders 
of government.297 
                                                 
290 Part III of the KD para. v. 
291 Part III of the KD para. i. 
292 Part II of the KD para. 6. 
293 Part II of the KD para. 6. 
294 Part II of the KD para. 6. 
295 Part II of the KD para. 2. 
296 Steytler & De Visser 2009:8. 
297 Part III of the KD para. iii. 
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The KD also views decentralisation as the ‘interface and functional relationships between the 
various organs of local governance.’298 It is a view that emphasises co-operative governance, 
which is called for between local and central government, on the one hand, and amongst the 
local governments, on the other, in a spirit of ‘mutual trust and confidence’.299 
The KD makes a case for strengthening the capacities for co-ordination amongst local 
government stakeholders, through ‘decentralized co-operation at all levels of governance in 
the region’. In this respect, the role of associations of local governments is noted.300 In 
addition it moots the possibility of exploring a continental institute of local governance to 
enhance continental local government co-operation.301 
7. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) 
7.1 Background 
The adoption of the ACDEG has its origin in articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union which emphasise the relationship among good governance, popular 
participation, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and sustainable development. 
The ACDEG therefore aims to promote the universal values and principles of democracy, 
respect for human rights and peace-building.302 These values are held to be necessary for 
                                                 
298 Part II of the KD para. 2 
299 Part II of the KD para. 1 
300 Part III of the KD para. iv. 
301 Part III of the KD para. ix. 
302 Para. 2, 3 and 4 of the Preamble to the ACDEG. 
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building consensus among different political players and advancing sustainable development 
in Africa.303 
7.2 Legal status 
The ACDEG was ‘adopted by the eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of member states 
of the African Union’ on January 2007.304 It aims to foster democracy, development and 
peace.305 While the main focus is not on decentralisation, the ACDEG recognises the essential 
role of decentralisation in fostering its overall objectives. Its legal effect, therefore, is that it 
has in fact solidified the existing ‘soft’ law on decentralisation on the African continent into 
regional customary international law. 306 ACDEG came into force on 15 February 2012, six 
years after it was adopted by heads of state and government.307 
7.3 Geographical focus 
As at the 7th July 2013, out of 54 member states to the African Union, 45 states have signed 
it, 21 ratified it and 21 made the requisite deposits with the Chairperson of the African 
Union.308 Although the ACDEG was adopted by heads of state and government in 2007, it 
                                                 
303 See Kane 2008: 43-5. 
304 Para. 1of the Preamble to the ACDEG. 
305 See Article 2 on the objectives of the ACDEG.  
306 Dugard 2007: 38-9. 
307 See the list of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections 
and Governance, available at http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/Charter%20 on%20Democracy%20and%20Gov 
ernance_0.pdf, (accessed 7.1.2013). 
308 See Article 51(3) of the ACDEG. 
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came into force only in 2012.309 To date, eight countries have not signed it, while another 25 
have not ratified or acceded to it at all. Its practical applicability in Africa will expand with 
the passage of time. Bosire, while examining the relationship between local governments and 
the promotion of human rights in Africa finds evidence of a ‘growing realisation of the 
importance of local government in the implementation of human rights obligations’ through 
the numerous declarations and ministerial statements on the African Continent.310 It is argued 
that the ACDEG is a good example of the growing opportunities for local governments to link 
decentralisation and good governance. 
7.4 Rationale for, and role of, local government under the ACDEG 
The ACDEG calls for popular participation, elimination of political discrimination, and the 
accommodation of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in the political process. 
The ACDEG recognises the potential role of democracy to create peace, given its consensus-
building attributes. Article 33 of the ACDEG vests an obligation on member states to foster 
peace by encouraging participatory political systems that are inclusive.311 The ACDEG calls 
on member states to ‘promote a culture of respect, compromise, consensus and tolerance as a 
                                                 
309 Under Article 48 the Charter could only enter into force after thirty days when fifteen member states have 
deposited the instruments of ratification. For instance, Botswana, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Malawi, Seychelles, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe have never signed the treaty, while Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, 
Senegal, Somalia, Sao Tome & Principe, Sudan, South Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia, and Uganda signed the treaty 
but have never ratified or acceded to it. 
310 Bosire 2011: 149 
311 See Articles 29-32 of the ACDEG. 
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means to mitigate conflicts, promote political stability and security’.312 It recognises the role 
of regular free and fair elections in guaranteeing democracy, and calls on member states to 
establish independent and impartial national electoral bodies.313 The ACDEG also provides 
for mechanisms to address election disputes and emphasises that an accessible electoral 
system is key to the democratic process.314 
The ACDEG provides that good governance and transparent and accountable systems of 
administration are important in building democratic institutions and constitutional order. 
Thus, the ACDEG calls upon member states to ensure that democratic institutions are not 
only independent but also constitutionally guaranteed.315 According to Kane, ‘any democratic 
system worthy of the name relies on operational institutions’.316 However, the author observes 
the ACDEG is vague about the true meaning of democracy and free and fair elections.317 It 
may therefore be difficult to impute a crucial role to decentralisation when the charter’s 
definition of ‘democracy’ is vague. Nonetheless, the existing literature on democracy and free 
and fair elections makes a case for local governments because of their democratic, peace- and 
consensus-building potential.318 Thus, the constitutional recognition of local government is 
implied even though ‘democracy’ is vaguely defined. 
                                                 
312 See Article 39 of the ACDEG. 
313 See Article 17 of the ACDEG. 
314 See Article 17 of the ACDEG. 
315 See Article 15 of the ACDEG. 
316 See Kane 2008: 49. 
317 See Kane 2008: 47. 
318 Briffault 1996: 1124.  
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7.5 The protection of the constitutional order 
After providing for the crucial role of an accessible electoral system, the ACDEG finds no 
justification for unconstitutional changes of government.319 In particular, the ACDEG rejects 
‘any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments which is an infringement 
of the principles of democratic change of government’.320 
7.6 Local governments as ‘institutions’ of good political, economic and social 
governance 
The ACDEG makes a commitment to improve public sector management, make service 
delivery effective and efficient, and combat corruption, a commitment it characterises as 
integral to ‘political and economic social governance’ undertaken in the interests of 
development.321 Moreover, it recognises the crucial role therein of women, the youth and 
disabled persons, and calls on member states to encourage their ‘full and active participation’ 
in the decision-making processes required by ‘political and economic social governance’.322 
Other matters acknowledged as relevant to such governance include consolidating sustainable 
                                                 
319 See Article 23 of the ACDEG. The ACDEG vests elaborate powers in the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union, as the treaty-body mechanism, to sanction any member state that unconstitutionally changes any 
government. As such, this body may suspend member states from participating in the activities of the African 
Union; there is also the risk of legal sanctions from the African Court of Human Rights. However, the ACDEG 
makes no provision for diplomatic isolation, a factor which militates against the possibility of applying serious 
pressure to those who perpetrate an unconstitutional change of government. It could be argued, then, that the 
ACDEG’s focus is ‘regime survival’ rather the protection of democracy and the rule of law. 
320 Article 23(5) of the ACDEG. 
321 Article 27 of the ACDEG. 
322 Article 22-32 of the ACDEG. 
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multiparty political systems; conducting free and fair elections; and entrenching respect for 
the rule of law.323 
The ACDEG lists the following as crucial in institutionalising political and economic social 
governance: effective public sector management; transparent public financial management; 
combating corruption; efficient management of public debt; equitable allocation of national 
resources; poverty alleviation; and investor-friendly tax policies and systems.324 Immediately 
after listing these factors, the ACDEG obliges member states to ‘decentralize power to 
democratically elected local authorities as provided for in national laws’.325 This is the 
ACDEG’s most vital provision in that is the only hard law on the continent that specifically 
instructs member states to decentralise. It also emphasises the vital role of traditional 
authorities, enjoining member states to ‘strive to find appropriate ways and means to increase 
traditional authorities’ integration and effectiveness within the larger democratic system’.326 It 
is argued that the ACDEG recognises that decentralisation has an essential role to play in 
political and economic social governance in Africa. 
8. Overview and assessment  
The overview of the instruments reveals critical aspects of decentralisation that are excluded. 
There is, for instance, little regard for the accommodation of diversity as a function to be 
carried about by local government. Even where accommodation of diversity is called for, it is 
lumped together with democracy. The instruments also do not indicate the role of traditional 
                                                 
323 Article 32 of the ACDEG. 
324 Article 33 of the ACDEG. 
325 Article 34 of the ACDEG. 
326 Article 35 of the ACDEG. 
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leaders in local government, even though extant literature on the latter stresses their peace-
making and conflict-management roles, ones undergirded by long-earned legitimacy in local 
communities.327 Furthermore, the instruments do not give prominence to the role of co-
operative government. Whereas the instruments call for central government to support local 
government, this should be provided on the understanding that the two orders of government 
are partners and that ‘support’ ought not to amount to a veiled form of control. 
Notwithstanding the above inadequacies, it is argued that the instruments establish important 
benchmarks for the analysis of decentralisation in any context, but particularly so in the case 
of countries in Africa. 
The table below is a summary of the six instruments discussed so far. In each case, it indicates 
the instrument’s background, legal status and geographical focus as well the rationale it 
provides, and role it envisages, for local government. The table also shows the importance 
that is attached to the recognition of local governments, to supervision of local governments, 
and to the importance attached to a boundary-demarcation process. 
                                                 
327 Oomen 2005: 110. 
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Table 1: Summary of the six instruments under review 
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ECLSG Hard law Member 
states to the 
Council of 
the 
European 
Charter  
x ? x   x           x 
VFD Soft law Anglophone 
sub-Saharan 
Africa 
    x             x   
KD Soft law African   ?     ? x       x x 
ACDEG Hard law  Member 
states of the 
African 
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Union 
 
Source: Adapted from the six international instruments under review
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The overview of international instruments reveals, to varying degrees, a number of common 
features. These features are: increased role of local government (LG) in development; 
constitutional recognition; statutory protection; transfer of powers; elected local governments; 
supervision (monitoring and intervention) of LG; co-operation with LG; sharing of national 
revenue; own revenue sources; due process in boundary demarcation; and inclusive 
institutions and processes. For instance: 
1. The WWD, categorised as soft law in international law, with a worldwide 
geographical focus, calls for most of these features except the transfer of powers, 
co-operation with LG and inclusive institutions and processes. 
2. The UNDGD, which is also categorised as soft law and applicable to member 
states of the UN, calls for only six features: increased role of LG in development, 
transfer of powers, elected LG, supervision of LG, co-operation with LG and 
inclusive institutions and processes. 
3. The Aberdeen Principles, categorised as hard law and only applicable in the 
British Commonwealth, provides for all features except supervision of LG and due 
process in boundary demarcation. 
4. The ECLSG, categorised as hard law and only applicable to member states to the 
Council of the European Charter, only provides for transfer of powers, supervision 
of LG, co-operation with LG, sharing of national revenue, own revenue and due 
process in boundary demarcation. 
5. The VFD, categorised as soft law and applicable mainly in Anglophone sub-
Saharan Africa, calls for all the features except statutory recognition of LG, due 
process in boundary demarcation and inclusive institutions and processes. 
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6. The KD, categorised as soft law and applicable on the entire African continent, 
calls for all other features except constitutional recognition of LG, elected local 
governments, supervision (monitoring and intervention) of LG, due process in 
boundary demarcation and inclusive institutions and processes. 
7. The ACDEG, categorised as hard law and applicable to member states of the 
African Union, calls only for the increased role of LG in development, transfer of 
powers, elected LG and inclusive institutions and processes. 
On average, each of the seven instruments calls or provides for at least six features, leading to 
the conclusion that: 
• Free and fair local elections are crucial in the promotion of grassroots democracy. The 
latter should be inclusive, responsive, and reflect the interests of the local electorate. 
• Sharing revenue between central government and local governments is important not 
only for sustainable economic development but protecting the institutional autonomy 
of local government. Once a system of revenue-sharing is legally provided, central 
government transfers cease to be viewed as ‘favours’ from central government but as 
legal entitlements instead.1 
• Local governments should be constitutionally recognised. When decentralisation is 
recognised constitutionally, it is able to serve its objectives better than when it is 
merely recognised by a statute.2 It is argued that genuine and effective 
                                                 
1 Breton and Scott 1978: 11. 
2 See generally Steytler & Fessha (2007). 
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decentralisation3 must have a constitutional character for the purposes of predictability 
and stability.4 
• Local government powers should be clearly defined and based on the principle of 
subsidiarity. The underlying reasoning is that local governments are better placed than 
the central government to regulate and manage the provision of services to local 
communities. 
• Central government should supervise local governments, with two tools being 
emphasised: monitoring and intervention. Supervision of, and intervention in, local 
governments by central government should be legally justifiable and respectful of their 
autonomy. 
• Creating or altering local government boundaries should take place within boundary 
demarcation processes built upon public engagement and consultation. 
9. Further support for decentralisation in international human rights 
instruments 
The role of decentralisation is also discernible from the international human rights 
instruments. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides for a 
right to every person ‘to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives’, and states that the source of every government’s authority must be 
derived from people’s consent. According to article 21 of the UDHR, every government’s 
authority must ‘periodically’ and ‘genuinely be elected by secret ballot of every person of 
                                                 
3 Part II of the KD para. 6. 
4 Seidman, Seidman & Walde 1999: 1. 
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voting age’. In essence the UDHR merely calls for free and fair elections without necessarily 
stating how such a right can be realised. Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that it is an ‘opportunity’ as well as a ‘right’ for every 
citizen ‘to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives’. The ICCPR repeats the UDHR’s provision on free and fair elections and 
adds that the right of every citizen to take part in ‘genuine periodic elections’ should be 
guaranteed. Again, the ICCPR does not specifically state how such an opportunity and right 
should be achieved. 
It is argued that the international legal framework for the right to public participation through 
elections does not state how in practice such a right may be realised. In fact, the drafting 
debates on the ICCPR zeroed in on political participation as an important ideal, with little 
emphasis placed on the institutions that could realise that ideal.5 
Markku examines the provisions of article 21 of the UDHR and article 25 of the ICCPR on 
the right to public participation from the point of view of accessibility, inclusiveness, and 
competition.6 According to the author, the word ‘genuine’, as used in article 21 of the UDHR, 
is in reference to the choice between the different political participants made by the voter 
when he or she votes: ‘The term “genuine” would thus introduce an element of 
competitiveness in the electoral process’.7 For Markku, the idea of universal suffrage makes 
the right to public participation somewhat more inclusive.8 
                                                 
5 Steiner 1988: 85. 
6 Markku 2002: 206-22. 
7 Markku 2002: 220. 
8 Markku (2002). 
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Article 13(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) provides for 
the right to public participation. By virtue of article 2 of the ACHPR, the right to public 
participation is enjoyed by all without discrimination on any grounds such as ‘race, ethnic 
group, colour, sex, language, religion or political opinions’.9 
The realisation of the right to public participation under article 13(1) of the ACHPR and the 
prohibition of discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds under article 2 of the ACHPR 
is nothing more than a restatement of similar rights in other international human rights 
instruments. It is argued that a decentralised system is more inclusive in supporting the right 
to public participation than a centralised one. Some writers pour scorn on this argument on the 
grounds that sometimes localities are parochial and have with little interest in national 
integration; in addition, they reject the argument that, because local residents can demand 
explanations more quickly than an entire national constituency, smaller units promote 
responsive democracy.10 
It is reiterated that the right to public participation through elections may be better realised 
through elections at the lower orders of government than at national level. Elections at the 
lower orders of government are more inclusive and more easily accessible; in a well-designed 
electoral system, they are also more competitive and better suited to promoting grassroots 
democracy than elections at national level.11 
                                                 
9 Article 2 of the ACHPR. 
10 Reynolds 2003: 106. 
11 Smith 2007: 107. 
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10. Indigenous peoples/tribal identity 
International human rights law’s call to protect ethnic minorities can be linked to the ability of 
decentralisation to accommodate ethnic diversity. For some time now, efforts to formalise a 
treaty for protecting indigenous peoples have been unsuccessful. Part of the opposition to 
recognising indigenous people’s rights in a specific or dedicated treaty arises from the internal 
social dynamics of states worldwide.12 However, a number of general international human 
rights instruments offer protection to indigenous peoples as minorities.13 Crucial to the 
protection of indigenous people’s rights is article 27 of the ICCPR. It provides thus: 
In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to 
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their 
own language. 
The Human Rights Committee, when commenting on article 27 of the ICCPR, details 
categories of people protected, and argues that they ought to be ‘a group and who share in 
common a culture, a religion and/or a language’ or ‘persons belonging to minorities which 
“exist” in a State party’. It notes that the ‘existence of an ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minority in a given State party does not depend upon a decision by that State party but [is] 
                                                 
12 The United Nations Declaration on Indigenous People’s Rights was adopted by a record vote of 30 to 2 votes 
with 12 abstentions. 
13 For instance, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, UNESCO 
Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960), and International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)(1965), show advances in the quest for protection of minority rights. 
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require[d] to be established by objective criteria’.14 In other words, minorities such as 
indigenous peoples do not exist at the whim of the state but as a matter of right. 
The Working Group for Minority Rights has produced the draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
(DRPBNELM).15 The fundamental criterion in the definition of an ‘indigenous person’ is 
self-determination.16 However, no generally acceptable definition has so far emerged. The 
International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) definition of ‘indigenous peoples’ is preferred. 
According to the ILO definition, ‘indigenous persons’ refer to tribes that are socially, 
culturally and economically distinctly regulated by customs or traditions or by some other 
special laws. The ILO definition also makes reference to the fact that indigenous peoples are 
historically connected to a country or region before conquest or colonisation, but still retain 
all or part of their social, cultural and political institutions.17 
The United Nations Declarations on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)18 provides a 
platform for establishing a relationship between decentralisation as a system of government 
and the protection of indigenous people’s rights. The connection between the UNDRIP, on 
the one hand, and decentralisation, on the other, is twofold. 
First, the recognition and protection of indigenous people’s rights can be achieved if the legal 
framework acknowledges diversity in the form of autonomous entities like local governments. 
                                                 
14 General Comment No. 23 para. 5.1-5.3. 
15 Adopted by UNGA in December 1992 (Resolution 47/137). 
16 See Article 1(2) of the United Nations Declaration on Indigenous People’s Rights. 
17 See Articles 1(1) (a) & (b) of the United Nations Declaration on Indigenous People’s Rights. 
18 Available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm. 
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Second, local government offers meaningful spaces for consultation to local communities.19 
Thus, given the responsive nature of local government, devolving powers to lower orders of 
government creates a legitimate institutional structure and appropriate forum for indigenous 
peoples as a vulnerable and disadvantaged group.20 
The UNDRIP acknowledges that diversity is the epitome of civilisation for the benefit of the 
common good of humanity.21 Furthermore, the view that one ethnic group is naturally 
superior to another is racist, scientifically baseless, legally invalid and morally unjust.22 
Principally, the UNDRIP proposes to address the historical injustice of discrimination against 
indigenous peoples. The recognition of indigenous people’s rights creates a linkage between a 
land right and political, economic and social development, as well as spiritual history and 
philosophy.23 The Declaration asserts that while development must be linked to the identity 
and aspirations of the people, development must be pursued in a co-operative manner with the 
central government.24 Indigenous people’s rights are linked to self-determination and self-
identity.25 It is argued that institutions established under a decentralised system of government 
help ethnic minorities to ‘govern’ themselves.  
                                                 
19 Scheinin 2002:42. 
20 See ‘Local Government and Human Rights: Doing Good Service’, Report of the International Council on 
Human Policy 2005, ATAR Roto Press SA, Vernier, Switzerland, p. 20. 
21 See para. 2 of the Preamble to the UNDRIP. 
22 See para. 3 of the Preamble to the UNDRIP. 
23 See para. 5 and 6 of the Preamble to the UNDRIP. 
24 See para. 7 of the Preamble to the UNDRIP. 
25 See also Article 3 & 8 of the UNDRIP. 
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The World Bank presently links poverty reduction and sustainable development to the 
protection of indigenous people’s rights. This view is reflected in the Bank’s borrowing 
policy, which makes access to funding conditional on consultation and engagement with 
indigenous peoples.26 The Bank also views indigenous people as a socially and culturally 
vulnerable group which, though marginalised,27 has a distinct identity.28 It is argued that 
decentralisation creates institutional democratic spaces for ethnic minority groups to have a 
say on international capital inflow that is necessary for a developmental state. 
11. Concluding remarks 
This chapter has made a case for decentralisation as a means to tackle the governance 
challenges that face many developing countries. Whereas the umbrella argument is good 
governance, the role of decentralisation in promoting sustainable development, nurturing 
democracy and accommodating ethnic diversity has been emphasised. The chapter also 
disputed the argument that decentralisation is only an ideal with limited practical application, 
especially in developing countries. Harnessing the benefits of decentralisation, on the one 
hand, and seeking to limit the risks associated with it, on the other, can lead to the 
development of an effective system of decentralised government. The institutionalised design 
features of such a system are discussed in the next chapter. 
                                                 
26 See the ‘OP 4.10- Indigenous People’s, available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PR 
OJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,contentMDK:205653~mnuPK:4564185~pagePK:64709096~piP
K:6.4709108~theSitePK:502184,00.html. 
27 See para. 2 of the Policy Principles. 
28 See para. 3 of the Policy Principles. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE 
CRITICAL FEATURES OF DECENTRALISATION 
1. Introduction 
The institutions of local government that are created under a decentralised system must serve 
the purpose of local development, grassroot democracy, and accommodation of diversity.1 
This chapter discusses critical features for the design of a system of local government. Six key 
features are identified as important for a successful decentralised system of government. 
These are: (a) integrity of local government institutions; (b) functional local government 
authority; (c) adequate fiscal autonomy; (d) administrative autonomy; (e) equitable 
intergovernmental transfers; and (f) sound intergovernmental relations. 
What follows is a brief analysis of what each of the six features entails. The argument is that 
these features are not only critical for establishing and maintaining a functional decentralised 
system, but also necessary for minimising or eradicating the possible negative effects of 
devolving power to lower orders of government. 
2. Integrity of local government institutions 
The following discussion of the integrity of local government institutions focuses on 
constitutional recognition, the boundary demarcation process, the electoral system and 
traditional leaders. 
                                                 
1 Chapter Two § 2.1. 
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2.1 Constitutional recognition 
Positivists in the past have argued that 
[m]unicipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, 
the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it 
creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some 
constitutional limitation ... the legislature might, by a single act, if we can suppose it capable 
of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal 
corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation 
on this right so far as the corporations themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, 
the mere tenants at will of the legislature.2 
Meehan explain that Canadian local governments have evolved through three main stages: 
from being viewed as creatures of government; then as subordinate to government, and hence 
subject to legal review by the courts; and finally as autonomous spheres of government 
because of their changed roles as repositories of constitutional covenants and democracy.3 
Thus, in the past, the authors explain, the courts’ scrutiny of local governments was on the 
basis of the ‘paramountcy’ of central government and ‘unauthorised delegation’.4 
‘Constitutional recognition’ of local government means that local government institutions 
acquire a status under the constitution just like any other order of government.5 Constitutional 
status in a decentralised system of government is a precondition for the existence of local 
                                                 
2 See City of Clinton v Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868), Dillon C cited in Meehan et 
al. 2007: 24. 
3 Meehan 2007: 1. 
4 Meehan 2007: 24. 
5 Article 2 of the ECLSG. See also the Vancouver Draft Guidelines, para. C1.1. 
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governments as distinct orders of government and not mere extensions of the central 
government administrative hegemony in a centralised system.6  
The case in point is South Africa, which has one of the best articulated local government 
structures as a result of its Constitution. Its Constitutional Court has so far developed a 
jurisprudence that is protective of local governments in a novel manner. In the landmark case 
of Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council,7 
the Constitutional Court describes the evolution of the status of local government in South 
Africa. The Court acknowledged that in the past courts would freely examine local 
government legislative powers in the context of national legislation. Under the new 
constitutional order, the Court held that ‘...a local government is no longer a public body 
exercising delegated powers. Its council is a deliberative legislative assembly with legislative 
and executive powers recognised in the Constitution itself’.8 
Constitutionally recognised local government institutions are important because they endure, 
are predictable, and have ascertainable rules.9 Meehan argues that if local governments are 
only considered as service providers, then there is less need for their constitutional 
recognition as autonomous orders of government. However, if one takes an expansive role of 
local governments as an important component for democracy, then the need for their 
                                                 
6 See para. 4(iv) of the Preamble to the VFD. See also Part II of the KD, para. 6. 
7 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 (12) BCLR 
1458. 
8 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd para. 26. This case confirmed the cases of Robertson and Another v City of Cape 
Town and Another, Truman-Baker v City of Cape Town 2004 (9) BCLR 950 (C) and City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others (CCT89/09) [2010] ZACC 11. 
9 Ginsburg, Elkins & Blount 2009: 8. 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
Chapter 3: Critical Features of Decentralisation 
constitutional recognition becomes the only way in which local constitutional democracy can 
be guaranteed.10 It is argued that the constitutional recognition of local government ensures 
that as lower orders of government they are able to perform their legislative and executive 
functions free from central government control and direction.11 Arguably, constitutional 
recognition of local governments is crucial in ensuring that local governments in a 
decentralised system are treated as partners of and not extensions of central government. A 
constitutionally entrenched provision may be amended subject to a very restrictive 
procedure.12 In this regard the entrenchment of local government provisions in a Constitution 
means that it is difficult to alter the legal status of a local government institution.13 
2.2 Boundary determination 
Local government boundary determination refers to the process of creating clearly 
distinguishable geographical and political local government spaces.14  
In Africa generally, the debate about local government boundaries has been whether old 
boundaries as drawn by colonial governments should be retained or not. This debate also 
                                                 
10 Meehan 2007: 44. 
11 See the Aberdeen Principles, Principle no 1. 
12 Paul Ssemogerere and Another v The Attorney-General Constitutional Petition No.3 2000. 
13 For example, the Constitutional Court of South Africa in the Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional 
Assembly: in re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para. 153 
took the point that ‘it is appropriate that provisions of the document which are foundational to the new 
constitutional state should be less vulnerable to amendment than ordinary legislation.’ 
14 Paddison 2004: 23. 
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involves whether the process of boundary demarcation should be oriented towards reducing or 
increasing existing local governments.15  
2.2.1 Importance 
The determination of local government boundaries may have either a political or a social 
dimension. In fact, there is a link between the territorial spaces of local governments and their 
political organisation.16 Thus, a boundary demarcation process is a critical factor in the 
success of any decentralisation programme as boundaries help local government determine 
identity groups, voting rights and its tax base. 
By themselves, boundaries may construct communities that had never existed and have no 
shared history, or counter the recognition of certain communities.17 Large tracts of land in one 
local government, traditionally belonging to a particular ethnic group, may be allocated to a 
different local government. A local government boundary demarcation process is important 
taking into account ethnic boundaries, and may consider whether an area should remain in one 
local government or ‘cross’ into another.18 
It is argued that a boundary demarcation process plays a crucial role in designating an 
electoral boundary.19 Electoral boundaries determine who may vote in particular areas and 
thus who participates in the local political process.20 
                                                 
15 See generally the GOU Report on the Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System (1987). 
16 Paddison 2004: 24. 
17 Briffault 1996: 1143. 
18 Cameron 2004: 216. 
19 Briffault 1996: 1142. 
20 Ladd 1989: 132-4.  
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Most local governments raise their revenue from the local services they render in a particular 
area. The main sources of local tax revenue are usually property rates.21 Local governments 
are not usually permitted to tax beyond their territories. Depending on which areas have been 
added to or excluded from its territorial jurisdiction, a local government demarcation process 
can structurally weaken or strengthen the fiscal autonomy of local governments.22 Boundaries 
are also important for the rules relating to the application of tax revenue in terms of how much 
of the locally generated revenue should be spent by a local government. The financial limits 
imposed by a boundary demarcation process fundamentally affect the financial and fiscal 
austerity of local governments.23 
2.2.2 Criteria for boundary determination 
Briffault identifies four criteria on which local government boundary demarcation can be 
based. These are: promotion of democratic citizenship; improvement of efficiency in public 
service delivery systems, determination of territories of communities; and the role of 
boundaries in relation to powers and duties of local governments. 24 It is argued that ethnic 
boundaries must be recognised or taken into account by a boundary demarcation process so 
that minority ethnic groups, such as indigenous people, are able to preserve their social, 
cultural and political way of life in a decentralised system of government.25 In addition, 
                                                 
21 Netzer 1993: 51-63.  
22 Cameron 2004: 224. 
23 Cameron (2004). 
24 Briffault 1996: 1123-33; Cameron 2004: 217. 
25 See the Overview Report of the Research Project by ILO and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ rights on the Constitutional and Legislative Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 24 
African Countries 2009: 17.  
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demarcation of boundaries should take into account the tax base of a local government.26 
Writing on South Africa’s subnational boundary demarcation process, Magi and De Villiers 
argue that the demarcation process must ensure that the existing boundaries are rationally 
justifiable and consider financial implications, disruption of service delivery, demographic 
patterns, development and administrative potential, cultural realities, and geographical and 
infrastructural factors.27 
2.2.3 Procedure for determination of boundaries 
In the process of creating or altering local government boundaries, local communities and all 
the stakeholders should be consulted. It can compromise the objectives of decentralisation if 
the central government changes a local government’s boundaries out of political expediency. 
It is argued that the manipulation of local government political boundaries can affect the 
democratic and developmental role of a decentralised system of government.28 Given the 
importance of public participation, investigating the input of local citizens by an independent 
body is crucial.29 
Local government boundaries should be created or altered by a neutral body properly 
constituted in order to fairly address all the issues that may arise in the demarcation of a local 
government boundary. 
Lindisizwe and De Villiers, writing on the South African context, urge the establishment of a 
credible demarcation body, and a well-defined policy on demarcation that respects the value 
                                                 
26 Steytler 2005: 207. 
27 Magi & De Villiers 2008: 37. 
28 Cameron (2004) 
29 Cameron 2004: 208. 
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of public consultation, especially in areas that may be prone to identity contestations.30 This 
point is pertinent in the African context given the ethnic diversity that exists in many African 
countries. For example, the Constitutional Court of South Africa in the case of Merafong 
Demarcation Forum and Others,31 highlights the role of public engagement as a procedural 
requirement in a boundary demarcation process for local governments. The Court therefore 
underscored the importance of public participation in boundary demarcation processes.32 
The argument here is twofold: first, that a local government boundary demarcation process 
should have an independent demarcation body that is free from central government 
manipulation; and secondly, that a boundary demarcation process must ensure that all the 
stakeholders are duly consulted before changes to boundaries are made. 
2.3 Adequate electoral model for local government 
Chapter Two of the thesis made a case for decentralisation from the perspective of 
democracy. It was submitted that local communities are ‘hatcheries’ for democracy because 
of the proximity of elected local leaders to citizens.33 The key question then becomes: what 
type of local government electoral system should be adopted in order to promote a ‘free and 
fair election’ for local democracy, local development and political legitimacy in fragile or 
fragmented societies? 
                                                 
30 Magi & De Villiers 2008: 34-5. 
31 Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, Case 
CCT41/07. 
32 Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others para. 53. 
33 See Chapter Two § 2.3.2.3. 
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The irony of elections in many African countries is that there is now a pattern of malpractice 
and rigging by the incumbents.34 The pattern of rigged elections in many African countries 
may cast doubt on the effectiveness of elections as a guarantor of local democracy. Even 
when the elections are not rigged, potential candidates are easily disqualified for national 
election on the basis of onerous electoral rules and high electoral thresholds.35 To avoid 
rigged elections or exclusionary electoral thresholds, the electoral system should suit the 
purpose of a local democratic process. 
2.3.1 Electoral systems 
There are two main electoral systems: ‘winner-takes-all’ and proportional representation. In 
the ‘winner-takes-all’ or ‘first-past-the-post’ system, a candidate who gets the highest number 
of votes wins the election. In a system of proportional representation, on the other hand, seats 
are allocated to candidates according to the percentage of votes they have obtained.36In a 
‘winner-takes-it-all’ system, a party or an individual that supported a losing candidate(s) loses 
the chance of political representation and participation. In contrast, in a proportional 
representation system, the party members or individuals who supported a candidate with the 
least number of votes in an election may still be represented. On independence, a preference 
for proportional representation in Africa was common in Francophone countries than 
Anglophone ones, especially where ethnic problems were rife.37 Thus, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Angola, and Mozambique, to mention a few, adopted proportional representation as the 
                                                 
34 Nohlen, Krennerch & Bernhard 1999: 4-15. 
35 Singiza & De Visser 2014: 4.  
36 Reynolds 1990: 90. 
37 Nohlen, Krennerch & Bernhard 1999: 16. 
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electoral system.38 However, in most African countries the electoral system which obtained 
during the colonial government period was adopted. Thus, most former British colonies in 
Africa (with the exception of Namibia, South African, Sierra Leone, and Liberia) adopted the 
parliamentary ‘winner-takes-all’ system that is used in Great Britain to this day.39 
It is also argued here that the benefits of proportional representation should be recognised in 
the design of electoral systems for local government, given the multi-ethnic nature of most 
African countries. Such an electoral system not only ensures an inclusive local democratic 
representation, but also supports multiparty politics, which for a long time had been rejected 
by political elites in Africa on the grounds that multiparty politics are divisive.40 
The ultimate aim of a good electoral system should be to guarantee the free expression of the 
will of the voters.41 Recent trends, however, show an increase in the need for special 
representation in order to protect certain categories of people on the basis of their 
‘uniqueness’, given the failure of Western representative democracies to reflect the diverse 
nature of their populations. Indeed, political representation in many Western democracies is 
dominated by rich white males to the exclusion of women, people of colour, the poor, and the 
disabled, to mention a few minority groups.42 Similarly, in many developing countries, 
political representation is also dominated by rich male elites to the exclusion of women, 
indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities and the poor. Ultimately, 
                                                 
38 Nohlen, Krennerch & Bernhard 1999: 17. 
39 Nohlen, Krennerch & Bernhard (1999) 
40 De Torrente 2000: 41. 
41 Markku 2002: 223. 
42 Kymlicka (1995). 
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[o]ne way to reform the process is ... by reducing the barriers which inhibit women, ethnic 
minorities, or the poor from becoming party candidates or party leaders; another way is to 
adopt some form of proportional representation, which has historically been associated with 
greater inclusiveness of candidates.43 
It is argued that a local government electoral system is important in guaranteeing the right to 
public participation of certain minority groups, such as indigenous peoples, through the use of 
special measures. Designing a special constituency on the basis of social, economic and 
educational disadvantages to cater for an indigenous group, creates opportunities for them to 
participate in the political democratic process in local government.44  
It is argued here that a credible local government electoral system should foster parties based 
on local or national interests and values rather than ethnic or religious or geographical 
enclaves.45 Nonetheless, no electoral system should exclude any person on the basis of ethnic 
origin or religious affiliation. According to Nohlen, Krennerch and Bernhard, 
in plural societies with multiple ethnic divisions which are common in southern Africa PR is 
better suited than a majority formula to provide for fair political representation of different 
social groups and to stimulate politics of compromise which are regarded as an 
indispensable prerequisite of national integration and democratic consolidation in these 
societies.46 
                                                 
43 Kymlicka 1995: 32. 
44 See the Overview Report of the Research Project by the ILO and the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights on the Constitutional and Legislative Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 24 
African Countries 2009: 35. 
45 Reynolds 1990: 92. 
46 Nohlen, Krennerch & Bernhard 1999: 23, cited in Reynolds 1995: 123. 
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A local government electoral system should promote reconciliation and not foment bitterness, 
anger and prejudice.47 Thus, an electoral system that leads to confrontational politics at local 
level does not promote local democracy, development, and peace. In countries like Namibia 
and South Africa, where the electoral system was part of the political negotiation, 
proportional representation was considered as necessary for national integration and 
consensus-building.48 An electoral system of proportional representation acts as a conflict-
regulating mechanism necessary to foster peace and democracy in post-conflict states.49 
The point is that ethnic interests are better catered for where political mobilisation is inclusive 
rather than narrowly parochial. Indeed, as Nohlen, Krennerch and Bernhard observe, 
‘majority representation in segmented societies runs the risk not only of exaggerating ethnic 
conflicts, but also of sharpening ethno- regional polarization.’50 
2.4 Criteria 
Reynolds identifies five crucial considerations in the design of the electoral system in 
fragmented societies.51 It is argued that these considerations are relevant to local governments 
in many African countries. They are: (a) representativeness, (b) accessibility, (c) 
accountability, (d) inclusive political mobilisation, and (e) stability of governments. 
                                                 
47 Reynolds 1990: 92.  
48 Nohlen, Krennerch & Bernhard 1999: 18. 
49 Murray 2007: 709. 
50 Nohlen, Krennerch & Bernhard 1999: 18. 
51 Reynolds 1990: 91-2. 
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2.4.1 Representativeness 
An electoral system that fairly represents the consent of local communities better promotes 
local political legitimacy than one that is exclusionary and factional.52 It is argued that a local 
government’s electoral design must cater for certain social groups, such as women, youth, 
disabled persons, and indigenous communities, as well.53 
2.4.2 Accessibility and simplicity 
For a local government electoral system to be accessible, it should be designed in a simple 
manner that is easy to understand so that local citizens can feel that their votes count.54 Such 
an electoral system ensures that all social groups are able to take part in the electoral 
process.55 
2.4.3 Accountability 
An electoral system may either foster or hinder the idea of competitive elections. Thus, the 
ability of local communities to demand adequate explanations from their leaders depends very 
much on the competitive nature of a local government electoral system.56 A local government 
electoral system that fosters competition ensures that local politicians are unable to 
manipulate the local government decision-making process.57 It is argued that if a local 
                                                 
52 Reynolds 1990: 92. 
53 Markku 2002: 209. 
54 Reynolds 1990: 92. 
55 Markku 2002: 207. 
56 Reynolds 1990: 92.  
57 Markku 2002: 217. 
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government electoral system offers diverse political alternatives, more local accountability 
will result than if there were few or no political alternatives at all. 
2.4.4 Stability of governments 
The above considerations at local level notwithstanding, a local government electoral system 
should promote stable government.58 Any local government should have the capacity to take 
decisions no matter how unpopular they may be. This means that an electoral system should 
ensure that there is a strong stable government with the capacity to initiate policies through 
appropriate law-making processes. Such a government presupposes the ability of an electoral 
system to create majority local governments. 
2.5 Traditional institutions 
As explained in Chapter Two, the recognition of traditional institutions in local governments 
is an important feature for the success of decentralisation, especially in the African context. It 
is argued that in many African countries, there is a link between traditional institutions and 
local governments. This link is mainly in the areas of customary land inheritance and land 
use.59 The integrity of local government institutional structures depends on the roles and 
influences that traditional institutions have in local governments. 
                                                 
58 Reynolds 1990: 92. 
59 Chapter Two § 2.3.2.2. See also Makumbe 2010: 88-9. 
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2.5.1 Definition and importance 
Traditional institutions refer to the age-old systems of government characterised by the local 
people’s belief in traditional customs and authority.60 It is no longer possible to deny their 
influence on people’s daily lives.61  
As Ndulo argues: 
[c]ommunity-based social and political institutions ought to be the building blocks of a new 
and effective African polity that can deliver a better life for African people. Any 
examination of the modalities affecting the devolution of power in Africa must, among other 
things, address the future of traditional institutions of governance in modern African 
political systems…There are various ways traditional leaders could be accommodated in 
constitutional arrangements. For instance, they could be incorporated into the local 
government system and form the nucleus of that system. This could, quite conceivably, 
enhance the legitimacy of local government structures in the rural areas.62 
As Gluckman explains, life in rural areas revolves around villages (in Africa, a village is a 
vital structure of traditional institutions) as the microcosms of production and development. 
People depend on villages for agriculture, resolving disputes, marriages, funerals, and trade.63 
For instance, a proposal for the construction of a road or the right to a mining concession may 
lead to resistance from local communities, especially where such activities may lead to the 
destruction of their ancestral land or medicinal plants. Engaging traditional leadership may 
                                                 
60 Makumbe 2010:88. 
61 See Mauss 1999: 64, cited in Oomen 2005: 169. 
62 Ndulo 2003: 350. See also Ndulo 1998/9: 85. 
63 Gluckman 1967: 7-20.  
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help to mobilise public opinion in support of such development projects.64 As was argued in 
Chapter Two, traditional institutions may be remodelled to fit into a modern constitutional 
governance system.65 It is true that most of the traditional leadership institutions are 
patriarchal.66 It is at such a point that modern liberal democratic attributes, such as the 
promotion of equality and human dignity, could be infused into these institutions before a 
case for institution-building through local government can be made. 
The imperative for this proposition is that local authorities may in fact act as hinges for a 
cohesive relationship between modern state structures and communities.67 
There are many examples in support of the relationship between politically legitimate 
traditional institutions of leadership and economic advancement. It is generally considered 
appropriate to argue that political legitimacy has been partly responsible for the economic 
success of those Asian economies known as the Asian ‘tigers’. For example, Japan, Indonesia, 
and South Korea have all taken advantage of their cultural diversity for economic 
advancement. There is evidence that even on the African continent some of the most stable 
countries, such as Ghana and South Africa, have also been successful in their respect for, and 
accommodation of, cultural diversity through traditional leadership institutions.68 
                                                 
64 Makumbe 2010: 95 
65 Chapter Two § 2.3.2.2. 
66 Tamale 1999: 272. 
67 Howard 1983: 479. 
68 Prempeh 2008: 763. 
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2.5.2 Way forward 
It is argued that given the influence of traditional institutions on the African continent, these 
institutions should be vested with powers to resolve disputes involving customary land-
holding.69 They should also be allowed to participate in the formulation of local governments’ 
plans and budgeting process in instances where they have strong institutional links with the 
local communities. For the above reasons, the institutional design of local government should 
adequately recognise the role of traditional institutions in local governments.  
For instance, a quota for representatives of traditional leaders may be legally provided for in 
local government councils. These quotas should ensure that women are adequately 
represented. Further, a house of traditional leaders should be legally established as an 
advisory body to both the central and local governments.  
3. Local government’s functional mandate 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Two it was argued that decentralisation has the potential to promote efficiency and 
accountability in that local authorities’ delivery of goods and services match local preferences 
better than central government.70 It was further argued that decentralisation may potentially 
enable local citizens to have a say in how resources are used on the assumption that local 
governments generate the revenue themselves from local citizens and spend it with a higher 
degree of discipline, minimising waste.71 In the discussion below, the proper tools necessary 
                                                 
69 Makumbe 2010: 95 
70 See Chapter Two § 2.3.1.1.  
71 See Chapter Two § 2.3.1.1  
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for local governments to deliver services are examined. The nature and extent of the functions 
that should be devolved to local governments are also assessed. 
3.2 Equipping local governments with the right governance tools 
Local governments, as lower orders of government, must be vested with adequate tools to 
exercise their discretion on their jurisdictional mandates. This view is supported by De Visser, 
who argues: ‘It is only when local government is afforded substantial powers that the notion 
of development, driven at local level, can really take root. Local government must be allowed 
to govern, to make mistakes, learn from its mistakes and, importantly, establish a sound and 
interactive relationship with its citizenry’.72 The role of local governments in economic 
transformation of local communities was discussed in detail in Chapter Two. It was 
emphasised local governments’ capacity to perform their tasks is critical for the success of 
decentralisation.73 It is argued that local governments’ capacity to perform their task relates to 
their ability to effectively govern. Local governments can govern using two major tools: 
executive and legislative powers. 
3.2.1 Executive powers 
The precise meaning of the term ‘executive power’ is contested. In the past it was defined by 
reference to certain powers held in common with the executive branch of government, such as 
foreign relations and the power to appoint staff.74 
                                                 
72 De Visser 2005: 35. 
73 See Chapter Two § 2.3..  
74 Garner 2004: 651. 
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The term ‘executive power’, however, is considered by writers as ‘... a shorthand for the 
power to execute the laws’,75 usually by a supreme body. Thus, flowing from this definition, 
the term implies that if the local governments are to carry out any of their functions, their 
executive powers should be ‘necessary and proper’ for the performance of those functions. 76 
The execution of their mandate aside, local government’s executive powers include the power 
to appoint the executive and administrative staff and the power to dismiss them if they 
perform poorly. Local government’s executive powers help local communities to assess the 
performance of their elected leaders by examining the policies catering to their local 
preferences. Further, the quality of the appointed staff determines the quality of the services to 
be delivered. Thus, if the existing local government policies show a clear departure from 
community preferences, or there is sufficient evidence of inefficiency in the performance of 
local government functions by the local staff, the local voters can exercise their democratic 
right by voting their leaders out of office. 
3.2.2 Local government’s legislative powers 
A legislative power refers to the authority to make laws.77 Hamilton takes the view that ‘the 
essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules for 
the regulation of the society’.78 The local government’s power to make laws is not an end in 
itself, but a mechanism through which its policies can be legally executed. Local government 
laws may specify the particular service to be delivered, the geographical boundaries of a 
                                                 
75 Prakash 2003: 702. 
76 See Prakash 2003: 737.  
77 Kavanagh 2000: 662. 
78 Hamilton 1961: 450, cited in Gardner 1991: 233. 
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service and the consequences of the breach of the rules governing the delivery of a service. In 
addition, local government legislative power may describe the taxes to be levied and the rates 
and exemptions thereof. It can therefore be argued that a legislative power is a tool through 
which local government services can be delivered. 
3.3 Decentralising the right functional matters 
The type of functions that vest in local governments must be relevant to the overall objective 
of decentralisation, as argued in Chapter Two.79 There are various mechanisms to transfer 
power to local governments. Powers and functions can be transferred to lower orders of 
government by devolution, delegation, and deconcentration. The detailed discussion of these 
three mechanisms was given in Chapter One.80 The allocation of powers may also take the 
nature of ‘concurrence’, where powers are attributed to both orders of government, but with 
one order of government, often the local government, permitted to exercise a power until the 
central government steps in to legislate.81 Powers may also be shared where different orders 
of government have powers that are related to each other with a requirement for consent 
before such a competency may be exercised.82 It is also argued that plenary powers (an 
offshoot of subsidiarity), may be transferred to local governments to execute matters that are 
                                                 
79 Chapter Two § 2.3.1. See also De Visser (2005). 
80 See Chapter One § 1.5. 
81 LaCroix 2007: 366. See also Garner et al. 2004: 1288 who define the term “concurrency power” as “a 
political power independently exercised by both federal and state governments in the same field of legislation”. 
82 Watts 2008: 88-9. 
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not excluded from their explicit competencies.83 The key issue is whether the mechanism 
used to transfer powers vests sufficient discretion in local governments. 
It is argued that local governments should be vested revenue raising power that is relevant to 
local governments such as, land use, land planning, environment, water, road construction, 
registration of births and deaths, health and primary education. These competencies are 
necessary for two main reasons. First, these competencies are important in changing the 
material well-being of the local communities. Secondly, education, land and land use, and 
environment matters are not only necessary to develop rural communities, but also have a 
socio-cultural and ethnic dimension. For instance, education as a local government function is 
important in ensuring that local communities can have a say on the language of instruction in 
schools. The local government’s control over land use is important in the protection of the 
ancestral lands of certain communities. Further, local government functions must be capable 
of generating enough revenue to fund their mandates. Functions with higher spill-over effects 
should not be decentralised. 84 
3.4 Limiting the degree of national governments legislative intervention 
In Chapter Two, while discussing the international context of decentralisation, it was noted 
that local governments should be allocated ‘full and exclusive’ powers.85 It is argued that after 
powers have been transferred, using any of the mechanisms, local government should be 
afforded sufficient discretion to pursue local policies.  
                                                 
83 Article 4(2) of the ECLSG. 
84 Reynolds 2003:116. 
85 See Chapter Two § 2.8. See for instance article 3(4) of the WWDLSG. 
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3.5 Incremental transfer of power 
In Chapter Two, the justification for vesting full and exclusive powers to lower orders of 
government was given. The argument was that local governments match better local 
preferences and service delivery than the central government.86 
However, some studies, especially of developing countries, show reservations about 
devolving powers to lower orders of government that lack the necessary capacity to fully 
execute their tasks.87 Moreover, fragmentation of service delivery could lead to inefficiency 
and create barriers to the provision of more efficient services.88 These findings are, however, 
contested as highly generalised, and ignore instances where local governments have 
adequately performed their role.89 Arguably, local preferences as well as the local capacity to 
fully execute local government tasks, can never be homogenous. These differences in ‘tastes’ 
and abilities call for the asymmetrical allocation of powers and functions. As Steytler argues, 
in countries where there is uneven distribution of resources and skills, the wisdom of a 
uniform system of allocation of powers and functions becomes questionable.90 Consequently, 
a good design of local government institutions should ensure that the competencies vested in 
local governments match the capacities of those institutions.91  
                                                 
86 Chapter Two § 2.3.1.1. 
87 Azfar et al. 2001: 48-60. 
88 Reynolds 2003: 105. 
89 Lambright 2011: 221.  
90 Steytler 2005: 208. 
91 Steytler (2005). 
 
 
 
 
141 
 
Chapter 3: Critical Features of Decentralisation 
3.6 Clarity 
It is argued that a clear and simple scheme of allocation of powers promotes efficiency and 
accountability, as discussed in Chapter Two,92 and that this is critical for the success of 
decentralisation.93 There are three main arguments for clear local government competencies. 
First, unclear local government functions may result in the duplication of services, whereby 
both the central government and local government perform the same functions.94 Secondly, an 
unclear definition of local governments’ competencies may create uncertainty and confusion, 
leading to poor service delivery.95 Thirdly, poorly defined functions and powers of local 
governments are likely to confuse local citizens in that they may not be certain which order of 
government is responsible for the poor service delivery.96 
4. Fiscal authority 
Local government fiscal discretion entails, on the one hand, the discretion to raise the local 
government’s ‘own revenue’, and on other hand, the discretion to determine tax rates and 
exemptions.97 The term ‘own revenue’ has a wide meaning; it denotes much more than taxes. 
It includes not only local taxes but also charges, fees, and other related sources of income.98 
Fiscal autonomy of local governments also presupposes the authority to engage in public and 
                                                 
92 See Chapter Two § 2.31.1 to 2.3.1.2. 
93 De Visser 2005: 40-1 
94 Young 2006: 19. 
95 Hooja & Mathew 2006: 26. 
96 Steytler & Fessha 2007: 322. 
97 Bird & Slack 2003: 1. 
98 Devas 2008: 19.  
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private partnerships, have a share in sales and local income taxes, and regulate private sector 
investment and lending/borrowing programmes for infrastructure development.99 
Studies show that where local governments have failed in their functions it has been in part 
because their ability to raise and spend revenue is either undermined or limited by the central 
government.100 De Visser argues that any attempt to separate functional competency in 
service delivery from the actual power to generate revenue creates a problem of 
accountability.101 
The role of local governments in redistributing income has been emphasised in Chapter Two. 
While it remains true that national government is better able to redistribute than local 
government local governments may mitigate negative effects income inequalities better than 
the central government.102 It is argued here that in order for local governments to perform 
their mandate, they should determine what to spend, and when and how to spend it. 
Ultimately, local governments should determine not only their tax revenue sources but also 
tax rates and exemptions.  
5. Administrative autonomy 
Local government administrative autonomy refers to a power or discretion to appoint local 
government staff, and the capacity to harness human resources for the purposes of improved 
service delivery in local communities. Local government administrative autonomy should 
                                                 
99 See for example the ‘Federation of Canadian Municipalities, Strengthening Municipalities: On the Path to 
Economic Sustainability’ 2002: 3, cited in Meehan et al. 2007: 55. 
100 Taylor 1986: 268. 
101 De Visser 2005: 257. 
102 See Chapter Three § 2.3.1.3. 
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therefore be both a discretionary power that vests in local government and a capacity and 
resource issue which the local government has to manage independently of the central 
government.103 As Stanton argues, administrative autonomy in a decentralised system of 
government is only possible when local governments have the leverage and discretion to 
appoint and dismiss their employees. In addition, the author argues, administrative autonomy 
in a decentralised system of government is possible when local governments can exercise 
their discretion in setting the terms and conditions of employment for their entire staff.104 
There are three types of personnel systems that are usually adopted by local governments: the 
separate, the unified and the integrated personnel system.105 
According to Lubanga, under the separate personnel system the local government completely 
controls every stage of its personnel and their functions, whereas in a unified personnel 
system the personnel are employed by the local government but form part of a wider civil 
service, parallel to the central government one. Thus, under a unified personnel system, the 
central government appointing authority recruits the personnel and plays a significant role in 
providing guidance on the terms and conditions of services. The integrated personnel system 
is a hybrid of both the separate and unified personal systems that vest the central government 
with an oversight role in the recruitment process without diminishing the local governments’ 
discretion in hiring and disciplining its staff.106 
                                                 
103 Kakumba 2008: 99. 
104 Stanton 2009: 47 
105 Kumar 2011: 54. See also Report on the Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System 1987: 
75. 
106 Lubanga 1998: 69. 
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Isingoma and Red explain the essence of a separate personnel system in local government 
administration.107 The authors argue, first, that a separate personnel system in local 
government administration ensures that local authorities become sensitive to local needs, 
priorities and preferences. A separate personnel system may promote good governance insofar 
as by vesting control of local government authorities in the local government’s senior 
managers, these managers will constantly justify their decisions to local politicians.108 
Administrative autonomy is important, but given the risk of elite capture and localised 
corruption, it is extra important to separate politics from administration. Separating the 
administrative functions of local government personnel from their political functions limits 
the dangers of ‘elite capture’ of local government administration by separating political 
competencies from technical competencies. Furthermore, this separation enhances local 
government accountability since the administration of a local government does not depend on 
the whims of politics and local manipulation.109 
 
It is argued that devolution is best served by a separate personnel system.110 The preference 
for a separate personnel system in decentralisation by devolution ensures the loyalty of the 
administrative staff to, and their control by, the local government.111 Given the difficulties 
that may be encountered in applying either of the two personnel systems in their purest form, 
emerging trends in many developing countries show a preference for the integrated personnel 
                                                 
107 Isingoma &Red 2006: 102. See also Lubanga 1998: 69. 
108 Isingoma & Red (2006). 
109 Kumar 2011: 54 
110 Kumar 2011: 54. See also Report on the Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System 1987: 75. 
111 Report on the Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System (1987). 
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system, sometimes referred to as the ‘hybrid system’, where the major features of both a 
separate and uniform personnel systems are considered.112 
6. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
Designing a proper system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers is crucial to the success of 
decentralisation.113 As argued in Chapter Two, fiscal transfers are vital for equitable 
development. It was also argued that in fragmented societies, fiscal transfers are a form of 
political appeasement with a peace-building potential.114 
In most developing countries, and indeed developed countries, most revenue sources accrue to 
the central government.115 The central government usually allocates funds to local 
governments through a system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The main purpose of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers is to ensure that the functions that have been devolved to 
local governments are effectively performed, given the low revenue-raising capacities of local 
governments.116 These transfers ensure resource distribution, compensation for spill-over 
effects, and harmonisation of national objectives with controlled local discretion and 
accountability mechanisms.117 Further, they have the effect of a re-distribution of resources 
between local governments, hence ensuring a minimum standard of service delivery.118 It is 
                                                 
112 Lubanga 1998: 70. 
113 Devas 2008: 83.  
114 Chapter Two 2.3.1.3. 
115 Bird 1994: 311-2. 
116 Watts 2001: 25. 
117 Watts 2001: 26. 
118 Watts 2001: 27. 
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argued that intergovernmental fiscal transfers are also important mobilisation tools and 
stimulants to local economic development.119 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems may lead to local governments’ dependence on 
central government, which negatively affects local autonomy.120 Intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers should not discourage local revenue mobilisation or act as a disincentive to local 
investment. This could happen if such transfers stifle productivity by discouraging innovative 
revenue-raising business strategies.121 Thus, while certain transfers may be conditional, there 
should be some leeway for local discretion. This implies that in the determination of local 
needs and the prioritisation of the application of the fiscal transfers, local governments should 
be able to exercise a certain level of discretion.122 
Care should be taken that, even within the whole system of transfers, the components of each 
of the transfers, such as tax sharing, specific grants or block grants, is specified. If a fiscal 
transfer is in the form of an equalisation grant, the ultimate aim should be to create a 
partnership, rather than a dependency, between local and central government. Where a 
transfer takes the form of a conditional grant, then the intention must be to respect local 
government’s discretion rather than to bolster the central government’s role at the level of 
local government.123 
                                                 
119 Devas 2008: 77-8.  
120 Devas 2008: 83.  
121 Devas 2008: 83.  
122 Devas 2008: 83.  
123 Devas 2008: 84.  
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Intergovernmental transfers should be based on three main considerations, namely: 
predictability, inclusiveness and redistribution. 
It is important to note that intergovernmental fiscal transfers should not be haphazard. There 
ought to be a formula for fiscal transfers to local government as opposed to merely a central 
government decree on local government financial transfers 
Devas, in making a case for a formula in intergovernmental fiscal transfers, argues that it (a) 
minimises political interference by central government so that regions which do not vote for 
the ruling government are not punished by reducing their entitled allocations; (b) minimises 
bureaucratic manipulation whereby what has been allocated to local governments may in fact 
be reduced by a line ministry before it reaches the lower levels;124 and (c) helps in ensuring 
both vertical and horizontal equity. In this regard, fiscal transfers may be based on the 
capacity of a local government to raise its own revenue vis-à-vis the functions that have been 
devolved or the local government’s population and geographical size.125 
Crucial to the existence of formula-based transfers is the need for intergovernmental 
consultation. Hence, at all times local government should be given the opportunity to give 
their input in determining the content of the central government fiscal transfers. What is 
envisaged here is not merely informing local governments how much money has been 
allocated to them. Rather, meaningful engagement requires that local governments express 
their financial demands before any financial allocations can be determined by the formula. 
Meaningful engagement also means that local governments’ views on the sharing of the 
‘national cake’ in relation to the cost of living between the different orders of government are 
                                                 
124 Devas 2008: 84.  
125 Devas 2008: 84.  
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considered. In fact, as Shah argues: ‘Fiscal rules accompanied by “gate keeper” 
intergovernmental councils/committees provide a useful framework for fiscal discipline and 
fiscal policy coordination.’126 
In Chapter Two, the role of decentralisation in fostering development was highlighted. It was 
argued that decentralisation is important in ensuring efficiency and income redistribution, 
which are necessary for local development. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers therefore help 
in reducing the horizontal fiscal imbalances, and the efficient allocation of resources based on 
local preference.127 The formula based nature of Intergovernmental fiscal transfers should 
therefore be equitable, and responsive to local needs. 
7. Intergovernmental relations 
The institutions of local governments and the powers and functions that devolve thereto may 
cause tensions between the central government and local governments.128 These tensions may 
relate to the exercise of local governments’ executive and legislative powers. If these conflicts 
are not managed well, the entire scheme of decentralisation may fail. The discussion below 
highlights the importance of intergovernmental relations (IGR) and the significance of each 
type. 
Watts defines IGR as the interaction between components of government at all levels within a 
political system.129 Some of the existing debates on local government demonstrate serious 
                                                 
126 Shah 1998: 34. 
127 See Chapter Two § 2.3.1.3. See also Sewell 1996: 146-7 
128 Okidi & Guloba 2006:9. 
129 Watts 2001: 23. 
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misgivings regarding the rationale for devolving power and its purported advantages.130 The 
low levels of political participation of certain social groups, corruption, inefficiency and 
underdevelopment, are challenges that still confront many local governments. It is argued that 
supervision and regulation of local governments, on the one hand, and co-operation, on the 
other, are critical features of a decentralised system of government. It is further argued that 
the supervision of local governments in a manner that is less confrontational with central 
government calls for a system of IGR. As stated by Siegle and O’Mahony, 
decentralization is a collaborative process. Effective decentralization is dependent on the 
cooperation of and coordination with the central government. Central government officials 
must be willing and committed to share some of their authority and resources if 
decentralization is to be effective. Local government leaders, in turn, must be capable of 
managing additional authority while accepting central government oversight.131 
Thus, good IGR should aim at fostering friendly relations between central government and 
local governments for the success of a coherent system of devolved power.132 Lambright 
cautions that the absence of a proper system of IGR may limit the success of decentralisation, 
given the dominant role of the central government, especially in many African countries.133 
De Visser makes a case for IGR as a balancing act between the benefits of autonomy to local 
government and the need for supervision by central government.134 He argues that there are 
three essential conditions for a system of intergovernmental relations. These are: 
                                                 
130 Shah 1997: 20. 
131 Siegle & O’Mahony 2006: 4 
132 Steytler 2009: 552. 
133 Lambright 2011: 76. 
134 De Visser 2005: 278. 
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• constitutional recognition of IGR 
• mutual respect for the institutional status of other orders of government 
• the institutional design of IGR that is legally enforceable in courts of law.135 
The discussion below deals with the different types of IGR and the impact of the adoption of 
either of the types to the devolution of powers. There are two major types of IGR: the more 
intrusive or ‘hard edge’ IGR or less intrusive, ‘soft edge’ IGR. In this chapter, ‘hard edge’ 
refers to the supervision of local government. ‘Soft edge’ refers to co-operation between 
central government and local government. The adoption of a particular type of IGR depends 
on the extent of devolution of powers from the central government to lower orders of 
government.136 
7.1 Supervision 
Supervision is an intrusive measure intended to correct local government failures.137 The 
rationale for supervision is that the central government must retain some level of leverage so 
that the autonomy granted to lower orders of government does not exacerbate the negative 
consequences associated with decentralisation.138 In a way, supervision neutralises the 
                                                 
135 De Visser 2005: 278. (Watts 2001: 26) argues, a system of IGR should be able to manage intergovernmental 
conflicts. 
136 Azfar et al. 2001: 48-60. 
137 De Visser 2005: 170. 
138 See Chapter Three § 2.4.5.  
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dangers of decentralisation. The absence of supervision may lead to a dysfunctional system of 
local governance.139 
Supervision is characterised by three main instruments: regulation, monitoring, and 
intervention. It is argued that supervision of local governments must be predictable, respect 
the autonomy of local governments,140 and must be proportional.141 
7.1.1 Predictability 
A framework for supervision of local government affairs should be stable and certain. This 
means that the circumstances under which the central government may supervise must be 
known to local governments. The key test is whether central government supervision has been 
‘confined to a posteriori verification of the legality of local authority acts’.142 The idea is that 
once local governments know precisely when the central government may supervise, then 
they will have to confine their authority to their constitutional democratic and developmental 
role.143 Unpredictability in the nature and manner of supervision is a disincentive for 
democratic nurturing, economic development and peaceful co-existence of diverse groups in a 
given country. In order to have a predictable system of supervision, any administrative 
supervision of local authorities should be according to clearly defined procedures.144 
                                                 
139 Shah 1998: 30. 
140 De Visser 2005: 174-98. 
141 De Visser 2005: 199. 
142 See AGRED para. C 11. 
143 Article 8(1) ECLSG; AGRED para. C 10. 
144 Article 8(1) ECLSG. 
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7.1.2 Autonomy of local governments 
Whenever central government exercises its supervisory powers, it should be in the context of 
promoting institutional autonomy of local governments. The objective of supervision by the 
central government should be to be to ensure that the devolution process succeeds. 
Particularly during an intervention, the legislative powers of the local government should be 
left intact, as it manifests the constitutional autonomy of any local government.145 
7.1.3 ‘Proportionality test’ in supervision 
The key principle in supervision of local government is the proportionality test.146 In other 
words: is the supervision commensurate with the object and purpose of decentralisation? 
Supervision of local governments should not diminish the local government’s power to take 
initiative and make decisions.147 Thus, supervision is a form of intrusion148 which requires 
independent bodies, such as courts of law, to oversee the nature and extent of the supervision 
by central government.149 
7.2 Co-operation 
Co-operation is the ‘soft edge’ of IGR because of its less intrusive nature in the local 
governments by the central government. Chapter Two presented an overview of principles 
derived from international soft law. A number of declarations relating to, or dealing with, 
                                                 
145 See AGRED para. C 11. 
146 Article 8(3) ECLSG. 
147 Article 8(4) WWDLSG (the Toronto Declaration).  
148 De Visser 2005: 179. 
149 See AGRED para. C 14. 
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decentralisation make a case for co-operation.150 It was argued that co-operation, in principle, 
‘neutralises’ the negatives effects of autonomy, on the one hand, and limits the central 
government’s tendencies to re-centralise local governments, on the other. As Levy and 
Tapscott state, ‘co-operative government is an imperative for stability and peace’.151 
Haysom juxtaposes the competitive federalism as espoused in the Canadian federal system 
with the co-operative federalism as espoused under the Germany federal system to make a 
case for co-operative government in IGR as a collective exercise of power.152 
De Visser, building on Murray’s synthesis of a framework for South Africa’s local 
governments,153 explains that each individual local government exercises its autonomy for the 
common good of the county as a whole, through co-operation.154 It is argued that co-operation 
is a condition for a local government to achieve democracy, development and peace. Thus, 
‘co-operative government means that national policy must be sensitive to local ... needs and 
concerns and must not ignore or ride roughshod over them’.155 
                                                 
150 See Chapter Two § 2.8. 9. 
151 Levy &Tapscott 2001: 9.  
152 Haysom 2001: 52. 
153 Murray 2001: 67. According to Murray, the Constitution of South Africa provides an innovative standard of 
formal description of the allocation of powers to local government with clear-cut parameters on how the system 
should operate. For instance, section 40 provides that the spheres of government are ‘distinctive’, 
‘interdependent’ and ‘interrelated’. 
154 De Visser 2005: 214. 
155 Murry & Nijzing 2002: 42. 
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7.3 Instruments of supervision 
7.3.1 Regulation 
The phrase ‘regulation of local government’ in its literal sense refers to the act of establishing 
the framework within which local government autonomy maybe exercised.156 De Visser 
distinguishes regulatory powers dealing with local governments’ institutions and the 
regulatory powers affecting local governments’ functions.157 
Through regulation, the central government may design the local government institutions and 
their powers and functions to fit with the objectives of decentralisation.158  
7.3.2 Monitoring and evaluation 
The discussion below illustrates the importance of monitoring as a feature of supervision in 
IGR. The discussion also highlights the relationship between monitoring and supervision and 
concludes that monitoring is a form of supervision. Although the term ‘monitoring’ in the 
discourse of decentralisation is sometimes described as antecedent to the power to ‘support’, 
‘promote’ and ‘supervise’ local government, it is distinguishable from the power to control.159 
Generally, the power to monitor is not a power to intrude into the affairs of local government. 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa, while examining the central government’s power to 
monitor local governments, held that ‘[w]e do not interpret the monitoring power as 
bestowing additional or residual powers of provincial intrusion on the domain of LG, beyond 
                                                 
156 Kavanagh 2002: 985. 
157 De Visser 2005: 170. 
158 Steytler 2008: 518. 
159 See the South African case of Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South African 1996 (10) 
BCLR 1253 (CC) para. 371-373, cited in De Visser 2005: 179. 
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perhaps the power to measure or test at intervals LG compliance with national and provincial 
legislative directives ...’160 
Reporting is part and parcel of monitoring in IGR. It is argued that there ought to be a 
mechanism by means of which the framework set by the central government can be enforced. 
Consequently, if ‘monitoring of local governments by “senior” governments is necessary in 
order to pick up early signals of problems that require intervention of some sort’,161 the means 
by which monitoring can be achieved have to be clarified. Indeed, some writers on local 
governments in Africa now place emphasis on self-reporting as a means through which local 
governments endeavour to ensure compliance with their obligations.162 It is argued that 
reporting is a key compliance measure of local governments’ constitutional and legislative 
obligations. International human rights law offers a good example of reporting as a means of 
ensuring compliance with standards of state party obligations.163 
Reporting on the performance of local governments provides a way of correcting errors. 
Reporting may also help poorly performing local governments adopt better practices.164 It is 
emphasised that the aim of reporting should ordinarily be concerned with information 
                                                 
160 See Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa para. 373 cited in De Visser 2005: 
179. 
161 De Visser 2005: 260, (emphasis in the text). 
162 De Visser 2005: 160. 
163 See CESCR General comment 1, Reporting by States parties UN doc. document E/1989/22, 24/02/1989 para. 
1, available at http: //www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/38e23a6ddd6c0f4dc12563ed0051cde7?Open 
document (accessed 20 September 2010). 
164 Kugonza 2012: 5. 
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gathering and should never be used as a means to penalise any local government for poor 
performance. 
7.3.3 Intervention 
Where monitoring of local governments by the central government reveals evidence of failure 
on the part of local governments, intervention may be triggered. Strictly speaking, a power to 
intervene may appear oppressive,165 and may in fact run counter to the notion of local 
government autonomy. However, as De Visser points out, intervention is part of an 
institutional design that seeks to promote the objects of local governments.166 The author 
further explains that interventions ‘can work as “insurance policies” for the central 
governments in that these governments will let go of some of their traditional areas of 
governance in return for security that, if there are serious failures, there are instruments 
available to address them’.167 The question then becomes: what does an intervention as an 
instrument of supervision entail and what are its parameters?  
As a rule, intervention must be exercised within the parameters of promoting the integrity and 
the objectives of local government. It is argued that intervention in local governments must be 
predictable, respect the autonomy of local governments, and must be proportional.168 
                                                 
165 Murray 1999: 335. 
166 De Visser 2005: 185. 
167 De Visser 2005: 197. 
168 De Visser 2005: 199. 
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7.4 Instruments of co-operation 
The discussion below focuses on co-operation as a type of IGR. As noted above, the powers 
and functions devolved to local governments require regulation and supervision by the central 
government. Yet over-regulation of local government institutions and supervision of local 
government may impede decentralisation. It is argued that co-operation is about relations of 
equality of different orders of government in the exercise of their distinct powers. Therefore, 
the two distinct orders of government ought to work together in executing their different 
mandates. 
Co-operation as a type of IGR focuses on the role of local government associations, joint 
plans and dispute resolutions. It is also argued that IGR may either be horizontal or take the 
nature of intergovernmental agreements. 
7.4.1 Associations of local governments 
Emerging international ‘soft’ law on decentralisation provides for the right of local 
governments to form associations169 and on the central government to ‘consult associations of 
local authorities when passing legislation affecting local government’.170 Associations of local 
governments provide a more reliable way of engaging in negotiations with central 
government than a single local government on its own.171  
                                                 
169 See Chapter Two § 2.9.8.  
170 Article 9(2) of the Toronto Declaration. 
171 Murray (2001). See also Article 10 of ECLSG. 
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7.4.2 Integrated planning  
The devolution of powers to local governments calls for co-operation in the planning process 
between the central government and local governments,172 hence the notion of integrated 
planning (joint planning) characterised as the epicentre of development.173 Integrated 
planning as an instrument of co-operative local government is foundational to local 
democracy.174 In South Africa, for instance, integrated planning is defined as ‘a participatory 
process of planning, through which the municipality assesses its needs, prioritises them and 
formulates objectives and strategies to address these needs’.175 Local governments cannot 
address their needs and priorities outside the overall national policy framework and priority 
areas.176 As a strategy, IGR joint planning ensures that the local governments’ needs form 
part of the umbrella state policies and development goals. As an instrument of co-operative 
governance, integrated planning requires ‘bottom-up development’: the ‘institutionalisation of 
integration refers to a legal framework that enables local government to participate, as an 
equal partner, in the integration of various levels of government.’177 
7.4.3 Intergovernmental agreements 
Intergovernmental service agreements are mutual undertakings between units of state or local 
governments with each other to provide common services in a local government or in 
                                                 
172 Katono 2007:76. 
173 De Visser 2005: 85. 
174 Okidi & Guloba 2006: 6. 
175 De Visser 2005: 85. 
176 Katono 2007:75. 
177 De Visser 2005: 211. 
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different local governments.178 Essentially, intergovernmental agreements focus on the 
‘overlapping of powers’.179 For example two or more organs of state may each have distinct 
powers that relate to one common project. In such cases, they may conclude an agreement 
about their powers to make that one common project work 180 Intergovernmental agreements 
amongst different local governments can result in delivery of certain large-scale services, such 
as water and education. When an IGR agreement is between local governments, it is a 
manifestation of horizontal IGR.181  
Intergovernmental agreements can promote efficiency in resource allocation and create a 
forum for mutual discussion amongst different local government units.182 Intergovernmental 
agreements are therefore crucial instruments for fostering co-operation and peace in a nation 
state.183  
7.4.4 Intergovernmental dispute resolution 
The essence of a dispute resolution mechanism in IGR is an honest admission that there are 
bound to be conflicts between organisations.184 Within the context of devolution of powers to 
lower orders of government, it is preferable that a mechanism for a fair resolution of conflict 
is in place. For instance, a dispute may arise by passing a law in an area where both the 
central government and local governments exercise a concurrent or residual power. Without a 
                                                 
178 Flood et al. 1997: 112. 
179 Gillette 2001: 194, cited in Reynolds 2003: 123. 
180 De Visser 2005: 212. 
181 Mohnach1999: 164. 
182 Mohnach (1999). 
183 Mohnach (1999). 
184 Steytler 2001: 175-80. 
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mechanism for resolving disputes amongst the different orders of government, the real 
benefits of decentralisation are endangered. It is argued that the legal framework should 
provide for a forum to deal with IGR disputes outside the traditional adjudication structures.  
8. Conclusion 
The above discussion highlights the critical features necessary for a successful system of 
decentralisation. The argument has been that in order to protect the integrity of local 
governments, constitutional recognition of local government, demarcation of boundaries, 
electoral systems and traditional institutions that underpin the system of decentralisation must 
be constitutionally recognised and entrenched. It was also argued that in multi-ethnic 
countries, local governments should adopt an electoral system that is not only inclusive but 
fosters political stability. 
It was also argued that an adequate decentralised system should ensure that local governments 
should be vested with the discretion to fully exercise executive and legislative powers. Thus, 
preference is placed on sharing of power between the central government and local 
governments. Creating lower orders of government with no independent revenue-generating 
capacity and little or no discretion to spend such revenue according to local priorities is 
antithetical to the theory of decentralisation. Invariably, the integrity of local government is 
unrealistic unless local government institutions are vested with the discretion to generate their 
own revenue and spend it. The argument for independent local government fiscal powers is 
also mindful of the role of central government transfers: hence the emphasis placed on the 
role of central government transfers in local economic development. 
It was argued that a successful decentralised system of government should recognise the role 
of traditional leaders by vesting them with special seats in the local government councils as 
well as the right to veto local government laws and policies. This, it was argued, may lead to a 
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mutual influence of traditional leadership with modern democratic values. Further, it was 
argued that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ design of local government may exacerbate some of the 
inadequacies of decentralisation. In countries where there are strong ethnic or economic 
disparities among communities, an asymmetrical form of local government is desirable. The 
discussion also highlighted the importance of local governments’ discretion to hire and fire 
their own staff in order to have a meaningful decentralised system. Reiterating the 
relationship between development and political stability, the chapter identified IGR as an all-
encompassing feature of a successful decentralised system of government.  
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4. CHAPTER FOUR 
DECENTRALISATION IN UGANDA: HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 
1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a historical background to local government in Uganda. Emphasis is 
placed on the disruption of the traditional institutions of government that existed before the 
introduction of novel and ‘modern’ Western European forms of government in Uganda. It will 
be argued that the introduction of Western European institutions of governance alienated most 
communities from participating in decision-making. The pre-colonial organisation in Buganda 
that was rolled out to the rest of the Uganda Protectorate soon after the Buganda Agreement 
will be the chapter’s point of departure. The political and constitutional developments, 
regarding local governments, from the pre-colonial period and the independence period up to 
1995, are also examined. 
The Buganda Kingdom is the focus of the thesis for two main reasons. First, the system of 
Buganda Kingdom’s administration that predated colonial rule was replicated in all other 
parts of the country by the British colonial rulers through the method of indirect rule. 
Secondly, the system of the Buganda Kingdom’s political organisation was similar to that of 
other kingdoms in Uganda, like the Ankole, Toro, and Bunyoro Kingdoms. Thus, the 
Buganda Kingdom’s traditional pre-colonial system of administration is fairly representative 
of the general administrative structures in the entire country before the advent of foreign rule. 
The questions that this chapter proposes to answer are as follows. Is the decentralisation 
phenomenon new in Uganda? Do the pre-colonial political and institutional features of the 
Buganda Kingdom have any role to play in the discourse on decentralisation in Uganda 
today? Did the sharing of powers, under the 1962 Constitution, between the central 
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government and the traditional Kingdoms in Uganda, then provide a model for reforming the 
present decentralisation legal and policy frameworks? The above questions will help us to 
understand the connection between law, history and politics with regard to local government 
in Uganda.1 
2. Political and administrative structures of Buganda before British rule 
Even before the coming of the European missionaries, Arab merchants, and later colonial 
rulers, the Buganda Kingdom had had a long history as a sophisticated model of political 
organisation which rivalled the political organisation of many pre-industrial Western 
European countries.2 Ssekandi and Gitta trace the Buganda Kingdom’s history well back to 
the 14th century, explaining the hereditary nature of leadership through a hierarchical system 
of chiefs. At the helm of political and cultural leadership was the King (the Kabaka), who was 
also referred to as the chief land owner (Ssebatakka). His ascendance to power took place 
through clan lineage. The Kabaka is considered to be the giver of grace and favour and an 
embodiment of Bugandan cultural identity.3 
Below the Kabaka was the Prime Minister, known as the Katikiro, who presided over the 
Parliament (the lukiiko). Below the Katikiro was the Chief Justice (the Omulamuzi), who 
presided over all matters of dispute resolution, with a right of appeal by an aggrieved party to 
the King. Below the Chief Justice was the Treasurer (the Omwanika), who was responsible 
for the collection of revenue from all subjects and the semi-independent states within 
Buganda. Finally, there was the Queen mother (the Namasole) who played an advisory role to 
                                                 
1 Kunal 2003: 6. 
2 Apter 1967: 63-4. 
3 Ssekandi & Gitta 1994: 194. 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
Chapter 4: Decentralisation in Uganda: History and Overview 
the King. In other words, a King could not take a decision without notifying all the other 
officials mentioned above as well as the Queen mother.4 
The Buganda Kingdom’s system of administration was highly decentralised through a system 
of chiefs who were appointed by the Kabaka.5 The county chief (the Ssaza chief) was the 
highest in the hierarchy of chiefs (historically there were 20 Ssazas in the Buganda Kingdom), 
followed by the sub-county chief (the Gomborora chief). Below the Gomborora chief was the 
Parish chief (the Muluka chief). The lowest level of administration was the sub-parish chief 
(the Muntongole). Generally speaking, the term mutongole also means a local leader.6 
Mamdani argues that while chiefs in the pre-colonial period were limited by the king’s 
powers, they too were limited by the will of the populace.7 According to Mamdani, this was a 
form of peer mechanism in leadership to ensure discipline. 
The Buganda Kingdom had different clans, whose leaders served as chiefs in different 
administrative roles. These clans were organised according to their different totemic 
connections. The leaders of these clans, also known as the Abataka, controlled the land tenure 
system and supervised the observance of the customs concerning marriage, succession, and 
other social relationships.8 The different clans indicate that even within homogenous 
kingdoms like Buganda, there existed social groups which were not only respected but 
culturally accommodated for the purposes of political cohesion.9 
                                                 
4 Apter 1967: 44. 
5 Nabudere 1980: 19. 
6 Apter 1967: 95. 
7 Mamdani 1996: 46. 
8 Ssekandi & Gitta 1994: 194. 
9 Ssekandi & Gitta 1994: 194. 
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2.1 The role of the traditional Lukiiko 
As mentioned, the Lukiiko was the traditional parliament of the Buganda Kingdom. The 
Lukiiko consisted of three native ministers as ex officio senior members thereof. These were: 
the Prime Minister, (the Katikiro); the Chief Justice (the Omulamuzi); and the Treasurer or 
Controller of the Kabaka’s revenues (the Omwanika). The term Lukiiko loosely translates into 
the word ‘meeting’ or a traditional assembly or meeting place. Traditionally, admission to the 
Lukiiko was limited to chiefs and the Kabaka’s appointed ministers, who were usually old 
men. The debates in the Lukiiko were open to the public and relatively democratic. The 
Lukiiko passed resolutions regarding war and mercy, and ensured an orderly coronation 
process for a new king. It also passed laws for the Kingdom.10 It is for this reason that even 
after interaction with modern European systems of parliamentary democracy, the Buganda 
Kingdom was keen to preserve the Lukiiko, rather than abandon it, albeit with limited 
success.11 
2.2 Boundary demarcation in pre-colonial Buganda 
Before colonial rule, traditional leadership boundaries were determined by geographical 
features, such as rivers, mountains, swamps, and lakes. In addition, language and cultural 
differences played a role in determining the physical boundaries of an identified ethnic group. 
Rarely were any stone markers or maps used to clearly delineate where a boundary of one 
Ssaza began or ended. However, somehow its boundaries were known and accepted by the 
                                                 
10 Twaddle 1993: 12-30. 
11 Nabudere 1980: 30. 
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different Ssazas within Buganda. Similarly, the boundaries of the Buganda Kingdom itself 
were drawn along geographical, linguistic and cultural lines.12 
2.3 Analysis of the traditional leadership 
The first conclusion that one may draw from the above description of the pre-colonial 
Buganda Kingdom’s traditional institutions of governance, is that devolution of power as a 
form of governance, as discussed in Chapters Two and Three, is not an entirely new 
phenomenon in Uganda.13 The different traditional governments that existed before colonial 
rule were either centralised or decentralised. In both cases, there existed a hierarchy of power. 
Rugege, writing on traditional leadership in Africa, argues that these leaders were the keepers 
of values and responsible for the defence of the kingdom as well as for food production.14 The 
author further argues that there was a high level of participatory democracy, where decision-
making took place in assemblies of men.15 The Buganda Kingdom’s pre-colonial tradition 
government conforms to the above view. 
Commenting on the effect of colonial rule in Africa, Oomen16 describes it as both a nightmare 
and a culture dialogue. According to the author, colonial rule was a nightmare because of the 
dehumanising nature of foreign rule, and a dialogue because of the interaction between two 
                                                 
12 Apter 1967: 96. 
13 Chapter Two § 2.3 and Chapter Three § 3.2.5. 
14 Rugege 2003: 172-3.  
15 Rugege (2003). 
16 Oomen 2005: 13-29. 
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different political and legal orders.17 Starting with the ‘nightmare’ Oomen describes, this part 
of the chapter examines how colonial rule disrupted existing local government structures. 
Much has been written about European colonial administration in Africa, which requires no 
further inquiry in this thesis.18 However, it is necessary to examine the nature of the colonial 
state that was adopted in Uganda during the period 1900-1962. In British colonial Africa, the 
method of rule was indirect. Indirect rule, a method espoused by Captain Lugard,19 ensured 
that the natives had a say in the day-to-day administration of the territories under British 
rule.20 In order to better exploit the African resources at the time, it was imperative that 
Africans were granted a stake in their native lands.21 It is argued that the Buganda Agreement 
of 1900 was one of the instruments through which the natives’ resources could be exploited. 
The British colonial government thus adopted the system of indirect rule by signing an 
agreement with the native rulers of the Buganda Kingdom, known as the Buganda Agreement 
of 1900, which will be discussed below. 
3. The Buganda Agreement of 1900: Critical features 
The Kingdom of Buganda entered into three agreements with the British government between 
1894 and 1955. The most crucial of these was the Buganda Agreement of 1900, on which this 
part of the chapter focuses. The fact that the Buganda Agreement of 1900 was ‘sowed’ on an 
                                                 
17 Oomen 2005: 13-29. 
18 See Milner (1948: 12); Speak (1863); Margery (1960); Nsibambi (1968); Morris & Read (1966); Nabudere 
(1980); Museveni (1997); Ibingira (1973); Karugire (1988). 
19 Lugard 1965: 18. 
20 Lugard 1965: 18. 
21 Lugard 1965: 18.  
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ill-prepared political landscape is another matter that requires a separate inquiry. As Ssekandi 
and Gitta argue, the Buganda Agreement of 1900 ensured that the Kingdom of Buganda 
became the colonial administrative launch pad from which the British annexed the rest of the 
territory that now comprises modern Uganda.22 
The Buganda Agreement of 1900 was signed between a young Kabaka (the King) through his 
regents, who could hardly read and understand English, and the representatives of Her 
Majesty the Queen of England.23 
Despite the fact that it was imposed on a young Kabaka, it laid down legal parameters within 
which the colonial government could administer the local units. It was an important milestone 
in the political and legal landscape. The Agreement laid the earliest foundation for 
decentralisation of government in Uganda,24 and also provided for new systems of land 
ownership, as well as environment protection.25 
For the purposes of native administration the Kingdom of Uganda was divided into districts or 
administrative counties.26 Each chief was charged with the responsibility to administer justice 
                                                 
22 Ssekandi & Gitta 1994: 194. 
23 Lugard (1893). 
24 Lugard (1893). 
25 See Article 15 of the Agreement. 
26 These were Kiagwe (sic), Bugerere, Bulemezi, Buruli, Bugangadzi (sic), Buyaga, Bwekula (sic), Singo, 
Busuju, Gomba, Butunzi, Kiadondo (sic), Mawokoto, Buvuma, Sese, Buddu, Koki, Mawogola, and Kabula. In 
each county there was a paid chief, selected by the Kabaka’s government. The words ‘Kiagwe’, ‘Bugangadzi’, 
‘Bwekula’, and ‘Kiadondo’ were mispronounced names of some of the counties of the Buganda and the 
Bunyoro Kingdoms. The correct names are Kyagwe, Bugangaizi, Buwekula, and Kiryandogo. 
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among the natives in his county, the assessment and collection of taxes, the maintenance of 
the main roads, and the general supervision of native affairs.27 
The Buganda Agreement of 1900 recognised the Lukiiko, which was described as the Native 
Council. The membership thereof had to be sanctioned and approved by Her Majesty’s 
representative in Uganda.28 
The Buganda Agreement of 1900 resulted in the loss of the Buganda Kingdom’s political 
autonomy. Scholars such as Ssekandi and Gitta argue that the fact that the Buganda Kingdom 
signed an agreement with the British colonial government was an acknowledgment of the 
Buganda Kingdom’s strength in the British protectorate.29 However, the above view is 
misleading given the effect of article 2 of the Agreement, which was in fact a poignant 
symbol of the Buganda Kingdom’s loss of sovereignty. 
Article 2 of the Agreement stated: ‘The Kabaka and chiefs of Uganda hereby agree 
henceforth to renounce in favour of Her Majesty the Queen any claims to tribute they may 
                                                 
27 Article 9 of the 1900 Buganda Agreement. 
28 Article 10 of the 1900 Buganda Agreement. For example the Agreement provided that the Kabaka could 
select three notables from each county to sit on the Native Council and dismiss them as he pleased, with the 
consent of Her Majesty’s representative in Uganda. In fact, before giving effect to any resolutions voted by the 
Native Council, the Kabaka was mandated to consult with Her Majesty’s representative in Uganda. Article 6 of 
the Buganda Agreement of 1900 also provided that the Native Council, or a committee thereof, acted as a Court 
of Appeal from the decisions of the lower courts headed by the county chiefs. However, the appeals from the 
decisions of the Native Council lay in the High Court, whose judges were appointed by Her Majesty’s 
representative in Uganda. Thus the Buganda Agreement of 1900 not only altered the traditional composition of 
the Native Council, but also limited its role as an institution of political discussion. 
29 Ssekandi & Gitta 1994: 194. 
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have had on the adjoining provinces of the Uganda Protectorate’. The Buganda Agreement of 
1900 elevated the Buganda Kingdom’s position in the British Protectorate of Uganda,30 and 
formally recognised the Kabaka as the native ruler of Buganda. However, the recognition of 
the Kabaka was dependent upon the Kabaka’s and the chiefs’ co-operation with the colonial 
administrators.31 Thus, the position enjoyed by the Buganda Kingdom depended on the 
whims of the central government, and not on its status as a partner in government. Moreover, 
the Buganda Kingdom was a province in the Protectorate of the same rank as any other 
province.32 The Agreement turned the institution of Kabakaship into an elected office, with 
monetary payments to the Kabaka, his chiefs and the rest of the royal families.33 Thus, the 
Kabaka, who historically had ruled on the basis of the social consent of the inhabitants of the 
Buganda Kingdom, became a paid servant of the British colonial rule. 
One of the fundamental ramifications of the Buganda Agreement was the introduction of 
taxation as the main source of raising revenue, not only in the Buganda Kingdom but later in 
the entire country. The Agreement provided for the Buganda Kingdom’s right to collect 
revenue, and to appropriate native labour.34 However, tax administration and collection were 
characterised by force and repression. Forced tax collection led to tax riots later on in Uganda, 
and ultimately affected the legitimacy of tax collection during colonial rule. The introduction 
                                                 
30 Golooba-Mutebi 2008: 4. 
31 Article 6 of the 1900 Buganda Agreement. 
32 Article 3 of the 1900 Buganda Agreement. 
33 Article 6 of the 1900 Buganda Agreement. 
34 Article 15 of the 1900 Buganda Agreement.  
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of taxation as a means of revenue collection in the Buganda Kingdom therefore alienated the 
institutions of the Kakaba from the majority of the Kingdom’s subjects.35 
3.1 Boundary demarcation 
The Buganda Agreement of 1900 annexed the counties of Buyaga and Bugangadzi to 
Buganda Kingdom, territories that belonged to the rival Kingdom of Bunyoro that had 
resisted colonial rule. The inclusion of these territories into the Buganda Kingdom’s territory 
was a form of payment for Buganda’s co-operation with the British colonial administrators in 
the fight against the Bunyoro Kingdom.36 The Buganda Agreement of 1900, therefore, 
changed the historical boundaries of the counties of the Buganda Kingdom by annexing 
thereto traditional boundaries of the Bunyoro Kingdom within the Uganda British 
Protectorate. In reality, the Buganda Kingdom did not exert complete political control over 
them.37 
It is argued that the manner in which colonial boundaries were drawn under both the Buganda 
Agreement of 1900 and the Uganda Order-in-Council of 1902, and the considerations, if any, 
that were taken into account in drawing up these boundaries, should be examined. What can 
be said here is that the Buganda Kingdom’s boundaries, on the one hand, and other areas of 
the Uganda Protectorate, on the other, were haphazardly drawn. Nonetheless, the demarcation 
                                                 
35 Mamdani 1996: 141-2. 
36 See generally Nabudere (1980). 
37 Under Article 15 of the 1900 Buganda Agreement forests, cultivable land, and minerals on private estates 
within the Buganda kingdom were brought under the control of the British colonial authority. 
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of boundaries based on ethnicity helped in unifying people who shared a common history, 
language and culture, but at the risk of national unity.38 
The Buganda Agreement of 1900 merely lists which rivers, forests, mountains or hills formed 
the boundaries of counties in Buganda, on the one hand, and the Buganda Kingdom’s 
boundaries in the Protectorate, on the other. The Agreement, however, did not make specific 
boundary marks.39 The Buganda Kingdom’s boundary demarcations were, however, clearly 
stipulated accurately later under the Uganda Order-in-Council of 1902.40 
In terms of the Uganda Order-in-Council of 1902, Uganda consisted of five provinces.41 
Under the 1902 Order-in-Council the Governor could determine the boundaries of any part of 
a province or district that formed part of the Protectorate, as he deemed fit.42 In theory and 
practice, the Governor could eliminate the geographical and political existence of the 
Buganda Kingdom if he chose to. 
                                                 
38 The Odoki Commission 1994: 482. 
39 Article 1of the 1900 Buganda Agreement. 
40 See the Uganda Order-in-Council No1 of 1902. The British Orders-in-Council were laws made by the Privy 
Council or Queen-in-Council to help the British colonial office to formally exert legislative and political control 
over British spheres of influence during the colonial period.  
41 The five provinces were: the Central Province, comprising the districts of Elgon, Karamoja, Busoga, Bukedi, 
and Labor; the Province of Rudolf (which later became part of eastern Kenya), comprising the districts of 
Turknel, Turkana, and Dabossa; the Nile Province, comprising the districts of Dodiya, Baru, and Shuli; the 
Western Province, comprising the districts of Unyoro (sic), Toro, and Ankole; and, finally, the Kingdom of 
Uganda (sic), with the islands appertaining thereto. See section 1 of the Uganda Order-in-Council N.1 of 1902. 
The names ‘Unyoro’ and ‘Uganda’ were mispronounced words referring to ‘Bunyoro’ and ‘Buganda’, 
respectively. 
42 Sections 6(1) and (2) of the Uganda Order-in-Council N.1 of 1902. 
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4. Alteration of the Buganda Agreement and the District 
Commissioner’s absolute power 
The events preceding the Buganda Agreement of 1900 illustrate that the British colonial 
government did not want to be legally restrained by any colonial agreements with native 
African rulers. Mugambwa argues that the signing of the 1900 Buganda Agreement coincided 
with the change in the British colonial government’s legal thinking that sought to extend the 
colonial legislative powers on all matters in every British colony, without exception.43 Even if 
the author is of the view that the Buganda Agreement remained a legal document in its own 
right up to 1950,44 it is argued that the 1902 Order-in-Council45 in practice repudiated it. 
What remained of the Buganda Agreement of 1900 (insofar as the powers of the Crown’s 
representative were concerned) was more of a political gimmick, rather than having any legal 
value.46 This view finds support in the fact that only the colonial government reserved a right 
to repudiate the Buganda Agreement of 1900.47 
Among other things, the 1902 Order-in-Council vested the exercise of power and jurisdiction 
over the Uganda Protectorate in the British Crown representatives,48 and in effect repudiated 
                                                 
43 Mugambwa 1987: 246. 
44 Mugambwa 1987: 274. 
45 Article 16 of the 1902 Order-in-Council. 
46 See Rex v Buganda Cotton Company [1930] 4 ULR 34. 
47 Article 20 of the 1900 Buganda Agreement. 
48 See the preamble to the Uganda Order-in-Council N.1 of 1902. See also Attorney-General v Godfrey 
Katondwaki [1963] E.A 328. 
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the terms of the Agreement.49 The 1902 Order-in-Council designated the Commissioner as the 
person in charge of the Protectorate administration.50 
The Commissioner was also the ‘law making body’ in the Protectorate. He could make laws 
for forms of revenue and their collection, administration of justice, peace, and good 
governance.51 The Commissioner, therefore, had exclusive legislative authority in the 
Protectorate and was subject only to the Secretary of State. In the exercise of his legislative 
authority, the Commissioner was only required to respect existing native laws and customs as 
long as they were not repugnant to English law.52 In summary, the Order-in-Council gave the 
Commissioner absolute powers in the administration of the Protectorate which no court could 
question.53 Thus, the excessive powers of the Commissioner overshadowed the traditional 
idea of leadership through consultation that had characterised the institution of the Kabaka of 
the Buganda Kingdom. 54 
4.1 The establishment of the colonial authority 
Changes were introduced by the Order-in-Council of 1920 which ended the fusion of 
legislative powers and executive powers. Instead, it established the Legislative and 
Administrative Councils as separate entities. The 1920 Order-in-Council provided for an 
Executive Council, but it did not provide for its powers and functions. Instead, the functions 
                                                 
49 Mugambwa 1987: 248. 
50 Mugambwa 1987: 248. 
51 Section 12 of the Uganda Order-in-Council 1902. 
52 Section 12(8) of the Uganda Order-in-Council 1902. 
53 See Nyali Limited v Attorney-General (2) [1956] 1 Q.B at 15 per Lord Denning, L.J. 
54 Seidman 1984: 285, cited in Ndulo 1998: 76. 
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of the Executive Council were given under the Royal Instructions Order of 1920.55 Even if the 
Legislative Council had powers to make laws, its legislative power was subject to the 
Governor’s veto.56 
Between 1949 and 1960, local administrations underwent significant changes.57 For instance, 
the Local Government Ordinance of 1949 (LGO) established a foundation for a multi-tiered 
council system.58 Later, the District Administration (District Councils) Ordinance of 1955 
(DADCO) made district councils more representative, although they were dominated in a 
racist manner by colonial administrators.59 Their functions also were expanded from merely 
acting as agents of the colonial legislative arm to the provision of services, such as land 
administration, primary, junior and secondary education, rural health services, rural feeder 
roads, rural water services, agricultural and veterinary services, and the maintenance of law 
and order.60 
The changes to the composition of the executive and legislative structures by the colonial 
government did not change the fact that the colonial structures were clearly exclusionary and 
oppressive. 
                                                 
55 See the Royal Instructions, 1920 (Laws Vol. VI 104), clauses XV & XXV. 
56 Kanyeihamba 2002: 15. 
57 See Odoki Commission 1994: 483. 
58 Kanyeihamba 2002: 26. 
59 See section 3 of the DADCO; Kanyeihamba (2002). 
60 Section 34 of the DADCO; Odoki Commission 1994: 483. 
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4.2 The impact of colonial rule on the Buganda Kingdom’s institutional 
structures 
Constitutional lawyers and writers have often ridiculed the Buganda Agreement as a relic of 
colonialism, and as a symbol of loss of traditional autonomy.61 However, as the first legal 
document introducing modern local administrative structures in Uganda, the Agreement plays 
a central role in the understanding of Uganda’s constitutional history.62 
As explained, there was no political vacuum in the Buganda Kingdom before the advent of 
British rule. There existed traditional political mechanisms that placed emphasis on consensus 
and dialogue. Thus, when the colonial administrators took over, they not only undermined 
these mechanisms but also ‘liberated’ the chiefs from ‘all institutionalised constraint’.63 The 
laws with which the British administered the entire Uganda Protectorate were inimical to the 
existing traditional structures of the Buganda Kingdom at the time, such as the notion of clan 
meetings.64 Rugege argues that whereas clan meetings in pre-colonial times were 
characterised by open debates, colonial rule was characterised by decrees and ordinances.65 
Moreover, none of the laws made during the colonial period was made by Africans. In this 
regard, traditional institutions of local democracy were replaced by centralised repression.66 
                                                 
61 Mugambwa 1987: 244; Morris & Reed (1972); Apter 1961: 109-33. 
62 Ibingira 1973: 19. 
63 Mamdani 1996: 122. 
64 Kanyeihamba 2002: 55. See also Daudi Ndibarema and Others v The Enganiz of Ankole and Others [1960] 
47. In this case the High Court disputes the view that traditional leaders were the sole custodians of Kingdoms. 
See also Rugege 2003: 173 and Nyali, Ltd v A.G. of Kenya (1956) Q.B 15. 
65 Rugege 2003: 172-173. 
66 Kanyeihamba 2002: 16; Ndulo 1998: 76. 
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The idea of colonial rule was based on the interests of the elites who formed and monopolised 
the centres of power.67 Thus, as Mamdani explains, whenever colonial administrators sought 
to change local power dynamics, they created new political institutions, such as the ‘warrant 
chiefs’ that were unknown to the local citizens.68 Further, Mamdani argues, colonial rule 
stratified local administration into two worlds: the urban, which was ‘civilised’; and the rural, 
which lacked proper amenities such as good sanitation, electricity, good schools and 
hospitals.69 The institutional segregation that was a consequence of this stratification not only 
supported racial discrimination, but ‘nurtured’ local institutions of leadership as inferior, 
meek and undesirable.70 
5. The Buganda Kingdom’s separate quest for independence 
The special position of Buganda Kingdom from the time of the Buganda Agreement caused 
constitutional difficulties for the rest of the Uganda British Protectorate during the struggle 
for independence. First, the Buganda chiefs were used as agents of colonial administration, 
and therefore the Baganda considered themselves superior to other Ugandan ethnic groups.71 
Secondly, it resulted in the dispute over the timing of the granting of Uganda’s Independence. 
While most ethnic groups in the 1950s wanted to have independence as soon as possible, the 
Buganda Kingdom wanted a separate granting of independence and at a later stage.72 Thus, as 
Kanyeihamba argues, whereas the new elites sought to bring change through the adoption of 
                                                 
67 Seidman 1984: 285.  
68 Ndulo 1998-1999: 77. 
69 Mamdani 1996: 122.  
70 Mamdani 1996. 
71 Ssekandi & Gitta 1994: 194. 
72 Ssekandi & Gitta (1994); Kanyeihamba 2002: 48-49. 
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the modern British system of administration and governance, the traditionalists preferred to 
preserve the status quo, including their privileges.73 
The privileges created by the colonial rule resulted in political tensions. Within the traditional 
institutions, there were also tensions over the territories that Buganda had acquired under the 
Buganda Agreement of 190074 from the Bunyoro Kingdom, known as the ‘lost counties’.75 
Both the Ankole and Toro Kingdoms were envious of the special status that the Buganda 
Kingdom enjoyed in the Protectorate.76 Ethnic groups from non-kingdom areas of the North 
also did not like the privileges that were enjoyed by kingdom areas. These differences had to 
be resolved before the British government could hand over power to local politicians.77 
6. Contested political questions before 1962 Independence 
The constitutional negotiations for independence were preceded by two reports compiled by 
the British Colonial Office: the Wild Constitutional Committee Report (1959) and the 
Munster Constitutional Committee Report (1960). Although the Final Report of the Munster 
Committee made a case for a single democratic state with a strong central government, it also 
recommended granting the Buganda Kingdom federal status within Uganda.78 During the 
                                                 
73 Kanyeihamba 2002: 47. 
74 Under Article 9 of the Buganda Agreement of 1900, Buyaga and Bugangaizi counties, which formerly 
belonged to the Bunyoro Kingdom, were given to the Buganda Kingdom. 
75 Kanyeihamba 2002: 59. Presently, Kibale district forms part of the former lost counties. 
76 Kanyeihamba 2002: 47. 
77 Ssekandi & Gitta 1994: 195. 
78 Ssekandi & Gitta (1994); Morris and Read 1966: 70. 
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Constitution Conference on Uganda’s Independence in London in 1961,79 Buganda’s 
delegates’ demand for separate autonomous federal status within Uganda was granted.80 
The three other kingdoms of Ankole,81 Bunyoro82 and Toro,83 and the territories of Busoga 
and Mbale were granted semi-federal status.84 Compared to other areas that remained under 
central government administration, the Kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro were granted 
                                                 
79 Seidman 1984: 56, cited in Ndulo 1998: 81, describes most independent constitutions in former British 
colonies in Africa as ‘an elaborate buffet, with elaborate constitutional provisions from other existing 
constitutions spread across the glittering sideboard, from which the constitutional maker filled her plate to her 
taste ... sentences, paragraphs, whole sections and chapters float from one constitution to the next’. 
Constitutional Conferences, also known as Lancaster Conferences, were common in former British colonies 
before independence. Constitutional Conferences were aimed at negotiating with former British colonies in 
preparation for their independence. Kanyeihamba (2002: 61) explains that ‘all British colonies which gained 
independence, in the 1960 and 1970s, a constitutional conference held in London was always a prelude to “self-
determination”’. 
80 See Schedule I to the 1962 Constitution of Uganda – the Constitution of the Kingdom of Buganda which 
granted a special federal arrangement for Buganda within Uganda. 
81 See Schedule 2 to the 1962 Constitution of Uganda: special provisions relating to the Kingdom of Ankole. 
82 See Schedule 3 to the 1962 Constitution of Uganda: special provisions relating to the Kingdom of Bunyoro. 
83 See Schedule 4 to the 1962 Constitution of Uganda: special provisions relating to the Kingdom of Toro. 
84 See Schedule I to the 1962 Constitution of Uganda: special provisions relating to the Territory of Busoga. The 
distinction between the powers given to the Buganda Kingdom and the powers given to other federal states was 
explained by the High Court in the case of Attorney-General v Godfrey Katondwaki [1963] E.A 328. The High 
Court held that although the semi-federal status of the Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro Kingdoms was reflected in 
schedules to the Constitution, it was in the nature of a treaty incapable of enforcement in courts of law, unless 
incorporated into the Constitution. This decision wrongly implied that the schedules did not form part of the 
Constitution. 
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more powers.85 All other areas fell under the direct administration of the central 
government.86 A further point of contention, as Kanyeihamba explains, was in regard to 
Bunyoro’s ‘lost counties’. The Bunyoro Kingdom, to which the ‘lost counties’ belonged, had 
demanded that the question of the ‘lost counties’ be resolved by the Independence 
Constitutional Conference.87 The recommendations of the Munster Commission, according to 
the author, though adopted by the British government, were never put in place, as no 
referendum took place.88 In order to break the impasse, the Secretary of State for British 
Colonies decided that no transfer would take place, but that the two counties would be 
administered by the central government until a referendum was held by the inhabitants of the 
areas to determine their status.89 
Three political parties had been formed before the first 1962 elections in terms of the pre-
independence negotiations and the 1962 Constitution. The Uganda People Congress (UPC), a 
Protestant-dominated party led by Apollo Milton Obote, won the elections against the 
predominantly Catholic Democratic Party (DP). The Buganda Kingdom Kabaka Y’ekka (KY) 
party (translated as ‘the King Alone’) then entered into an alliance with the UPC known as the 
UPC/KY Alliance.90 
                                                 
85 Kanyeihamba 2002: 65. 
86 Kanyeihamba (2002: 65). See also the List of Towns under Central Government Control under Schedule 10 to 
the 1962 Constitution of Uganda. 
87 Kanyeihamba 2002: 65. 
88 Kanyeihamba (2002). 
89 Kanyeihamba 2002: 65-71. 
90 See the history of the Parliament of Uganda at http://www.parliament.go.ug/index.php?option=com_content 
&task=view &id=4&Itemid=3. KY was a Buganda Kingdom’s conservatives dominated party. President Obote 
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Thus, the 1962 Constitution of Uganda was to a large extent a compromise document after 
numerous negotiations between different ethnic and political groups. It was after the 
negotiations had been completed that the British government issued an instrument of 
independence.91 Notwithstanding the negotiations before the grant of independence to Uganda 
from British colonial rule, the historical traditional ‘value’ that was attached to the culture of 
dialogue and consensus-building in the traditional authorities was missing in the democratic 
process. In the discussion that follows, the political institutions under the 1962 Constitution 
are explained. 
7. The 1962 Uganda Constitution: A general overview 
The most contentious political questions before the promulgation of the 1962 Constitution 
related to the competition for leadership positions and power rather than to issues, such as a 
genuine devolution of power to local governments. Ironically, there was no mention of, or 
attempt at reforming, the colonial state, as evidenced by the political institutional design that 
emerged. Kanyeihamba asserts that the 1962 Ugandan Constitution created a ‘hotchpotch’ 
form of government that was both federal and unitary, with vague delineation of the 
boundaries of the different regions within the country.92 Nonetheless, the 1962 Constitution 
placed emphasis on power-sharing and co-operative government between the central 
government and federal states, especially in the areas of service delivery.93 
                                                                                                                                                        
was the first independence executive Prime Minister, who was twice overthrown by the military, first in 1972, 
again in 1995. 
91 See Uganda Independence Act 1962. 
92 Kanyeihamba 2002: 78. 
93 Section 79(1) of 1962 Constitution. 
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7.1 Buganda’s federal status and other federal states under the 1962 
Constitution 
The Constitution provided for ‘federal states’, ‘districts’, and ‘territories’.94 The federal states 
were the Kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro, and Toro, the ‘Territory of Mbale’, and 
the ‘Territory of Busoga’,95 each of which was dealt with in a separate schedule.96 The federal 
states and territories were designed along the lines of the Buganda Kingdom political 
structures.97 
7.2 Buganda’s political and institutional structures 
The Buganda Constitution provided for the Kabaka as the ‘ruler’ of the Buganda as long as 
he was elected by the majority of votes in the Lukiiko.98 However, candidacy for the 
Kabakaship was limited to those of royal lineage.99 The Buganda Kingdom’s Constitution 
established the Kabaka’s Council consisting of the Katikiro; the Omulamuzi; the Omwanika; 
the Minister of Health and Works; the Minister of Education; the Minister of Natural 
Resources; and the Minister of Local Government.100 The Kabaka’s Council was vested with 
the executive authority of the Buganda Kingdom’s Government.101 All members of the 
                                                 
94 Section 2(1) of 1962 Constitution. 
95 Section of 2(2) 1962 Constitution. 
96 Section 5(1) of 1962 Constitution. 
97 See Milner 1963: 1-63. 
98 Article 2(1) of the Constitution of Buganda. 
99 Article 2(2) of the Constitution of Buganda. 
100 Article 4 of the Constitution of Buganda. 
101 Article 8(1) of the Constitution of Buganda. 
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Kabaka’s Council, with the exception of the Katikiro, were appointed by the Kabaka.102 The 
Katikiro was elected by the Lukiiko from a list of five persons nominated by the Kabaka.103 
It is noted that although the Kabakaship was retained, he was voted for by the Lukiiko. In 
addition, the introduction of the Kabaka’s Council ran counter to the traditional role of clans’ 
heads as the bridge between the Kabaka and the local communities. The Constitution also 
provided for the appointment of a Ssaza chief (county chief) for each Ssaza (county), who 
was responsible for administration and tax collection. Each Ssaza was divided into 
Gombororas (sub-counties), headed by a Gomborora chief (sub-county chief). Each 
Gomborora was divided into Milukas (parishes), with a Muluka chief (parish chief) as the 
head of administration.104 
The legislature of the federal state of Buganda had powers to amend any of the provisions in 
the schedule dealing with the Buganda Kingdom.105 A special procedure was required for 
each of the federal states to approve any legislation that altered that status or part thereof.106 
The Constitution clarified the boundaries of Buganda in respect of the disputed counties of 
Buyaga and Bugangaizi. The boundaries of the federal states of the Buganda and Bunyoro 
Kingdoms were determined in Schedule 11 of the Constitution.107 The federal status of the 
Buganda Kingdom and other federal states was entrenched in the Constitution.108 The 
                                                 
102 Article 10 & 12 of the Constitution of Buganda. 
103 Article 12(2) of the Constitution of Buganda. 
104 Article 41 of the Constitution of Buganda. The word ‘miluka’ is a plural form of the word ‘muluka’. 
105 Section 6 (1) of 1962 Constitution. 
106 Sections 5(2), (3), (4) & (5) of 1962 Constitution. 
107 Section 2(6) of 1962 Constitution. 
108 Section 4 of 1962 Constitution. 
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Constitution also provided for the division of the country into as many constituencies as was 
reasonable. However, no constituency would include any part of the Buganda Kingdom, or 
the territory of another federal state.109 
7.3 Buganda’s financial autonomy 
The 1962 Constitution especially provided for the financial autonomy of the Buganda 
Kingdom. In terms of the 1962 Uganda Constitution, it was mandatory for the central 
government to transfer funds to the Kabaka’s Government.110 The Constitution provided for 
fiscal transfers to other federal states to assist them with the cost of service administration.111 
The Constitution vested the federal states with powers to levy and retain revenue from taxes. 
The Constitution defined the term ‘revenue’ as ‘rate, rent, due, fee, fine, royalty and other 
revenue.’112 
Under the Constitution, the national Parliament could not reduce the power to collect and 
retain revenue to the disadvantage of a federal state of Buganda Kingdom without its 
consent.113 
Schedule 9 of the 1962 Constitution provided for independent revenue sources for the 
Buganda Kingdom.114 The Buganda Kingdom was entitled, in addition to revenue generated 
                                                 
109 Section 46 of 1962 Constitution. 
110 Article 107(1) of the 1962 Constitution. 
111 Article 108(1) of the 1962 Constitution. 
112 Article 109(3) of the 1962 Constitution. 
113 Article 109(1) of the 1962 Constitution. 
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from taxes, to 50 percent of the revenue raised from the Buganda Kingdom (mainly from 
diesel and petrol duty) by the central government.115 It was also agreed that more financial 
transfers from the central government would be available for any services for which the 
Kabaka’s government assumed financial responsibility. On the part of the Kabaka’s 
government, it was agreed that it would be excluded from local authorities’ grant structures 
from the central government given that the Buganda Kingdom had its own local government 
system.116 
7.4 Buganda’s shared legislative powers with central government 
The 1962 Constitution vested legislative powers in the federal states. The legislative power to 
make laws for peace, order and good governance was an exclusive competency of the NA.117 
However, in respect of the federal state of the Buganda Kingdom, its legislature had exclusive 
powers to make laws for peace, order and good governance within the Buganda Kingdom.118 
Thus, the Buganda Kingdom’s legislative powers vis-à-vis other federal states was stronger. 
                                                                                                                                                        
114 The title of Schedule 9 to the 1962 Constitution stated: ‘Agreement between the Uganda and Buganda 
Government Delegation on the Financial Relationship between the Government of Uganda and the Kabaka’s 
Government.’ 
115 Schedule 9 para. 1(a) to the 1962 Constitution. 
116 Schedule 9 para. 5 to the 1962 Constitution. 
117 Section 73 of the 1962 Constitution. 
118 Section 74(1) of the 1962 Constitution. 
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The Buganda Kingdom reserved a right to veto certain national laws dealing with the courts, 
land or local administration within it.119 The 1962 Constitution also provided for co-operation 
between the Buganda Kingdom and the central government in the areas of service delivery.120 
7.5 Local government administration under the 1962 Constitution 
The Constitution provided for the districts of Acholi, Bukedi, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, 
Madi, Sebei, Teso and West Nile, outside the kingdom areas.121 The 1962 constitutional 
design acknowledged the political and developmental uniqueness of the non-kingdom areas, 
especially those found in the northern parts of the country. Because most of them had less 
cohesive traditional political structures than in the kingdom areas, it was appropriate for the 
central government to retain a significant role in the political control of those areas. In 
addition, the areas of the northern part of the country were less developed compared to those 
of the southern parts of the country. It would not have been appropriate to grant semi-federal 
status to areas that had no means of revenue generation. 
Uganda’s local administrations in the 1960s were described as a colonial inheritance, given 
that the legal framework at independence was prescriptive and rule-oriented, based on 
command and control. In fact the local administration legal framework was developed along 
the lines of English urban and rural district councils.122 The legal framework categorised local 
                                                 
119 Section 74(5)(b) of the 1962 Constitution. The Buganda Agreement of 1900 introduced an alien means of 
land ownership similar to the Victorian Torrens system of land registration, known as the Mailo [a corruption of 
the English word ‘mile’]. Under the Buganda Agreement of 1900, land was either registered by title, became 
private Mailo, or Kabaka’s Mailo, or a chief’s Mailo, or vested in the British Crown.119 
120 Section 79(1) of the 1962 Constitution. 
121 Section 5 (1) of 1962 Constitution. 
122 Hubert & Andersen 19932; Mamdani 1996: 18. 
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governments as either (rural) local administration or urban authorities. However, these 
categories of local government had similar powers and functions. The main legislative 
enactments made pursuant to the Constitution were the Local Administration Act (LAA)123 
and the Urban Authorities Act (UAA).124 The features of these two pieces of legislation will 
be examined below. 
7.6 The Local Administration Act: District administration in non-kingdom 
areas 
Compared to the manner in which the federal states’ powers were provided for under the 
Constitution, the articulation of local government was rather limited. Besides, the power to 
regulate local governments in kingdom areas was vested in the respective federal states. 
The Constitution left the task to Parliament to make laws dealing with local administration.125 
Though the Constitution mentioned that there would be district councils in every district, their 
functions were mainly administrative.126 It is also noted that the national assembly 
empowered local administrations to make laws for the establishment of the ‘Districts 
Constitutional Heads’, their appointment to office, tenure and ceremonial functions.127 
                                                 
123 Its long title stated that it was ‘[a]n Act to make provision for the establishment and regulation of 
administrations in and for Districts and to provide for matters incidental thereto and connected therewith’. This 
Act was amended by Act 13/66 to become the Administrations (Districts) Act. 
124 Its long title stated that it was ‘[a]n Act to establish and regulate Urban Authorities and to provide for matters 
incidental thereto and connected therewith.’ 
125 Section 88(1) of the 1962 Constitution. 
126 Section 88(1) of the 1962 Constitution. 
127 Section 89(1) of the 1962 Constitution; Section 2(1) of the LAA.  
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Local administrations in non-kingdom areas had a delegated authority through subsidiary 
legislation and were under the direct supervision of the Minister of Local Government. For 
instance, the Minister of Local Government could at any time appoint any person to be an 
inspector for ‘inspecting the observance and performance by any administration of the duties 
and powers imposed and conferred upon it’.128 This inspection could lead to sanction or 
suspension of expenditure once evidence of ‘improper authorisation’ of expenditure had been 
established.129 The Minister had powers to withhold, refuse or reduce grants to a district 
administration.130 Where the Minister felt that the district administration council had not 
fulfilled its mandate properly, he could compel it to perform its function properly.131 The 
Minister could also dissolve a district administration council.132 The Minister could appoint a 
regional service commission for the purposes of appointing district appointment boards,133 
whose main functions were to appoint, dismiss and discipline the staff of a district 
administration.134 
                                                 
128 Section 85(1) of the LAA. 
129 Section 86(1) of the LAA. 
130 Section 87(1) of the LAA. It should be noted that the language of the 1962 and 1967 Constitutions was not 
gender neutral; in fact, under the Interpretation Act, the word ‘man’ included ‘woman’. 
131 Section 88(1) of the LAA. 
132 Section 89(1) of the LAA. 
133 Section 78(1) of the LAA. 
134 Section 82(1) of the LAA. 
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7.6.1 Political structures  
The LAA vested the administrative powers of a district in a Constitutional Head, and for 
districts which had no Constitutional Heads, in a Secretary-General and a Council.135 
Members of the district administration council were elected by universal adult suffrage.136 
The chairman of the district administration council was elected by secret ballot by members 
of the council.137 Every district administration was a legal person with a common seal.138 
7.6.2 Legislative powers  
Although a district administration was vested with powers to make laws, its legislative powers 
were subject to Ministerial veto. For instance, a district administration could legislate on any 
authorised matter, such as personal or customary law, public security, or in respect of any of 
the functions delegated to it.139 Laws made by a district administration applied to all persons 
within its jurisdiction, excluding persons who were not part of African customary or personal 
law.140 However, a district administration’s legislative powers were subject to any existing 
law.141 Therefore, ‘any existing law’ could override laws made by a district administration. 
Moreover, laws made by a district administration council could only become effective after 
                                                 
135 Section 3(1) of the LAA. 
136 Section 10(1) of the LAA. 
137 Section 12A of the LAA. 
138 Section 3(2) of the LAA. 
139 Section 32(1) of the LAA. 
140 Section 32(2) of the LAA. 
141 Section 35 of the LAA. 
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they had been approved by the Minister of Local Government and consented to by the District 
Constitutional Head.142 
7.6.3 Functions  
The function of the district administration was simply to ‘administer’ a district, with no 
specific functions that devolved to it other than a bureaucratic one as an auxiliary agent of the 
central government.143 
The LAA merely stated that the role of district administrations was to ‘administer’ in 
specified areas of service delivery, including education, medicine and health, water, roads, 
prisons and agriculture.144 A district administration could also control common resources,145 
and maintain game parks and tourist amenities.146 A local administration managed recreation 
centres, established and administered town and county planning and development schemes, 
and controlled building in peri-urban areas.147 The district administration was also vested with 
powers to enforce building standards,148 promote trade, local industry149 and socio-cultural 
and sporting activities.150 
                                                 
142 Section 36 of the LAA. 
143 Section 22(1) of the LAA. 
144 The First Schedule to the LAA. 
145 Section 25(i-xi) of the LAA. 
146 Section 25(xii) of the LAA. 
147 Section 25(xxii-xxiii) of the LAA. 
148 Section 25(xxv-xxix) of the LAA. 
149 Section 25(xxx) of the LAA. 
150 Section 25(xxxi) of the LAA. 
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7.6.4 District administration finances  
District administrations were authorised to collect revenue, such as graduated tax, rates, and 
rents. The district administrations’ power to collect revenue was, however, subject to the 
Minister’s determination of rates.151 Furthermore, the central government paid district block 
grants and expansion grants to cover all or part of the cost of grant-aided services.152 In 
addition, the administration had powers to raise loans153 and obtain an overdraft154 with the 
consent of the Minister.155 
7.6.5 Sub-division of district administrations  
District administrations were divided into counties and every county into a sub-county. 
Changes to the boundaries of these sub-divisions could be made by a resolution of a district 
council to either amalgamate or establish new counties and sub-counties.156 Every sub-county 
was divided into smaller units, namely parishes and villages. It was mandatory to appoint a 
chief for every sub-county, parish and village. To some extent, the above structures hailed 
back to the Buganda Kingdom’s pre-colonial political structures. Every chief at each of the 
different levels of local administration had to be appointed at the discretion of the local 
administration council by a resolution.157 Local councils in counties, sub-counties, parishes, 
                                                 
151 Section 48 of the LAA. 
152 Section 49 of the LAA. 
153 Section 52 of the LAA. 
154 Section 53 of the LAA. 
155 Section 54 of the LAA. 
156 Section 39(1) of the LAA. 
157 Section 40 of the LAA. 
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villages and towns were subjects of the district administration. In certain circumstances 
district administrations could delegate some functions to these councils.158 
7.7 The Urban Authorities Act 
Under the 1967 Constitution local governments were further categorised as urban authorities. 
The designation of an area as a municipality depended on an area’s level of development and 
urbanisation.159 Under the UAA, the Minister of Local Government could simply declare, by 
a statutory order, an area to be a municipality. He or she could assign it a name and define its 
boundaries, or declare that an area had ceased to be a municipality.160 
The Minister prescribed the council’s composition, and the election or appointment of its 
councillors. In addition, the Minister had the power to divide the territory into wards, and 
determine the number of ward councillors. Further, the Minister appointed the chairperson or 
his deputy from among the elected councillors, some of whom were appointed by the Minister 
him or herself. The Minister also stipulated the terms and conditions of office of the district 
administration chairperson.161 The Minister made rules for the regulation and conduct of 
elections, and determined the qualifications of electors and candidates, among other things.162 
The Council appointed a Town Clerk who was the chief officer, and who exercised 
administrative powers. However, the appointment of any person as a Town Clerk was subject 
                                                 
158 Section 37 of the LAA. 
159 See The Local Governments (Classification of Towns) Order pursuant to sections 3(5) and 7(1) of the Urban 
Authorities Act. 
160 Section 3 of the UAA. 
161 Section 5 of the UAA. 
162 Section 8 and 9 of the UAA. 
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to Ministerial approval.163 While the Town Clerk served at the will of the Council, the 
Council could not terminate the services of the Town Clerk without the consent of the 
Minister.164 
The powers of the urban council were not fundamentally different from those of a local 
administration.165 Thus, section 30A of the UAA permitted the application of the provisions 
of the LAA relating to taxation. The municipality had the power to make laws, a power 
similar to that of local administrations.166 Revenue sources of municipalities were also similar 
to those of local administrations.167 The Minister had powers to suspend a council if a ground 
of misconduct or financial impropriety was identified.168 
The powers granted to the Minister regarding the establishment of municipalities were similar 
to those for establishing towns.169 For example, the Minister could declare any area to be a 
town, and assign it a name. In addition, the Minister could determine its boundaries or 
determine that any area had ceased to be a town.170 However, no alteration to the boundaries 
                                                 
163 Section 23 of the UAA. 
164 Section 25 of the UAA. 
165 Section 29 of the UAA. 
166 Section 42 of the UAA. 
167 Section 48 of the UAA. 
168 Section 62 of the UAA. 
169 See the Local Government (Declaration of Towns) (No.1) Order. This Statutory Instrument was made under 
the Urban Authorities Act, 1964 Revision Cap 27. The economic population and geographical size of an urban 
determined whether an urban area was designated as a municipality or a town. 
170 Section 3 of the UAA. 
 
 
 
 
194 
 
Chapter 4: Decentralisation in Uganda: History and Overview 
could be made of a town in the Buganda Kingdom unless the alteration was in accordance 
with the agreements between the central government and the Kabaka’s government.171 
7.8 Sharing of national and state identity under the 1962 Constitution 
The question of who would become the constitutional Head of State after independence was a 
bone of contention. The traditional kingdoms were unhappy with the possibility of having a 
politician or commoner as a possible Head of State.172 For the Buganda Kingdom, the 
position was even more radical, as it wanted the Head of State to be the King of the Buganda 
Kingdom.173 A law was passed to solve the impasse in that districts could elect their leaders, 
designated as the constitutional head or ruler of the district.174 This meant that non-kingdom 
areas could provide candidates to be elected as the Head of State if the chance arose. As a 
political compromise, the Buganda Kingdom provided the president as the Head of State and 
Commander-in-Chief for a five year period, while the non-kingdom areas provided a vice-
president.175 
The Constitution provided for the National Assembly (NA) as the central government law-
making body176 whose other major function was to elect the President and the Vice-President 
from among the rulers of the federal states and the Constitutional heads of districts.177 The 
                                                 
171 Section 63 of UAA. 
172 Kanyeihamba 2002: 76. 
173 Kanyeihamba (2002). 
174 See section 4 of the repealed Constitutional Heads (Elections) Act Cap 133. See also Jowet Lyagoba v 
Bakasonga [1963] EA 57. 
175 Section 34(2) of 1962 Constitution. 
176 Section 73 of the 1962 Constitution. See also the repealed National Assembly (Elections) Act Cap 131. 
177 Section 36(1) of 1962 Constitution. See also The Presidential Elections Act Cap 252. 
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Constitution also provided that the President and the Vice-President could be removed by a 
resolution moved by the Prime Minister or a Member of the NA, supported by half of the 
members of the NA.178 The executive authority of Uganda vested in the President who 
exercised it in accordance with the Constitution.179 By virtue of this arrangement, state 
identity and executive power were shared. Traditional leaders shared the Presidency in that 
after every five years a President had to be elected from a different kingdom area.180 The 
rotational nature of sharing state identity and executive power ensured that different ethnic 
identities were reasonably accommodated, since the offices of the President and Vice-
President were the epitome of Uganda’s identity as a nation.181 
7.9 Assessment of the 1962 Constitution 
Unlike many African constitutions at independence, which were highly centralised,182 the 
1962 Ugandan Constitution catered for sharing of political power between central 
government, the federal states and district administrations. When its basic institutional design 
is reviewed against the principles of local development, democracy, and accommodation of 
diversity, it appears that the legal framework of local government at the time was 
considerably well articulated. 
First, the Buganda Kingdom had a measure of political and financial autonomy entrenched in 
the Constitution. The other traditional kingdoms also enjoyed political, autonomy though not 
                                                 
178 Section 36(3) of 1962 Constitution. 
179 Section 61(1) of 1962 Constitution. 
180 Kanyeihamba 2002: 76-80. 
181 The Presidential Elections Act Cap 252. 
182 Prempeh 2007: 479. 
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to the same degree as the Buganda Kingdom. Another element to be considered here is that 
the local government design relating to urban areas was different to that for rural areas. The 
legislative framework of local administration, which provided for rural administrative 
structures separate from urban ones, in effect polarised the urban local administration from 
the rural local administration.183 
Lastly, the constitutional design entrenched institutions of colonial rule, such as the office of 
the chief, who retained untrammelled powers at local level. While the institutional design for 
devolution of powers to local administrations and urban authorities was reasonably elaborate, 
the institutions that were established thereunder were not fully democratic. By placing much 
of the political power in the hands of unelected kings, the constitutional design promoted 
monarchical rule to the detriment of democratic principles. Thus, the 1962 Uganda 
Constitution, just like in many other first post-independence African Constitutions, then may 
be described as ‘a false start’ in that, other than for the Buganda Kingdom, there was no 
proper transfer of powers to local communities.184 
8. Abrogation of the 1962 Constitution 
8.1 The ‘Kabaka crisis’ and the recentralisation of state power 
The abrogation of the 1962 Constitution followed what is referred to as the ‘Kabaka crisis’ in 
Uganda’s legal and constitutional history. The Kabaka crisis heightened tensions between the 
central government and the Buganda Kingdom and heralded the total loss of power for the 
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Buganda Kingdom and other federal states, and the centralisation of power. It is referred to as 
a ‘crisis’ because of the legal and institutional instability that resulted.185 
On 22 February 1966, amidst allegations of an alleged coup plot against the government, the 
Prime Minister suspended the 1962 Constitution, abolished the posts of president and vice-
president, and assumed all executive powers. On 24 February 1966, cabinet made proposals 
for a new Constitution. An interim constitution was debated and promulgated the same day. 
On 15 April, the NA turned itself into a Constituent Assembly, leading to the adoption of the 
1967 Constitution. In response to these events, the federal legislature of the Buganda 
Kingdom passed a resolution barring Buganda’s representatives in the National Assembly 
from being sworn in, in terms of the new Constitution. Furthermore, the Buganda Kingdom 
resolution demanded that the central government officials leave the territory of Buganda.186 
The suspension of the old constitutional order was challenged in the case of Uganda v 
Commissioner of Prisons Ex parte Matovu.187 The Court dismissed the application and held 
that the new Constitution had established a new order, whose legitimacy could not be 
questioned in court. The Court, based its decision on Kelsen’s theory of revolution,188 and 
took the view that a military coup could legitimately change a government. The Court held 
that the events that took place in 1966 amounted to a coup d’état that lawfully changed the old 
legal order. The Court stated: 
                                                 
185 The Odoki Commission 1993: 51. 
186 Kanyeihamba 2002: 103-13 
187 Reported as Uganda v Commissioner of Prisons Ex Parte Matovu [1966] EA p 514. Mr Matovu, a chief in 
the Buganda Kingdom government, had mobilised his subjects not to pay taxes to the central government. 
188 Kelsen 1945: 117-18.  
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The series of events which took place in Uganda from February 22 to April, 1966, were law 
creating facts appropriately described in law as a revolution; that is to say there was an 
abrupt political change not contemplated by the existing Constitution, that destroyed the 
entire legal order and was superseded by a new Constitution, namely, the 1966 Constitution, 
and by effective government.189 
The Ex parte Matovu case had two important implications for the history of decentralisation 
and power-sharing in Uganda. First, the decision ended all the pretences of power-sharing 
between the central government and the federal states, and increased the role of central 
authority.190 Secondly, the decision militarised the relationship between the central 
government and local government and projected the central government of the day as 
invincible.191 Oloka-Onyango, commenting on Ex parte Matovu, considers the Court’s 
decision as a constitutional ‘ghost’, in that it was a precursor to militarism in Uganda’s 
politics.192 
8.2 The recentralisation of power under the 1967 Constitution 
The constitutional and legislative framework that related to the devolution of powers to 
various centres of power under the 1962 Constitution thus came to an abrupt end in 1966, 
resulting in the promulgation of the 1967 Constitution. All laws that related to local 
government and federal states under the 1962 Constitution were amended to give effect to the 
                                                 
189 See Ex parte Matovu holding no 5. 
190 Prempeh 2008: 323. 
191 Kanyeihamba 2002: 128.  
192 Oloka-Onyango 1996: 14. 
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new constitutional order. All functions that were exclusive to federal states under the 1962 
Constitution now fell under new districts under the 1967 Constitution.193 
The 1967 Constitution provided for 19 districts throughout the country, all falling under the 
direct control of the central government.194 Although there was no procedure for their 
establishment, their respective boundaries were provided in the Second Schedule to the 1967 
Constitution.195 The 1967 Constitution did not include any of the federal arrangements that 
existed under the 1962 Constitution. The 1967 Constitution declared all federal states part of 
the unitary republican government.196 All federal states that existed under the 1967 
Constitution, with the exception of the Buganda Kingdom, became districts. The federal state 
of Buganda was sub-divided into East Mengo, Masaka, Mubende, and West Mengo districts. 
The Constitution empowered Parliament to establish councils and other local authorities in the 
districts.197 Parliament was also vested with the power to prescribe the manner in which local 
officials would be appointed and their tenure of office.198 The 1967 Constitution granted 
strong powers to the Minister of Local Government regarding the performance of the districts’ 
functions and responsibilities. The Minister had unlimited powers to suspend or dissolve a 
district administration council and other local authorities, and he or she could suspend and 
                                                 
193 Article 82 of the 1967 Constitution of Uganda; see also The Local Administrations (Districts) Act 13/66 
(repealed by Act 18/67). 
194 These were: Acholi, Ankole, Bugisu, Bukedi Bunyoro, Busoga, East Mego, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Madi, 
Masaka, Mubende, Sebei, Teso, Toro, West Mengo, and East Nile. See Article 180(1) of the 1967 Constitution. 
195 Article 180(2) of the 1967 Constitution. 
196 Article 2(1) of the 1967 Constitution. 
197 Article 81 of the 1967 Constitution. 
198 Articles 81(a), (b) & (c) of the 1967 Constitution of Uganda. 
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replace any officer thereof.199 In addition, the Constitution granted powers to the President to 
take over the administration of a district in certain instances by a statutory instrument and 
upon advice of the cabinet.200 
8.3 Demise of local government institutions under the military government 
The political uncertainty and the economic meltdown that started in 1966 partly explain the 
military takeover of the government in 1971.201 When the then Prime Minister ‘lawfully’ 
abrogated the Constitution and used the military to establish his rule as the Head of State, he 
as a consequence introduced the army into active politics in the country.202 
In 1971, the Army Commander, Major General Idi Amin, staged a military coup d’état. One 
reason given by the coup d’état leaders was to save a ‘bad situation from getting worse’.203 
The examples of ‘a bad situation’ referred to above were: the economic stagnation at the time, 
collapse of state democratic institutions, and loss of political legitimacy because of the 
alienation of the majority of the population from decision-making at local levels. By the time 
Idi Amin took power, the state structures were already highly centralised. Idi Amin merely 
formalised the militarisation of those institutions. He also ended all pretence of parliamentary 
oversight of government by vesting the law-making power in himself.204 
                                                 
199 Article 81(d) of the 1967 Constitution of Uganda. 
200 Article 82(1) of the 1967 Constitution of Uganda. 
201 Kanyeihamba 2002: 126.  
202 Kanyeihamba 2002: 131.  
203 See The Soldiers Statement, 1971, Government Notice No. 82/1971, cited in Kanyeihamba 2002: 160.  
204 See Legal Notice No. 1 of 1971 that suspended the Constitution and vested all powers in the President. See 
also Decree No 5 of 1971. 
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After initially allowing political parties to operate, a decree was promulgated to suspend and 
ban all political activities. The earliest clampdown on former leaders particularly targeted 
former local government leaders.205 In the place of local government leaders, military 
personnel were appointed. The country was divided into ten provinces, each placed under the 
leadership of military officials. Each district was headed by a district military commissioner, 
who was assisted by militias at different levels of local government as chiefs.206 They 
arrested, killed and extorted people at will.207 
8.4 The role of the local communities in the liberation struggle 
Local communities played a key role in the liberation struggle from the days of President 
Amin’s regime to the second Obote regime. The role of local communities can be explained 
by two main factors: extreme oppression and material deprivation. 
First, local people in the villages bore the brunt of the local militias without having recourse 
to any disciplinary mechanism against the perpetrators.208 People suspected of engaging in 
subversive activities were arrested and tortured (and in some cases killed) by local officials.209 
Secondly, local communities experienced the effect of the absence of basic amenities, such as 
clean water, drugs and good schools for their children.210 The material deprivation and 
repression of communities were important reasons for communities to resist the military 
                                                 
205 Kanyeihamba 2002: 146-7.  
206 The Odoki Commission 1993: 485. 
207 Museveni 2000: 13; Kanyeihamba 2002: 150.  
208 Kanyeihamba 2002: 158-63. 
209 Kanyeihamba 2002: 162. 
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government.211 The local community became a breeding ground for resistance, and thus, 
armed opposition groups found it easy to recruit local people.212 
The first government after the fall of President Idi Amin was led by Prof Yusufu Lule, under 
the umbrella organisation of the Uganda National Liberation Front/Army (UNLF/A).213 Prof 
Yusufu Lule was removed by the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) and 
immediately replaced by President Godfrey Binaisa.214 President Binaisa was also deposed by 
the Military Commission, headed by the late Paulo Muwanga.215 The national elections, held 
in 1980 under the heavy influence of the Military Commission, resulted in the second Obote 
regime from 1980-1985.216 The rigged elections led to a rebellion headed by the current 
President, Yoweri Museveni, that lasted for five years.217 
During President Obote’s second regime, local government structures were dominated by 
hand-picked party faithful of the UPC and members of the party youth wing. These officials 
wielded tremendous power and were responsible for many deaths and disappearances of 
                                                 
211 Golooba-Mutebi 2000: 16. 
212 Kanyeihamba 2002: 163; Lambright 2011: 24. 
213 This government was formed after numerous negotiations between two main factions. The one faction, 
known as Kikosi Maalum, was led by President Obote, and the other, known as the Front for National Salvation 
(FRONASA), was led by the current President, Yowerri K Museveni. See Kanyeihamba 2002: 183.  
214 President Binaisa was the Attorney-General of Uganda in the 1960s and was the lead government counsel in 
the Commissioner of Prisons Ex parte Matovu case. 
215 Kanyeihamba 2002: 197. 
216 Museveni 2000: 117. 
217 Kanyeihamba 2002: 200-1. 
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people suspected of having been rebel collaborators.218 The second Obote regime was also 
overthrown by a military junta led by General Tito Okello Lutwa.219 
When the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) finally gained state power in 1986, 
after removing General Lutwa’s military junta, the solemn promise to Ugandans was that the 
change of government was not ‘a mere change of guards, but a fundamental change’.220 
Onyango-Obbo explains the historical and political context of the events preceding the NRM 
government thus: 
Uganda was broken, bloodied by war, poor, and its citizens exhausted by marauding military 
goons when Museveni took power. They [Ugandans] were willing to support NRM as long 
as it didn’t take the country back to the nightmarish past. And they were willing to be 
forgiving of any crime that was not as worse (sic) as Amin’s or Obote II’s.221 
8.5 Assessment 
The period between 1967 and 1986 can be summarised as a period of over-centralisation of all 
political powers in Uganda, with local government structures serving as mere extensions of 
central government. This period also marked a general decline in the rule of law, economic 
collapse, and material deprivation of the majority of the people. The period was characterised 
by military government, disrespect for human rights, civil wars, and dictatorship. 
                                                 
218 Kanyeihamba 2002: 232. 
219 Kanyeihamba (2002). 
220 See President Museveni’s speech on February 1986 cited in Kanyeihaba 2002: 200-38. 
221 Onyango-Obbo, C ‘Kony has survived for 25 years by stealing Museveni’s secrets’ http: 
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However, this period was also one in which the foundation for democratic revival was laid. 
Most people became disillusioned with the prevailing circumstances; hence the desire for a 
fresh start. The desire for a new beginning started with opposition to the military government 
of Idi Amin and developed into a civil war against the misrule of President Obote. A 
consensus seemed to emerge that in order to have a sustainable democratic future, an 
inclusive government was needed. It was for this reason that the period after 1986 witnessed 
attempts to decentralise powers and functions from the centre to local communities. 
9. Local government reforms between 1986-1995 
In 1986, immediately after the overthrow of the military government that had overthrown the 
civilian government, the NRM government legalised itself by proclamation. The proclamation 
also adopted the 1967 Constitution.222 
A statement by the Minister of Local Government at the time summarises the history of the 
reforms introduced after 1986. According to him, the principal object of decentralisation 
reform was to enhance local democracy through citizens’ participation in sustainable 
development. In order to strengthen local democracy it was imperative to change the nature of 
the state at local level through institutional reform and capacity-building.223 
The decision to decentralise power to local government was made in 1986. However, 
decentralisation reform gained currency only in 1993 through the Presidential Policy 
                                                 
222 See Legal Notice No. 1 of 1986. 
223 See Hansard of the Parliament of Uganda 1993. 
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Statement.224 In 1993 the President issued a statement on decentralisation. According to the 
statement, the objectives of decentralisation were as follows:  
• to transfer power to the local communities as an initial stage in decentralisation; 
• to reduce the workload on remote and unfunded central government technocrats; 
• to evenly distribute resources to local communities; 
• to gradually increase the political autonomy of local communities; 
• to enhance local administrative autonomy by linking local service delivery to local tax 
payment; 
• to promote public participation in the formulation of local government policies; and 
• to improve the quality of public sector performance by ensuring that the decision-
making process was participatory.225 
9.1 Resistance councils  
The transition from a highly centralised state to a more decentralised system of government 
started with the enactment of two pieces of legislation: the Local Governments (Resistance 
Councils) Statute (LGRCS) and the Resistance Committees (Judicial Powers) Statute 
(RCJPS).226 These two pieces of legislation provided for the establishment of the five-level 
                                                 
224 The Uganda Government (MOLG) Decentralization: The Policy and its Philosophy. Kampala: Ministry of 
Local Government/Decentralisation Secretariat 1993a. 
225 The Uganda Government (MOLG) Decentralization: The Policy and its Philosophy. Kampala: Ministry of 
Local Government/Decentralisation Secretariat 1993a. 
226 The RCJPS 1/87: Golooba-Mutebi 2000: 20. 
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local government structures known as Resistance Councils (RCs). The RCs ranged from level 
one, known as RC I, to the district level, known as RC V.227 The structure of the RC system is 
represented in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Structure of transitional resistance council committees 
 
Source: Adopted from the LGRCS and the RCJPS; see also Golooba-Mutebi 2000: 18.  
 
Only RC III and RC V were bodies corporate.228 Every district, city, municipality, sub-
county, city and municipal division and town was vested with executive and legislative 
                                                 
227 Section 4 of the LGRCS; Golooba-Mutebi 2000: 18. 
228 Section 6 of the LGRCS. 
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powers.229 The county, ward, parish and village were vested with mainly administrative 
roles.230 The RCJPS vested RC I-III with limited judicial powers and functions.231 The 
political heads of all the different levels of local government were elected by local people 
through a procedure that involved a voter standing behind his or her preferred candidate. The 
candidate with the biggest number of people behind him or her was declared the winner.232 
9.2 Central government oversight institutions 
The LGRCS replaced the District Commissioner (DC) with the District Administrator (DA) in 
every district. The DA was a presidential appointee and the overall (transitional) political 
head in every district.233 He or she was responsible for government policy implementation, 
security, and development.234 The district administrative head, however, remained separate 
from the political head. The exercise of what had remained of the powers of the DC was 
vested in a new official, known as the District Executive Secretary (DES). The powers of 
DES were very limited,235 given the pervasive ministerial control of district administrations at 
the time.236 For instance, the Minister, upon a recommendation from the DA, had powers to 
suspend a district council based on a DA’s ‘belief’ of wrongdoing by the council.237 The 
                                                 
229 Section 11(1) of the LGRCS. 
230 Sections 11(2) and 18 of the LGRCS. 
231 Section 2 of the LGRCS. 
232 Odoki Commission 1993: 487. 
233 Section 23 of the LGRCS; Golooba-Mutebi 2000: 19-21. 
234 Section 23(4) of the LGRCS; the Odoki Commission 1993: 488. 
235 Sections 30 and 31 of the LGRCS; Odoki Commission 1993: 488; Golooba-Mutebi 2000: 19-22. 
236 A minister could declare an area part of local government or could delegate the central government’s 
functions to local governments. See sections 7(3) and 12 of the LGRCS. 
237 Odoki Commission 1993: 488. 
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LGRCS also provided for the establishment of a district development committee (DDC) in 
each district chaired by the DA. A DDC had the power to formulate and implement the 
district local government development plans.238 
10. Conclusion 
The description above has earmarked important periods in the development of local 
government law in Uganda since the pre-colonial period. In answering the three questions at 
the beginning of the chapter, three points have been made. First, decentralisation is not a new 
idea in Uganda. Secondly, the Buganda Kingdom illustrates the multi-ethnic uniqueness of 
many communities, the recognition of which in a decentralisation system has real political 
and developmental dividends. The Buganda Kingdom affirms the multi-ethnic nature of 
Uganda as a nation state given the historical process through which the different ethnic groups 
were brought together under the ‘protectorate’ during the period of British colonial rule. 
Thirdly, the sharing of powers between the central government and the Buganda Kingdom in 
1962 is useful in understanding the proper sharing schemes that needed to be adopted for a 
successful decentralised system. 
It is further noted that the contribution of RCs in 1986, as new form of local government at 
that time, in rallying local democracy and political legitimacy, was limited.239 The fusion of 
both political and judicial powers into one institution was clearly undesirable at the time when 
local government reform was seen as part of the strategy to democratise local governments.240 
It is argued that the absence of secret voting undermined the claim to democracy. The reforms 
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introduced by decentralisation at this stage were intended to consolidate the quasi-military 
government and were never intended to democratise the country at all.241 Further 
consultations on the form of new local governments that would be suitable for a more 
democratic order were preferred. The next chapter discusses the political and legal debates 
that preceded the 1995 Constitution which provided for an entrenched decentralised system of 
government.
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5. CHAPTER FIVE 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY, SUB-
NATIONAL ETHNIC QUESTIONS AND POLITICS IN THE POST-
1995 CONSTITUTION 
1. Designing the 1995 Constitution: the Odoki Commission 
In 1995 a new Constitution was promulgated, replacing the unitary Constitution of 1967. The 
promulgation of the 1995 Constitution followed the Odoki Commission Report whose 
mandate was to gather the views of the people and make recommendations to the 
Constituency Assembly (CA).1 The discussion in this chapter deals with three main themes: 
the Odoki Commission recommendations on decentralisation; the promulgation of the 1995 
Constitution; and the establishment of the local government institutions. The chapter also 
assesses the relationship between the abuse of central governmental political power, the 
proliferation of districts, the recentralisation of Kampala City and the establishment of 
Regional Governments (RGs) as a means of undermining the institutional integrity of local 
governments. 
There were two main reasons why it was important to gather people’s views on reforming 
democratic institutions such as local government. First, in order to have a sustainable 
democratic reform process, public involvement was needed at the outset. Secondly, the act of 
collecting views from the public was a healing process that was needed for a country that had 
                                                 
1 See sections 4 & 5 of the Uganda Constitutional Commission Statute No 5 of 1988. 
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emerged from years of conflict and political neglect.2 The Commission was mandated to 
collect views from the public on the new Constitution that would guarantee national 
independence, territorial integrity, democratic governance, viable political institutions, 
demarcation of responsibilities between the different state organs, creation of public 
participation spaces, free and fair electoral systems, and the establishment and upholding of a 
culture of accountability.3 
The Commission published a report which influenced the Constituent Assembly’s debate on 
local governments and the eventual adoption of the new Constitution that provided for a 
decentralised system of government. The Commission addressed several issues concerning 
local government, including its constitutional status, governance structures, finances, staff, 
electoral systems, competencies, and Buganda’s quest for federal status. 
The Commission recommended protecting the integrity of local government institutions by 
calling for a gradual and smooth transfer of powers and responsibilities from the central 
government to local government.4 It held that decentralisation requires a sound financial base 
for local governments so as to enable the exercise of devolved planning powers through the 
initiation of appropriate policies at all levels.5 Further, the Commission made a case for the 
                                                 
2 Kanyeihamba 2002: 254-5. For instance, Ndulo (1998: 93) argues that ‘[t]he process of adopting a constitution 
is both important and substantive. The process must be legitimate and legitimacy requires inclusiveness. It 
should represent the interests of all the people in the country, and the people must be made to feel that they own 
the process as well as the product.’ 
3 See Principal Objectives of the Odoki Commission. 
4 Odoki Commission 1993: 513. 
5 Odoki Commission 1993: 504. 
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control and supervision of the civil service by local government authorities,6 and emphasised 
the need to base local governments on democratically elected councils.7 All of these 
recommendations accord with the arguments made in Chapter Two and Three,8 as will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
1.1 Constitutional guarantee of local government 
The Commission recommended that a decentralised system of government upon which local 
governments were to be based should be constitutionally protected. This, it was argued, 
protected against arbitrary changes in future by the central government.9 The Commission 
recommended vesting powers in Parliament to regulate local government.10 In Chapter Three 
of this thesis it was argued that a constitutionally protected local government is a key feature 
of a good decentralised system.11 
1.2 Demarcation of district as the basic unit of decentralisation 
The Commission recommended that the district should be the basic unit of local government. 
It argued that although existing districts could be retained, there was a need for a mechanism 
for boundary changes, especially for people who sought to have separate districts. However, 
the existing boundaries would be appropriate starting points. Given that in the past, 
demarcation of boundaries had not been rational, it was recommended that considerations 
                                                 
6 Odoki Commission 1993: 495. 
7 Odoki Commission 1993: 494. 
8 Chapter Two § 2.8.9 and Chapter Three § 3.1. 
9 Odoki Commission 1993: 495. 
10 Odoki Commission 1993: 524. 
11 Chapter Three § 3.2. 
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such as language, culture, geographical features, economic viability, population density, and 
‘the desire of the people concerned’ should form the criteria for creating new districts.12 As 
argued in Chapter Three, a good boundary demarcation process is vital for the success of a 
successful decentralised system.13 Thus the Odoki recommendation in this respect accords 
with the views expressed in Chapter Three. Furthermore, the recommendation provided for an 
independent body to responsibly consider all stakeholders’ input into the creation of new 
districts or the merging of old ones, a provision also emphasised in Chapter Three.14 
1.3 Supremacy of the elected district local government council 
The Commission recommended that an elected district council should be the supreme political 
authority.15 The Commission did not explain what the phrase ‘supreme political organ’ meant. 
However, it recommended that powers to make policies, pass laws and supervise the activities 
of the administration of the district be vested in the hands of the district council as the 
‘supreme political organ’.16 Arguably the recommendation considered the relationship 
between local democracy and local development, as explained in Chapter Two.17 
1.4 Electoral system of local governments 
According to the Commission, three views emerged on the system of electing local councils: 
to vote by lining up behind a person’s preferred candidate; a collegial system; and a secret 
                                                 
12 Odoki Commission 1993: 497. 
13 Chapter Three § 3.3.2. 
14 Chapter Three § 3.3. 
15 Odoki Commission 1993: 499. 
16 Odoki Commission 1993: 499. 
17 Chapter Two § 2.3.1. 
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ballot.18 It was recommended that there should only be a secret ballot by universal adult 
suffrage. A collegial system was only recommended for special interest groups in district 
councils. The Commission recommended the criteria for a local government council’s 
candidacy.19 The recommendation for a collegial system to elect special interest groups 
accords with the arguments put forward in Chapter Three on the criteria for a good local 
electoral system.20 The Odoki Commission further recommended that district councils should 
have the discretion to decide whether the election of the lower local government council 
members should be by secret ballot or by physically standing behind the candidates. 
However, the Commission did not recommend for a proportional electoral system, which, as 
argued in Chapter Three,21 would be appropriate for a multi-ethnic country like Uganda. 
1.5 Political parties 
According to the Commission, there was no consensus amongst the members of the public as 
to whether local government elections should be open to political party competition.22 
Drawing on the history of multiparty politics in the 1960s and later in the 1980s the 
Commission explained that Uganda’s political instability was attributable to particular 
political parties, such as the UPC.23 Treading carefully, the Odoki Commission adopted a 
vague recommendation on multiparty politics in district councils. The Commission 
recommended that until the introduction of multiparty politics, local government elections 
                                                 
18 Odoki Commission 1993: 499. 
19 Odoki Commission (1993). 
20 Three Chapter § 3.4.3. 
21 Chapter Three § 3.4.3.4. 
22 Odoki Commission 1993: 518. 
23 Museveni 2000: 7. 
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should be organised according to the non-party political system. The Commission however, 
recommended that should a multiparty system be introduced later, then local governments 
should offer a platform for all political parties.24 The vagueness with which the Commission 
dealt with the role of multiparty politics in district councils ignored the intrinsic role of 
political pluralism in promoting local democracy, as was argued in Chapter Two.25 
1.6 Political and executive heads of a district local government 
The Commission conflated the district’s ‘political head’ with its ‘chief executive’.26 On the 
one hand, the Commission recommended that the district council chairperson should be the 
political head and answerable only to the local electorate, rather than the central government. 
On the other hand, the Commission recommended that every district should elect a chief 
executive from among the members of the council by an absolute majority.27 Amid this 
confusion, the Commission then recommended that the chief executive of every district 
should be the political head of a district, with powers to chair all executive committee 
meetings in a district, oversee general administration, co-ordinate all activities of the lower 
local councils, and ensure good intergovernmental relations.28 The above recommendation 
implies that the political head of the district council would perform the executive and 
administrative functions of the district. This confusion contradicts arguments made in Chapter 
                                                 
24 Odoki Commission 1993: 519. 
25 Chapter Two § 2.3.2. 4. 
26 Odoki Commission 1993: 501. 
27 Odoki Commission 1993: 502. 
28 Odoki Commission 1993: 502. 
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Three on the need to separate politics from the administrative and technical competencies in 
the district council.29 
1.7 District local government finances 
The Commission took the view that the existing sources of local government revenue were 
inadequate. This, according to the Commission, had made most local governments dependent 
on central government grants. Moreover, local graduated tax, which was the main source of 
revenue, was open to misuse.30 According to the Commission, most people expressed the 
view that additional powers should be granted to local government in order to increase their 
sources of revenue so as to reduce the Ministerial powers of control over local government.31 
It was also recommended that local governments should have the responsibility to collect 
taxes, such as road licences, corporation tax, sales tax, exercise duty, road toll, and 
agricultural export tax, on behalf of the central government and to retain these taxes in 
accordance with formulae worked out by experts. These formulae should take into 
consideration the physical size and population of a district, the number of primary schools and 
health units it contains, the length of its feeder roads, its agricultural productivity and revenue 
potential.32 The Commission further recommended that while districts should be granted 
powers to raise domestic or foreign loans, these loans should be approved by Parliament. This 
                                                 
29 Chapter Three § 3.7.4.1. 
30 Graduated tax in Uganda has its origin in the colonial rule. It was levied on every adult member in a family. It 
has been compared by some writers to a poll tax.  
31 Odoki Commission 1993: 504. 
32 Odoki Commission 1993: 508. 
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recommendation agrees with the arguments advanced in Chapter Three that fiscal autonomy 
is an essential feature of a good decentralised system of government.33 
1.8 Local government personnel 
The Commission maintained that local government’s discretion to hire and fire its own staff 
had a bearing on the success of local government.34 While acknowledging the competency of 
the Public Service Commission in the recruitment of the local government’s technical and 
highly skilled staff,35 the Commission proposed that in each district an independent District 
Service Commission (DSC) be appointed by the district council.36 This recommendation 
accords with the rationale outlined in Chapter Three for a local government’s control of its 
staff.37 
1.9 Powers and functions of local government 
The Odoki Commission took the view that in order to understand the responsibilities and 
functions of local governments, it was best to first define the central government’s exclusive 
competencies. The Commission argued that only by excluding functions which are of national 
and international importance (for which the central government should have exclusive 
responsibility) could the powers of local government be made clear.38 13 areas were identified 
                                                 
33 Three Chapter § 3.7.1. 
34 Odoki Commission 1993: 511. 
35 Odoki Commission 1993: 512. In Chapter Three §20.4, the role of the central government appointing 
authority was discussed in relation to the issuance of guidelines. 
36 Odoki Commission 1993: 512. 
37 Three Chapter § 3.7.2. 
38 Odoki Commission 1993: 513. 
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as exclusive competencies of central government: arms, ammunitions and explosives; defence 
and security; banks and banking, promissory notes, currency and exchange control; taxation 
of incomes; citizenship and immigration, emigration, deportation, extradition and passports; 
copyrights, patents and trademarks; land, minerals, water resources and environment; national 
parks; public holidays; national monuments, antiquities, archives and public records; foreign 
relations and external trade; national planning of all services, including those run by local 
governments; and other matters incidental to the services mentioned above.39 The 
Commission also recommended that local governments should be vested with the powers to 
make investment decisions in consultation with the National Planning Commission in cases 
where an investment project was for the medium or long term.40 This recommendation can be 
compared with argument made in Chapter Three to the effect that local governments play an 
incomes distributive role that ultimately fosters equitable local development.41 
It is, however, noted that the manner in which the Odoki Commission recommended the 
determination of the local governments’ responsibilities and functions accounts for the 
difficulty the CA had in determining the true local government powers.42 
The Commission linked the ‘ability to perform’ as the major criterion in the transfer of 
powers and functions to local governments. It is argued the Commission adopted the principle 
of subsidiarity in the determination of the local government’s powers – a principle discussed 
in Chapter One.43 This recommendation also suggests the Commission followed a residual 
                                                 
39 Odoki Commission 1993: 513. 
40 Odoki Commission 1993: 509. 
41 Chapter Three § 3.6.6. 
42 The CA debates 1994: 3847-71. 
43 Chapter One § 1.5.2. 
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approach in the division of powers between the central government and local governments, a 
feature highlighted in Chapter Three.44 
1.10 Intervention in local governments 
The Commission acknowledged that, although the sanctity of local government status was 
important, situations could arise requiring some level of central government intervention. The 
Commission listed circumstances under which the central government, through either the 
executive or the legislature, could intervene in local government. Such circumstances 
included a state of emergency, widespread corruption, abuse of office, financial 
mismanagement, breakdown of law and order, or any actions that may threaten ‘national unity 
or the sovereignty of the country’. However, it was recommended that as soon as the 
conditions for taking over the administration of a district no longer existed, local 
administration should be restored.45 Nonetheless, no specific types of intervention were 
suggested. It is important to note that the Commission specifically recommended against 
vesting any power in the Minister of Local Government to suspend a local government 
council or any of its committees.46 
Insofar as it laid out clear criteria for the central government to intervene in the affairs of 
district councils, the Commission sought to protect the integrity of district council institutions. 
Equally, the long list of reasons for intervention gave central government a wide ambit for 
correcting any errors in district councils. This recommendation therefore does not fully accord 
                                                 
44 Chapter Three § 3.6.3. 
45 Odoki Commission 1993: 513. 
46 Odoki Commission 1993: 513. 
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with the arguments against arbitrariness in the intervention process advanced in Chapter 
Three.47 
1.11 The ‘Buganda Question’ 
The Commission reviewed the history of the Buganda Kingdom within the context of the 
development of Uganda as a modern nation state.48 
The Commission emphasised five aspects of the Buganda Kingdom’s uniqueness: (a) its 
geographical position in Uganda; (b) its population size; (c) its early interaction with Islam 
and Christianity; (d) its pre-colonial political organisation; and (e) its fear of loss of identity.49 
According to the Commission, the majority of the views from the Buganda region favoured 
the return of power-sharing between the central government and the Buganda Kingdom, as it 
existed under the 1962 Constitution.50 
The Commission Report, without first clarifying the issue of the Buganda Kingdom’s special 
demand for federal status, decided to discuss ‘the Buganda Kingdom question’ together with 
the question of traditional leaders. After reviewing the merits and demerits of institutions of 
traditional leaders, the Commission recommended that traditional institutions should be 
governed by a separate constitutional arrangement. The Commission held the view that given 
the feudal nature of traditional institutions, they were inimical to the promotion of democratic 
values, human rights, and development. Nonetheless, the role of traditional institutions as in 
                                                 
47 Chapter Three § 3.9.3. 
48 Odoki Commission 1993: 525-33. 
49 Odoki Commission 1993: 534.  
50 Odoki Commission 1993: 536. See Chapter 4 § 4.7.1.  
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fostering peace, prosperity and national unity was acknowledged.51 Yet in a manner that 
appeared to target the Buganda Kingdom, the Commission recommended not involving 
traditional leaders and their institutions in national politics; instead, traditional leaders were 
limited to ‘purely cultural and developmental roles’.52 It is argued that two issues were 
conflated by the Commission: traditional leaders and the Buganda Kingdoms’ request for a 
special federal status. The question of traditional leaders related to their constitutional 
restoration, whereas the Buganda Kingdom’s question related to its demands to share power 
with the central government. In the end, the Commission never truly addressed the political 
alienation of the Buganda Kingdom within the nation state.  
2. Uganda as a constitutional state under the 1995 Constitution 
Most of the Commission’s recommendations were adopted by the CA delegates, leading to 
the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution. However, some important recommendations were 
either rejected or radically altered.53 The discussion that follows reviews the general reforms 
introduced by the 1995 Constitution on the nature of the state in Uganda, and the protection of 
the institutional integrity of district councils as constitutionally recognised lower orders of 
government. 
2.1 Supremacy and separation of powers  
The Preamble to the 1995 Constitution of Uganda provides for a durable constitutional order, 
outlining in essence the essential features of a constitutional state. According to the Preamble, 
                                                 
51 Odoki Commission 1993: 547. 
52 Odoki Commission 1993: 549. 
53 Kanyeihamba 2002: 250. 
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attributes such as ‘unity, peace equality, democracy, freedom social justice and progress’54 are 
central features of a constitutional state. 
The 1995 Constitution is ‘supreme’55 insofar as it was derived from mandate of the electorate 
through its democratically elected leaders.56 Besides the provision for the sanctity of the 
Constitution, there are special protection measures under article 3 of the Constitution. The 
1995 Constitution is one of the few in common law countries that bestow on every citizen a 
right as well as the obligation to resist any form of unconstitutional usurpation of political 
power. Thus every citizen is obliged to resist any attempt to ‘overthrow the established 
constitutional order’.57 It is argued that the above provision was a response to the abolition of 
the 1962 and 1967 Constitutions through the force of arms, as explained in Chapter Four.58 
Article 126 of the Constitution provides for the separation of powers59 by providing for the 
Parliament,60 the Executive,61 and the Judiciary.62 
2.1.1 The Parliament 
Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected in three broad ways: directly by universal adult 
suffrage where the county serves as the constituency; allocation of seats for women in every 
                                                 
54 Para. 4 of the Preamble to the Constitution. 
55 Article 2 of the Constitution. 
56 Article 1(4) of the Constitution. 
57 Article 3(6) of the Constitution. 
58 Chapter Four § 4.8. 
59 Aristotle 1932: 1297b-1298a; Conway 2011: 305. 
60 Article 77 of the Constitution. 
61 Article 99 of the Constitution. 
62 Article 126 of the Constitution. 
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district; and by a collegial system for special interest groups representing persons with 
disabilities, the workers, the youth and the army. Except for the army representatives (who, in 
theory, are politically neutral), all other MPs can either be nominated by a political party or 
compete as independent candidates. The Constitution adopts the winner-takes-all electoral 
system in that the person who gets the majority of the votes in any of the categories becomes 
the elected MP. The Vice President and Ministers are ex officio MPs. MPs are elected every 
five years.63 The Parliament is headed by a Speaker assisted by the deputy Speaker, both of 
whom are elected from among the MPs in the first session of Parliament.64 Parliament is 
mandated to enact laws and protect the ‘Constitution and promote the democratic governance 
of Uganda’.65 Further, Parliament plays a critical oversight function on all public accounts, 
including those dealing with local governments. For instance, Parliament is empowered to 
withhold central government transfers to a district council, if evidence of financial abuse in a 
district council is presented.66  
2.1.2  The Executive 
The executive arm of government is headed by the President who is directly elected by 
universal adult suffrage. He or she must obtain more that 50% of the valid votes cast. The 
President is the Head of State, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the ‘Fountain of 
Honour’ and takes precedence over all other persons in the country. The President also enjoys 
absolute judicial immunity while still in office.67 The executive is composed of the Vice 
                                                 
63 Article 78 of the Constitution. 
64 Article 82 of the Constitution. 
65 Article 78 of the Constitution. 
66 See Rule 155 of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Uganda, 2006 made Pursuant to Article 90. 
67 Article 79 of the Constitution. 
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President, Prime Minister and Ministers who are appointed by the President from among the 
MPs and approved by a simple parliamentary vote.68 The President as the head of the 
executive arm of government has a duty ‘to abide by, uphold and safeguard this Constitution 
and the laws of Uganda and to promote the welfare of the citizens and protect the territorial 
integrity of Uganda.’69 The President, Vice President, Prime Minister and Ministers form the 
Cabinet, whose main function is to initiate, formulate, and execute government policies, in 
accordance with the Constitution.70 
2.1.3  The Judiciary 
The judiciary, as the third arm of government, has a duty to adjudicate disputes. It is also 
vested with the duty to enforce and interpret the Constitution independently of the other arms 
of government.71 Should either of the other two arms of government exceed their 
constitutional mandate, the judiciary has to intervene as a fair and independent arbiter. 
Uganda’s court structure consists of the Supreme Court as the highest court, the Court of 
Appeal, the High Courts and the subordinate courts.72 The Supreme Court is composed of the 
Chief Justice and no fewer than six other justices.73 The Supreme Court is the final court of 
appeal.74 The Court of Appeal is composed of the Deputy Chief Justice and not less than six 
                                                 
68 Article 108, 108A, and 111 of the Constitution. 
69 Article 99 of the Constitution. 
70 Article 111(2) of the Constitution. 
71 Article 128 of the Constitution. 
72 Article 129 of the Constitution. 
73 Article 130 of the Constitution. At the time of writing the thesis, Uganda had no substantive Chief Justice 
since March 2013 and no Deputy Chief Justice since 2012. 
74 Article 132(1) of the Constitution. 
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other justices.75 The High Courts are composed of the Principal Judge and judges of the High 
Court whose number is determined by Parliament.76 The High Courts have original 
jurisdiction in all matters except those relating to the interpretation of the Constitution.77 
The jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution vests in the Court of Appeal sitting as the 
Constitutional Court.78 Article 50 of the Constitution allows any person whose rights have 
been violated to seek redress from any court of competent jurisdiction. On the other hand, 
article 137 vests the exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution and to grant redress in 
the Constitutional Court.79 
In Chapter Thee, the protection of local government by means of constitutional recognition 
(and not as a mere creature of statute) was argued as one of the attributes of a decentralised 
system of government.80 It is noted that only the Constitutional Court is vested with the power 
to strike down laws that violate the Constitution. Implicitly, if any laws dealing with local 
government undermine the Constitution, such laws can be invalidated by the Constitutional 
Court.81 
                                                 
75 Article 134(1) of the Constitution. 
76 Article 138 of the Constitution. 
77 Article 139(1) of the Constitution. 
78 Article 137(1) of the Constitution. 
79 Attorney-General v Tinyefuza Supreme Court Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 1997 arising from Constitutional 
Petition No. 1 of 1996. 
80 See Chapter Three § 3.2.1.  
81 Oloka-Onyango 1996: 144. 
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3. The new constitutional status of local government 
The Constitution entrenches local governments in three broad ways. First, the Constitution’s 
stance seems to adopt the principles of subsidiarity in the allocation of powers and functions 
to local governments by providing for residual powers which devolve to district councils. For 
instance, the Constitution provides for 29 areas of exclusive central government competence, 
on the assumption that what remains is a residual function of district councils.82 Thus, in part, 
the Constitution adopted the recommendation of the Odoki Commission on the transfer of 
functions.83 Secondly, the Constitution itself grants every district council political and 
administrative powers. For example, the Constitution makes provision for the district council 
as the legislative authority in a district. The Constitution also provides that the district council 
chairperson is the political head of the district. Further, the Constitution provides for the 
district Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) as the senior district manager.84 Thirdly, the 
Constitution provides for the protection of the district council by establishing a special 
procedure by which the institutions and powers of local government may be altered. For 
instance, the Constitution provides local governments with a right to veto any changes to the 
powers and institution of local government.85 
                                                 
82 See Article 189 and the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. 
83 It is noted that the Odoki Commission had only recommended 13 areas of exclusive central government 
competencies. 
84 Article 188(1) of the Constitution. 
85 See Article 261 of the Constitution. The constitutionally entrenched provisions are in Articles 5(2), 152, 
176(1), 178, 189 and 197 of the Constitution. 
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3.1 The institutional structure of local government 
Uganda’s local government is a two-tiered structure.86 District councils on the one hand, and 
sub-county councils on the other, are legal persons with capacity to sue and to be sued, and 
vested with executive and legislative powers.87 Under article 181(3) of the Constitution, a 
sub-county is also a constituency for electing district council councillors. 
3.1.1 Constitutional framework 
The Constitution of Uganda provides for district councils as the basis of the local government 
system.88 This provision adopted essentially what the Odoki Commission recommended.89 
Under article 207 of the Ugandan Constitution, a reference to a local government includes: a 
district council, an urban council, a sub-county council, or any other unit prescribed by law to 
replace any of the councils mentioned above. District councils are entrenched under the 
Constitution, in that it requires a special procedure to amend any of the governance structures 
                                                 
86 Some writers hold different views. See Tusasirwe 2007: 14 and Oloka-Onyango 2007: 12. See also Lady 
Justice Arach-Amoko’s judgment in Victor Juliet Mukasa and Another v Attorney-General, Miscellaneous 
Cause no. 247/06. 
87 Section 3(2) read together with section 6 of the LGA. 
88 Article 177 of the Constitution states: ‘(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, for the purposes of 
local government, Uganda shall be divided into the districts referred to in article 5(2) of this Constitution. (2) 
The districts referred to in clause (1) of this article shall be taken to have been divided into the lower local 
government units which existed immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution.’ 
89 See Odoki Constitution Commission 1994: 496 para. 18.81. 
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and functions of district councils.90 The Constitution vests Parliament with the discretion to 
establish other institutional structures below the district.91 
The demarcation of districts is governed by the 1995 Constitution.92 Parliament is empowered 
to alter district boundaries or create new ones. Changes of boundaries must be supported by 
the majority of the members of Parliament.93 Demarcation is based on three factors. First, the 
change to a district boundary must be based on the need for effective administration. 
Secondly, it must be based on the need to bring services closer to the people. Thirdly, the 
means of communication, geographical features, population density, economic viability and 
the ‘wishes of the people concerned’ must be considered.94 There is no specific injunction on 
Parliament to assess these wishes through a consultative procedure. 
3.1.2 Legislative framework 
The LGA is the main legislation dealing with district councils.95 The LGA repeats the 
provisions of article 207 of the Constitution on district councils or Local Council Five (LC5), 
a term that takes over from RC5, as the basic unit of decentralisation.96  
                                                 
90 See Article 261 of the Constitution. The constitutionally entrenched provisions are in Articles 5(2), 152, 
176(1), 178, 189 and 197 of the Constitution. 
91 Article 176(1) of the Constitution. 
92 Article 179 of the Constitution.  
93 Article 179(2) of the Constitution.  
94 Article 179(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
95 The long title to the LGA states that it is an Act to ‘consolidate and streamline the existing law on local 
governments in line with the Constitution to give effect to the decentralisation and devolution of functions, 
powers and services; to provide for decentralisation at all levels of local governments to ensure good 
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3.2 Rural councils 
Under the district council, the LGA provides for the county councils (the LCIVs), sub-county 
councils (the LCIIIs),97 the parish councils (the LCIIs) and village councils (the LCIs) for 
rural local governments.98 The legal position of LIVs, LCIIs and LCIs as structures in local 
government in Uganda is contested. The Constitutional Court nullified the elections of the 
office-bearers of county, parish and village councils in 2007,99 and at the time of writing this 
thesis, no fresh elections have been conducted. In fact there have been suggestions to disband 
county, parish/ward and village /cell councils altogether.100 The description thereof thus may 
only serve academic purposes. Thus, the depoliticisation of LCIV, LCII, and LCI (discussed 
in Chapter Four),101 formerly known as Ssaaza, Muluka and Muntongole under the 1962 
Constitution,102 may also be linked to the central government desire to further weaken the 
Buganda Kingdom’s most powerful political structures and exclude it from the overall 
decentralisation process. 
                                                                                                                                                        
governance and democratic participation in, and control of, decision making by the people; to provide for 
election of local government councils and for any other matters connected to the above.’ 
96 Section 4(a) of the LGA. 
97 Section 3(2)(a) & (b) of the LGA. 
98 Section 45(1)(a) of the LGA. 
99 See Rubaramira Ruranga v Electoral Commission and Another, Constitution Petition No. 21 of 2006. 
100 ‘Gov’t to review local councils’ The New Vision on 2nd May 2009, available on http: 
//www.newvision.co.ug/detail.php?mainNewsCategoryId=8&newsCategoryId=13&newsId=753296. 
101 See Chapter Four § 4.9.2. 
102 See Chapter Four §4.7.2. 
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3.2.1 Enhancement of local council courts’ powers 
As explained in Chapter Four, from 1986 to 1996, Resistances Councils (RCI-IIIs) exercised 
limited judicial powers.103 In 2006, the Local Council Courts Act (LCCA) was enacted,104 
enhancing the judicial powers of LCIIIs on the one hand, and LCIIs and LCIs on the other in 
customary related disputes.105 The LCIIIs were designated as appellate courts from the 
decision of LCIIs and LCIs courts.106 As already noted, the Constitutional Court nullified the 
elections of the office-bearers of county, parish and village councils in 2007,107 and at the 
time of writing the thesis, no fresh elections have been conducted. Even if the LCIIIs have 
duly elected political office- bearers, they cannot exercise any original judicial jurisdiction at 
                                                 
103 See Chapter Four § 4.9.2. 
104 See Part I and II of the Local Council Courts Act Cap 13 of 2006. The long title to the LCCA provides ‘[a]n 
Act to establish local council courts for the administration of justice at local level, to define the jurisdiction, 
powers and procedure of the established courts and to provide for other related matters.’ The LCCA came into 
force on 8 June 2006, and repealed the Executive Committees (Judicial Powers) Act Cap 8. 
105 Under the Second Schedule of the LCCA, local council courts can hear cases dealing with simple contracts, 
assault and battery. These courts have the power to hear cases of custody of children, conversion, damage to 
property, and the infringement of district council bylaws. Under the Third Schedule of the LCCA, these courts 
can also hear cases dealing with civil debts governed by customary law such as, customary bailment, customary 
joint land ownership and customary land tenure, customary marriages, customary divorce, customary separation 
and customary declaration of parentage.  
106 See Part X of the LCCA. 
107 See Rubaramira Ruranga (2006). 
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all in the absence of legally constituted LCIIs and LCIs courts. The vagueness of these courts 
explains in part the underlying bias against traditional adjudication systems.108 
3.2.2 Designation of urban councils 
Urban councils are categorised as town councils, municipal councils or city councils. 
Municipal councils (LCIV/IIIs), municipal division councils (LCIIIs), ward councils (LCIIs) 
and cell councils (LCIs) within a district council are designated as urban local councils. 109  
The number of inhabitants in a given area and its level of economic development determine 
the designation of that area as an urban council. Thus, for an area to be designated a town it 
must have more than 25,000 inhabitants.110 For any urban area to be designated as a 
municipality it must have more than 100,000 inhabitants.111 An urban area must have more 
than 500,000 inhabitants to be designated a city.112 In addition, the LGA provides that before 
any area is declared and gazetted as an urban area, it must have the capacity to meet the costs 
of the delivery of services, have offices, a water source and a master plan for land use.113 The 
practical implication of this provision is that it is next to impossible to declare any area an 
urban local government because of the resource and human capacity limitations of many local 
councils. Besides, most local governments depend on central government transfers. 
                                                 
108 See the detailed discussion on the history and politics of traditional institutions in Uganda in Chapters Four 
§28 and Five §37.2. 
109 Section 45(1)(a) of the LGA. 
110 Section 32(1)(a)(i) of the LGA. 
111 Section 32(1)(a)(ii) of the LGA. 
112 Section 32(1)(a)(iii) of the LGA. 
113 Section 32(1)(b) of the LGA. 
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Table 2: Criteria for declaration of urban councils 
Population (number of inhabitants) 
 
Categorisation  
<25,000 
 
Town council 
<100,000 
 
Municipal council 
<500,000 
 
City council 
Source: Adopted from section 32 of the LGA. 
 
Urban councils are further categorised from A-D.114 The level of economic activity of a given 
urban council determines its category.115 The categorisation of urban councils overlaps with 
the categorisation of town, municipal, and city categorisation. There is no legal consequence 
for categorisation of urban councils as either A or B. The categorisation thereof merely shows 
that most urban councils are colonial remnants.116 
                                                 
114 See The Local Governments (Classification of Towns) Order pursuant to sections 3(5) and 7(1) of the Urban 
Authorities Act. 
115 See O.2 of the Local Governments (Classification of Towns) Order. 
116 A municipality is an area which, because of its level of development and urbanisation, is designated as such 
by a minister. See the Local Government (Declaration of Towns) (No.1) Order. This Statutory Instrument was 
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3.3 Consequences of categorisation of an urban council 
A municipal council falls under the political jurisdiction of the district council in which it is 
situated.117 The uniqueness of a municipal council is that it enjoys a degree of administrative, 
fiscal and planning autonomy from the district council, as provided for by article 197 of the 
Constitution.118 Ordinarily, municipal councils are county councils but of a unique kind.119 
As a further consequence of urban categorisation, the LCIIIs below the municipal councils 
become known as municipal division councils (the equivalent of rural subcounty councils),120 
while all LCIIs and LCIs below the municipal division councils become known as ward and 
                                                                                                                                                        
made under the Urban Authorities Act, 1964 Revision Cap 27. The Act was later repealed by the Local 
Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute, No 15/1993. Section 48(2) of the Statute saved the subsidiary 
legislation made under the Urban Authorities Act. The Local Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute was 
repealed by the Local Governments Act, 1/1997. Section 177 of that Act saved subsidiary legislation made 
under the Local Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute. Source: Laws of the Republic of Uganda Revised 
Edition 2000 Vol. XXIV p 5145. It noted that under Section 32(2) of the LGA every district headquarters is 
declared as a town. 
117 Section 5 of the LGA provides that a municipality is a lower council of the district council in which it is 
situated. 
118 Oloka-Onyango (2007: 12) describes municipal and town councils as a hybrid of a county and sub-county 
councils. See also section 79 of the LGA. Makara Makar (2009: 156) clarifies that municipal and town councils 
are of a hybrid nature as they are not under the direct control of district councils. According to the author, 
municipal councils have independent executive powers in the performance of their functions. The author adds 
that these councils receive their central government transfers, collect local government revenue and spend it 
‘according to their own priorities’. 
119 Oloka-Onyango 2007: 12. 
120 It is noted that where a sub-county council as an LCIII is designated as an urban area, it becomes a town 
council 
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cell councils respectively.121 It is noted that only municipal and municipal division councils 
have the legal personality. 
Figure 2: Structure of a district council in Uganda 
 
Source: Ministry of Local Government/ articles 5 and 178 and Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, and sections 
3-5 and 45 of the LGA. The green border refers to the rural local governments from LCI-LCV while the red 
border refers to the urban local governments from LCI-LCV. The red, purple or green fill refers to local 
governments LCIII, LCIV and LCV with corporate personality. The square in pink refers to the hybrid nature of 
municipal councils as an urban LCIV. The local governments with a court symbol refer to local council courts. 
 
Notwithstanding the elaborate legal framework for Uganda’s local governments, there has 
been a systematic manipulation these institutions over a period of time, the discussion of 
which is made below. 
                                                 
121 Section 45(1)(b) of the LGA. 
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4. Manipulation of district councils: Sub-national politics and the re-
emergence of autocracy 
In the first three parts of the chapter the institutions of LG have been described. In the 
discussion that follows three manifestations of manipulation of local government institutions 
are presented: the political undercurrents in the proliferation of many districts,122 the 
recentralisation of Kampala city and the continuous rejection of Regional Governments 
(RGs). Districts, as manifestations of local governments’ institutional integrity in Uganda are 
important units through which local development, local democracy and accommodation of 
ethnic diversity may be supported as argued in Chapter Three. In Chapter Three, it was argued 
that for local governments units to execute their ultimate objectives above, they ought to be 
created by a neutral body with clear criteria.123 The description thereof assess whether the 
manipulation of local government institutions undermines the integrity and objectives of 
decentralisation as discussed in Chapters Two and Three. In turn, the discussion questions 
whether the central government has lived up to its constitutional mandate of protecting the 
institutional integrity of district councils. 
4.1 The proliferation of districts 
Uganda has a population of about 29.7 million people.124 At the time of writing the thesis, 
there were 122 districts in Uganda, up from 33 when the current regime came into power in 
                                                 
122 Oloka-Onyango 2007:12. 
123 Chapter Three §3.3.3. 
124 Bahemuka 2006: 8. 
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1986.125 This translates into an average of 243,443 people per district. Between 1986 and 
1997, 11 new districts were created. In 2000, a further 11 districts were created, while in 
2005, the year preceding the 2006 elections, 22 new districts were created. In 2006, the year 
that followed the elections, 9 districts were created. It had been expected that only 14 new 
districts would be approved in 2010.126 However, by the end of 2010, the total number of 
districts had risen to 122, up from 79 in 2006.127 
Table 3: Growth of districts (1962-2010) 
Year No. of districts 
Percentage growth of 
districts 
1962 17 - 
1968 18 6% 
1971 19 6% 
1974 37 95% 
1979 33 -11% 
1990 34 3% 
                                                 
125 The Daily Monitor July 21, 2009. The number districts above includes Kampala city, which was formally, 
centralised in 2010. 
126 The Daily Monitor July 21, 2009. 
127 See a List of Districts, Municipalities and Town Councils in Uganda as of July 2010 available at http: 
//molg.go.ug/2010/11/05/list-of-districts-municipalities-and-town-councils-in-uganda-as-of-july-2010/ (accessed 
10 July 2010). 
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1991 38 12% 
1994 39 2.60% 
1997 45 15% 
2000 56 24% 
2005 70 25% 
2006 79 13% 
*2010 *112 *42% 
Source: ACODE Policy Research Series, No. 27, 2009 p 42, excluding the percentages and figures with 
asterisks. 
 
The table above shows that there was a 559% growth in the number of districts from 
independence in 1962 to 2010. The phenomenal rate of growth in the number of districts can 
be illustrated by looking at three periods. There was a 24% growth in the number of districts 
in 2000 from 1997. There was also a 25% growth of the number of districts in 2005 from 
2000. Lastly, there was an unprecedented 160% growth in the number of districts in 2010 
from 2005. In 2013, the President placed a moratorium on creating new districts.128 
4.2 The recentralisation of Kampala City 
Since the commencement of decentralisation, Kampala City has been part of the local 
government system, and treated as having the status of a district. Its five divisions were 
considered sub-counties. Before 2005, Kampala City formed part of the local government 
                                                 
128 Lumu D & Waluusimbi D ‘Museveni tired of new districts’ The Observer 11 March 2013. 
 
 
 
 
238 
 
Chapter 5: Local Governments’ Institutional Integrity, Sub-National Ethnic Questions and Politics in 
the Post-1995 Constitution 
structures and was known as the KCC. The KCC was regulated in the main by the LGA, with 
similar structures and powers to any other district council. The elected political leader of KCC 
was the City Mayor, while the administrative head was known as the City Town Clerk.129 
With the amendment to the Constitution in 2005 and the adoption of the Kampala Capital 
City Act (KCCA), the administration of Kampala, designated as the Capital City, was re-
vested in the central government.130 The Constitution now vests powers in Parliament to 
determine the boundaries of the Kampala City Council Authority (KCCA).131 Parliament is 
also empowered to determine the administration and development of KCCA.132 
                                                 
129 The detailed discussion of the district council’s governance structures and powers is given in Chapters Six 
and Seven. It is noted that before the centralisation of district senior managers in 2005, the Town Clerk was 
appointed by the Kampala City Service Commission. 
130 Article 5(4) of the Constitution. See also Constitution (Amendment) Act 2005. See also the Kampala Capital 
City Act (KCCA), 2010, whose long title states:  
An Act to provide, in accordance with Article 5 of the Constitution, for Kampala as the city of Uganda; to 
provide for the administration of Kampala by the central Government; to provide for the territorial boundary of 
Kampala; to provide for the development of Kampala City; to establish the Kampala City Authority as the 
governing body of the City ; to provide for the composition and election of the members of the Authority; to 
provide for the removal of members from the Authority; to provide for the functions and powers of the 
Authority; to provide for the election and removal of the Lord Mayor and the Deputy Lord Mayor; to provide 
for the appointment of, powers and functions of an executive direct and deputy executive director of the 
Authority; to provide for lower urban council under the Authority; to provide for the devolution by the 
Authority of the Functions and Services; to provide for the Metropolitan Physical Planning Authority for 
Kampala and the adjacent districts; to provide for the power of the Minister to veto decisions of the Authority in 
certain circumstances and for related matters. 
131 Article 5(5) of the Constitution. 
132 Article 5(46) of the Constitution. 
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The KCCA provides for three important offices that are pertinent in assessing the 
recentralisation of the former KCC as a local government institution: the Kampala City 
Authority (KCA) as the legislative body of the City, 133 the office of the Lord Mayor;134 the 
Executive Director (ED);135 and the Ministry in charge of Kampala City.136 These structures 
are briefly described below. 
4.2.1 The City Authority 
The KCCA provides for the ‘Authority’137 as a corporate body with capacity to sue and to be 
sued. The Authority has the mandate to govern the city on behalf of the central government. 
The City Authority is composed of the Lord Mayor, the Deputy Lord Mayor, and a directly 
elected councillor representing each electoral area in the city.138 The KCCA provides for two 
youth councillors representing the youth, two councillors with disabilities representing 
persons with disabilities. In either case, one of the councillors must be a woman. The KCCA 
provides for the elections of councillors representing each of the following professional 
bodies: the Uganda Institute of Professional Engineers, the Uganda Institute of Architects, the 
Uganda Medical Association and the Uganda law Society. The electoral system adopted for 
electing the Authority’s councillors is similar that that of electing district council 
                                                 
133 Section 9(1) of the KCCA. 
134 Section 9(1) of the KCCA. 
135 Section 17 of the KCCA. 
136 Section 79 of the KCCA. 
137 Section 2 of the KCCA defines the term ‘Authority’ to mean ‘the Kampala Capital City Authority established 
by section 5’. 
138 The Electoral Commission is mandated to demarcate the city electoral areas for the purposes of conducting 
elections for directly elected councilors. 
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councillors.139 The procedure for removing the Authority councillors from office is also 
similar to that of removing district council councillors from office.140 
The KCCA lists 29 areas of the City Authority’s competencies. The most pertinent ones are 
initiating and formulating policies of the Authority, determining service delivery standards 
and determining tax levels. The City Authority monitors the general administration of the 
Authority and is mandated to deliver services in the divisions and to promote economic 
development in the city. The Authority’s other functions are physical planning and the control 
of development of the city.141 It is noted that the Authority exercises legislative powers 
similar to those of the district councils.142 
4.2.2 The Lord Mayor 
The KCCA provides for the office of the Lord Mayor, elected directly by universal adult 
suffrage and by a secret ballot. The qualifications of a person to stand as a candidate for the 
office of the Lord Mayor are similar to those of a Member of Parliament.143 The Lord Mayor 
is answerable to the Minister and the City Authority.144 The Lord Mayor may be removed 
from office using the same procedure as that of removing the district council chairperson from 
office.145 The office of the Lord Mayor is a full-time job.146 
                                                 
139 A detailed discussion of the district council elections is provided in Chapter Six. 
140 Section 11 of the KCCA. 
141 Section 7 of the KCCA. 
142 Section 8 of the KCCA. 
143 Section 9 of the KCCA. 
144 Section 11 of the KCCA. 
145 Section 12 of the KCCA. 
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The Lord Mayor is the political head of the Capital City and not the political head of the 
Authority.147 Nonetheless, the Lord Mayor presides over all meetings of the City Authority 
and performs both ceremonial and civic functions, including hosting foreign and local 
dignitaries. Besides the political and ceremonial roles of the Lord Mayor, he or she is 
mandated to monitor the administration of the Capital City and to provide guidance to the 
division administrators. The Lord Mayor also represents the Capital City on the Metropolitan 
Authority.148 
4.2.3 The Executive Director 
The KCCA provides that the ED is the chief executive of the city Authority. The ED is 
appointed by the President on the advice of the Public Service Commission. For a person to 
be appointed as the ED of the Authority, he or she must qualify to be a permanent secretary in 
a government ministry.149 The ED is under the disciplinary control and direction of the Public 
Service Commission.150 
The ED is the head of public service in the Authority. The ED is the Authority’s accounting 
officer responsible for the management of public funds. The ED is accountable to Parliament 
and coordinates and implements national and the Authority’s policies, laws, by-laws, 
                                                                                                                                                        
146 Section 9 of the KCCA 
147 Section 2 of the KCCA defines the term ‘capital city’ to mean the ‘Kampala Capital City’. 
148 Section 11 of the KCCA. Section 2 of the KCCA defines a ‘Metropolitan Authority’ as ‘the Metropolitan 
Physical Planning Authority established by section 20’ (sic). Under section 21 of the KCCA, the Metropolitan 
Authority is mandated to deal with the planning matters of the capital city and the neighbouring districts of 
Mukono, Mpigi and Wakiso.  
149 Section 17 of the KCCA. 
150 Section 18 of the KCCA. 
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regulations, programs and projects. The ED advises the Authority on central government’s 
policies and advises the Authority on technical, administrative and legal matters. The ED is 
mandated to implement lawful Authority decisions.151 Thus the functions of the ED are 
similar to those of the district Chief Administrative Officer (CAO).152 
4.2.4 The mandate of the Kampala Capital City Authority’s Minister 
Section 2 of the KCCA defines a ‘Minister’ as the Minister responsible for the Capital City.153 
The KCCA provides for extensive powers of the Minister for the Kampala City Authority. 
For instance, the Minister has the powers to change or overturn the decisions of the Authority 
should he or she form the opinion that the Authority’s decisions contradict government 
policy. All that the Minister needs to do thereafter is seek the approval of the cabinet for his or 
her decision to be valid. The Minister has the power to appoint a Commission of Inquiry 
should he or she form the opinion that something serious has arisen in the Authority. The 
Minister oversees the performance of the Authority by presenting yearly reports to 
Parliament. A Minister’s directive on any matter cannot be questioned by the Authority. 
Besides, the Minister can veto any decisions taken by the Authority if in his or her opinion 
such a decision is illegal.154 
                                                 
151 Section 19 of the KCCA. 
152 See the detailed discussion on the role of the district CAO in Chapter Six. 
153 Currently, the Minister of Kampala Capital City Authority is also the minister in charge of the presidency. 
154 Section 79 of the KCCA. 
 
 
 
 
243 
 
Chapter 5: Local Governments’ Institutional Integrity, Sub-National Ethnic Questions and Politics in 
the Post-1995 Constitution 
4.2.5 Historical context of the recentralisation of Kampala City 
Whereas administrative efficiency might have been the reason for recentralisation of the 
Kampala City, given the evidence of past mismanagement of the city,155 the evidence of 
political undercurrents leading to the change of status is too overwhelming to ignore. 
Since 1996 the opposition has won the majority of elective seats of Kampala City. In fact, in 
the last local council election of 2006, the ruling party managed to win only one in five 
council seats, representing 20% of all the seats.156 In the 2011 national and local council 
elections, the Lord Mayoral seat was won by the opposition party with 64% of the votes cast. 
However, the ruling party won the majority of city council seats.157 The decision by the 
central government to legally take over the control of Kampala City is mainly explained by 
political reasons rather than the desire to improve the management of the city.158 According 
the President, Kampala voters had hanged themselves by voting Mr Lukwago and other 
                                                 
155 Makara 2009: 9. 
156 Oloka-Onyango 2007: 39. 
157 See generally the 2011 Uganda Elections Results. 
158 See Oloka-Onyango (2007: 12) who argues: ‘The more telling reason was political; Kampala has for a long 
time been a hotbed of political opposition; by recentralizing control over its administration, it was hoped that the 
political problem could be handled. While no bill has yet been presented to Parliament, the draft which is 
circulating takes away the remaining vestiges of autonomy originally enjoyed by the Capital city and places it 
under the thumb of the president.’ 
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opposition-leaning politicians. The President explained that by recentralising the city 
administration he had ‘cut them off from the ropes’ (sic).159 
The controversy surrounding removal the Lord Mayor of the Kampala City Authority from 
office is evidence of the highly charged political context/animosity between the central 
government and the elected political leaders of Kampala City.160 In 2013, the Minister for 
Kampala Capital City Authority appointed a tribunal chaired by a High Court Judge to 
investigate the allegation against the Lord Mayor of abuse of office and incompetency. The 
tribunal found the Lord Mayor guilty on eight of the 12 impeachable offences.161 The Lord 
Mayor was subsequently ‘impeached’ from office162 and his seat declared vacant.163 The 
tribunal’s report, the decision to impeach him from office and the declaration by the Attorney 
                                                 
159 Kafeero ‘Museveni tells off Lukwago in city tour’ The Daily Monitor available at 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Museveni-tells-off-Lukwago-in-city-tour/-/688334/2284166/-
/mtmwia/-/index (accessed 18 April 2014). 
160 See Lukwago Elias and 3 Others v the Attorney General and Another Miscellaneous Cause NO. 362 OF 
2013. See also Lukwago Elias and 3 Others v Attorney-General and Another Misc Application No. 445 of 2013, 
where the High Court Judge stayed the Authority’s Councillors’ meeting that purported to impeach the Lord 
Mayor. The alleged meeting was in fact chaired by the Minister of Kampala City Authority. The Court order 
was openly defied by the Minister, hence the numerous litigations on the subject matter.  
161 GOU: The Report of the KCCA Tribunal (2013) Constituted to Investigate Allegations against the Lord 
Mayor of Kampala Capital City Authority Pursuant to a Petition of Councillors of the Kampala Capital City 
Authority 3013:66-192. 
162 Masereka ‘Drama as Lukwago is impeached’ The Red Paper, available at 
http://www.redpepper.co.ug/lukwago-impeached (accessed 20 February 3014). 
163 ‘Lukwago returns to court to fight tribunal report’ The Observer available at 
http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29608:lukwago-returns-to-court-to-
fight-tribunal-report&catid=34:news&Itemid=114 (accessed 9 April 2014). 
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General, the ED and the Minister that the Lord Mayor’s seat was vacant have been challenged 
in the High Court.164 Given the strict nature of sub judice rule in Uganda, I propose not to 
make any further comments on the subject matter.165 
4.3 Assessment 
In Chapter Three, it was argued that the integrity of local government institutions is vital for 
the success of decentralisation.166 As noted earlier, the Odoki Commission recommended for 
constitutionally protected local governments in order to guard against arbitrary institutional 
changes. The Commission also recommended for clear criteria before local government can 
be changed or altered. 167 But the above three narratives indicate that many districts have been 
arbitrarily created, hence undermining the constitutional objective of decentralisation. It is 
argued that a district may be created on account of promoting local democracy. Local 
democracy as a process affords voters the power to select their local leaders and allows them 
to participate in local decision-making process. Furthermore, communities can demand 
explanations from their elected local leaders more quickly from smaller local governments 
that bigger ones. Downsizing local governments units therefore enhances the state’s ability to 
address local developmental challenges.168 
                                                 
164 Okanya A ‘Court to hear Lukwago petition on tribunal today’ The New Vision, available at 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/mobile/Detail.aspx?NewsID=644110&CatID=1 (accessed 30 February 2014). 
165 The rule of sub judice is an old English common law rule that bars discussion of court cases before their 
determination. In Uganda this rule is still strictly enforced. 
166 Chapter Three § 3.2. 
167 Odoki Commission 1993: 495. 
168 Singiza & De Visser 2010:23-24. 
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Despite the existence of criteria for creating new districts under Article 179(1)(a) and (b) of 
the Constitution, there is evidence that some of the newly-created districts serve as 
inducements to communities to vote for a specific political party (usually the ruling party). As 
long as the ruling party has the numbers in Parliament that it does,169 it can create as many 
districts as it wants without a significant input from independent stakeholders. The process of 
the creation of districts was assessed in a recent report as follows: 
The creation of the districts did not follow any established parameters, neither was the 
process informed by administrative necessity or economic rationale. Instead, the President 
announced their creation via presidential decrees, often to reward politicians threatening to 
withdraw support for the NRM, or to punish those who had.170 
The evidence of arbitrariness in the creation of many districts in Uganda shows that the 1995 
Constitution did not fully adopt the recommendation of the Commission that called for 
considerations such as language, culture, geographical features, economic viability, 
population density, and ‘the desire of the people concerned’ as the major criteria for creating 
new districts.171 Oloka-Onyango remarks that ‘the strategy of district proliferation has also 
been adopted by President Museveni as a means of dispensing patronage, and ultimately of 
splintering challenges to the central government hegemony and control’.172 
Thus, rather than ensuring the realisation of socio-economic rights, the objective of the 
creation of districts appears to be to benefit a few local politicians in the new districts in order 
                                                 
169 Currently the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) has a two-thirds majority in Parliament.  
170 ARD Democracy and Governance Assessment: Republic of Uganda, 2005 Kampala: USAID 2005:41.  
171 Odoki Commission 1993: 497. 
172 Oloka-Onyango 2007: 12.   
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to strengthen the central government’s political clout.173 The same views are applicable to the 
recentralisation of Kampala City. 
The rancour against ethnicity in Uganda notwithstanding, the consideration of culture and 
ethnicity in the drawing of local government boundaries is not uncommon and may enable 
communities to participate in local politics.174 However, the evidence of the creation of 
ethnic-based districts by the central government in Uganda seems to be diametrically opposed 
to its official decentralisation policy framework which aimed to exorcise ethnicity altogether. 
The recent Parliamentary and Presidential moratorium on creating any more districts is a 
matter of ‘too little too late’, and of no remedial value.175 The relationship between increases 
in the number of districts and changes in voting trends and distribution of patronage in 
Uganda is easy to find. When the voting trend in the country from 1996 to 2011 is juxtaposed 
with the proliferation of districts over the same period of time, it is discovered that when the 
regime’s political support was high, there was little incentive to create many districts 
compared to when its support had somewhat reduced as illustrated by Table 3.176 
For instance, in the election year 1996, only six districts were created at the time when the 
President’s share of votes was at 74.33%. In the election year 2001, 17 new districts were 
created when the President’s share of votes was at 69.33%. In the election years 2005, 26 new 
districts were created when the President’s share of votes had declined to 59.26%, while in 
2010, a year preceding the election year 2011, 42 new districts were created, resulting in the 
increase in the President’s share of votes to 68.38%. Thus the more districts were created, the 
                                                 
173 Oloka-Onyango 2007: 12.  
174 Singiza & De Visser 2010: 10. 
175 Lumu D & Waluusimbi D ‘Museveni tired of new districts’ The Observer 11 March 2013. 
176 See Chapter Five § 5.4.1. 
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greater the ‘stability’ (in statistical terms) of the President’s share of the national vote. It can 
safely be argued that districts were used as a form of ‘vote buying’ that stabilised the 
President’s decline in political popularity, as illustrated by Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3: Voting trends in Uganda (1996-2011) 
 
Source: Adopted from the Uganda Electoral Commission results from 1996 to 2011. Yellow represents the 
ruling NRM led by President Museveni, the grey represents the voter turnout, while the mixture of red, green, 
blue and indigo represents the combination of the UPC (whose traditional colour is red), the Forum for 
Democratic Change (FDC) (whose traditional colour is blue), and the DP (whose traditional colour is green). 
Indigo represents the independent candidates and smaller political parties. From the above table it can be seen 
that the voter turnout in the 2011 elections was slightly lower than 59.6 compared to an average of 70% voter 
turnout in 2001 and 2006. Between 1996 and 2006 the President’s share of votes declined from 75% to 59%.177 
                                                 
177 See Uganda Electoral Commission available at http: //www.ec.or.ug/eresults.php. In May 1996, Yoweri 
Kaguta Museveni obtained 74.33%, Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere 23.61% and Muhammad Kibirige Mayanja 
2.06%. There was a 72.9% voter turnout. In 2001 March elections, Yoweri Kaguta Musevi obtained 69.33%, 
Kiiza Besigye 27.82%, Aggrey Owor 1.41%, Muhammad Kibirige Mayanja 1%, Francis Bwengye 0.31%, and 
Karuhanga Chapaa 0.14%. The voter turnout was 70.3%. Both the 1996 and 2011 elections were held under the 
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Figure 4: Number of electoral districts and electoral outcomes 
 
Source: Adopted from the Electoral Commission Results from 1996-20011 and the number of districts created 
over the same period. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
non-party political system. In 2006, a year after the introduction of political pluralism, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 
of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) got 59.26%, Kiiza Besigye of the Forum for Democratic Change 
(FDC) 37.39%, John Ssebana Kizito of the Democratic Party (DP) 1.58%, Abed Bwanika (Independent) 0.95% 
and Miria Obote of Uganda the People’s Congress (UPC) 0.82%. The voter turnout was 69.2%. In 2011, Yoweri 
Kaguta Museveni (NRM) got 68.38%, Kiiza Besigye (FDC) 26.01%, Norbert Mao (DP) 1.86%, Olala Otunu 
(UPC) 1.58%, Betty Kamya of Uganda Federal Alliance (UFA) 0.66%, Abed Bwanika of the People's 
Development Party (PDP) 0.65%, Jaberi Bidandi Ssali of People's Progressive Party (PPP) 0.44%, and Samuel 
Lubega (independent) 0.41%. The voter turnout was 59.3%. 
 
 
 
 
250 
 
Chapter 5: Local Governments’ Institutional Integrity, Sub-National Ethnic Questions and Politics in 
the Post-1995 Constitution 
The recentralisation of Kampala City not only threatens the notion of local governments as 
hatcheries of democracy, as discussed in Chapter Two,178 but also fundamentally undermines 
the integrity of decentralisation. The recentralisation of Kampala City is therefore a clear 
example of the arbitrariness on the part of the central government, and affirms the very risks 
that the Odoki commission had sought to overcome. In Chapter Three it was argued that 
constitutionally recognised local governments endure, can be predicted, and are legally 
ascertainable. However, when this argument is applied to the recentralisation of the former 
KCC, it is clear that over and above the constitutional protection, the role of political players 
is equally vital in protecting local governments. The political manipulation of local 
government institutions is not limited to the arbitrariness with which many districts have been 
created and the recentralisation of Kampala City. The deliberate misunderstanding of the 
Buganda Kingdom’s special federal demands points to the continuation of further political 
manipulation. It is in the context of the Buganda Kingdom’s special federal status demands 
that Regional Governments (RG) are discussed below. 
4.4 Regional Governments (RG) 
The historical uniqueness of the Buganda Kingdom was discussed in Chapter Four.179 The 
Buganda Kingdom’s separate demand for independence, its special federal status under the 
1962 Constitution and the nullification thereof under the 1967 Constitution were pointed out. 
It was argued that the nullification of the Buganda Kingdom’s special power-sharing 
arrangement with the central government partly explains the constitutional and political 
                                                 
178 See Chapter Three para. 2.4. See also Onyango-Obbo ‘Mayor Lukwago and the new truth his victory reveals 
about Uganda’s politics’ The Daily Monitor, available at 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/OpEdColumnists/CharlesOnyangoObbo/-/878504/1131088/-/h5xbc6/-/index 
179 See Chapter Four § 4.3.  
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instability from 1967 to 1995.180 It was also noted in Chapter Five that the Odoki Commission 
did not favour the reintroduction of the Buganda Kingdom’s greater political autonomy, a 
position that was adopted by the CA delegates.181 In Chapter Two, it was argued that where 
there are clear dividends for greater political autonomy because of an ethnic group’s unique 
history, asymmetric federalism should be adopted.182 Rather than provide for asymmetrical 
federalism, the central government sought to appease the Buganda Kingdom with a nebulous 
version of asymmetrical federalism called Regional Government. This is discussed in the 
paragraphs below. 
In 2005, ten years after the promulgation of the Constitution, the Constitution was amended to 
provide for Regional Governments (RGs).183 Under article 178(3), the districts of Buganda, 
Bunyoro, Busoga, Acholi and Lango are deemed by the Constitution to have agreed to form 
regional governments. However, no RGs have so far been established in terms of this article. 
While the RGs establishment deemed to have been created have been specified, parliamentary 
approval is still required.184 
                                                 
180 See Chapter Four § 4.8.1. 
181 See Article 178 of the Constitution and Chapter Five §5.1.2. 11. 
182 See Chapter Three §2.4.4. 
183 See Constitution (Amendment) (N0.2) Act, 21/2005.  
184 Article 178(4) of the Constitution provides: ‘The headquarters of the regional governments deemed to have 
been established in clause (3) of this article shall be as follows: (a) in Buganda, Mengo Municipality which shall 
be created by Parliament; (b) in Bunyoro, Hoima Municipality which shall be created by Parliament; (c) in 
Busoga, Jinja Municipality; (d) in Acholi, Gulu Municipality; and (e) in Lango, Lira Municipality. (5)The 
districts forming the regional government shall form a regional Assembly’.  
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The Constitution also provides for the establishment of RGs by mutual consent through an 
agreement between two or more districts.185 The agreement to co-operate is with a view to 
performing the functions specified in the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution dealing with RGs. 
Before any district decides to enter into a co-operation arrangement to form a RG, a proposal 
to join must be approved by a two-thirds majority resolution of the district council, and 
ratified by a two-thirds majority of the sub-county councils.186 
Article 178(7) of the Constitution provides that ‘[n]otwithstanding article 180’,187 a RG is ‘the 
highest political authority within its region’ with ‘political, legislative, executive and cultural 
functions in the region’. Article 180 of the Constitution underscores the political authority of 
the RG in its area of jurisdiction. This provision underlines the significance of the RGs as 
political entities. 
4.4.1 Regional Assembly (RA) 
The RA is composed of representatives directly elected by universal adult suffrage in the 
region.188 Unlike districts which are vested with political authority by the Constitution, RAs 
are merely clothed with cultural powers. It is argued here that a RA is a forum for regional 
democratic participation. In the Ugandan context, it is difficult to separate cultural matters 
from politics. Aside from providing for special representation of women, youth and persons 
with disabilities, the Constitution provides for representatives for the indigenous cultural 
                                                 
185 See Article 178 of the Constitution. 
186 See Article 178(2) of the Constitution. 
187 Article 180 of the Constitution underscores the political authority of the district local government council in 
its area of jurisdiction. 
188 Paragraph 2(1)(b) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
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interests in areas where there is a traditional or cultural leader.189 In principle, indigenous 
cultural interests are represented by persons who are nominated by the traditional or cultural 
leader in a region. However, the number of these representatives should not exceed 15 percent 
of the members of the RA.190 The representatives of indigenous and cultural affairs are not 
permitted to vote in a partisan manner.191 It is argued that it is undemocratic to limit the 
voting rights of elected representatives. Besides, it is unclear how this will be enforced. The 
chairpersons of the district councils in the region are ex officio members of the RA, but have 
no voting rights.192 
4.4.2 Functions 
The Constitution calls on RAs to establish ‘standing and other committees or organs for the 
efficient discharge of its functions’. The Constitution specifically provides for the standing 
                                                 
189 Paragraph 2(1)(d) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
190 Paragraph 2(1)(d) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
191 Paragraph 7(1) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. Paragraph 7(2) Fifth Schedule 
pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution provides: ‘A matter shall be considered to be of a partisan nature if in 
the course of its being tabled or debated in a regional assembly it is declared by a majority vote of the directly 
elected representatives to be partisan’. 
192 Paragraph 2(1) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. Under paragraph 2(4) Fifth 
Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution, the members of a RA can only serve for the same term of 
office as members of district councils in the region. Thus, on the expiry of the term of office of district councils, 
the term of office of members of RA automatically ends. It is noted that under paragraph 2(2) Fifth Schedule 
pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution the RA elects its own Speaker.  
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committee on cultural matters constituted by ‘representatives of cultural interests’. The 
Constitution thus vests a discretion in the RA to establish other committees.193 
The overall function of the standing committee on cultural matters is therefore ‘culture’ 
within a given region.194 The phrase ‘cultural matters’ has a wide content under the 
Constitution. It includes the choice and installation of a traditional leader or cultural leaders; 
determination of matters relating to traditional or cultural leaders or royal lineage; the choice 
of clan leadership; funeral rites and customary inheritance; clan lands, shrines and 
installations; and cultural practices which are consistent with the Constitution.195 
The standing committees on cultural matters must consult a traditional or cultural leader while 
executing their functions.196 A decision by a committee on cultural matters is not effective 
until approved by a traditional or cultural leader, and in cases of the process of appointing a 
new traditional leader, a cultural or clan leaders’ council.197 The above provision does not 
state how such an approval should take place. Such a provision is open to manipulation in the 
absence of a proper mechanism for its enforcement. For instance, the absence of a clear 
criterion to be followed before a traditional or cultural leader or a cultural or clan leaders’ 
council can approve a decision of a standing committee, is problematic. Besides, it is not clear 
whether the decision of the standing committee should affect some or all members of the 
clans before it can be approved.  
                                                 
193 Paragraph 3(1) & (2) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
194 Paragraph 3(3) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
195 See Paragraph 3(4) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
196 See Paragraph 3(5) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
197 See Paragraph 3(6) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
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4.4.3 Election of the RG chairperson 
The Fifth Schedule to the Constitution provides that a chairperson of the RG must be elected 
by every adult member of voting age in the area. The RG chairperson is also RG political 
head.198 To qualify to be a candidate for a RG chairperson, a person must be: 
• a citizen of Uganda by birth;199 
• a member of an indigenous community, whose parent or grandparent is or was a 
resident in the region and a member of an indigenous community existing and residing 
within the borders of the region as at 1 February 1926;200 
• qualified to be a Member of Parliament;201 
• not be less than 35 years of age;202 and 
• ‘willing and able, where applicable, to adhere to and perform the cultural and 
traditional functions and rites required by his or her office’.203 
Parliament is empowered to determine the manner in which a chairperson of a RG can be 
removed.204 Provision is also made for the appointment of RG ministers with the approval of 
                                                 
198 See Paragraph 4(1) and 4(3)(a) & (d) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
199 Article 10 of the Constitution. 
200 See Paragraph 4(2)(a) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
201 Paragraph 4(2)(b) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
202 Paragraph 4(2)(c) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
203 Paragraph 4(3)(b) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
204 Paragraph 4(4) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
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the RA.205 In 2009, a Bill was published to implement the provisions of article 178 of the 
Constitution However, the Bill was never discussed in Parliament and is not going anywhere 
near the floor of the House.206 I propose not to discuss the details of the Bill given its date of 
publication and the currency that surrounds its dubious nature. 
4.4.4 Assessment 
Uganda has been relatively stable for the last two decades.207 The only challenge has been the 
civil war in the northern parts of the country.208 Of late, however, there has been some kind of 
                                                 
205 Paragraph 5(1) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
206 See the Regional Government Bill, 2009 No. 20/2009. The memorandum of the Bill states that:  
The object of this Bill is to provide for the establishment of the regional governments in accordance with the 
Constitution as amended by the Constitutional (Amendment) (No.2) ct, 2005 (Act No. 21 of 2005); to provide 
for the functions and services of the regional governments; to provide for the formation by regional 
governments of regional assemblies and the composition, functions, services, speaker, and committees of 
regional assemblies; to provide for headship of regional governments and for Ministers of regional 
governments; to require cooperation of the regional governments with Central Government; to provide for the 
Chief executive officer and staff of regional governments and for districts which do not form regional 
governments; and to make provisions for the elections in respect of regional governments; to provide for the 
takeover of the administration of regional governments by the President in special circumstances and related 
matters. 
207 Siegle & O’Mahony 2006: 47. 
208 The northern part of the country, in political terms, is predominantly Luo-speaking, although it has other 
ethnic subgroups, such as the Acholi and the Lango-speaking peoples. In geographical terms, however, the 
northern part of the country also includes parts of the West Nile Region. From 1986-2009, the northern region 
witnessed one of the most horrific civil conflicts in Uganda that involved Uganda government forces (formerly 
the National Resistance Army (NRA), now the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF)) and the Lord’s 
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latent anger and frustration in the southern parts of the country.209 Varied reasons can be 
given for this anger, including cases of corruption, political violence and intolerance.210 All 
these have fomented some resistance against the government. Thus, from 2001 to 2008, there 
have been an unprecedented number of protests against the government.211 For instance in 
2010, clashes between supporters of the Buganda Kingdom and military and police led to 
injuries and loss of life.212 It is argued that this anger is in part the result of the poor 
institutional design of local government that has alienated an important pillar of local 
                                                                                                                                                        
Resistance Army (LRA) under Joseph Kony. The war, although fought mainly in the Acholi region, equally 
affected the entire northern region. For details on the northern Uganda conflict, see generally Dolan (2009). 
209 See ‘Deaths in Uganda forest protest’ available at http: //news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/af rica/6548107.stm; ‘Uganda 
MPs angry at forest plan’ available at http: //news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6478829.stm; State Department report 
on Uganda available at http: //www.scribd.com/doc/30655494/Clinton-Report-42710#about; ‘Chogm debate 
flops again’ available at http: //www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/917286/-/wymahm/-/index; 
‘Museveni an obstacle to democracy‘ The Independent, available at http: 
//www.independent.co.ug/index.php/cover-story/cover-story/82-cover-story/2824-museveni-an-obstacle-to-
democracy-. See also Esrom William Alenyo vs. The Electoral Commission and Another Court of Appeal 
Election Petit Appeal No. 9 of 2007; Kirunda Kivejinja Ali v Katuntu Abdu Court of Appeal Election Petit 
Appeal No. 24 of 2006. 
210 See State Department report on Uganda, available at http: //www.scribd.com/doc/30655494/Clinton-Report-
42710#about; ‘Chogm debate flops again’, available at http: //www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-
/688334/917286/-/wymahm/-/index. 
211 See ‘Museveni an obstacle to democracy’ The Independent, available at http: 
//www.independent.co.ug/index.php/cover-story/cover-story/82-cover-story/2824-museveni-an-obstacle-to-
democracy-. 
212 ‘The riots were not about Kabaka Mutebi and Kayunga’ The New Vision, available at http: 
//www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/20/695436; ‘Deaths in riot after Uganda fire’ available at http: 
//english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/03/20103183262 6 4 9981. 
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governance – traditional leadership. It is argued that even if the provision for the RG was 
intended to specifically address the Buganda Kingdom’s special federal status, there is still 
active discontent on this issue. 
The provision for RGs and governance structures thereunder is an attempt to address 
simmering ethnic questions within the nation state.213 Key to the establishment of the RGs is 
the requirement to comply with constitutional principles relating to democracy.214 The 
establishment of RGs seems to have stalled after serious political confrontation with the 
Buganda Kingdom. 
It is also noted that it is procedurally difficult to establish a RG given that all district and sub-
county councils and councillors must, by a two-thirds majority vote, approve the proposal to 
join. Thus RAs are not realistic forums for ethnic groups that may wish to take up the offer as 
a watered-down version of asymmetrical federalism.215 It is maintained that the provision for 
the RGs does not address the inadequacies in decentralisation, given the RGs’ main focus on 
cultural matters.216 Moreover, the apparent constitutional protection of the indigenous 
people’s cultural rights subject to the existence of a traditional or cultural leader, assumes that 
every ethnic minority group necessarily must have a leader.217 Thus, in cases where no 
                                                 
213 See Article 178 of the Constitution. 
214 See article 178(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
215 Siegle & O’Mahony 2006: 45. 
216 Paragraph 3(2) and (3) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution; Paragraph 4(3)(b) Fifth 
Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
217 See Paragraph 2(1)(d) Fifth Schedule pursuant to Article 178 of the Constitution. 
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leadership structures exist among certain indigenous peoples, there is no constitutional 
protection extended to them from a RG.218  
Since RGs are only limited to cultural aspects of the regions, they ignore the legitimate 
demands of certain communities, like the Baganda, who demand a special federal status 
within Uganda.219As argued by Kaplan, the protection of unique identity groups through 
greater political autonomy is a credible way to fix the political fragility if the state fragility is 
linked to ethnic strife that exists in many less developed countries.220 
The Buganda Kingdom’s quest for a special federal status poses subtle problems of protecting 
the rights of minorities that exist within it.221 Some ethnic groups, with a culture distinct from 
that of the Baganda, have historically existed within it. In addition, many other ethnic groups 
from other parts of the country have settled in the Buganda Kingdom as a result of migration. 
The key test for a successful quest for and configuration of the Buganda Kingdom’s special 
federal status, would be the manner in which such a federal arrangement protects and 
integrates minorities that have historically existed within Buganda, such as through stronger 
local governments.222 
The constitutional promise to protect marginalised groups as a right223 presupposes that some 
ethnic groups, like the Batwa,224 demand special attention and protection. Recognition of 
                                                 
218 Jjemba 2009: 1-17. 
219 Singiza & De Visser 2011: 10. 
220 Kaplan 2008: 32-3. 
221 For example, the ‘Banyala’, the ‘Baluli’, and the ‘Bakoki’ have traditionally existed within the Buganda 
Kingdom. 
222 Singiza 2010: 9. 
223 See NODPSP No.III of the Constitution. 
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cultural diversity should not have been the only constitutional precondition for the 
establishment of a RG.225 
5. Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter has traced the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution to the 
repealed unitary Constitution of 1967. As highlighted in Chapter Four, the 1967 Constitution 
not only provided for a highly centralised state but had also abolished the territorial autonomy 
of the Buganda Kingdom that was provided for under the 1962 Constitution.226 The chapter 
examined the role of the Odoki Commission under the 1995 Constitution and argued that to a 
large extent, the recommendations by the Commission were adopted by the Constituency 
Assembly. 
The chapter described the different local government institutional structures in Uganda, but 
maintained that only district and sub-county councils enjoy legal personality, with the 
exception of the municipal council, which takes the form of a hybrid rural-urban council. The 
chapter discussed the legal and policy background to the creation of many districts and argued 
that the process has been open to abuse by the central government for the sake of politics, 
rather than sound economics. The creation of many districts was also discussed together with 
the centralisation of Kampala City to highlight the extent of the abuse of the process of 
creating or altering local government boundaries in Uganda. The chapter argued that there is 
                                                                                                                                                        
224 The Batwa are an indigenous people in the great lakes region and are found in Burundi, Rwanda Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and Uganda.  
225 See Article 12(1) of the Constitution. See also ‘MPs oppose autonomy for minority tribes’ The New Vision 
available at http: //www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/699607 (accessed 30 October 2009). 
226 Chapter Four § 4.8.2. 
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evidence to suggest that the creation of many districts serves as a reward for political support 
and, in part, to weaken strong ethnic groups. An economically stronger and/or more populous 
district can compete politically with the central government better than an economically 
weaker or less populous one. Ultimately the chapter pointed out that the object of 
decentralisation as identified in Chapter Two has been deliberately undermined by the central 
government.227 Using the newly established KCCA as an example, the chapter explained that 
the centralisation of Kampala City was, in part, to punish local communities for continuously 
voting for the opposition parties, and not necessarily to improve the quality of service 
delivery to Kampala City residents. 
While evaluating the 1995 constitutional amendment that provides for RGs, the chapter made 
the point that RGs are in fact a response to the Buganda Kingdom’s demand for special 
federal status. The chapter concluded that the rejection of the RG offer from the central 
government by the Buganda Kingdom calls for immediate legal reform of Uganda’s 
decentralisation programme. The preceding two chapters have examined the historical context 
of decentralisation, and the reforms introduced after the promulgation of the 1995 
Constitution. They have laid the ground for the next two chapters that analyse the governance 
structures and the powers and functions that are devolved to district councils.
                                                 
227 Chapter Two § 2.3.1. 
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6. CHAPTER SIX 
DISTRICT COUNCIL GOVERNMENT 
1. Introduction 
The Constitution of Uganda calls for the protection of the right to public participation of all 
citizens in the democratic process. Consequently, access to leadership positions at all levels 
and the ability of citizens to freely elect their leaders are projected as core to democracy.1 It is 
for this reason that the right to vote is guaranteed under the Constitution.2 The Odoki 
Commission took the view that: 
[f]rom the pre-colonial period to the present, people became increasingly marginalised in 
deciding on matters which affect them, and grew apathetic about government. Yet it is at the 
local level that the citizens have the fullest opportunity to participate directly in their own 
governance … The emasculation of local governments meant fewer opportunities to exercise 
political power. Many Ugandans believe that this partly accounts for the intense and 
sometimes violent competition for political and public offices at the national level.3 
According to the Odoki Commission, districts should be controlled by elected representatives 
of the people, who must remain answerable to the electorate at all times.4 Adopting the Odoki 
Commission recommendation, article 80(2) of the Constitution vests Parliament with the 
power to prescribe, among others, the election and composition of the members of the district 
councils. 
                                                 
1 See NODPSP No II para. (ii) of the Constitution. 
2 Section 59(1) of the Constitution.  
3 See Odoki Constitution Commission 1993: 491 para. 18.56-18.57. 
4 See Odoki Constitution Commission 1993: 498 para. 18.9. 
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Chapter Two linked the role of local elections in a decentralised system in fostering 
transparency and accountability in subnational governments.5 In Chapter Three it was argued 
that an electoral system, particularly in fragmented societies, can only produce legitimate 
electoral outcomes if it is (a) representative, (b) accessible, (c) accountable, (d) promotes 
inclusive political mobilisation, and (e) creates stability of governments.6 
2. Features of Uganda’s district council electoral system 
In the discussion below, five salient features of the district council’s electoral system are 
identified. In turn, these features are examined to assess whether the criteria (a)-(e) above are 
met. The major focus in this part of the chapter is on the choice between proportional 
representation and constituency voting on the one hand, and the universal adult suffrage, 
secret ballot and ‘lining behind ones preferred candidate’ on the other. The dominance of the 
ruling party in district council politics and the exclusion of ethnic minority representation are 
also presented as problematic for local democracy. 
2.1 The choice between proportional representation and constituency voting 
The Constitution does not specify a particular electoral system for district council elections. 
Instead, the Constitution provides that in every election, at the closure of the poll, the 
presiding officer must count and record the number of votes obtained by each candidate. 
Every candidate or his or her representatives or polling agents must verify that vote counting 
at the polling station was accurate. The results are then announced.7 In the words of section 
135(1) of the LGA: ‘Each returning officer shall, immediately after the addition of all the 
                                                 
5 Chapter Two § 2.3.1.2.  
6 Chapter Three § 3.4.3. 
7 Articles 68(2)(3),and (4) of the Constitution. 
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votes for each candidate or after any recount, declare elected a candidate who has obtained the 
largest number of votes by completing a return in a prescribed form.’ 
The person who obtains the highest number of votes wins the electoral seat or area. The 
practical effect that flows from section 135(1) of the LGA is that once a winning person in 
any electoral area has been declared, the losing party or supporters thereof are not 
represented.8 Section 135(1) of the LGA adopts the ‘winner-takes-all’ electoral system. 
2.2 The choice between universal adult suffrage, secret ballot and line voting 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the debate on district council elections in the Odoki 
Commission revolved around three main methods of voting: a secret ballot; lining up behind a 
person’s preferred candidate; and electing district council leaders using electoral colleges.9 
Article 176 of the Constitution provides universal adult suffrage for district council elections. 
There is no particular injunction that district council elections (other than those of the district 
council chairperson) should be by a secret vote. The only injunction is that district council 
elections should be in accordance with article 181(4) of the Constitution, which makes 
reference to a five year term of office. In any case, Parliament has the discretion to exempt 
district council chairperson elections from the secret ballot requirement.10 Thus, the method 
of physically standing behind one’s preferred candidate is constitutionally valid.11 Currently, 
the LGA adopts a secret ballot universal adult suffrage for all district council elected 
                                                 
8 For example, the UK winner-takes-all system has been criticised by the United Kingdom’s Electoral 
Commission Chairwoman, Jenny Watson, as ‘Victorian, antiquated, left over from an era when less people had 
to vote’.  
9 Chapter Five § 5.1.2.4. 
10 Article 68(1) of the Constitution 
11 See the repealed section (2) 111 of the LGA. See also Makara 2009: 9. 
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officials.12 Against this background, the discussion below examines whether the adoption of a 
constituency-based system, in which three methods of voting are provided for, counters the 
inadequacies of the winner-takes-all system. 
3. District council constituencies 
The right to vote is a key criterion for the demarcation of electoral areas under article 181 of 
the Constitution.13 The Constitution vests the obligation in the Electoral Commission to 
demarcate districts into equal electoral areas according to the number of inhabitants.14 
However, the number of electoral areas may differ depending on logistical considerations, 
                                                 
12 Section 111(1) of the LGA. Until recently, only the election of the district council chairperson was by 
universal adult suffrage and by a secret ballot. The election of sub-county, and municipal, town, and county 
local government chairpersons was conducted differently. Voters would physically line up behind their 
preferred candidate, who would have been nominated for the office, or his or her representative, or portrait. See 
the repealed section (2) 111 of the LGA. See also Makara 2009: 9. Article 68 (6) of the Constitution provides: 
‘Parliament may by law exempt any public election, other than a presidential or parliamentary election, from the 
requirements of clause (1) that it shall be held by secret ballot.’ Thus, the method of electing candidates by 
physically standing behind them remains and is constitutionally valid. 
13 Article 181 of the Constitution provides that for elections of local government councils: ‘(1) A district shall be 
divided by the Electoral Commission into electoral areas which shall be demarcated in such a way that the 
number of inhabitants in the electoral areas are as nearly as possible equal. (2) The number of inhabitants in 
an electoral area may be greater or less than other electoral areas in order to take account of means of 
communication, geographical features and density of population. (3) The demarcation of electoral areas shall 
ensure that a sub-county, a town council or an equivalent part of a municipality is represented at the district 
council by at least one person. (4) All local government councils shall be elected every five years. 
(5) Subject to article 61 of this Constitution, elections of all local government councils shall take place on such 
date as the Electoral Commission shall determine in accordance with the law.’ 
14 Article 181(1) of the Constitution. 
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such as communication, geographical features and population density.15 To ensure full 
participation of people in every district, demarcation of the electoral areas must ensure that at 
least one person represents a sub-county or a town.16 
The LGA provides that the process of demarcation of electoral areas is required to ensure that 
every sub-county or municipal division is represented in the district council.17 Thus, a district 
as an electoral area may be subdivided into sub-counties and/or municipal divisions. The 
LGA provides that a district electoral area should have about 30,000 inhabitants.18 
According to the LGA, the population quotas notwithstanding, the demarcation of the 
electoral areas for female representatives should ensure that women constitute one-third of the 
district council.19  
As stated in Chapter Five, a sub-county (or LCIII) is a constituency for electing district 
council councillors.20 The Constitution enjoins Parliament to determine districts and sub-
counties as political institutional structures.21 At the same time the Constitution mandates the 
Electoral Commission to create district council constituencies.22 In principle, the criteria of 
creating districts and sub-counties are similar to those of creating district council electoral 
                                                 
15 Article 181(2) of the Constitution. 
16 Article 181(3) of the Constitution. 
17 Section 109(1)(a) of the LGA. 
18 Section 108(1)(c) of the LGA. 
19 Section 108(3) of the LGA. 
20 See Chapter Five § 5.3.1 
21 Article 179 of the Constitution.  
22 Article 181(1) of the Constitution. 
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constituencies.23 All district council councillors’ and chairpersons’ elections are organised, 
conducted and supervised by the Uganda Electoral Commission. The Electoral Commission is 
specifically mandated to ‘compile, maintain, revise and update the voters register’.24  
What the above means is, that should the population quota in a given district result in less 
than the minimum number of female councillors in any district council, then the electoral 
areas would have to be increased to meet the minimum requirements. 
4. The role of political parties 
In Chapter Two, the role of political pluralism was highlighted as crucial for local 
democracy.25 In Chapters Four and Five, the history of political pluralism was also given.26 
As noted earlier, when the present ruling party captured state power in 1986, political parties 
and their activities were de facto banned. It was in this environment of restricted political 
party activities that the process of devolution of powers to district councils began.27 Makara 
argues that 
although the NRM (until 2005) had claimed to be a movement and not a one-party state, it 
did operate like the latter. The reality of the politics of decentralisation in Uganda tends to 
                                                 
23 Article 181(2) of the Constitution. See detailed discussion in Chapter Five § 5.3.1.1. 
24 Article 61(2) of the Constitution. See also section 101 of the LGA. Where there are fewer women’s seats than 
what all lower councils in a district can provide, the electoral areas for female councillors under section 110(e) 
are permitted by themselves to co-opt two or more female councillors from the lower councils. The electoral 
areas for female councillors must, in co-opting more female councillors, use a population quota that is 
determined by the Electoral Commission. 
25 Chapter Two § 2.3.2.4. 
26 Chapter Four § 4.6 and Chapter Five § 5.1.2.5. 
27 Oloka-Onyango 2007: 11. 
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vindicate Manor’s argument that the real reason why national politicians accept 
decentralisation is because they wish to use decentralisation to connect their regime with 
social groups and to sustain or revive their party organisations.28 
Indeed, at the inception of decentralisation in 1986, district councils, then known as the 
Resistance Committees Five (RC5), were intertwined with the ruling party’s security 
apparatus, and hence undermined their democratic credentials.29 
4.1 The Movement Political System 
The Constitution provides for two main political systems, namely the non-party political 
system (or the Movement Political System) and the pluralistic political system (or the 
Multiparty Political System).30 Either of the two political systems is subject to the voters’ 
‘choice’, expressed either by an election or a referendum. In addition, the Constitution 
provides that either of the two political systems can be adopted through a majority vote of the 
elected representatives in Parliament. However, their decision has to be supported by a 
resolution of the majority of each of the district councillors. At least 50 percent of the district 
councils in the whole country must support such a resolution.31 
The 1995 Constitution defined the Movement Political System by listing its four basic 
principles: (i) ensuring that every citizen was involved in the decision-making process; (ii) 
promoting transparency in that every decision taken had to be justified and explained to the 
citizens; (iii) ensuring that every citizen had an opportunity to access any leadership position; 
                                                 
28 Makara 2009: 64. 
29 Makara 2009: 135. 
30 See Articles 69-71 of the Constitution. 
31 See Article 74 of the Constitution. 
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and (iv) ensuring a candidate’s individual merit.32 The Constitution specifically prohibited 
political parties from performing any activities that would ‘interfere with the Movement 
Political System’.33 The Movement Act (MA) was enacted to give effect to the Movement 
Political System.34 It provided for a National Executive Committee, its Secretariat, and 
district council committees. The MA also provided for the National Conference as the body 
corporate of the Movement Political System.35 The National Conference was also the 
executive organ of the Movement Political System.36 
According to the MA, the National Conference consisted of a Chairperson, a National 
Political Commissar and all members of Parliament.37 Importantly, it also included all 
members of executive committees of district councils and all district council chairpersons.38 
The Chairperson of the National Conference was the head of the Movement Political System 
and chaired the National Conference and the National Executive Committee. He or she 
convened and presided over National Conference and National Executive Committee 
meetings. The Chairperson implemented the ‘policies and principles of the movement’.39 He 
or she was also the chief spokesperson of the Movement Political System and the overall 
                                                 
32 See Article 70 of the Constitution. 
33 See Article 269 of the Constitution and Lambright 2011: 28. 
34 The long title to the Movement Act, Cap 261 provided: ‘an Act to make provision for the movement political 
system pursuant to article 70 of the Constitution and for related matters’. 
35 Section 3(3) of the MA. 
36 Section 5 of the MA. 
37 Section 4 of the MA. 
38 Sections 3(1) and (2)4 of the MA. 
39 Section 6 of the MA. 
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source of guidance to the organs of the Movement Political System and could ‘do any other 
thing necessary for the good of the Movement’.40 
There was arguably very little distinction between the government of the day and the 
Movement Political System. Thus, the structures of the Movement Political System were for 
all intents and purposes a ‘rival’ and not a ‘shadow’ government.41 Makara argues that 
‘although the NRM (until 2005) had claimed to be a movement and not a one-party state, it 
did operate like the latter’.42 
In this part of the chapter, the main focus is on the re-introduction of political pluralism in 
2005, following the 2005 constitutional amendment. The Constitution, in its amended form, 
adopts the Multiparty Political System. Political parties can compete for political office in 
district councils.43 A candidate may also be nominated as an independent without the 
                                                 
40 Section 6 of the MA. 
41 Singiza & De Visser 2014: 15-16, forthcoming. 
42 Makara 2009: 64. 
43 See generally the Constitution (Amendment) Act No 11 2005. The case of Rubaramira Ruranga v Electoral 
Commission and Another, Constitution Petition No. 21 of 2006, was the first to test the notion of multiparty 
politics in district elections after the constitutional amendment that allowed for the return of multiparty politics. 
The case dealt with the composition of electoral colleges of LCI, II and IV. The Constitutional Court held that in 
a multiparty system it is not an individual that is nominated, but rather a party flag-bearer. The Court nullified 
elections of all LCI, II IV local administrative unit councils throughout the country on account of non-
compliance with the constitutional guarantees of political pluralism. According to the Constitutional Court, an 
electoral collegial system that did not provide for parties to nominate candidates was unconstitutional. Thus, a 
person could not be validly nominated as a candidate unless provision was made for different parties to 
nominate candidates in a collegial system for LCI, II, and IV elections. 
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sponsorship of any political organisation or political party.44 The Constitution in its current 
form places numerous injunctions on the formation and participation of political parties. The 
Constitution obliges every political party in a multiparty political system to be of a ‘national 
character’45 and not one based on ‘sex, ethnicity, religion or other sectional division’.46 
The framework for political parties is regulated by the Political Parties and Organisations Act 
of 2005 (PPOA).47 The PPOA, while adopting the provisions of article 71(1)(b) of the 
Constitution, prohibits the formation of political parties ‘based on sex, race, colour, or ethnic 
origin, tribe, creed or religions or other similar division’.48 Further, the PPOA prohibits the 
use of words, slogans or symbols which might arouse any of the divisions prohibited above.49 
In other words, Parliament on the instruction of the Constitution restricts the expression of 
ethnic identity in a multiparty political system. 
This principle is also followed through in local government. Local government elections are 
regulated, in the main, by the Local Governments Act (LGA).50 This Act, too, prohibits the 
use of any colours or symbols that have tribal or religious affiliation or ‘any other sectarian 
connotation’ as a basis for one’s candidature for election or in support of one’s campaign.51 
Under the LGA, individual candidates who violate this provision not only put their 
                                                 
44 Section 119A of the LGA. 
45 Article 71(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
46 Article 71(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
47 Section 3 of the PPOA. 
48 Section 5(a) of the PPOA. 
49 Section 5(b) of the PPOA. 
50 See the Local Governments Act Cap, 243, as amended. 
51 The LGAs 125(2). 
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candidature at risk but also risk the imposition of 48 currency points or two years 
imprisonment. In other words, the government of Uganda did not want the reintroduction of 
multiparty politics to open the door for ethnic mobilisation. In fact, it imposed an outright ban 
on party political campaigning around ethnic, religious or cultural matters.52  
Before the introduction of multiparty politics, the one-party political system emphasised the 
‘individual merit’ of an individual candidate.53 Under the Movement Political System a 
person was elected to a political office based on his or her ability to perform. Under the 
pluralistic political system, however, emphasis is placed on the internal democratic 
organisation of an individual political party. Thus, under a Multiparty Political System, an 
individual candidate, as a party flag-bearer, is selected first by the party members (through a 
system of party primaries), and then voted into a political office by the majority of the voters 
in an electoral area.54 
5. Rules for candidacy 
In Chapter Two it was argued that local governments have the ability to identify local 
priorities and development needs better than the central government. It was also emphasised 
that given the consensus-building attributes for traditional institutions, the leaders of these 
institutions supplement local democracy rather than hinder it.55 In Chapter Three it was 
argued that an adequate local government electoral model should be representative, 
                                                 
52 The LGAs 125(4). See also Singiza and De Visser 2014: 19, forthcoming. 
53 Article 70 of the Constitution. 
54 Article 71 of the Constitution. In practice, there is a fine line between the Movement Political System and the 
‘Multiparty Political System’ since both emphasise party discipline and internal cohesion. 
55 Chapter Two § 2.3.2.4. 
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accessible, foster political competition and accountability, be competitive, inclusive and 
create stable government.56 The Constitution does not exclude any category of person from 
participating in district council elections and therefore accords with the above arguments. 
The LGA provides specific grounds that may disqualify a person to be elected as a district 
councillor. These are either 
• insanity;57 
• holding any office relating to the conduct of an election under the LGA;58 
• being a traditional or cultural leader;59 
• being under sentence of death, or serving a term of imprisonment exceeding six 
months without the option of a fine;60or 
• employment by a district council for which a person seeks to stand.61 
The discussion below will highlight two issues, namely (1) the absence of educational 
qualification and (2) the banning of traditional leaders from politics. 
 
                                                 
56 Chapter Three § 3.4.3. 
57 Section 116(2)(a) of the LGA. 
58 Section 116(1)(b) of the LGA. 
59 Section 116(1)(c) of the LGA. 
60 Section 116(1)(d) of the LGA. 
61 Section 116(1)(e) of the LGA. 
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The Odoki Commission did not recommend the exclusion of candidates for district council 
councillors on account of his or her level of education qualification. The Commission 
reasoned: 
Many people have given views on qualifications for a person to be elected to the district 
council. On the whole, people want candidates with a reasonable standard of education and a 
clean record in the community. ... In our view, there is no need to prescribe any formal 
education standard. Any person who can read and write and speak the local language 
reasonably fluently should qualify to be elected. We must trust that the electoral process 
itself will weed out incompetent people and produce the right councillors for the district.62 
It should be noted that this recommendation covered all members of a district council. In the 
CA, attempts to set higher education standards were resisted on the grounds that the majority 
of district politicians had a lower level educational background. 63 Hence a higher education 
qualification might disenfranchise the electorate of their freedom to choose.64 
It is arguable that the absence of educational qualifications for councillors accords with what 
the majority of the CA delegates wanted. To the extent that the Commission considered 
higher education qualification as unjustified limitation is in accord with the arguments 
advanced for an inclusive and accessible local government electoral model. The Constitution 
adopted the stance of the Commission. Thus, under the Constitution, the only condition that a 
person must fulfil is that he or she must be a citizen of Uganda.65 However, under article 180 
                                                 
62 Odoki Commission 1993: 499. 
63 See CA debates 1994: 3755 per Okalebo Ephrahim.  
64 See CA debates 1994: 3755 per Lt. Col. Sserwanga Lwanga. 
65 Article 180(3) of the Constitution. 
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(2) of the Constitution, Parliament is vested with powers to provide, among others, for 
additional qualifications. The additional qualifications are discussed below. 
The provisions of the Constitution, the LGA and the newly enacted Institutions of Traditional 
or Cultural Leaders Act (ITCA)66 explain the rules of candidacy for district council 
councillors. Article 246 of the Constitution provides for the existence of traditional 
institutions.67 Article 246(2)(e) of the Constitution provides that ‘a person shall not, while 
remaining a traditional leader or cultural leader, join or participate in partisan politics.’ Article 
246(2)(e) of the Constitution, on which basis section 116(2)(c) of the LGA and section 13(1) 
of the ITCA are enacted, clearly bars traditional and cultural leaders from local government 
politics.68 Section 116(e)(1)(c) of the LGA provides: ‘A person shall not be elected a local 
government councillor if that person ... is a traditional or cultural leader as defined in article 
246(6) of the Constitution.’ It is noted that the Constitution only prohibits traditional or 
cultural leaders from joining or participating in ‘partisan politics’.69 It may difficult for a 
traditional leader, who is elected to a district council, to remain neutral, if he or has been 
                                                 
66 Cited as The Institutions of Traditional or Cultural Leaders Act (ITCA). 
67 Article 246(6) of the Constitution defines a ‘traditional leader or cultural leader’ as ‘a king or similar 
traditional leader or cultural leader by whatever name called, who derives allegiance from the fact of birth or 
descent in accordance with the customs, traditions, usage or consent of the people led by that traditional or 
cultural leader’. 
68 See also sections 13(1) & (2) of the ITCA. Section 13(2) of the ITCA provides that any traditional or cultural 
leader that joins or participates in partisan politics must abdicate his position not less than 90 days before the 
date of the nomination. 
69 Article 178 of the Constitution defines the term ‘partisan’ only in relation to the RA deliberations and 
provides: ‘A matter shall be considered to be of a partisan nature if in the course of its being tabled or debated in 
a regional assembly it is declared by a majority vote of the directly elected representatives to be partisan’. 
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sponsored by a political party. However, it is possible for a traditional leader who is elected to 
a district council on an independent ticket, to remain neutral. The LGA blanket provision that 
bars traditional and cultural leaders from district councils is therefore unconstitutional. 
6. Special representation 
6.1.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Three it was argued that an adequate electoral model should be representative, 
accessible, and capable of promoting reconciliation, accountability, and inclusive political 
mobilisation. It was argued that these features are necessary for creating stable local 
governments.70 Against the background of the above norm, the section below assesses the 
elections of minority social groups to determine if the electoral process is capable of 
producing legitimate outcomes necessary for democratic local government. 
7. Electoral approach 
It is the duty of the Electoral Commission to help establish the different bodies that form the 
electoral colleges.71 The Electoral Commission must engage with the associations of social 
minorities and political parties to elect their representatives by appointing returning officers 
and presiding officers for the purposes of conducting elections of representatives of each 
special interest group.72 As noted earlier, only adult members of voting age of these 
associations (electoral colleges) qualify to vote by a secret ballot for candidates representing 
                                                 
70 See Chapter Three § 3.4.3.  
71 Section 118(2B) of the LGA. 
72 Section 118(3) of the LGA.  
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social minorities.73 The Constitution provides for special interest group representation in the 
district councils and instructs Parliament to make provision for representation of social 
minorities in the district councils.74 The LGA provides for electing special interest groups 
such as women, the youth, and persons with disabilities. The manner in which the LGA 
provides for their special presentation is problematic. The LGA mandates the Electoral 
Commission to reach out to social minorities in electing district council special interest group 
councillors.75 The Electoral Commission, on the instruction of the LGA,76 considers only 
youth, persons with disabilities77 and elderly persons as social minorities that require special 
representation.78 Whereas the first two associations are statutory, the latter one, on whose 
basis district council councillors representing the elderly are elected, is not.79 Yet ethnic 
minority groups in Uganda, even those affiliated to the Minority Rights Group International,80 
are not accommodated. The mechanism for electing social minorities in district councils is not 
                                                 
73 Section 111(1) of the LGA. See also Rubaramira Ruranga. 
74 Article 180(2) (b), (c) and (d) of the Constitution. 
75 Section 117(1) of the LGA 
76 Section 118(2B) of the LGA. 
77 See the National Youth Council Act Cap. 319 and the National Council for Disability Act (No. 14), 2003. 
78 Article 80(2) of the Constitution on affirmative action. 
79 The Uganda Reach the Aged Association (URTAA) is a voluntary, non-profit Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO) whose main focus is to improve the quality of life and preserve the dignity of older people 
in Uganda. 
80 See the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, available at 
http://www.minorityrights.org/744/directory/world-directory-of-minorities-and-indigenous-
peoples.html#sthash.L7bU5rY2.dpuf. (accessed 10 March 2014). 
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representative, does not foster inclusive political mobilisation, and therefore contradicts the 
norm established in Chapter Three.81 
7.1.1 Women 
The LGA specifically requires that one-third of district council councillors must be females.82 
A Member of Parliament (every district has a female MP representing women) is an ex officio 
member of a district council in his or her constituency but has no voting right in the council.83 
The procedure for the election of female councillors is subject to such alterations as may be 
deemed necessary by the Electoral Commission.84 The women councillors in district councils 
are elected by universal adult suffrage.85 What this means is that whereas a person must be a 
woman to stand as a councillor to occupy the special seats for women in a district council, she 
has to be voted for by both men and women of voting age in an electoral area. 
7.1.2 Youth 
The LGA provides for the election of two councillors representing the youth (the members of 
the executive committee of the National Council of Youth in the district acting as the electoral 
college), one of whom must be female.86 The respective youth councils are provided for under 
                                                 
81 See Chapter Three § 3.4.3. 
82 Section 10(1) (e) of the LGA. 
83 Section 10(2) of the LGA. 
84 Section 117 (1) of the LGA. For instance, the Electoral Commission may make regulations relating to the 
procedure of electing special interest groups councillors. 
85 Section 117(2) of the LGA. 
86 Sections 10(1)(c) and 118 (1)(a) of the LGA. 
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section 5 of the National Youth Council Act (NYCA) Cap. 319.87 Provision is also made 
under the NYCA for the composition and hierarchy of youth councils.88 
7.1.3 Persons with disabilities 
The LGA provides for the election of two councillors representing persons with disabilities 
(the members of the executive committee of the National Council of Persons with Disability 
in the district acting as the electoral college), one of whom must be female.89 
The National Council for Disability Act 1 of 2003 (NCDA) provides for the National Council 
of Disability,90 whose functions include, among others, ‘to assist the Electoral Commission to 
                                                 
87 Section 1 of the NYCA provides that a ‘“district”, “county”, “sub-county”, “division”, “town”, “parish”, 
“ward”, and “village” have the meanings ascribed to them under the Local Governments Act’. Section 5 of the 
NYCA provides:  
‘The following youth councils are established in each district – village youth councils; parish or ward youth 
councils; sub-county, division or town youth councils; county youth councils; and a district youth council’. 
88 Section 6 of the NYCA provides: ‘A village youth council shall consist of every person who has attained the 
age of eighteen years but is below the age of thirty years and is a resident of the village. A parish or ward youth 
council shall consist of all the members of the village youth committees in the parish or ward. A sub-county, 
division or town youth council shall consist of all the members of the parish youth committees in the sub-
county, division or town. A county youth council shall consist of all the members of the sub-county, division or 
town youth committees in the county. A district youth council shall consist of – the chairperson, vice 
chairperson, secretary, publicity secretary and finance secretary of each county youth committee in the district; 
and one male representative and one female representative of each sub-county youth council in the district 
elected by the sub-county youth council’. 
89 Section 10(1)(d) of the LGA. 
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ensure the conducting of free and fair elections of representatives of persons with disability to 
Parliament and District Councils’.91 The NCDA establishes district and sub-county councils 
for disabled persons.92 The LGA provides that councillors representing persons with 
disabilities are elected by the electoral college formed by all the members of the district 
executive committee and sub-county executive committee of the National Union of Disabled 
People of Uganda (NUDPU).93 
                                                                                                                                                        
90 Sections 2 and 3 of the NCDA. Section 2 of the NCDA defines ‘disability’ as a ‘substantial functional 
limitation of daily life activities of an individual caused by physical, sensory or mental impairment and 
environmental barriers’. 
91 Section 6(1)(i) of the NCDA. 
92 Sections 18(2) and 21(1) of the NCDA. Under section 18 of the NCDA, the district council for the disabled 
consists of the following: a district rehabilitation officer, a district finance officer, a district education officer, 
the district director of medical services, two district councillors with disability, and the chairperson of the 
district committee responsible for disability affairs or social services. These members are ex officio members. In 
addition, the district council for disability consists of two other persons with disability in the district, one of 
whom must be female. Further, a representative of the parents of children with disabilities appointed in 
consultation with the organisations of persons with disability in the district, and one representative of the Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working with persons with disability in the district are also members. A 
youth representative of persons with disability on the district local government council, a person of proven 
integrity with knowledge of disability who is involved in the advocacy of disability matters appointed in 
consultation with the organisation of persons with disability in the district, are also members. The district 
council for disability has a chairperson and a vice-chairperson who have to be elected from amongst persons 
with disability of the district council of disability. At least the chairperson or the vice-chairperson has to be 
female. 
93 Section 118(2)(a) of the LGA. Section 118(2) of the LGA. Although the LGA does not provide that a 
councillor representing disabled persons has to be disabled, the fact that the criteria for membership of the 
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7.1.4 The elderly 
In every district council, two councillors representing the elderly are elected by an association 
of the elderly forming an electoral college.94 The two councillors representing the elderly are 
elected by the electoral college formed by all the members of the district executive committee 
and sub-county executive committee of the National Association of Elderly Persons.95  
8. Recalling a councillor 
The Constitution provides for the revocation of the mandate of any member of the district 
council by the electorate.96 Parliament is vested with powers to prescribe the procedure for 
revocation of the elected members of the district council.97 Regulation 7 of the Local 
Government Council Regulations (LGCR)98 provides for the grounds upon which the 
mandate of an elected councillor can be revoked. These grounds are: failure by the councillor 
to declare his or her assets within three months after assuming office; neglect of a councillor’s 
duty; and commission of acts incompatible with his or her position as a member of the 
council. 
                                                                                                                                                        
National Union of Disabled Persons of Uganda is disability, implies that a councillor representing disabled 
persons has to be disabled. 
94 Section 118(2A) of the LGA. 
95 Section 118(2A)(a) of the LGA. The Uganda Reach the Aged Association (URTAA) is the main organisation 
that represents elderly persons in Uganda. 
96 Article 182(1) of the Constitution. 
97 Article 182(2) of the Constitution. 
98 See LGCR 7(a) and (b) under Part II of the Third Schedule to the LGA. 
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Thus the criteria for revoking a district councillor’s mandate relate to the link between 
decentralisation and accountability.99 The detailed discussion on the relationship between 
decentralisation and accountability was made in Chapter Two.100 
A councillor’s mandate is revoked by the electorate if one-third of the registered voters in a 
district councillor’s electoral area sign a petition and lodge it with the Electoral Commission. 
Once the authenticity of the petitioners and the validity of the petition is ascertained by the 
Electoral Commission, a district councillor’s seat is declared vacant.101  
9. Assessment of the electoral system of district councillors 
9.1 Determining constituencies based on the number of inhabitants 
It is argued that the demarcation process which depends on estimates of population numbers 
is open to manipulation and statistical errors, given the absence of a credible voters 
register.102 In the absence of a centralised national identification system,103 it is difficult to 
precisely determine persons of voting age or whether in fact a voter is dead. Thus, under-age 
                                                 
99 See the Ministry of Local Government Decentralisation Policy Strategic Framework 2006: 19. 
100 See Chapter Two § 2. 3.1.2. 
101 LGCR 7 (2) and (3) under Part II of the Third Schedule to the LGA. 
102 See Save the Children ‘Lack of Birth Certificate Fuelling Child Abuse - Save the Children‘ The Observer 26 
November 2009. See also sections15-18 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1973 Cap 309, which 
provides for an onerous procedure of registering deaths. It is argued that it is difficult to register the death of 
person when his or her birth particulars are unknown. 
103 See Ojwee D ‘Aronda warns ID project staff against arrogance’ The New Vision available at 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/654665-aronda-warns-id-project-staff-against-arrogance (accessed 19 April 
2014). 
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voters and ‘ghost voters’ continue to fraudulently take part in the voting process.104 
Furthermore, the determination of electoral areas based on the number of inhabitants and not 
on that of voters is misleading. Usually, the exercise of the right to vote is based on universal 
adult suffrage only. In addition, it should not have been for the Electoral Commission to 
determine the political boundaries in district councils but an independent boundary 
demarcation body, as argued in Chapter Three.105 
9.2 The dominance of the Movement Political System 
The change from the Movement Political System to the Multiparty Political System of 
government was adopted in 1995 after a constitutional amendment.106 It is argued that the 
change from a de facto one-party system to multiparty politics was not a genuine one. Rather, 
it was a political compromise after persistent pressure from different stakeholders to re-
introduce multiparty politics, including the donor community. As part of the compromise, the 
constitutional amendment catered for the extension of the Presidential term limits, a political 
move described as the ‘purification of the Movement’.107 
Consequently, the transition to multiparty politics in 2005 was not a genuine political and 
legal reform measure. It was, as Oloka-Onyango observes, a means by which dissidents in the 
ruling party could be ‘purged’, pleasing Western donors and without undermining the ruling 
                                                 
104 Col. Dr. Besigye Kiiza v Museveni Yoweri Kaguta, Electoral Commission (Election Petition No.1 Of 2001) 
[2001] UGSC 3 (21 April 2001).  
105 See Chapter Three § 3.3.3.3. 
106 See generally the Constitution (Amendment) Act No 11 2005 Act. 
107 Oloka-Onyango 2007: 24. The removal of presidential term limits in 2005 essentially allowed President 
Museveni, in power since 1986, to seek another term or terms in office after serving for the two constitutional 
terms from when the 1995 Constitution was promulgated. In fact he had then served for five terms from 1986. 
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party’s political dominance of the district council structures.108 Moreover, the legal provision 
that prohibits the use of ethnicity as a rallying force in the formation of political parties attests 
to the unproven fear that multiparty politics are unsuitable for multi-ethnic countries such as 
Uganda.109 The most common argument against multiparty politics has been that it is 
unsuitable for Ugandan district council politics with no strong middle class.110 
In a true sense, political pluralism is merely tolerated, not totally favoured in district council 
elections for councillors.111 Thus, notwithstanding the introduction of political pluralism, the 
philosophy and political dominance of the de facto one-party state remain intact.112 
9.1 Electoral outcomes 
The electoral outcomes of district councils show an overwhelming dominance of the ruling 
party. For example, as of 2005, only three out of 70 district councils were controlled by 
opposition-leaning chairpersons, while in the 2006 local government elections, only 15 out of 
84 district council chairperson seats were won by opposition parties, despite the fact that the 
ruling party’s share of the national vote had statistically declined.113 In the 2011 Local 
                                                 
108 Oloka-Onyango 2007: 24-5. 
109 Museveni 2000: 15. 
110 Oloka-Onyango 2007: 25. 
111 For example, Lambright (2011: 201) documents evidence of political intimidation where the former Vice-
President warned voters against electing opposition-leaning district political leaders in the 2011 local council 
elections. Citing another instance, the same author explains that in 2006 when the Pallisa district elected a 
member of the opposition party as the district chair, the chair-elect could not form an executive committee until 
he ‘signed a memorandum of understanding with the NRM’. 
112 See Lambright 2011: 28. 
113 Lambright 2011: 28. 
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Government Elections, out of a total of 112 district council seats, 85 were won by the ruling 
party while the remaining seats were shared between the opposition parties and independent 
candidates.114 The former Kampala City Council was among the few district councils that had 
not been fully dominated by the ruling party.115 
Table 4: Electoral outcomes of district council chairpersons 
Election 
Year 
NRM Others No. 
Districts 
Female district 
chair persons 
PWDs district chairpersons 
2001 70 3 73 1 0 
2006 69 15 84 1 1 
2011 85 27 112 1 0 
Source: Adopted from the Uganda Electoral Commission District Council Elections results from 2001-2011 
 
 
The above two tables illustrate the evidence of the domination of the district councils by the 
ruling party.116 This hegemony can be explained by the history of devolution in Uganda. 
                                                 
114 See the Uganda Electoral Commission, District Council Elections, 2011. It is noted that some of the 
independent candidates lean towards the ruling party. 
115 See Chapter Five § 5.3.11, on the relationship between voting trends at national level and the proliferation of 
districts in Uganda. See also Singiza & De Visser (2010). 
116 See for instance Tusasirwe (2007: 36), who discusses voters’ cynicism in the country’s electoral process. 
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9.2 Exclusion of ethnic minorities 
In Chapter Three it was argued that a proportional representation electoral system may suit 
local democracy in fragmented societies, given proportional representation’s inclusive nature. 
It was further argued that the proportional representation electoral system contributes to 
stability, which ultimately translates into stable local government institutions.117  
The adoption of the ‘winner-takes-all’ model is not only risky for local democracy, but 
excludes ethnic minorities. The local government electoral system does not provide for the 
special representation of ethnic minorities. Four special interest categories of councillors were 
discussed: councillors representing women, the youth, persons with disability, and the elderly. 
Article 80(2)(c) of the Constitution specifically provides that ‘any law enacted by virtue of 
this article shall provide for affirmative action for all marginalised groups referred to in article 
32 of this Constitution’. Article 32(1) of the Constitution bestows an obligation on the state to 
‘take affirmative action in favour of groups marginalised on the basis of gender, age, 
disability or any other reason created by history, tradition or custom, for the purpose of 
redressing imbalances which exist against them’. From the above provision, although 
‘gender’, ‘age’, and ‘disability’ are the prominent criteria on which the state may take 
affirmative action, the criteria are widened by the phrase ‘or any other reason created by 
history, tradition or custom’. Categories of people such as the Batwa, the Ik and the Nubians, 
have historically been discriminated against and treated as inferior to other ethnic groups. The 
Batwa have their unique traditions and customs with a special attachment to their ancestral 
land. The Nubians, likewise, although culturally considered as Luos from northern Uganda, 
have a strong Islamic culture that is distinct from the majority of the Luo ethnic 
                                                 
117 See Chapter Three § 3.4.3. 
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communities.118 It is argued that the examples of these two ethnic groups are what article 80 
(2)(c) of the Constitution envisages. 
The provision for the election in district councils of representatives of minority social groups 
accords with the constitutional vision of affirmative action under article 32 of the Constitution 
and the guiding principles of State Policy.119 The existing constitutional and legislative 
framework for the representation of women, the youth, persons with disabilities and the 
elderly in the district councils has not translated into them competing for the highest political 
offices in a district. In a way, the affirmative action through special representation has 
confined these social groups to less powerful political positions in districts.120 Thus many 
special interest groups in district councils just as in Parliament consider their seats as favours 
from the ruling party, rather than as a right.121 The absence of minority groups, such as the 
Batwa, the Ik and the Nubians from special representation in the district councils remains a 
big gap in the legislation and is a clear contradiction of the Constitution,122 not to mention the 
indignity, shame and outrage that ethnic minorities inevitably must suffer as a result of this 
unfairness. The manner in which the Constitution and the LGA provide for a district council 
                                                 
118 Singiza & De Visser 2011: 27. 
119 See NODPSP No. XIV and XV of the Constitution. 
120 Tusasirwe 2007: 32.  
121 Bainomugisha & Mushemeza 2006: 31. 
122 According to the Election Commission, Local Government Election Results 2011, there was not a single 
councillor from Batwa ethnic group in the Kanungu and Kisolo district councils, districts that are inhabited by 
the Batwa ethinic group. Besides, Kaabong district, in Karamoja region, with a population of about 11,272, has 
only two Ik councillors (male and female) in the district council. The two councillors in fact represent Kamion 
sub-county, an area populated by the Ik people. 
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therefore falls short of the standard of accessibility and inclusiveness that was discussed in 
Chapters Two and Three.123 
Ayele, writing on intra-regional territorial political representations within the Ethiopian 
federal system, identifies four major advantages for ethnic-based political representation: it 
allows minority ethnic groups to participate in the democratic process without feeling 
alienated by the majority ethnic groups; it gives the minority ethnic groups the necessary 
political space within which to operate; it acts as a buffer against the cultural domination of 
the minority ethnic groups by the majority; and it has the overall effect of restoring a group’s 
‘dignity and pride’ and hence its peace-building potential within a broader political scheme.124 
The third criticism deals with the low participation levels of women in district councils. 
Byamukama remarks rather sadly that once women have their allotted seats of one-third, few 
have the courage to compete for the remaining slots that are open to men as well. The author 
explains that the cumbersome existing electoral system makes it more difficult for women to 
compete with men on the same footing.125 Ultimately, as Tusasirwe points out, 
[t]he reservation of special seats for women under sections 10, 16 and 47 of the LGA were 
clearly a good starting point for ensuring the participation of women. But how come (sic) 
women still minimally participate in civic matters? It is therefore clear the people still 
minimally participate in their own governance despite rather than because of the provisions 
of the Act.126 
                                                 
123 See Chapter Two §4.3.6 & Chapter Four §4.5.  
124 Ayele 2014: 69. 
125 Byamukama 2000: 6. 
126 Tusasirwe 2007: 32 
 
 
 
 
289 
 
Chapter 6: District Council Government 
Table 5: Distribution of district council seats across social groups for 2011 
Political 
processes 
Directly 
elected district 
council seats 
Women 
councillors 
Special interest groups 
No. of 
Seats 
1,339 921 448 
Source: Adopted from the Uganda Electoral Commission District Council Elections results 2011 
9.3 Educational qualification 
The disqualification of a person who wishes to stand as a councillor on the grounds of 
insanity, or of being under a sentence to death, or of serving an extended term of 
imprisonment, is a justifiable limitation to the right to participate in district council elections. 
In addition, the disqualification of a person on the grounds of employment by a district 
council, and/or a candidate’s role in the elections under the LGA, are reasonable and 
justifiable limitations to ensure free and fair elections. However, the absence of education 
qualifications for councillors, and the exclusion of the traditional or cultural are more 
questionable, and will be examined now. 
The LGA outlines the following, irrespective of the level of local council, as mandatory duties 
of a district councillor: 
• to maintain close contact with the electoral area and consult the people in matters 
to be discussed in the council; 
• to present views, opinions and proposals in the district council; 
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• to attend sessions of the district council and meetings of the district council’s 
committees and subcommittees of which he or she is a member; 
• to appoint a day in a given period so as to meet people in his or her electoral area; 
• to report to the electorate on decisions made by the council and actions taken to 
resolve problems raised by residents in the electoral area; 
• to ‘bring to bear on any discussion in the council the benefit of his or her skill, 
profession, experience or specialised knowledge’; 
• to take part in communal and development activities in his or her electoral area and 
the district.127 
From the above, it is clear that a district councillor plays an important role in promoting the 
right to public participation in the district council. In addition, it can be inferred that a district 
councillor must possess a certain level of skill and professional expertise in order to execute 
his or her duties.128 The argument here is that the district councillors should be literate. They 
should be knowledgeable in simple arithmetic, computer literate and able to analyse 
complicated documents, such as budgets and financial statements. This position finds support 
in the fact that a district councillor has a duty to ‘bring to bear on any discussion in the 
council the benefit of his or her skill, profession, experience or specialised knowledge’, if 
any.129 
                                                 
127 Regulation 8(1) of the LGCR of part I of the Third Schedule to the LGA.  
128 Singiza & De Visser 2011: 12. See also CLGF 2005: 8 Principle no 8 para. 3. 
129 Regulation 8(1) (f) of the LGCR of part I of the Third Schedule to the LGA. 
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Two studies on Uganda district human resource capacity present conflicting findings on the 
level of human resource skills at all levels of district councils. One study by Ts’oele and 
Goldman shows that most districts’ staff are highly qualified.130 Steiner, on the other hand, 
finds a shortage of educated and skilled human resources both at the political level and civil 
service level, with high deficiency levels in areas such as accounts, planning, engineering, 
teaching, and health.131 If the findings of Ts’oele and Goldman are accurate, it is argued that 
the high levels of education are not reflected in the political leadership. Taking the findings of 
Steiner as more representative of the reality on the ground, it is argued that the absence of a 
large number of skilled civil servants in many districts makes a compelling case for a 
reasonably skilled political leadership. Kanyeihamba bemoans the lack of skills for the 
majority of political office-holders in the country.132 
On the other hand, it may be argued that such a provision would amount to unlawful 
discrimination under article 21(2) of the Constitution.133 This view is supported by the fact 
that the Odoki Commission had in fact merely recommended the ‘ability to read and write’ as 
the minimum education qualification for all members of the district councils. It is argued that 
the academic qualification as a condition for candidacy might have been rejected by the 
majority of the CA delegates on account of the prevailing conditions then. There is now 
evidence that districts such as Bushenyi, Mbararaa and Gulu, which had highly academically 
                                                 
130 Ts’oele and Goldman 2006: 6. 
131 Steiner 2006: 14. 
132 Kanyeihamba 2002: 265-6, cited in Singiza & De Visser 2011: 12. 
133 Article 21(2) of the Constitution provides: ‘Without prejudice to clause (1) of this article, a person shall not 
be discriminated against on the ground of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, social or 
economic standing, political opinion or disability’. 
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qualified district political leaders, performed better in accordance with major governance 
criteria than other districts whose district councils were populated with councillors with 
modest education levels.134 
9.4 Limitations on the recall of councillors 
In Chapter Three, two models of democracy were highlighted: direct democracy and 
representative democracy. The conclusion was that even if none of the democratic systems are 
purely direct or representative, direct democracy ensures that citizens are more engaged in the 
decision-making process than in representative democracy. Hence, a recall process such as 
one under Article 182 (1) of the Constitution and Regulation 7(a) and (b) under Part II of the 
Third Schedule to the LGA is a direct means through which the electorate express their 
approval or disapproval of their representatives.135 In theory a recall process may make local 
councils more democratic in that district councillors must constantly demonstrate to local 
citizens that the decisions they make accord with the community’s priorities. In practice, 
however, there is a real danger of a backlash from the national government. For instance, a 
recall process may antagonise districts from the central government in cases of revoking the 
mandate of the central government’s preferred councillors, resulting in the risk of withdrawal 
of state privileges and resources.136 Thus, the provision for the revocation of the mandate of 
district council councillors poses some practical challenges. 
                                                 
134 See the Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments 
2009: Synthesis Report March 2010: 9. 
135 See Chapter Three §2.3.2. 
136 Tusasirwe 2007: 15. 
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Tusasirwe, citing Burkey, argues that it is practically impossible to revoke the mandate of the 
district’s elected councillors in Uganda. His argument is that the fear of the central 
government’s reprisal against local communities (should the recalled councillor happen to be 
a member of the ruling party), outweighs possible dividends that may come from the 
revocation of the district councillor’s mandate.137 It is noted that Burkey’s view, on whose 
authority Tusasirwe relies, dealt with the pre-1997 district council constitutional and legal 
regime, where district councillors were not directly elected by universal adult suffrage.138  
Lambright’s study finds districts that overwhelmingly support the ruling party demonstrate 
higher performance levels than districts that support opposition parties. In addition, those 
districts that overwhelmingly support the ruling party show higher levels of political 
autonomy than districts that support the opposition.139 The author argues: ‘Popular and elite 
support for the ruling party directly influences councils’ ability to effectively translate policy 
into outputs and to respond to the needs of their constituents’ (emphasis in original).140 The 
above analysis, while difficult to challenge, may lend credence to the erroneous view that 
voters’ support of the opposition parties in district councils has no political dividends at all 
and illustrate the economic risk associated with recalling a ruling party councillor.  
Thus it may be argued that, although in the past revocation of a district councillor’s mandate 
was difficult, it is now possible, given that most councillors (except those councillors that 
represent special categories) are elected by universal adult suffrage. However, the above 
argument is simplistic, given that no district councillor’s mandate has ever been revoked by 
                                                 
137 Tusasirwe 2007: 15. 
138 Burkey (1991), cited in Tusasirwe 2007: 15 
139 Lambright 2011: 139-44. 
140 Lambright 2011: 140-1. 
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the electorate in the entire country. Invariably the practical importance of the provisions of 
articles 182(1) and (2) of the Constitution is questionable. It is argued here that the fact that 
no councillor’s mandate has been revoked since 1997 suggests that the fear of a backlash from 
the central government remains. 
9.5 Exclusion of traditional leaders 
Traditional leadership in Uganda is hereditary and male dominated.141 It may be argued that 
traditional leadership does not fit into the modern definition of democracy. The argument 
would then be that if district councils as deliberative assemblies are to play any democratic 
role, undemocratically chosen rulers should be excluded from them. Moreover, traditional 
leaders might have a greater advantage over their political opponents given their high profile 
in local communities. 
Yet the exclusion of traditional or cultural leaders poses a number of human rights and 
constitutional challenges. Disqualifying an individual to stand as a candidate for a district 
council on the basis of his or her traditional leadership role counters the notion of the right to 
public participation without any reasonable justification. Moreover, excluding traditional or 
cultural leaders from district councils undermines the possibility of incorporating traditional 
democratic values into a democratic decentralised system. It is misleading to assume that 
‘elderly persons’ with no voting rights in a district council, can represent an ethnic group on 
traditional and cultural matters. Even if there may be reason for excluding traditional 
institutions from district council politics, provision should have been made for an Assembly 
of Traditional Leaders (or an ‘Assembly of Clan Leaders’) separate from district councils. As 
                                                 
141 See Tamale 1999: 272. 
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argued in Chapter Three, such an assembly should have the power to veto district council 
laws or policies that may undermine the cultures and customs of a given ethnic community.142 
10. The district chairperson 
10.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Two, the argument was that the notion of local democratic autonomy is grounded 
in the ability of the local population to elect their own leaders.143 In this part of the thesis, the 
district council chairperson’s functions are examined. In turn, an assessment is made to 
determine whether, in light of his or her functions, the approach adopted by both the 
Constitution and the LGA in electing the district council chairperson produces legitimate 
political outcomes necessary for a developmental and democratic local government. 
10.2 Executive functions of the chairperson 
The district chairperson is mandated by the Constitution to preside over the district council 
executive committee meetings144 and to oversee the general administration of the district 
council. Further, the district council is obliged to coordinate the activities of the urban and 
rural councils within a district council. In addition, the district council chairperson must 
coordinate and monitor the central government functions within the district council. He or she 
may also perform any other functions assigned by Parliament.145 
                                                 
142 See Chapter Three § 3.5.3. 
143 See Chapter Two § 2.3.2.4. 
144 See the discussion on the composition and role of the district council executive committees in § 6.11 of this 
chapter. 
145 Article 183(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
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The LGA repeats the provision of the Constitution on the functions of the district council 
chairperson.146 The only addition is that the district council chairperson must abide, uphold 
and safeguard the Constitution and the district laws and other laws of Uganda, and ‘shall 
endeavour to promote the welfare of the citizens in the district’.147 
The district council chairperson is subject to the decisions of, and answerable to, the district 
council’s the authority.148 Arguably, both the district council and the district council 
chairperson seem to have a separate democratic legitimacy, with a potential of conflict in 
cases of serious political disagreements between the two. It is noted that a district chairperson 
is the executive head of a district given he or she is the head of the district council executive 
committee149 and that members of the district council executive committee serve at his or her 
pleasure.150 
 The discussion below examines the elaborate procedure of electing the district council 
chairperson. The system of electing the chairperson is assessed from the criteria adopted in 
Chapter Three, namely (a) representativeness, (b) accessibility, (c) accountability, (d) 
inclusive political mobilisation, and (e) stability of governments.151 
                                                 
146 Section 13(1) of the LGA. 
147 Section 13(2) of the LGA. 
148 Article 183(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
149 Article 186(2)(c) of the Constitution. 
150 Section 20(1)(a) of the LGA. 
151 See Chapter Three § 3.4.3. 
 
 
 
 
297 
 
Chapter 6: District Council Government 
10.3 The electoral system 
Similar to the electoral system of district council councillors, the Constitution does not 
specify an electoral system that is uniquely tailored to district council chairperson elections. 
Instead, it provides that in every election, at the closure of the poll, the presiding officer must 
count and record the number of votes obtained by each candidate. The same procedure is 
adopted for electing the district council chairpersons. It is emphasised that the term of office 
of the district chairperson is five years.152 
Under the Constitution, every person is permitted to have access to leadership positions in 
local district councils. However, there are parameters set before one can run for the office of 
district chairperson. The Constitution lists three crucial conditions: (a) a person must be 
qualified to stand as a Member of Parliament; (b) a person should be between 30 and 75 years 
of age; and (c) a person should be ordinarily resident in the district.153 
Section 111(3) of the LGA expands the three conditions under article 183(2) of the 
Constitution to ten. Thus, a candidate for a district chairperson must fulfill the following 
conditions: 
• possess Ugandan citizenship; 
• be a proven resident in the district; 
• be aged between 30 and 75 years; 
• be a registered voter; 
                                                 
152 Article 181(4) of the Constitution. 
153 Article 183(2) of the Constitution. 
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• have a minimum education of advanced level or its equivalent; 154 
• have submitted his or her nominations papers on the nomination day; 
• have attached to his or her nomination paper a list of 50 registered voters from at least 
two-thirds of the electoral area with each of their signatures appended; 
• have paid a non-refundable fee of 5 currency points; 
• during the time when Parliament adopts the Multiparty Political System,155 a public 
officer has to resign his or her office at least 30 days before nomination day;156 and 
• when Parliament has adopted a Multiparty Political System, a district candidate may 
be nominated by a political organisation or political party sponsoring him or her. He 
or she may also be nominated as an independent without the sponsorship of any 
political organisation or political party.157 
It is noted the LGA requires that district council candidates must be nominated by a certain 
number of registered voters even after he or she has been nominated as a flag-bearer of a 
                                                 
154 Section 111(3A) of the LGA. The LGA caters for situations in which a person obtains his or her academic 
qualification in Uganda or outside Uganda, and then claims that his or her academic qualifications are 
equivalent to the Advanced Level standard of education. He or she may also have obtained his or her academic 
degrees from outside Uganda. See Sections 111(3B), (3C) and (3D) of the LGA. 
155 See the detailed discussion on change from either of political systems in §3.1 of this chapter. 
156 Section 116(3), (4) & (5) of the LGA. 
157 Section 119A of the LGA. 
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political party. Consequently, a candidate nominated by a particular party may be disqualified 
if he or she fails to raise the required number of registered voters to nominate him or her.158 
Article 80(1) of the Constitution, a provision that deals with educational qualifications of 
Members of Parliament (essentially similar to the provisions of section 111(3) of the LGA159) 
has been subject to comment by the courts in Uganda. In the words of Justice Twinomujuni, 
‘This is a clear and mandatory provision of the Constitution. You either have these 
qualifications and you qualify for the election to Parliament or you don’t and you are not 
qualified.’160 
Courts have been consistent as to what amounts to an equivalent advanced certificate of 
education. The common view has been that where candidates’ academic qualifications have 
been challenged, then the challenged candidate should have the burden to prove that in fact he 
or she does have the qualifications.161 In fact, a number of candidates for the position of 
district council chairpersons have had their nominations declared invalid because either all or 
one of the qualifications under subsection 3 of section 111 of the LGA had not been 
satisfied.162 
                                                 
158 Section 111(3) of the LGA. 
159 Article 80 (1) of the Constitution provides in part that a candidate must have ‘completed a minimum formal 
education of advanced level standard or its equivalent’. 
160 See Lubya iddi Kasiki v Kagimu Maurice Peter Election Petition Appeal No. 6 of 2002 per Twinomujuni, 
JA. 
161 See Abdul Balingira Nakendo vs. Patrick Mwonda Court of appeal Election Appeal No.23 of 2006; Lubya 
iddi Kasiki v Kagimu Maurice Peter Election Petition Appeal No. 6 of 2002. 
162 See Lubya iddi Kasiki v Kagimu Maurice Peter Election Petition Appeal No. 6 of 2002. 
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10.4 Vacation of office 
Both the Constitution and the LGA provide for the removal of the district council chairperson 
from office.163 In Chapter Three, the argument was that local government institutions should 
be constitutionally protected.164 The Constitution outlines three instances in which the district 
chairperson may have to vacate office: These are: 
• abuse of office; 
• misconduct or misbehaviour; 
• physical or mental incapacity;165 and 
• change of party affiliation. 
Parliament is vested with powers to make provision for any other grounds on which the 
district chairperson may vacate office.166 The LGA thus adds seven more instances for which 
a district chairperson may vacate his or her office. These are: 
• resignation;167 
• violation of the leadership code (the discussion of the leadership code will follow);168  
                                                 
163 See Article 185 of the Constitution; section 14 of the LGA. 
164 Chapter Three § 3.2.1. 
165 Article 185(1) of the Constitution. 
166 Article 185(2) of the Constitution. See also sections 14(1)(a), (b), (c), and (d) of the LGA. 
167 Section 14(1A)(a) of the LGA.  
168 Section 14(1A)(c) of the LGA. See also ‘Kayunga LC5 reinstated’ The New Vision, available at http: 
//www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/19/718582 (accessed 3 March 2011). The Leadership Code Act 2002 is an Act of 
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• failure to attend four consecutive meetings of the council;169 
• death sentence or a sentence of more than six months;170 
• acceptance of a public office appointment;171 
• conviction on an offence of moral turpitude, within the preceding six years;172 and 
• when circumstances arise under any law which disqualify him or her.173 
It is argued that the constitutional and legal frameworks that provide for vacation of office of 
the political head of district councils under clearly and legally stated circumstances, 
strengthens those very institutions. 
10.4.1 Procedure 
There are two separate procedures for the removal of the chairperson of a district, both of 
which are initiated by the district council. The procedure depends on the reasons for removing 
him or her. Where the intention to remove the chairperson depends on any of the grounds 
                                                                                                                                                        
Parliament that provides ‘for a minimum standard of behaviour and conduct for leaders; to require leaders to 
declare their incomes, assets and liabilities; to put in place an effective enforcement mechanism and to provide 
for other related matters.’ See the detailed discussion of the leadership code in § of this chapter. 
169 Section 14(1)(e) of the LGA. 
170 Section 14(1A)(e) of the LGA. See also ‘For killing his opponent, Mayuge LCV boss to hang’, The Daily 
Monitor, available at http: //www.monitor.co.ug/News/-/688324/824790/-/c5ne17/-/index.html (accessed 4 June 
2010). 
171 Section 14(1A) (d) of the LGA. 
172 Section 14(1A)(f) of the LGA. Section 14(1A)(f) of the LGA. Kavanagh 2000: 1267 define the word 
‘turpitude’ in terms of depravity and wickedness. 
173 Section 14(1A)(g) of the LGA. 
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other than his or her mental illness, a tribunal is constituted to determine his or her 
removal.174 Where the intention to remove the district chairperson is based on mental illness, 
a medical board has to be constituted to determine his or her removal.175 
The major safety net against the abuse of the tribunal or medical board procedure is that the 
process to remove the chairperson must be preceded by a resolution by district council 
supported by a two-thirds majority.176 
10.4.2 Dismissal on grounds other than mental illness 
The LGA provides that a motion to recall a district chairperson commences with a notice 
signed by not less than one-third of the members of the council and submitted to the 
Speaker.177 The notice must state the intention to remove the chairperson and the reasons on 
which the intended notice is based. In other words, the chairperson must be informed 
beforehand of the charges he or she faces.178 This provision minimises the possibility of abuse 
of the process. For instance, the majority of councillors can unilaterally resolve to remove a 
district council chairperson and choose to inform the chairperson of the impeachable offences 
preferred at the time of the tribunal hearing. This means that she or he will not adequately 
prepare for her or his defense at the hearing stage. Under such circumstances, the district 
council chairperson can be condemned without a fair hearing. 
                                                 
174 See section 14(1) of the LGA. 
175 Section 14(7) of the LGA. 
176 See section 14(1) of the LGA. 
177 Section 14(2) of the LGA. 
178 Sections 14(2)(a) & (b) of the LGA. 
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Once a notice of intention to remove the chairperson has been submitted to the Speaker, no 
member of the council who had signed it may withdraw his or her signature.179 Within 24 
hours of the receipt of the notice, the Speaker shall inform the chairperson and the Minister.180 
From the wording of section 14(3) of the LGA, it is within the Minister’s discretion, in 
consultation with the Attorney General, to refer the notice to remove the chairperson to the 
tribunal.181 This implies that the central government could decide to make any purported 
notice to remove the chairperson ineffective. 
Once the Minister is satisfied that sufficient grounds exist for removing the chairperson, he or 
she must constitute a tribunal within 21 days from the date of the notice. The tribunal is 
composed of a judge of the High Court or a person qualified to be a High Court judge and two 
other members, all of whom are appointed by the Minister in consultation with the Chief 
Justice. The LGA provides that only persons of high moral character and proven integrity, 
considerable experience, demonstrated competency, and high calibre in the conduct of public 
affairs, are eligible to be appointed to the tribunal.182 At all times the chairperson has a right 
to appear at the proceedings, with legal representation or any other expert of his or her 
choice.183 
                                                 
179 Section 14(2A) of the LGA. 
180 Section 14(3) of the LGA. 
181 Section 14(4) of the LGA. 
182 Section 14(4) of the LGA. 
183 Section 14(5) of the LGA. 
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The purpose of the tribunal is to investigate the allegations against the chairperson and not to 
determine if he or she should cease to be in office.184 
Upon a determination of the prima facie case against the chairperson by the tribunal, the 
district council by a resolution, supported by a vote of not less than two-thirds majority of all 
members of the council must approve the findings of the tribunal before the chairperson 
vacates the office.185 
Even if a tribunal determined that a prima facie case existed against the chairperson, the 
ultimate arbiters are the members of the district council. Notwithstanding the central 
government’s influential role at the commencement of the procedure to remove a chairperson, 
the final decision to remove a chairperson lies with the district council. It is noted here that 
the central government to some extent controls the procedure to remove the chairperson from 
office. However, given the level of independence of the tribunal, it is argued that whatever 
interference in the process to remove the district chairperson by the central government is 
minimal. 
10.4.3 Dismissal on medical grounds 
Under subsection 1(e) of section 14 of the LGA a chairperson of a district may be removed on 
the basis of his or her physical or mental incapacity. The procedure commences with a notice 
in writing signed by not less than one-third of all members of the council and submitted to the 
                                                 
184 Section 14(4) of the LGA. See also ‘Local govt probing disappearance of Masindi boss’ The New Vision 2 
June 2010, available at http: //www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/18/721549 (accessed 2 June 2010). 
185 Section 14(6) of the LGA. It is argued that the requirement for a vote to be supported by not less than a two-
thirds majority of all members of the council refers to the majority of members of the council present at the 
meeting of the council, which is quorate.  
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Speaker.186 The notice has to state the intention to remove the chairperson on grounds of 
physical or mental incapacity and the particulars of the alleged incapacity.187 The Speaker 
must, within seven days of the receipt of the notice, ensure that a copy of the notice is served 
on the district chairperson and the Chief Justice.188 
Should the district chairperson fail or refuse to appear before the medical board 14 days after 
it has been constituted, then he or she ceases to hold office, as long as the district council has 
passed a resolution supported by not less than two-thirds of all members of the council to that 
effect.189 
It is noted that throughout the procedure for the removal of the chairperson, time is of the 
essence given the possibility of a political vacuum in the district should any delays occur. 
Thus a motion for a resolution for the removal of the chairperson has to be moved within 14 
days from the date the Speaker receives the report from the medical board. Consequently, 
where a resolution is not passed within 14 days, the resolution will be invalid.190 Implicitly, a 
person who is unfit to perform the functions of the chairperson of a district can remain in 
office on a mere technicality. The LGA provides for adherence to the principle of legality at 
all times during the procedure to remove the district chairperson.191 
                                                 
186 Section 14(7) of the LGA. 
187 Sections 14(7)(a) & (b) of the LGA. 
188 Section 14(8) of the LGA. 
189 Section 14(14) of the LGA. 
190 Section 14(16) of the LGA. 
191 Section 14(17) of the LGA. 
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10.4.4 Violation of the leadership code  
As explained earlier, the violation of the leadership code is a possible ground for dismissal of 
the district council chairperson.192 In the discussion below, the consequence of the violation 
of the leadership code is discussed. In Chapter Two a distinction was drawn between the 
narrow sense of the term ‘accountability’ as control, sanctions and punishment, and a broader 
sense of the legal constraints on public officials’ exercise of power and discretion.193 The 
Leadership Code (LCA) generally provides for the minimum standard of behaviour of 
conduct for leaders, and194 defines a ‘leader’ as ‘a person holding any of the offices specified 
in the Second Schedule to this Code’.195 The LCA also defines ‘Government’ to include a 
district council.196 The Constitution provides for the IGG and deputy IGG who are appointed 
by the President with the approval of Parliament. The IGG must be qualified to be appointed 
as a High Court judge. The IGG must be a Ugandan, of high moral character, proven 
integrity, considerable experience, demonstrated competence, and high calibre in the conduct 
                                                 
192 See § 6.9.3 of this chapter. 
193 Chapter Two §3.1.2. 
194 See the long title of the Act cited as Act 17 of 2002. 
195 Section 2(1) of the LCA. Part A of the Second Schedule to the LCA lists the President, the Vice President, 
the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of Parliament; the Chairperson and the Vice Chairman of the National 
Conference under the Movement Political System; the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister; the National 
Political Commissar under the Movement Political System; the Attorney General; Ministers; Ministers of State 
and Deputy Ministers; the Members of Parliament; the Director and the Deputy Director of Movement Political 
System; a member of the National Executive of any political party or organisation; the Chairpersons and Vice 
Chairpersons of district councils; members of district executive committees; district council councillors; and 
Speakers and Deputy Speakers of district councils. 
196 Section 2(1) of the LCA. 
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of public affairs.197 The Inspectorate of Government Act (IGA) provides for the Inspectorate 
of Government (IG) consisting of the IGG and two Deputy Inspectors General.198 The IGA 
repeats the provisions of article 233 (5) of the Constitution in relation to the qualifications, 
appointment and term of office of the IGG.199 The IGA provides for ten functions of the 
IGG.200 
The relevant functions are: 
• promotion and fostering of the rule of law and principles of natural justice in 
administration;201 
• elimination of corruption and abuse of authority;202 
• promotion of fair, efficient and good governance in public office;203 and 
• enforcement of the Leadership Code of Conduct.204 
The IGA also vests the IGG with the power to investigate on his or her own initiative or upon 
a complaint by any person against any leader.205  
                                                 
197 Article 223(5) of the Constitution. 
198 Section 3(1) of the Inspectorate of Government Act (IGA) cited as Act 5 of 2002. 
199 Sections 3(3), (4), and (5) and 4(3) of the IGA.  
200 Section 8(1) of the IGA. 
201 Section 8(1)(a) of the IGA. 
202 Section 8(1)(b) of the IGA. 
203 Section 8(1)(c) of the IGA. 
204 Section 8(1)(d) of the IGA. 
205 Section 8(2) and (3) of the IGA. 
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The obligation to enforce the Leadership Code vests in the IGG, whose functions are to 
receive and examine declarations, to examine instance of corrupt practices, breach of the 
Leadership Code, investigation of and report on any alleged ‘high handed, outrageous and 
infamous or disgraceful conduct’ of a leader, determination of which is made by the 
Minister.206 
10.4.5 The role of the IGG under the Leadership Code Act 
Under the LCA, IGG is empowered to receive complaints relating to the breach of the 
leadership Code.207 The IGG is mandated to ‘inquire into, or cause the complaint to be 
inquired into’208 once he or she makes a finding that the complaint is not baseless, and that the 
matter is within his or her mandate.209 The LCA provides that once the inquiry is completed, 
the IGG is obliged to communicate his or her decision in a report to the authorised person.210 
The authorised person is then obliged to implement his or her decision.211 The legal limits of 
the IGG role is the enforcement of the leadership role is discussed below. 
                                                 
206 Section 3 of the LCA. Section 2(1) of the LCA defines a ‘Minister’ as ‘responsible for ethics and integrity’. 
207 Section 18(1) of the LCA. 
208 Section 18(2) of the LCA. 
209 Section 18(2) of the LCA. 
210 Section 19(1) of the LCA. Section 2(1) defines the term ‘authorised person’ as ‘a person or body authorised 
by law to discipline the leader in relation to whom the expression is used’. 
211 Section 20(1) of the LCA. John Ken-Lukyamuzi v AG and the Electoral Commission, Constitutional Petition 
No. 19/2006 was the first case to test the consequences of the violation of the Leadership Code by elected 
leaders dealt with a Member of Parliament. Article 83(1) of the Constitution (the equivalent of section 14(1A)(c) 
of the LGA) has been subject to interpretation by both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. The 
Constitutional Court took the view that once a violation of the Leadership Code has been determined by the 
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Figure 5: The IGG’s investigative powers in district councils 
 
 
10.4.6 Limits to the IGG’s oversight role  
In this section, the jurisprudence immerging from the courts on the legal limits of the IGG in 
removing elected district council political leaders from office is discussed.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Inspector General of Government (IGG), a Member of Parliament has to vacate his seat. Overruling the decision 
of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court in John Ken-Lukyamuzi v The Attorney-General and Another, 
and Constitutional appeal NO. 02 OF 2007 arising out of the Constitutional Petition No. 19 of 2006, held that 
the IGG cannot order a Member of Parliament to vacate his or her seat unless an independent tribunal has made 
the determination. See also Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala v The Inspector General of Government and 
Others Miscellaneous application No.28 of 2009 which appear to adopt the Supreme Court position. 
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In the case of Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala v The Inspector General of Government and 
Others,212 Mr Kezaala applied to set aside the Jinja Municipal Council’s resolution which 
adopted the IGG’s report that recommended his interdiction/suspension from the mayoral 
office of Jinja municipal council. The main grounds of the application were that Mr Hajji 
Kezaala had been impeached from office despite the existence of two court orders restraining 
them from effecting the recommendations of the IGG. There was evidence that the IGG in 
fact pressurised Jinja Municipal Council to implement her recommendations.213 The High 
Court restated the oversight role of the IGG in its investigative and inquiry powers in relation 
to public bodies such as district councils. 
The High Court concluded that it was inappropriate, illegal and oppressive by the IGG to 
pressurise Jinja Municipal Council to implement her decision to remove the Mayor from 
officer in defiance of a court order.214 The High Court also distinguished between the IGG’s 
investigative powers and powers of inquiry. The High Court took the view that proceedings of 
the IGG commence with investigations, in which case he or she may gather information 
through interviews. During that stage, the IGG may not be required to comply with the rules 
of natural justice. 
Two main issues emerged: first, the distinction between the IGG’s power to investigate and 
carry out an inquiry, and second, whether the IGG could force any elected leader from office 
after merely conducting an inquiry. According to the High Court’s reasoning, when the IGG 
forms an opinion, from the findings of the investigations, under sections 19, 23, and 26 of the 
                                                 
212 Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala v The Inspector General of Government and others Miscellaneous 
application No.28 of 2009. 
213 Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala 10. 
214 Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala 16. 
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LCA, he or she must carry out an inquiry, a process that is judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. 
In which case, article 44(c) of the Constitution relating to natural justice has to be complied 
with.215 
The High Court was of the view that the IGG treated the completion of an investigation as if it 
were a completion of an inquiry, in terms of sections 18, 19 and 20 of the LCA. Ultimately, 
the recommendation to the Jinja Municipal Council to remove the Mayor from office on the 
basis of an ‘investigation’, and not an ‘inquiry’ was erroneous. As a result, the Mayor’s right 
to be heard, as required of any inquiry, was violated.216 
The High Court nullified the resolution by the Jinja Municipal Council to remove the Mayor 
and set aside the report of the IGG.217 This case clarifies the correct procedure to be adopted 
before district council elected leaders are removed from office on account of abuse of office. 
The case also illustrates the incidence of the central government seeking to exercise control 
over the removal of the local government political leaders from office. 
Even if the district council chairperson violated any of the provisions of the Leadership Code, 
he or she has to be tried by an independent tribunal of competent jurisdiction. He or she 
cannot simply be removed from office on an allegation of the violation of any of the legal 
provisions. Evidence must be adduced, a fair hearing must take place, and then an order must 
be made by an independent tribunal of competent jurisdiction. 
                                                 
215 Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala 21-2. 
216 Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala 25-6. 
217 Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala 27. 
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11. District council executive committees 
In Chapter Three, it was argued that local government executive powers are important for 
initiating and enforcing local government policies.218 The description below examines the role 
of the district council executive committees in initiating and executing district council 
policies. As the sections below will show, their powers do not compare with the views 
expressed in Chapter Three. 
The Constitution provides for the district council executive committee to ‘perform the 
executive functions of council’.219 According to the Constitution, the district executive 
committee has to be composed of the district chairperson, the district vice-chairperson, and 
such number of secretaries as the council may decide.220 According to the Constitution the 
secretaries have to be nominated by the chairperson of the district council from members of 
the district council and approved by a majority of all the members of the district council.221 
11.1 Composition and size 
The LGA further provides that the district council executive committee must not exceed one-
third of the district council.222 The LGA provides that the number of secretaries should not 
exceed three.223 In addition, the LGA provides that one of the secretaries of the executive 
committee must be a female.224 
                                                 
218 Chapter Three 3.6.2.1. 
219 Article 186(1) of the Constitution. See also Section 16(1) of the LGA. 
220 Article 186(2)(c) of the Constitution.  
221 Article 186(4) of the Constitution. 
222 Section 16(2) of the LGA. 
223 Section 16(2) (c) of the LGA. 
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It is argued that Parliament has no powers to limit the number of secretaries since a district 
council has a discretion under the Constitution to decide on the number.225 It is argued that the 
district council has the discretion to determine any number of secretaries as may be necessary. 
Hence, the provision of the LGA which limits the number of the secretaries to three is invalid 
in the face of article 186(2)(c) of the Constitution. 
11.2 Functions 
The key role of a district council executive committee is to initiate and formulate policies for 
council’s approval.226 In addition, the district council executive committee monitors the 
implementation of district council programmes. The district executive committee may then 
correct any errors in those programmes.227 This committee also recommends persons to the 
district council to be appointed to the district service commission, the district public accounts 
committee, the district contract’s committee board (then referred to as the district tender 
board), the district land board(s), and any other commissions or committees that may be 
created.228 It is also a dispute resolution forum for any conflict involving lower councils.229 
Lastly, the district council executive committee considers and evaluates the council’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
224 Section 16(3) of the LGA. 
225 Article 186(2)(c) of the Constitution. See also the Odoki Commission 1993: 505 para. 18.119(b). The Odoki 
Commission had in fact recommended a long list of portfolios of secretaries and covered areas, such as finance 
and development, security, social services, land use, environment, agriculture, youth and women. Thus the role 
of secretaries, according to the Odoki Commission, related to the social and economic development functions of 
a district council which may be inexhaustible. 
226 Section 17(a) of the LGA. 
227 Section 17(c) of the LGA. 
228 Section 17(d) of the LGA. 
229 Section 17(e) of the LGA. 
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performance with regard to approved workplans and programmes.230 The district council may 
also authorise the district executive committee to perform any other function.231 
The role of secretaries is to perform the district council executive committee duties as 
assigned to them by the district council chairperson.232 For example, the LGA provides that 
the district council chairperson must assign at least two of the secretaries to the health and 
child welfare portfolio and the persons with disabilities and the elderly portfolio. The district 
vice-chairperson and secretaries act as avenues through which the assignment of portfolios to 
secretaries may take place. 233 
11.3 Remuneration 
The offices of the members of a district council executive committee, including the offices of 
the chairperson, vice-chairperson and secretaries, are full-time jobs,234 whose emoluments are 
specified in the First Schedule of the LGA.235 The LGA prohibits any member of the district 
executive committee to hold any profitable position likely to compromise his or her office.236 
                                                 
230 Section 17(f) of the LGA. 
231 Section 17(g) of the LGA. 
232 Article 186(7) of the Constitution. 
233 Section 16(4) of the LGA.  
234 See section 19(2) of the LGA. 
235 Section 19(2) of the LGA. Lambright’s study finds that in 1999, a district council chairperson earned 
approximately $494, while a vice-chairperson earned $327. The study also finds that each of the executive 
committee members earned $275. In comparison, the study finds that the annual district council expenditure per 
person was approximately $13 dollars, illustrating the financial burden of the district council politicians on local 
tax payers. See Lambright 2011: 52 
236 Section 19(3) of the LGA. 
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11.4 Termination of membership 
11.4.1 Reasons for termination of membership 
Membership of the district executive committee terminates under certain circumstances: 
• revocation by the chairperson; 
• election of a member as a district council Speaker or deputy Speaker; 
• resignation; 
• disqualification from the council; 
• physical or mental disability 
• death; 
• censure; or 
• assumption of office by the new district chairperson.237 
Other than the procedure of censure, all the other listed circumstances seem to be obvious and 
therefore no special procedure is needed. For instance, revocation of a member’s mandate, 
election of a member as a district council Speaker’s or deputy Speaker, resignation from 
office and or death requires a simple official letter and or a copy of the death certificate. In the 
discussion below the process of censure of a member of the district council executive 
committee is discussed. 
                                                 
237 Section 20(1)(a), (b), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (c)(iv), and (c)(v) of the LGA. 
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11.4.2 Procedure for censure 
The section below assesses the procedure of ensure against the backdrop of the discussion on 
local democracy and accountability.238 The word ‘censure’ means to ‘express severe 
disapproval of’.239 The power to censure a member of the district council executive 
committee emanates from the district council’s power to determine the composition of the 
district executive committee, under subsection 1(c) of section 16 of the LGA. 
The process of censure starts with a petition to the chairperson of the district council through 
the Speaker of the district council. The petition of censure must be signed by not less than 
one-third of the members of the district council and must state the grounds for dissatisfaction 
‘with the conduct or performance of the member of the district executive committee.240 Upon 
receipt of the petition, the chairperson of the district council is required to ensure that the 
district council executive committee member is given a copy of the petition of censure.241 The 
motion of resolution of censure cannot be debated until after 14 days from the date the 
petition was sent to the chairperson.242 
The LGA provides for the right to be heard during the process of censure, although no 
specific aspects of this right are mentioned, thus creating a legal uncertainty on the true 
meaning of the right to be heard. 243 
                                                 
238 Chapter Two § 2.3.1.1. 
239 Kavanagh et al. 2000: 184. 
240 Section 21(2) of the LGA. 
241 Section 21(3) of the LGA. 
242 Section 21(5) of the LGA. 
243 Section 21(5) of the LGA. 
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12. Challenging electoral outcomes 
Challenging electoral outcomes refers to the ability of the voters or candidates to contest the 
declared district council election results before an independent arbiter to determine its validity 
and/ or fairness.  
In Chapter Two local democracy was shown to be at work in elections that privilege the 
following rights and freedoms: freedom to form and join organisations; freedom of 
expression; the universal right to vote; eligibility for public office; the right to compete for 
support and votes; alternative sources of information; and the expression of other 
preferences.244 It was argued that irrespective of a person’s political or ethnic affiliations, 
local elections ultimately ‘force’ all political players to work together under the broad 
umbrella of the nation state. The consensus-building nature of local elections therefore 
promotes co-operation and respect across the political spectrum.245 The above views are only 
true if the elections are conducted under an adequate electoral model necessary for local 
democracy, as argued in Chapter Three.246 Because it is important that electoral outcomes can 
be challenged in an open and democratic way, the discussion below tests whether the 
provisions on challenging the district council electoral outcomes accord with the views 
expressed in Chapters Two and Three.  
The election results of a district councillor can be challenged by a candidate who loses an 
election.247 Secondly, they can be challenged by an individual registered voter. For an 
                                                 
244 Chapter Two § 2.3.2. 
245 Chapter Two § 2.3.2.4. 
246 Chapter Three §3.4. 
247 Section 138(3)(a) of the LGA. 
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individual registered voter to challenge the election result of a councillor, he or she has to be 
supported by not less than 500 registered voters in the constituency.248 This must be done 
within 14 days from the time of declaration of the results by the Electoral Commission.249 
The LGA lists four grounds upon which a petition challenging election results of a district 
councillor can be based. These are: 
• a failure to comply with the provisions of the LGA, non-compliance with which would 
have affected the results in ‘a substantial manner’;250 
• declaration of a person as elected that actually did not win the elections;251 
• commission of illegal practices, or any other offence under the LGA, in connection 
with the election by the candidate personally or indirectly through his agents;252 or 
• that the candidate at the time of the election was not qualified or was disqualified as a 
candidate.253 
The LGA also provides that only an aggrieved candidate may petition against the election of a 
district council chairperson and seek an order that the person declared as elected was not 
                                                 
248 Section 138(3)(b) of the LGA. 
249 Section 138(3)(c) of the LGA. 
250 Section 139(a) of the LGA. See also Kakooza John Baptist v Electoral Commission and Another Supreme 
Court Election Petit Appeal No. 11 of 2007. One example of non-compliance with the electoral laws is ballot 
stuffing. In Kirunda Kivejinja Ali v Katuntu Abdu Court of Appeal Election Petit Appeal No. 24 of 2006, proven 
evidence of bribery of voters was also ground to nullify the election result. 
251 Section 139(b) of the LGA. 
252 Section 139(c) of the LGA. 
253 Section 139(d) of the LGA. 
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validly elected.254 The opening lines of section 138(1) are: ‘An aggrieved candidate for 
chairperson may petition’.255 
The LGA provides that a notice of the presentation of the petition, together with the petition, 
must be served by the person challenging the election results ‘on the respondent or 
respondents as the case may be’.256 This provision does not clearly state exactly against whom 
a petition challenging the election of the chairperson of a district may lie. It is noted that the 
district elections are organised, conducted and supervised by the Uganda Electoral 
Commission.257 
A reading of section 139(1) of the LGA shows that a petition that challenges the validity of 
the election results is against ‘a candidate declared elected as a chairperson’. Thus a person 
who has been declared by the Electoral Commission as a winner under section 137 of the 
LGA must be the first person against whom a petition challenging the validity of his or her 
election lies. Under section 2 of the Uganda Electoral Commission Act (UECA), the Electoral 
Commission is a corporate body which can sue or be sued in its own name. The Electoral 
Commission has the duty to conduct and organise district elections.258 Should the Electoral 
                                                 
254 Section 138(1) of the LGA. See also Ndahura Roanald v Hajji Nadduli Abdul Election Petition Appeal 
No.20 of 2006 (unreported). In this case, the Court took the view that in order to challenge the election results of 
an LC5 chairperson under section138 (1) of the LGA, a person must have been a candidate. In other words, a 
person who was not a candidate cannot be ‘aggrieved’ by an invalid election result. 
255 See Ndahura Roanald v Hajji Nadduli Abdul Election Petition Appeal No. 20 of 2006 (unreported) per 
Justice L.E.M Mukaza-Kikonyogo 7. In Ndahura Roanald v Hajji Nadduli Abdul, a petition to challenge the 
election results of the district chairperson was dismissed for want of locus standi.  
256 Section 141 of the LGA. 
257 Section 101 of the LGA. 
258 Section 101 of the LGA. 
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Commission fail to conduct free and fair district council elections then it becomes a ground in 
any petition challenging the election of the chairperson of a district. 
The LGA provides instances upon which a petition challenging the election results of the 
district chairperson may be based. These grounds are similar to those of challenging the 
election results of district council councillors. The essential test is the failure to comply with 
the provisions of the LGA, non-compliance with which affected the results in ‘a substantial 
manner’.259 Two examples of non-compliance with the electoral laws are ballot stuffing,260 
proven evidence of bribery of voters and ‘forced open’ voting as opposed to secret ballot.261  
The Supreme Court in the case of Col. Dr. Besigye Kiiza v Museveni Yoweri Kaguta, 
Electoral Commission262 took the view that before any election results can be invalidated on 
the ground of non-compliance with any of the legal provisions, the effect of non-compliance 
therewith should be ‘substantial’. Ordinarily, acts such as vote-rigging, bribery, violence, bias 
of electoral officials, an inflated voters’ register or falsification of the electoral results, should 
have had a substantial effect on the entire election. In this case the Supreme Court based its 
argument on the Presidential Elections Act 2000 and the evidential burden in Presidential 
                                                 
259 Section 139(a) of the LGA.  
260 See Kakooza John Baptist vs. Electoral Commission and Another Supreme Court Election Petit Appeal No. 
11 of 2007. 
261 See Kirunda Kivejinja Ali vs. Katuntu Abdu Court of Appeal Election Petit Appeal No. 24 of 2006. 
262 Col. Dr. Besigye Kiiza v Museveni Yoweri Kaguta, Electoral Commission (Election Petition No.1 Of 2001) 
[2001] UGSC 3 (21 April 2001); See also Rtd. Col. Dr. Kizza Besigye v Electoral Commission, Yoweri Kaguta 
Museveni (Election Petition No.1 Of 2006) [2007] UGSC 24 (31 January 2007)  
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Petitions,263 the provisions of which are similar in wording to that of section 139(a) of the 
LGA that provides for challenging district council elections. In the Supreme Court’s view, a 
person can still be declared a ‘winner’ of a rigged election (even when any of the four grounds 
have been proven), on account to failure to substantially discharge the burden of proof. This 
view has in turn been adopted by the Court of Appeal and the High Courts in all cases dealing 
with district election petitions.264 
12.1 Assessment 
Chapter Two, discusses the ability of decentralisation to promote local development, local 
democracy and accommodation of ethnic diversity.265 The assessment below examines the 
debate that surrounds the educational qualifications of district council elected leaders, the 
procedure for removing district council elected leaders from office and the erroneous rules of 
challenging the electoral outcomes of district council elections against the backdrop of the 
principles of Chapter Two. 
                                                 
263 Section 58(6)(a) of the Presidential Elections Act 2000 provides: ‘The election of a candidate as a President 
shall only be annulled on any of the following grounds if proved to be satisfaction of the Court – (a) non-
compliance with the provisions of this Act, if the Court is satisfied that the election was not conducted in 
accordance with the principles laid down in those provisions and that the noncompliance affected the result of 
the election in a substantial manner.’  
264 Although a large number of district elections have been nullified by the courts, many district election 
petitions have failed because the petitioners did not adduce enough evidence to substantially demonstrate non-
compliance with the legal provisions. 
265 See Chapter Two § 2.3. 
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12.1.1 Academic qualifications 
The provision for academic qualifications for a district council chairperson may amount to 
unlawful discrimination under article 21(2) of the Constitution.266 However, the academic 
qualifications of a district chairperson may promote innovation and creativity in a district 
given that a more educated person is expected to adopt better and more efficient methods of 
leadership than a less educated person. Arguably an innovative and creative district council 
elected political leadership supports the thesis that links decentralisation to efficiency as 
argued in Chapter Two.267 It may be less cumbersome to train a person with an advanced 
level of education or similar qualification than to train a completely illiterate person in areas 
such as information technology or elementary accounting. Secondly, it is argued that the 
provision for an academic qualification guards against ‘mediocrity’ in district politics.268 
In fact, the provision for an ‘equivalent’ academic qualification may be circumvented by 
presenting academic certificates that are hard to verify.269 It is argued that the qualification for 
a district chairperson should be specified such that if a person does not possess an advanced 
level education certificate then, he does not qualify at all even if he or she may have some 
other equivalent educational qualifications. 
                                                 
266 Article 21(2) of the Constitution provides: ‘Without prejudice to clause (1) of this article, a person shall not 
be discriminated against on the ground of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, social or 
economic standing, political opinion or disability’. See the detailed discussion on arguments for and against 
education qualification for district political leaders in §6.1 of this chapter. 
267 See Chapter Two § 2.3.1.1. 
268 Kanyeihamba 2002: 265-6. 
269 Kanyeihamba 2002: 265-6. 
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12.1.2 Infringement of voters’ mandate 
Arguably the two separate tribunal procedures for removing a district council chairperson 
ensure political accountability of district council chairpersons to local representatives. The 
two procedures underpin the importance of political accountability as an integral part of local 
democracy. However, the two procedures seem to infringe on the political authority of the 
electorate from whom the district council chairperson derives the political power to govern 
because he or she is directly elected by local citizens. 
The question then becomes: why should a district council, with a narrow electoral mandate, 
move a motion to remove a district chairperson with a wider electoral mandate?270 Arguably, 
in a presidential system, the legislature can only impeach a directly elected executive. The 
explanation here is that both the Constitution and the LGA adopt a hybrid system that 
incorporates both the presidential and the parliamentary systems. It is argued that the two 
procedures may promote ‘vertical and downward accountability’, where central government 
and district councils keep the district council elected leaders under constant scrutiny.271 
In this context, ‘downward’ accountability relates to the political risk that district elected 
politicians face should they not respond to local needs. On the other hand, ‘vertical’ 
accountability relates to the central government’s and district council’s institutional capacity 
to check on the excesses of district political leaders. It is argued that the provision for the 
removal of the district chairperson does not threaten the institutional integrity of local 
government. Instead, the procedure is an indicator of a democratic and accountable 
                                                 
270 The chairperson of a district council is directly elected by all voters, whereas some of the councillors of the 
district council are elected by the electoral colleges. 
271 See the Ministry of Local Government Decentralisation Policy Strategic Framework 2006: 19. 
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governance system. The fact that the voters may elect the head of the district council and 
remove him or her through their elected representatives in the district council is a good 
indicator of a responsive democratic system that emphasises performance. 
Earlier in this part of the thesis, the executive powers of the district council chairperson were 
discussed.272 It was argued that the executive powers of the district council chairperson are so 
narrow and only limited to IGR and social welfare aspirations, with a limited political 
mandate. For instance, other than the fact that the district council chairperson presides over 
the district council executive meetings, he or she is very much limited to the oversight role of 
the general administration in the district council. It is not clear how the chairperson can, only 
his or her own, protect the Constitution or promote the welfare of the citizens in the district. 
It is also argued that the process of censure of the members of the district executive 
committee potentially leads to conflict between two district organs, each with its own 
electoral mandate. On the one hand, the members of the district executive committee serve at 
the pleasure of the district chairperson. On the other hand, members of the district executive 
committee can be censured by the district council.273 In cases where the district council 
chairperson is from a different political party than the one that controls the majority of seats in 
the district council, there is a real possibility of a political stalemate in the appointment of new 
                                                 
272 See § 6.9 of this chapter. 
273 See sections 20(1)(a), (b), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (c)(iv), and (c)(v) of the LGA on the criteria for the motion of 
censure of the members of the district executive committee. 
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members of the district council executive committee,274 hence limiting their potential to 
initiate and execute district council policies. 
12.1.3 The role of the IGG 
It is also noted that faced with numerous complaints by members of the public,275 the IGG has 
tended to be overzealous in its monitoring mandate with regard to district councils. In its most 
controversial recommendation, the IGG directed a municipal council to dismiss an elected 
political official, a decision that the High Court considered highly arbitrary. It is noted that the 
experience of the IGG in enforcing the Leadership Code for district councils’ elected leaders 
resembles the kind of control exercised by the central government.276 Ultimately, its role in 
ensuring that district council chairpersons are accountable to their electorate remains very 
limited. However, when a broader understanding of the term ‘accountability’ is adopted, it is 
argued that the provision for the Leadership Code, insofar as it aims at enforcing political 
accountability. The provisions on the leadership code, insofar as the call for district council 
chairperson to comply with the minimum standards of leadership mirrors the views expressed 
                                                 
274 For instance, Lambright (2011: 201) cites press reports where an opposition district chairperson failed to 
form a district executive committee until he signed a ‘memorandum of understanding’ with the ruling party and 
hence not only limited the executive and political authority of the chairperson in the district executive 
committee but also ‘muted’ the voters’ preference in the district. 
275 The Inspectorate of Government Report to Parliament July-December 2007: 8. 
276 Kakumba & Fourie 2008: 122. In South Africa, for instance, the government Ombudsman’s 
recommendations are merely adivisory. Because the Ombudsman’s office remains largely neutral and outside 
the fray of politics, its opinions are generally highly respected. 
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in Chapters Two and Three, that link the ability of decentralisation force local leaders to offer 
explanations and justifications of their decisions to the local electorates.277 
12.1.4 The future of political pluralism in district councils  
The importance attached to local governments in nurturing political pluralism was discussed 
in Chapter Two, where the argument ran that local governments were hatcheries for 
multiparty democracy. The Chapter disputes the unproven assertions that political pluralism 
was unsuitable for local governments in multi-ethnic societies on account that multiparty 
politics exacerbates ethnic conflicts.278 The existing jurisprudence on loss of a political seat 
on due to a change in political affiliation is problematic and informs the larger debate on 
political pluralism in Uganda. In my view, such jurisprudence should only be confined to 
national political leaders. 279  
As already noted, section 119A of the LGA only provides for a candidate’s nomination for 
any district council elections. It was within the powers of Parliament to state that once a 
district political office-bearer changes his or her political affiliation he or she must 
automatically vacate his or her seat. It is argued that a district council political office-bearer 
should never vacate his or her office on a change of political party affiliation, in the absence 
of any specific constitutional or statutory provision.  
                                                 
277 Chapter Two § 2.3.1.1, 2.3.1.4 and 3.4.2.3. 
278 Singiza & De Visser 2014, forthcoming. 
279 For example in the case of George Owor v Attorney General & Another (Constitutional Petition .No. 038 of 
2010) February 2011), the Constitutional Court held that an MP elected on a political party ticket or affiliation 
loses his or her seat the moment he or she joins another political party.279 This decision has been confirmed by 
the Supreme Court, in the case of Attorney General v George Owor Constitutional Appeal NO 01 OF 2011. 
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12.1.5 Onerous rules of challenging electoral outcomes 
The grounds upon which an aggrieved candidate may challenge the election of a district 
council councillor and chairperson may on the face of it appear sufficient for a free and fair 
election. One controversy, however, emanates from the substantive test under section 139(a) 
of the LGA, which provides that non-compliance with any of the provisions of the LGA 
should have affected the results in ‘a substantial manner’. The question then becomes: should 
a district election result be validated or invalidated by adopting a qualitative or quantitative 
test for a free and fair election? Should non-compliance with any of the legal provisions relate 
to the number of illegal acts or to the nature and quality of the elections? It is conceded that it 
is wrong for any court to strike down the whole elections for minor irregularities. The 
argument is that only ‘major’ but not necessarily ‘substantially major’ irregularities should be 
condemned.280 
Chapter Three makes a point that a local government electoral system should be capable of 
producing legitimate electoral outcomes that fairly represent the consent of local 
communities.281 It is argued here that an electoral system that makes it difficult to reasonably 
challenge a fraudulent electoral outcome impedes the electorate from producing a legitimate 
council. The above assessment fundamentally affects the importance attached to local 
                                                 
280 For instance, in the Unites States of America case of Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 , the issue revolved around 
whether it was just and equitable to count all votes, including the so called ‘dimpled’ ones. By majority vote, the 
Supreme Court declined grant an order to count the ‘dimpled’ votes arguing that counting such votes amounted 
to using a different standard of counting votes in different counties, an order that could have violated section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution on the equal protection of laws. 
281 See Chapter Three § 3.4.3. 
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elections as expressed in Chapter Two.282 Moreover, given the evidence of political 
interference in districts’ elections,283 it is argued that the above jurisprudence is problematic 
to local government democracy as expressed through local elections. Lambright’s study, on 
the one hand, finds that ‘voter buying’ and political patronage of a district council weaken the 
ability of local politicians to question the central government’s political excesses. Ultimately, 
the political patronage through interference in the district electoral process not only weakens 
the integrity of the district institutions, but also limits their ability to perform their tasks.284 On 
the other hand, according to Lambright, the political interference in district council elections 
by the central government has had minimal effect on the overall election outcome.285 In spite 
of Lambright’s conclusion, it is argued here that it is very difficult to expect people in local 
communities to marshal sufficient resources to adduce evidence that is so substantial in order 
to overturn an invalid district council election result. 
It is also argued that it may not be easy for an individual to get the endorsement of not less 
than 500 registered voters within the 14 day period before his or her petition becomes valid. 
The first criticism deals with the provision for a large number of registered voters required in 
order to validate one’s candidature. It is argued that the above provision may be open to 
ethnic, religious or gender biases. For example, the majority of the voters from an ethnic 
group with historical prejudices against a candidate from an ethnic minority group may refuse 
                                                 
282 See Chapter Two § 2.3.2.4.. 
283 See Lambright (2011: 200), who finds that voter interference occurs at the selection stage of candidates, the 
provision of campaign resources, especially the privileged access to state resources for the ruling party-leaning 
candidates, and voter intimidation. 
284 Lambright 2011: 148. 
285 Lambright 2011: 201-9. 
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to nominate a candidate on account of his or her ethnic origin. Secondly, the possibility for an 
individual to challenge election results is practically almost impossible. 
Consequently, an invalid councillor’s election result may remain legally unchallenged. 
Furthermore, some of the alleged electoral malpractices such as ‘forced open voting’ relate to 
inclusion of voting by lining behind a person’s preferred candidate under the LGA,286 a valid 
voting method that is easy to manipulate. The practice of political parties whipping their 
party-faithful to vote in a certain way is not uncommon in Uganda. Thus, where a 
controversial bill is pending a vote, parliamentary rules of procedure dealing with a secret 
ballot may either be suspended or altered to ensure that individual party members’ votes are 
known.287 It is tantamount to electoral fraud, and therefore unusual, for any political party to 
enforce the same party discipline even at a polling station or in the voting booth. 
                                                 
286 See § 6.2.2 of this chapter. 
287 Bainomugisha & Mushemeza 2006: 27. See also Paul Ssemogerere and Another v The Attorney General 
Constitutional Petition No.3 2000 where the one of the issues revolved around whether parliamentary rules that 
allowed voting by voice was constitutional. The Constitutional Court ruled it was not. In the South African case 
of Breede Valley Onafhanklike and Others v Municipal Manager: Breede Valley Municipality case no 3390/006 
Cape High Court (unreported), the dispute arose after two parties in a municipal council coalition agreed to 
monitor their members’ votes during the election of office bearers. As part of the monitoring, not only would 
councillors belonging to different parties sit next to each other but also show their ballot papers to their 
neighbours to ensure that they voted according to the coalition agreement. The High Court, while examining 
whether the coalition agreement was valid, considered the adoption of the fundamental right to vote under 
section 19 of the Constitution to mean that such a right has to be exercised in secrecy. Thus, the coalition 
agreement which took away the right to a secret ballot was invalid. Further, that the waver of secrecy in voting 
had the ability to exert pressure to vote in a specific way. Steytler and De Visser argue that the above decision 
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In the last part of this chapter, the district councils’ deliberation and decision making-process 
is examined. 
13. Council deliberation and decision making 
13.1 Introduction 
This part of the chapter deals with the manner in which district council meetings are 
regulated. In Chapter Two, it was argued that a proper decentralised system must provide 
appropriate institutions for public participation for all categories of local communities.288 It 
was further argued that public participation may take the form of either representative 
democracy or direct democracy.289 A local council is therefore one of the institutions through 
which citizens may participate meaningfully, though indirectly, through their local 
representatives. As Makara notes, the combination of both attributes of direct democracy and 
representative democracy ensures that citizens’ voices at grassroots levels can be heard.290 
It is argued here that a local council meeting is primarily a forum where the elected 
representatives take decisions. It is also argued that a local council meeting is a platform 
where the local council could engage with outside stakeholders. Arguably, a local council 
meeting as a vehicle for community participation must conform to the need to recognise 
diversity, reconcile differences, and stimulate collaboration amongst different political and 
social groups. Thus, the insistence on consensus-seeking is a positive democratic attribute. 
                                                                                                                                                        
did not distinguish the right to a secret ballot while electing legislative assemblies and the voting process in 
municipal council meetings. See Steytler & De Visser 2013: 3-11. 
288 Chapter Two § 2.4. 
289 See Chapter Two § 2.3.2. 
290 Makara 2009: 9. 
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The question then becomes: does the regulation of district council meetings promote the right 
to public participation of the different political and social groups as a consensus-seeking 
measure? In answering this question, the role of the district council Speaker and his or her 
functions, the convening of district council meetings and the role of the district council 
standing committees must be examined. 
13.2 Speaker 
The Constitution merely provides that there be a Speaker for each district council to perform 
the functions similar to those of the Speaker of Parliament; it does not provide for the position 
of the deputy Speaker.291 The Odoki Commission took this view: 
In order to have an in-built system of checks and balances between the district executive and 
the district legislature, the district chief executive should not chair the meetings of the 
district council. It is proposed that there should be a chairman for each district council, 
elected in the same way as district executive [sic] from among the elected members of the 
district council. His or her role is to chair meetings of the council; in essence, it will be a 
position similar to that of the speaker of the national parliament.292 
The LGA clearly spells out the Speaker’s role. The Speaker’s primary role is to preside over 
all meetings of the district council.293 He or she has the overall authority over and supervision 
of order in the district council meetings. He or she ensures enforcement of rules of 
procedure.294 The functions of the Speaker of the district council are similar to those of the 
                                                 
291 See Article 184 of the Constitution. 
292 See the Odoki Commission 1993: 502 para. 18.116.  
293 Section 11(9)(a) of the LGA  
294 Section 11(9)(b) of the LGA. 
 
 
 
 
332 
 
Chapter 6: District Council Government 
Speaker of Parliament.295 Thus, no business can be transacted in the district council until the 
Speaker of the district council has been elected.296 The Speaker of the district council presides 
at the election of the deputy Speaker.297 
There is as yet no jurisprudence in Uganda that has interpreted the role of a Speaker of a 
district council. Instead, the Constitutional Court has dealt with the powers and role of the 
Speaker of Parliament. The Constitutional Court takes the view that although the powers of 
the Speaker of Parliament are discretionary, he or she is subject to the direction of the 
Constitution. For instance, the Speaker of Parliament cannot override constitutional rules 
relating to the procedure of lawmaking.298 
It follows that the powers of the Speaker of a district council have to be exercised subject to 
the Constitution. 
The LGA provides for the election of a Speaker and a deputy Speaker from the members of 
the district council by a vote of more than 50 percent and by secret ballot.299 The chief 
magistrate is mandated to preside at the first election of the Speaker, following the general 
election of the district local council.300 
                                                 
295 Section 11(9)(c) of the LGA. 
296 Section 11(10)(b) of the LGA. 
297 Section 11(8A) of the LGA. 
298 See Paul Ssemogerere and Another v The Attorney General Constitutional Petition No.3 2000 per 
Twinomujuni, JA. 
299 Section 11(3) of the LGA. 
300 Section 11(8)(a) of the LGA  
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A district council Speaker holds a full-time position.301 He or she is paid emoluments and 
allowances. A Speaker of the district council may not hold any office of profit or emolument 
likely to compromise his or her office.302 
The Speaker and deputy Speaker of a district council, just like any other elected official, can 
vacate office under certain instances. There are different instances when a district Speaker and 
deputy Speaker must leave office. These include: 
• a conviction for abuse of office; 
• proven incompetence; 
• proven misbehaviour; 
• physical or mental incapacity;303 
• resignation; 
• acceptance of another appointment to public office; and 
• death.304 
The LGA vests the district council with the power to remove the Speaker or deputy Speaker 
from office by resolution.305 
                                                 
301 Section 11(11) of the LGA. 
302 Section 11(12) of the LGA. 
303 Sections 11(6)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the LGA. 
304 Section 11(7) of the LGA. 
305 Section 11(6) of the LGA. 
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The procedure for the removal of the Speaker and the deputy Speaker of the district local 
council commences with a notice in writing signed by at least one-third of all the members of 
the council, which is submitted to the district chairperson. The notice must state the grounds 
for removal and the intention to pass a resolution to remove him or her.306 Once a councillor 
has appended his or her signature to the notice for the purposes of the resolution to remove the 
speaker, he or she may not remove it.307 Although the LGA provides that the Speaker has to 
preside at the council meeting for the removal of a deputy Speaker,308 there is no mention of 
who presides at the council meeting for the removal of the Speaker. It is suggested that a 
Chief Magistrate should preside at the district council meetings to remove the Speaker. It is 
argued that, rather than submit the notice of the motion to remove a district council Speaker to 
the district council chairperson, it should be submitted to the Minister of Local Government in 
order to limit the possibility of conflicts of interest.309 For example, where the district council 
Speaker and district council chairperson come from different political parties, accusations of 
bias may arise resulting into political paralysis in the district.  
13.3 Council meetings 
According to the regulations made under section 28 of the LGA, the district council meetings 
must take place ‘at least’ once every two months, at a place and time determined by either the 
Speaker or the chairperson of a district council.310 It is argued that the number of times that 
                                                 
306 Section 11(6A) of the LGA. 
307 Section 11(6B) of the LGA. 
308 Section 11(8A) of the LGA. 
309 Lambright 2011: 145. 
310 See Regulation 9(1) of Part III of the Third Schedule of the LGA. 
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district council meetings may take place may be increased to more than once in two months 
where necessary.  
Clearly, the above provision conflates the roles of the two political offices, with potential for 
conflict. Arguably, the above provision ensures that neither the district council Speaker, nor 
the district council chairperson, is able to forestall the process of convening district council 
meetings by deliberating refusing to convene meetings.311 The regulations provide for a seven 
day notice period before the commencement of a district council meeting. The notice of the 
meeting must state the agenda, and has to be circulated to all members of the district council 
and, if necessary, followed up by public announcements.312 No court case in Uganda has 
examined the importance of having a district council agenda. 
It is submitted that the requirement for the notice of a district council meeting to state the 
agenda is to ensure an informed debate in the district council meeting. Generally, district 
council meetings are open to the public unless, in the view of the Speaker or by resolution of 
district council, it should be held in camera for reasons of confidentiality.313 While the 
                                                 
311 For instance, in Bushenyi district council, a petition of censure against the district council Speaker was 
signed by the majority of the councillors and supported by the district chairperson on grounds of ‘misconduct, 
abuse of office and failure to conduct council meetings in an impartial manner’. The allegation against the 
Speaker emanated from the Speaker’s ruling against the Minister of Local Government to leave the council 
chambers for showing disrespect to the office of the Speaker. The chairperson later wrote to the same Minister 
to help in ensuring that the Speaker was removed from office. See Lambright 2011: 145. 
312 See Regulation 9(1) of Part III of the Third Schedule of the LGA. 
313 See Regulation 9(3) of Part III of the Third Schedule of the LGA. 
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regulations do not specify the specific language to be used, any record of proceedings has to 
be in English.314 
It is argued that a district council presents a forum through which communities’ priorities may 
be assessed and deliberated upon. Thus, district council meetings are important for debating 
local development issues. In addition, district council meetings are forums through which 
actual public participation at lower orders of government may take place. It is important that 
the rules of conduct of district council meetings under the LGA foster orderliness in their 
deliberations. 
Ordinarily, the rules of conduct should promote the culture of consensus-building and civility 
through deliberative debates in the district councils. For example, the regulations require that 
50 percent of the district council members shall form a quorum.315 Further, the determination 
of matters of the district council has to be by consensus, and if not, then by simple majority of 
the present members.316 It is noted that the fact that a district council decision must be 
determined by consensus or by a simple majority has consensus seeking attribute and suggests 
inclusivity. It may also be argued that the provision for a ‘50 percent’ attendance as the 
minimum quorum for the council meetings ensures that district council meetings are easy to 
convene and ultimately and promote the consensus-seeking character of district councils’ 
deliberations. In cases where a district council is not controlled by a single political party, it 
may still be possible to raise the necessary quorum for a district council meeting to convene. 
                                                 
314 See Regulation 10(2) of Part III of the Third Schedule of the LGA. 
315 See Regulation 9(5) of Part III of the Third Schedule of the LGA. 
316 See Regulation 9(6) of Part III of the Third Schedule of the LGA. 
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A district council meeting that is easily convened ultimately helps to legitimatise the district 
council decision-making process.317 
Further, the fact that the district council’s records are in English makes it difficult for other 
linguistic groups to readily access the debates of a district council. Moreover, the manner in 
which district council meetings take place (and their minimal frequency), indicate that they 
are incapable of promoting local democracy and communitarian voices. For instance, other 
than the provision that district councils must meet once every two months,318 Lambright’s 
study covering the three districts of Bushenyi, Mpigi, and Lira also notes poor attendance 
levels at council meetings.319 It is suggested that a district council councillor who misses two 
consecutive district council meetings should be suspended and not be paid any allowances for 
the rest of the year. It is further suggested that the frequency with which a district council may 
meet or the language in which district council business should be conducted should be 
determined by the district council itself and not regulated by Parliament. 
13.4 Standing Committees 
In the discussion below, district council standing committees are examined from two angles: 
first, as a technical committee that may guide the district council legislative process, and 
secondly as necessary fora for ordinary citizens to engage with the district councils’ 
deliberative processes.  
                                                 
317 This view is supported by evidence of political polarisation between the ruling party and other party members 
in the Bushenyi district council, where a good proposal is usually rejected by the ruling party council members 
simply because such a proposal may have been moved by members of the opposition parties. See Lambright 
2011: 219. 
318 See Regulation 9(1) of Part III of the Third Schedule of the LGA. 
319 Lambright 2011: 228. 
 
 
 
 
338 
 
Chapter 6: District Council Government 
The Constitution provides for the establishment of district standing committees and other 
committees, whose chairpersons and members are elected from members of the district 
council.320 The district chairperson, his or her vice chairperson and a secretary may take part 
in the district council standing committee’s meeting but have no voting rights.321 Section 22 
(2) of the LGA provides for election of the chairpersons and members of district standing 
committees by secret ballot and by a simple majority of members of the district council. In 
order to avoid any conflict of interest, members of the district executive committee are not 
eligible to vote.322 
The LGA provides that the number of district council standing committees should be equal to 
the number of district council secretaries.323 The LGA vests the district council with the 
discretion to determine the number of standing committees.324 However, no member of a 
district standing committee may belong to more than one committee.325 The reason may be 
that since district council standing committees must independently give technical advice to 
the district council, they should not be influenced by internal political considerations and 
biases. 
Although the LGA provides that the functions of these committees relate to the efficient 
performance of the functions of the district council,326 no specific functions are mentioned for 
                                                 
320 Article 186(8) of the Constitution. 
321 Article 186(9)(a) & (b) of the Constitution; section 22(4) of the LGA. 
322 Section 22(2) of the LGA. 
323 Section 22(1) of the LGA. 
324 See the opening line of section 22(1) of the LGA.  
325 Section 22(3) of the LGA. 
326 Section 22(1) of the LGA. 
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these committees. Hence, their exact mandate and role are not clear. However, since district 
standing committees support the district councils and perform duties that are only assigned to 
them, the district council must exercise discretion in determining their exact roles. During the 
CA debates, the role of district council standing committees was compared to the central 
government cabinet portfolios and district heads of department.327 This comparison is, 
however, narrow and only correct when a district council is viewed as an executive authority. 
It is argued that when a district council is also viewed as a legislative authority, the role of 
district council standing committees is more accurately comparable to the standing 
committees of Parliament under article 90(1) of the Constitution.328 
In the Paul Ssemogerere case, the Bill, which was passed into law without going through the 
committee of Parliament that should have dealt with the subject matter, was invalidated as 
unconstitutional. The Court held: 
Article 90(1) makes it mandatory for Parliament, during its first session, to appoint standing 
committees and other committees necessary for the efficient discharge of its functions. It is 
noteworthy that members of the standing committees are elected from among members of 
                                                 
327 See CA debates 3776-82. 
328 Article 90 of the Constitution provides for Committees of Parliament that: ‘(1) Parliament shall appoint 
committees necessary for the efficient discharge of its functions. (2) Parliament shall, by its rules of procedure, 
prescribe the powers, composition and functions of its committees. (3) In the exercise of their functions under 
this article, committees of Parliament – (a) may call any Minister or any person holding public office and private 
individuals to submit memoranda or appear before them to give evidence; (b) may co-opt any member of 
Parliament or employ qualified persons to assist them in the discharge of their functions; (c) shall have the 
powers of the High Court for – (i) enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, 
affirmation or otherwise; (ii) compelling the production of documents; and (iii) issuing a commission or request 
to examine witnesses abroad.’ 
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Parliament, and are not elected during the first session of Parliament, 2(a). The 1995 
Constitution does not name a committee of the whole house or spell out its functions. Some 
of the functions of the standing committee as specified under [sic] 90(3) are to discuss, 
scrutinize, carry out research and make recommendations on all the Bills laid before 
Parliament, carry out relevant research in their respective fields, and report to Parliament on 
their functions. In a nutshell the main function of a standing committee is to consider Bills in 
the minute details and depth [sic], thus doing what the house as a whole could not easily do 
if it had time. (emphasis added)329 
It is argued that whenever the district council exercises its legislative function, the role of the 
district council standing committees should be similar to those of the standing committees of 
Parliament, namely to scrutinise Bills of the district council before they are passed into 
ordinances. Arguably, the district council standing committees play an oversight role to 
ensure that ordinances enacted by the district council comply with the Constitution, 
government policy and any other relevant legislation. 
Azfar, Livingston and Meagher, while generally commenting on all of the district committee 
system in Uganda, take the view that the system of committees under the LGA is problematic 
for the following reasons. First, that district council committees are seen as tools of local 
political class hegemony in which the local politicians and the elite groups determine who 
participates in these committees. This hegemony undermines the very essence of public 
participation in district councils. Secondly, that in most cases these committees serve as 
avenues through which local resources are diverted for personal use in the form of unjustified 
sitting allowances, and hence these committees promote corruption and political patronage in 
                                                 
329 See Paul Ssemogerere and another v the Attorney General Constitutional Petition No. 3 of 2002 per A.E.N. 
Mpagi-Bahigeine, JA. (Judgment not paged). 
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district councils. Thirdly, the fact that these committees rarely meet means that the members 
of the public are never afforded an opportunity to air their views.330  
14. Conclusion 
In Chapter Two it was argued that local elections are the means through which local 
communities may participate in their own affairs by determining through a vote who are to 
lead them.331 The assumption was that even when local elections may result in different 
outcomes, after elections local politicians must agree to work together under the umbrella of a 
nation state. It was also argued that an adequate local government electoral system should be 
competitive and inclusive.332 
The discussion in this chapter finds that the district councils’ elections are exclusionary to 
certain social and political groups, such as ethnic minorities and political parties. The 
discussion also reveals the following: that the procedure for challenging the election outcomes 
of the political office- bearers and the criteria under which those office-bearers may vacate 
office have a negative bearing on their overall political legitimacy. While examining the 
district council’s committee system, the discussion finds that rather than serve as avenues for 
public participation, the district committee system is open to political abuse and manipulation. 
Ultimately, the district council’s governance structures are not accessible to all, contradicting 
the view that decentralised systems of government are good ‘hatcheries’ of democracy. 
The above views are supported by Lambright’s study which reveals a correlation between 
local economic conditions and district electoral outcomes. For instance, according to the 
                                                 
330 Azfar Livingston & Meagher 2006: 234. 
331 See Chapter Two § 2.3.2.1 
332 Chapter Three 3.4.3. 
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author, there is evidence that more incumbent district chairpersons lost elections in ‘slow 
developing districts’ than ‘in rapid developers’ after the reintroduction of multiparty 
politics.333 This is evidence that local elections can enforce accountability in district councils. 
Thus, in spite of the criticism of district councils’ electoral system, elections remain one of the 
best avenues through which local communities can democratically express their voices.334 
Oloka-Onyango, however, argues that the numerous district elections in Uganda have not 
translated into actual community participation, where local people’s inputs, as voters, are 
considered by local politicians.335 Tusasirwe’s study also reveals the dissatisfaction of local 
communities with local elections because of the absence of tangible results for local 
communities.336 
The main problem is that the legal regime and the emerging jurisprudence on elections 
generally in Uganda do not address vigorously the ‘plague’ of election rigging. In my view, it 
would have been better if the legislation barred a ‘guilty party’ in an election petition from 
standing again in a fresh election, as a deterrent against electoral malpractice. Secondly, it 
would have been better if the courts offered clearer guidance on how to curb the problem of 
rigged elections. The discussion in the next chapter focuses on the interpretation of the powers 
and functions of district councils. 
                                                 
333 Lambright 2011: 206. This view is supported by Lambright (2011: 207), who finds a relationship between 
improved political competition and electoral outcomes especially after the return of multiparty politics. 
334 Kabwegyere 2000: 71.  
335 Oloka-Onyango 2007: 17.  
336 Tusasirwe 2007: 36. 
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7. CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISTRICT COUNCILS’ POWERS AND FUNCTIONS 
1. Introduction 
The sharing of power and functions between the central government and local governments is 
a cornerstone of a good decentralised system, and an expression of developmental and 
democratic autonomy.1 In Chapter Three, it was argued that local governments should be 
vested with clear functions. It was further argued that the central government’s limitation of 
local governments’ discretion to initiate and execute their functions must be legally justified, 
and only limited when local governments cannot efficiently perform certain tasks.2 
Clarification of local governments’ powers and functions not only helps in delineating 
competencies amongst the various orders of government,3 but also fosters co-operative 
governance.4  
1.1 Historical context 
Before the 1995 Constitution, as discussed in Chapter Four, district councils (which were 
known as district local administrations) had no powers and functions constitutionally 
entrenched. Their powers to make laws came from an Act of Parliament. District local 
administrations powers and functions were delegated by Parliament which could be varied or 
                                                 
1 Chapter Two § 2.3.  
2 Chapter Three § .3.6. 
3 Steytler 2006: 8. See also Young 2006: 19. 
4 Quieroz De Ribeiro & Garson 2006: 17. 
 
 
 
 
344 
 
Chapter 7: District Councils’ Powers and Functions 
withheld at any time. District local administrations had no executive powers, only 
administrative responsibilities as agents of the central government.5 
The division of powers and functions between the central government and local governments 
in Uganda was, in the past, ill-defined. As discussed in Chapter Four, what existed was the 
delegation of administrative functions in a prescriptive manner.6 Decentralisation as a state 
reform measure, introduced in 1993 in Uganda and constitutionally protected under the 1995 
Constitution, created new modes of sharing power between the central government and 
district councils in a manner that is often practised in federal systems of government.7 The 
power-sharing arrangements that were finally adopted under the Constitution show that the 
debates by the CA delegates on the devolution of powers and function to district councils 
were influenced by power-sharing systems of federal and decentralised Constitutions in 
Europe, North America, and the far East.8 Moreover, as described in Chapter Four, federal 
power-sharing schemes existed under the 1962 Constitution.9 Uganda was thus no stranger to 
the federal power-sharing arrangement and hence carried these debates forward through the 
CA. 
                                                 
5 See Chapter Four § 4.7.6. 
6 See Chapter Four § 4.7.6. 
7 See Chapter Five § 5.1.2.9. 
8 Some CA delegates argued for power-sharing based on those of Nigeria, Germany, and the Unites States of 
America. Although it is conceded that conceptually the district council power-sharing scheme was based on that 
of the Nordic countries, given the influence of the Nordic consultancy group, the influence of federal power-
sharing systems on the CA delegates cannot be disputed.  
9 Chapter Four § 4.7.4. 
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1.2 Absence of a policy context  
It is difficult to interpret the precise powers and functions that devolve to district councils in 
Uganda given that the decision to devolve powers and functions to them was never informed 
by a comprehensive policy. Rather, the decision was initiated through a presidential speech.10 
This means that the existing constitutional and legislative framework on district councils did 
not proceed from any coherent central government policy.11 In countries that have devolved 
powers and functions to lower orders of government, such as South Africa, the objects of the 
local governments are provided for.12 The absence of the object of the district councils in the 
Constitution complicates the determination of the nature of district council powers and 
functions.  
1.3 The mandate of district councils under the LGA 
The relationship between the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy 
(NODPSP) and the functions that devolve to district councils have been examined by some 
                                                 
10 See President Yoweri Museveni’s address when launching the Local Government Decentralisation 
Programme on 2 October 1992, p.6. See also Decentralisation in Uganda: The Policy and its Philosophy, 
Decentralisation Secretariat, 1993. 
11 Oloka-Onyango 2007: 21. See also the Ministry of Local Government Decentralisation Policy Strategic 
Framework 2006: 3 para. 1.1 
12 Section 152 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides: ‘1. The objects of local 
governments are (a) to provide democratic and accountable governments for local communities; (b) to ensure 
the provision of services to communities; (c) to promote social and economic development; (d) to promote a 
safe and healthy environment; and (e) to encourage the involvement of communities and community 
organisation in the matters of local government. 2. A municipality must strive, within its financial and 
administrative capacity, to achieve the set of objectives set out in subsection (1)’. 
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writers on decentralisation in Uganda.13 The above relationship is restated in Uganda’s 
Decentralisation Policy Strategic Framework.14 This policy was published in 2006, 11 years 
after the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution that provides for decentralisation. 
The LGA lays down three parameters for district councils in the exercise of their legislative 
mandate. 
• District councils are obliged to protect the Constitution.15 District councils’ functions 
should be interpreted with the overall objective of protecting the Constitution. 
• District councils have a responsibility to promote democratic governance. Hence,  an 
interpretation of the district council powers and functions must be of such a nature that 
they promote public participation, openness, accountability and good governance.16 
• District councils are vested with the responsibility to implement and comply with 
government policy.17 
On the one hand, the LGA recognise the role of district councils as important in the 
promotion of constitutional and democratic rule, but on the other hand they are inclined 
towards central government control, given the obligation to ‘comply’ with the central 
                                                 
13 Singiza & De Visser 2011: 28. 
14 See the Decentralisation Strategic Policy Framework the Ministry of Local Government 2006: 4-8. 
15 Section 30(1)(c) of the LGA. 
16 Section 30(1)(c) of the LGA. 
17 Section 30(1)(d) of the LGA. 
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government’s policy.18 It is against the above objective standard and its legislative mandate 
that the powers of district council are interpreted. 
2. Constitutional framework for interpreting district powers  
It is important to purposefully interpret the Constitution in order to understand precisely 
which particular powers and functions devolve to district councils. Where relevant and 
appropriate, the framework discussed in Chapter Two will be adopted to interpret the transfer 
of powers and functions to district councils. 
2.1 Constitutional interpretation in Uganda 
Even though there have been very few cases interpreting powers and functions of district 
councils in Uganda,19 an examination of certain rules of constitutional interpretation has been 
made elsewhere and require no further detailed discussion here.20 The Constitutional Court 
acknowledges, quite rightly and firmly, the supremacy of the Constitution. Invariably, any 
practice or law which contradicts the Constitution is null and void.21 
The various cases22 in which the rules of constitutional interpretation were adopted by the 
Ugandan courts are briefly summarised as follows: 
                                                 
18 Soanes et al. (2004: 293) define ‘comply’ as ‘act in accordance with the wish or command’. 
19 See Victor Juliet Mukasa Yvonneoyo v A.G Miscellaneous Cause NO.247/06 at p 17.  
20 Singiza 2007: 8-9. Although the author’s examination of the rules of constitutional interpretation in the 
context of the right to non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, it is argued that the same rules apply 
in interpreting the powers and functions of district councils.  
21 Susan Kigula & 416 others v the AG Constitutional Petition No. 6 of 2003 (unreported) rule f. 
22 Charles Onyango Obbo Andrew Mujuni Mwenda v AG Constitutional Petition No.15 of 1997 (unreported). 
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• First, the principles which govern construction of a statute are the same as those which 
govern the interpretation of the Constitution. According to the Constitutional Court, 
constitutional provisions should be given the widest possible interpretation.23 
• Secondly, the interpretation of the Constitution should be dynamic, progressive and 
flexible, so as to keep pace with ever-changing ideals of a society.24 
• Thirdly, the Constitution should be interpreted as a whole with no single provision to 
be relied on to negate any other.25 No single provision should be separated from the 
rest, but that all the provisions should be brought within the perspective of the entire 
constitutional scheme.26  
As argued in Chapter Three, in order for the transfer of local government powers to serve the 
purpose of decentralisation, they should be clearly defined. It was further argued that the 
central government legislative control of the local government’s functional areas should be 
supportive and not to defeat the object of decentralisation.27 Given the specific content to 
rules of constitutional interpretation, it is argued that the cumulative effect of these rules 
means that the district council’s functions and powers must be progressively interpreted so as 
to promote the application of new emerging legal concepts without destroying the original 
text and meaning of the Constitution.28 Thus the use of the word ‘dynamic’29 calls for the 
                                                 
23 Susan Kigula rule a. 
24 Susan Kigula rule b. 
25 Susan Kigula rule c. 
26 Susan Kigula rule f. 
27 Chapter Three §3.6.5 and 3.6.4. See also President Yoweri Museveni’s address when launching the Local 
Government Decentralisation Programme on 2 October 1992, p.6. 
28 Oloka-Onyango 1996: 144. 
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interpretation of local government powers informed by the emerging trends on local 
governments manifested through a range of statements on decentralisation in Africa.  
It is also noted that the rules of constitutional interpretation as adopted by the Constitutional 
Court call for a careful balancing of competing values and interests. For example, the phrase 
‘dynamic, progressive and flexible’ as used by Constitutional Court in the Kigura case,30 
presupposes that in certain cases the judges may be confronted with two competing interests. 
The judges must address, on the one hand, the interests of the central government, and on the 
other, the interests of the district council. 
It is argued that in such cases the determination of which interest outweighs the other 
demands, as Aleinikoff argues, ‘the development of a scale of values external to the Justices’ 
personal preferences’.31 Thus depending on which order of government is best suited for the 
performance of a task, the scale would have to tilt in favour of the constitutional purpose of 
decentralisation. Clearly, there is no hard and fast rule in determining which of two interests 
should give way to the other. The discussion below examines the appropriateness of district 
councils’ powers and functions vis-à-vis their constitutional mandate. 
2.2 The district council role in the state’s directive principles 
If the whole constitutional scheme has to be read together, then the directive principles must 
therefore be relevant to the interpretation of the district powers. In the absence of any 
Constitutional object of district councils, this part of the chapter examines the link between 
decentralisation and the directive principles. Eight directive principles are singled out: 
                                                                                                                                                        
29 Soanes 2004: defines ‘dynamic’ to mean ‘of a process or system characterized by constant change or activity’. 
30 Susan Kigula (2006). 
31 Aleinikoff 1987: 973.  
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democracy; human rights; economic growth; distribution of income; environment; protection 
of disabled persons; and education.  
2.2.1 Democracy 
One of the most important directive principles of state policy is the promotion of democracy. 
This includes empowering and encouraging citizens’ active participation, access to leadership 
positions at all levels, and decentralisation and devolution of governmental powers and 
functions.32 As argued in Chapter Two, notwithstanding the possibility that in some cases 
local government structures may be prone to capture by elite groups, local communities learn 
about the essence of democracy (trade-offs and compromises) at local level better than at 
national level.33 This means that interpreting district council powers and functions ought to 
serve the constitutional purpose of democratic district councils. It is argued that district 
councils should be vested powers that are relevant and truly connected to democracy. For 
instance the power to make laws is connected to the right to public participation, itself an 
essential feature of a constitutional democracy, without which, the broader constitutional and 
democratic scheme of decentralisation would be limited.  
2.2.2 Human rights 
In Chapter Two, the theory of decentralisation was predicated on good governance, the 
essential features of which include the promotion of human rights.34 One of the fundamental 
roles of a state is to promote the human rights. Thus, the directive principles oblige the state 
to ensure that institutions which are charged with the responsibility to protect and promote 
                                                 
32 NODPSP no. II of Uganda Constitution.  
33 Chapter Two § 2.3.2.3. 
34 Chapter Two § 2.3. 
 
 
 
 
351 
 
Chapter 7: District Councils’ Powers and Functions 
human rights are adequately resourced.35 If the state is serious about promoting human rights, 
it must do so by promoting the right to political participation.36 It is argued that the right to 
political participation is best realised and exercised at local levels of the state.  
2.2.3 Economic growth 
The Constitution directs the state to become the pillar of growth in the areas of agriculture, 
industrial technology and scientific development.37 The role of district councils in economic 
development is based on the assumption that smaller orders of government can be more 
responsive and efficient than the central government. In this regard, the role of district 
councils in the promotion of economic growth through certain essential sectors, such as 
agriculture, is critical in interpreting district council powers and functions. 
2.2.4 Distribution of income 
The Constitutional directive principles envisage balanced development as a means of 
narrowing the income inequality between rural and urban areas. District councils in this 
regard are not symbols of development per se but transformational tools for rural 
development.38 In Chapter Two, it was conceded that redistribution is generally better 
performed at national government level. However, this does not imply that decentralisation 
cannot foster redistribution of income, especially where discretion is vested in local 
governments in the determination of how they spend equalisation grants.39 It may be argued 
                                                 
35 NODPSP no. V of Uganda Constitution. 
36 NODPSP no. VII of Uganda Constitution. 
37 NODPSP no. XI of Uganda Constitution. 
38 NODPSP no. XII of Uganda Constitution. 
39 Chapter Two § 2.3.1.3. 
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that discretion over equalisation grants does not automatically result in income distribution in 
a district, but merely produces the district council’s autonomy. However, a district council can 
play a very important role in interpersonal redistribution of incomes, such as taking into 
consideration the ability to pay in the provision of basic services. The interpretation of the 
role of district councils in income distribution should take into account this ability to narrow 
the gap between the rich and poor through equalisation grants. 
2.2.5 Environment 
The Constitution places an obligation on the state to protect and sustainably manage natural 
resources.40 The Constitution also requires the state to promote and implement clean energy 
policies.41 Natural resource management and clean energy, among other things, refer to good 
water and fuel management policies. Thus the interpretation of district council powers should 
also bear in mind the essential role of lower orders of government in managing and protecting 
the local environment. 
2.2.6 Women and persons with a disability 
The recognition of the rights of persons with disabilities and of women as directive principles 
is helpful in interpreting which functions vest in the district council. Persons with disabilities 
in the past were discriminated against in Uganda. Equally, in the past, women in Uganda were 
legally discriminated against.42 Recognition of the rights of persons with disabilities and the 
rights of women reinforces the idea that in order to achieve real participatory democracy at 
                                                 
40 NODPSP no. XIII of Uganda Constitution. 
41 NODPSP no. XXVII of Uganda Constitution. 
42 For instance, under article 20 of the 1967 Constitution, sex and disability were not prohibited grounds of 
discrimination. 
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grassroots level, vulnerable groups in a society, particularly those previously discriminated 
against, must be recognised and their interests protected. In this regard the role of district 
councils in the promotion of gender-sensitive policies and the protection of people with 
special needs cannot be underestimated.43 
For example, the provision of basic services such as agricultural extension services, rural 
ambulance services, and the control of contagious diseases, should vest in the district council. 
The role of district councils in the provision of these services impacts directly on households. 
It is argued that since women run most households and provide the essential labour in the 
agriculture production sector, the powers of district councils should be interpreted bearing in 
mind the immediate impact on women. 
In addition, physical infrastructure, such as rural roads, is delivered by district councils. The 
type of physical infrastructure has a direct impact on persons with disabilities. The type of 
physical infrastructure either empowers or impairs persons with disabilities, depending on 
how accommodative it is of persons with disabilities. Thus, the interpretation of district 
council powers should consider the essential role of district councils in providing physical 
infrastructure that reasonably accommodates persons with disabilities. 
2.2.7 Education and health services 
The Constitution directs the state to promote compulsory basic education by obliging it to 
take appropriate measures to afford every citizen an equal opportunity to attain the highest 
                                                 
43 NODPSP no. XV & XVI of Uganda Constitution. 
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education standard.44 The Constitution also directs the state to take all practical measures to 
ensure the provision of basic medical services to the population.45 
District councils occupy unique spaces in the promotion of compulsory basic education. 
District councils may promote the use of local languages as the medium of instruction in 
primary schools. The promotion of local languages in schools may be linked to the realisation 
of compulsory basic education. It also grants an opportunity to minority groups, such as 
indigenous peoples, to access the highest standard of education. It is argued that the use of 
local languages in the provision of medical services is a practical measure in the promotion of 
basic medical services to the local populations. For districts councils to promote access to 
education by enabling use of local languages, they need the authority/power to determine the 
language of instruction in primary schools. 
3. The principle of subsidiarity in interpreting district council powers 
Chapter Two of the thesis discussed in detail some of the compelling notions for 
decentralisation. An articulation of the international normative framework for decentralisation 
was primarily located in the principle of subsidiarity. For example, emerging international 
soft law calls for the transfer of functions to local governments on the basis of the local 
government’s ability to more effectively match goods to local preferences than the central 
government.46 It is reiterated that the manifestations of subsidiarity in emerging international 
                                                 
44 NODPSP no. XVIII of Uganda Constitution. 
45 NODPSP no. XX of Uganda Constitution. 
46 Chapter Two § 2.8; De Visser 2010: 114. 
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soft law on decentralisation call for the vesting of clear powers and functions to local 
governments.47 
Subsidiarity as a principle is prevalent in Uganda in two ways: under the Constitution’s 
directive principles and under article 176(2)(b) of the Constitution. First, the directive 
principles of state policy provide that ‘[t]he State shall be guided by the principle of 
decentralisation and devolution of governmental functions and powers to the people at 
appropriate levels where they can best manage and direct their own affairs’. Secondly, article 
176(2)(b) of the Constitution provides that ‘decentralisation shall be a principle applying to 
all levels of local government and, in particular, from higher to lower local government units 
to ensure people’s participation and democratic control in decision making’. The key phrases 
here are ‘at appropriate levels where they can best manage and direct their own affairs’ and 
‘from higher to lower local government units’. The Constitution thus directs that 
decentralisation and devolution of powers should favour lower orders of government as a 
means through which local communities can best manage their affairs. 
Thus the drive towards decentralisation (subsidiarity) as expressed in the Constitution 
becomes a criterion for transfer of powers. 
According to the Decentralisation Policy Strategic Framework, ‘Current development 
thinking is that programmes that impact on people are better implemented through 
decentralisation of functions and powers and responsibilities to local levels’. 48 
According to the Strategic Framework, decentralisation is efficient and effective in that local 
communities are able to determine their needs and priorities on a sustainable basis.49 In 
                                                 
47 See article (4)(3) of the ECLSG & CLGF 2005: 6 Principle no 4 para. 1. See Chapter § 2.8. 
48 Decentralisation Policy Strategic Framework Ministry of Local Government 2006: 14 para. 30. 
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essence, according to the Strategic Framework, those powers where community input is of 
limited important should not be transferred.50 
The process of assignment of roles to district councils should be examined against the 
background of the principle of subsidiarity. Ultimately, the district council powers and 
functions under the Constitution should be interpreted in a manner that prefers smaller orders 
of government. 
4. Functional areas over which district councils have authority 
4.1 Examining the lists 
In the section below, the approach adopted by the Constitution in the transfer of powers and 
functions to the district councils is examined against the backdrop of the arguments for 
decentralisation made in chapters Two and Three and the principles and rules of constitutional 
interpretation stated above. 
Article 189(1) of the Constitution provides that ‘subject to the provisions of this Constitution, 
the functions and services specified in the Sixth Schedule to this Constitution shall be the 
responsibility of the Government’. Article 189(3) of the Constitution provides that ‘[d]istrict 
councils shall have responsibility for any functions and services not specified in the Sixth 
Schedule to this Constitution’. The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution provides for 28 areas of 
competency for which the central government is responsible. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
49 Decentralisation Policy Strategic Framework Ministry of Local Government 2006: 14 para. 30. 
50 Decentralisation Policy Strategic Framework Ministry of Local Government 2006: 18 para. 3.4. 
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In summary, the Constitution lists 28 exclusive powers of the central government. Impliedly, 
all other public powers are residual powers of the district councils.  
Section 30(1) of the LGA provides for functions that vest in the district councils.51 District 
councils have the discretion to exercise all the functions except those listed under Part I of the 
Second Schedule of the LGA.52 Part I of the Second Schedule to the LGA is similar in 
wording to the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. The LGA proceeds to define district 
council authority by providing that district councils can exercise their authority within their 
area on any of the listed competencies under Part II of the Second Schedule of the LGA. 
Under Part II, the district council is vested with the provision of services such as education; 
medical and health services (sic) such as primary health care services; water; roads (except 
those under the responsibility of the central government); and the provision of all 
decentralised services (27 areas of services). These includes areas such as the aiding and 
supporting of schools; preservation of public decency; undertaking private works and 
services; selling of all by-products from district-related works or services; promotion of 
district council publicity; promotion of health schemes; provision of sports and social welfare; 
and vehicular parking services.53 Lastly, the district council has the obligation to register 
births and deaths and to help the central government in environment-related activities.54 
 
                                                 
51 Section 30(1)(a) of the LGA. 
52 Section 30(1)(b) of the LGA.. 
53 Section 30(2) of the LGA and Part II para 1-18 of the Second Schedule to the LGA. 
54 Ibid. 
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It is argued that the list of exclusive central government powers as described in Schedule 6 to 
the Constitution and Part I of the Schedule 2 to the LGA is so long and detailed that nothing 
remains for the district councils. The long list makes it difficult to determine precisely which 
areas of competency remain for the district council. In addition to the long list, the Sixth 
Schedule has an item 29 which provides that ‘[a]ny matter incidental to or connected with the 
functions and services mentioned in this Schedule’. In my view, when Parliament enacted 
section 30(1) of the LGA resulting in 18 areas of competency listed under Table 6, it 
overlooked that in terms of item 29 of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution almost no 
powers remained to be vested in the district councils. 
The delineation of the district council functions under Part II of the Second Schedule of the 
LGA, read within the context of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, suggests, as will be 
explained below, a concurrency of powers. The apparent concurrency of powers has its 
origins in the way the Constitutions treats the allocation of powers to the central government 
and the district councils, namely by  
• defining so many central powers that nothing remains for the district council; 
• including item 29, which suggests that, despite the residual functions of district 
council, they revert back to central government; and 
• suggesting that Parliament will prescribe and detail the residual functions of the 
district council. 
It is argued that the adoption of a concurrency of powers by Parliament under section 30 of 
the LGA is in fact what the CA delegates were keen to avoid.55 During the CA debates, the 
                                                 
55 CA debates pp 3833-346. 
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terms ‘concurrent’ and ‘shared’ powers were never favoured by the CA delegates. According 
to one CA delegate, 
the committee started with three lists, the Central Government, Concurrent and Local 
Government. Then ultimately we called in the technical advice not necessarily from the 
Ministry of Local Government but through the Ministry of Local Government to 
International Consultants. They advised that it is normal and advisable to specify the 
functions of the Central Government. Anything that is not specified as a function of the 
Central Government is automatically a function of the Local Government because it has 
been stated that before the responsibilities of the Local Government are inexhaustible.56 
Had the CA delegates considered district council powers as inexhaustible, it would have given 
district council powers a wider scope. An initial reading of the Sixth Schedule without item 
29 suggests that anything that is not included in the Schedule vests in the district council as a 
residual power. However, item 29 of the Sixth Schedule introduces the doctrine of incidental 
powers. As a consequence, only if a function is not ‘incidental or connected with’ the central 
government then it reverts to the district council.57 The long list of the central government 
competencies and item 29 of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution contradict the intentions 
of the CA delegates.  
4.2 Overlap of central government and district council functions 
A reflection on the manner in which this delegation is carried out in section 32 of the LGA is 
indicative of the fact that it is more of an instance of power-sharing on the basis of 
subsidiarity than the classical delegation of roles by superiors. It is submitted that the 
delegation of functions from the Ministry of Local Government to a district council, is 
                                                 
56 Odoki Commission Report 1993: 513. 
57 See item 29 of the Sixth Schedule.  
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intended to strengthen the core functions of district councils. The contrary interpretation 
would in fact defeat the purpose of decentralisation all together.  
Table 8 shows the overlap of function between the central government and the district 
council. The right-hand column in bold lists 15 areas of competency that the author considers 
should be the exclusive competency of the central government. The left-hand column in 
italics lists 14 areas of district council competencies that overlap with the central government 
competencies.  
Table 6: Twenty-eight exclusive competencies of central government 
1. Arms, ammunition and 
explosives. 
2. Defence, security, 
maintenance of law and order. 
3. Banks and banking. 
4. Taxation and taxation 
policy. 
5. Citizenship, immigration 
and emigration. 
6. Copyrights, patents and 
trademarks. 
7. Land, mines, mineral and 
water resources, and the 
environment. 
8. National parks. 
9. Public holidays. 
10. National monuments and 
13. National elections. 
14. Energy policy. 
15. Transport and 
communications policy. 
16. Development and 
upgrading of national roads.
  
17. National censuses and 
statistics. 
18. Public services of 
Uganda. 
19. The judiciary. 
20. National standards. 
21. Education policy. 
22. National surveys and 
mapping. 
25. National research 
policy. 
26. Control and 
management of epidemics 
and disasters. 
27. Health policy. 
28. Agricultural policy. 
29. Any matter incidental 
to or connected with the 
functions and services 
mentioned in this 
Schedule. 
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antiquities. 
11. Regulation of trade and 
commerce. 
12. National plans and 
coordinating plans made by local 
governments. 
 
23. Industrial policy. 
24. Forest and wildlife 
reserve policy and 
management. 
 
 
Table 7: District councils' functions under Part II of Second Schedule of LGA 
1. Education services 
• nursery 
• primary 
• secondary 
• trade 
• special education 
• technical education 
10. providing and managing 
a) sports and 
recreation, 
b) social work 
development, 
c) remedial social 
welfare 
programs 
d) welfare of 
18. All decentralised services, 
such as : 
a) crop, animal and 
fisheries husbandry 
extension services 
b) entomological 
services and vermin 
control 
c) human resource 
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2. medical and health services 
• hospitals other than those 
providing referral and 
medical training 
• health centres, 
dispensaries, sub-
dispensaries and first-aid 
posts 
• maternity and child 
welfare services 
• control of communicable 
diseases, such as 
HIV/AIDS, leprosy and 
tuberculosis 
• control of spread of 
diseases in the district 
• rural ambulance services 
• primary health care 
services 
• vector control 
• environmental sanitation 
• health education 
3. water services 
• maintenance of water 
children and the 
elderly 
e) public vehicles 
11. registration of marriages, 
birth and deaths for 
transmission to the 
Registrar-General. 
12. assisting the central 
government in 
environment 
preservation and 
protection. 
13. upon delegation by the 
central government, 
identification and 
preservation of sites and 
objects or buildings of 
historical and 
architectural value. 
14. payment of salaries of all 
established staff (this 
function cannot devolve 
to sub-counties). 
15. regulation, control, 
management, 
administration 
promotion and licensing 
management and 
development 
d) recurrent and 
development budget 
e) district statistical 
services 
f) district project 
identification 
g) district planning 
h) local government 
development 
planning 
i) land administration 
j) land surveying 
k) physical planning 
l) forests and wetlands 
m) licensing of produce 
buying 
n) trade buying 
o) trade development 
p) commercial 
inspectorate 
q) co-operative 
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supplies in liaison with 
the line ministry 
4. road services 
• construction 
• rehabilitation 
• maintenance of roads not 
under the responsibility of 
government 
5. preventing damage to property of the 
central government and the council. 
6. undertaking private works and services 
7. selling all by-products resulting from 
carrying out any works or services 
8. promoting publicity for the council and 
the district 
9. promoting schemes of health, 
education and road safety sensitisation. 
 
of council functions and 
services 
16. aiding and supporting 
the establishment and 
maintenance of schools, 
hospitals, libraries, art 
galleries, museums, 
tourist centres, homes for 
the aged, destitute or 
infirm or for orphans; 
providing bursaries to 
assist children residing 
in the district; making 
donations to charitable 
and philanthropic bodies, 
welfare, youth, persons 
with disabilities, women 
and sport organisations 
17. preserving public 
decency and preventing 
offences against public 
order in public places 
 
 
 
development 
r) industrial relations 
s) social rehabilitation 
t) labour matters 
u) probation and 
welfare 
v) street children and 
orphans 
w) women in 
development 
x) community 
development 
y) youth affairs 
z) cultural affairs 
19. any other service or function 
which is not specified in this 
schedule. 
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Table 8: Overlap of central government and district council functions 
The district government 
delegated functions 
under Part II of the 
Second Schedule of the 
LGA  
The central government functions 
under the Sixth Schedule of the 
Constitution. 
• District information 
services 
 
• Transport and communication 
• Road services • Development and upgrading of national 
roads.  
 • Taxation and taking policy 
• Land administration 
• Land surveying 
• Physical planning 
• Wetlands 
• Assisting the central 
government in 
environment preservation 
and protection. 
• Land, minerals, water resources and 
environment 
• Human resource 
management and 
development. Payment of 
salaries of all established 
staff (this function cannot 
• Public service 
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devolve to sub-counties). 
• Registration of marriages, 
births and deaths for 
transmission to the 
Registrar-General. 
• National census and statistics 
• Education services 
 
• Education policy 
• Industrial relations 
• Social rehabilitation 
• Labour matters 
• Industrial policy 
• Forests • Forest and wildlife reserve policy and 
management. 
• Control of communicable 
diseases, such as 
HIV/AIDS, leprosy and 
tuberculosis; 
• control of spread of 
diseases in the district 
• Control and management of epidemics 
and disasters 
• Medical and health 
services such as hospitals 
other than those providing 
referral and medical 
training, health centres, 
dispensaries, sub-
dispensaries and first-aid 
• Health policy 
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post-maternity and child 
welfare services; 
• Water services 
• Crop, animal and fisheries 
husbandry extension 
services 
• Entomological services 
and vermin control 
• Agriculture policy 
• Licensing of produce 
buying 
• Trade buying 
• Trade development 
• Commercial inspectorate 
• Cooperative development 
• Regulation, control, 
management, 
administration promotion 
and licensing of council 
functions and services 
aa) commercial inspectorate 
 
• Regulation of trade and commerce 
• District planning 
• Local government 
• National planning 
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development planning 
• District statistical services 
• District project 
identification 
 
• Aiding and supporting 
tourist centres 
• National parks 
• Art galleries, museums, 
tourist centres; 
preservation of sites and 
objects or buildings of 
historical and architectural 
value. 
 
• National monuments, antiquities 
 
 
Most of the functions under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution and Part II of the Second 
Schedule of the LGA in fact offer little guidance. In any invent, a district council is not 
allowed to enact any laws on any matter that has been adequately provided for by the central 
government.58 
                                                 
58 Section 42(2) of the LGA provides: ‘For avoidance of doubt, no ordinance shall be made in respect of any 
matters that or issue for which adequate provision is made under the Constitution or any other law made by 
Parliament except for ease of reference, in which case the ordinance shall reproduce the provisions of article or 
law in its entirety.’ 
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It may also be argued that what is ‘incidental’ in item 29 of the Sixth Schedule of the 
Constitution is not only what is auxiliary to the performance of the central government 
powers. The phrase ‘or connected with’ clarifies the intention of the entire scheme of 
devolution of powers and functions to the district councils. Thus, only if a matter is not 
‘incidental to or connected with’ the Sixth Schedule does it become a district council 
function.59 In Chapter Two, it was noted that the emerging soft law on local governments 
calls for the transfer of powers to local governments. It was argued that local governments 
tend to produce goods for which local communities express preference.60 It was also argued in 
Chapter Three that a clear and simple scheme of allocation of functions not only promotes 
efficiency and accountably, but is critical for the success of decentralisation.61 In light of that 
it is argued that the incidental powers of the central government must be interpreted 
restrictively. 
Steytler and De Visser, writing in the context of power-sharing between local governments 
and the national government in South Africa, argue that the ‘incidental powers doctrine’ 
should be interpreted purposefully and restrictively.62 The authors argue that there are 
functions which, when strictly interpreted, fall outside a local government core function but 
are in fact critical for the administration of a given local government function. The authors 
cite the example of the imposition of a fine in the enforcement of the by-laws. They argued 
that the imposition of fines, while not explicitly granted as a power, is incidental to other 
                                                 
59 Garner (2004: 1288) defines the term ‘incidental power’ as ‘a power that, although not expressly granted, 
must exist because it is necessary to the accomplishment of an express purpose’. 
60 Chapter Two § 2.3.1.1. 
61 Chapter Three § 3.6.6. 
62 Steytler & De Visser 2013: 5-7 
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powers. The argument here is that incidental powers should not be used to increase the 
functional ambit of the central government.63 Applying that reasoning to powers and 
functions of district councils in Uganda, the following can be argued: 
A liberal interpretation of item 29 of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution may suggest that 
all residual powers of the district council powers revert to the central government, because all 
district council functions are connected to the central government. However, in light of the 
call for subsidiarity that was discussed in Chapter Two,64 it is argued that item 29 should be 
interpreted restrictively.  
For example, under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, national standards and health 
policy are competencies of the central government. In this regard, the Public Health Act is 
enacted to set standards in the manufacture, preparation, storage or transmission of any food 
article that is unfit for human consumption. The Act does not provide for all aspects of foods 
that may endanger human health. Against this framework the Local Government (Mbarara 
District) Brewing and Consumption of Native Beer Ordinance, Statutory Instrument No. 243-
47 is enacted. Section 5 of the ordinance prohibits the supply of native beer to drunkards and 
young persons. In essence, the ordinance uses the legislative space afforded by the 
Constitution and the statutory framework to protect children and persons described as 
‘drunkards’ from harmful native beers. Thus the central government sets the standards for 
foods fit for human consumption, while the role of district council is to implement the 
framework using tailored-made ordinances to suit local circumstances. It is argued that the 
                                                 
63 Steytler & De Visser 2013: 5-8 
64 Chapter Two § 2.8. 
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legislative role of the district council is not subservient to the central government’s legislative 
power, but rather supportive. 
4.3 Validity of section 42(2) of the LGA 
Section 42(2) of the LGA narrows the district council’s power to make laws by excluding 
district councils from enacting any laws on any matter that has been ‘adequately’ legislated 
upon by Parliament. Given the arguments above, what is then the constitutionality of section 
42(2) of the LGA given that it limits a district council’s legislative power to matters which 
have not been legislated upon by Parliament? 
It is argued that a blanket limitation of district council legislative power on any matter that has 
already been legislated upon by Parliament is invalid in terms of Article 176(2) read together 
with article 180(1) of the Constitution. Presumably, if Parliament chooses, it can legislate 
exhaustively on any given competency, leaving no room for the district council to perform its 
legislative role. It is argued that even if Parliament legislated on a competency that is shared 
with the district council, there is still room for the district council to exercise its devolved 
legislative power. All that Parliament is obliged to do is to ensure that the district council’s 
legislative space that is created by articles 180(1) and 176(2) of the Constitution is not 
unilaterally occupied by the central government. 
4.4 Delegation of further powers  
Article 189(2) of the Constitution creates room for the central government (on application by 
a district council) to allow a district council to exercise any of the competencies stated in the 
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Sixth Schedule under a system of delegation.65 The central government retains the power to 
‘assume responsibility for functions and services assigned to the district council’.66  
Oloka-Onyango, while examining the nature of powers that devolve to district councils, 
argues that article 189(2) of the Constitution manifests an inclination towards a highly 
centralised state.67 The use of words and phrases such as ‘may’, ‘be allowed’, and ‘if 
delegated’ are pointed out by the author as evidence of the Constitution’s centrist 
inclination.68 The inclination towards a centrist state is buttressed by the fact that any 
additional functions that vest at the district councils are dependent on the pleasure of the 
central government. It is argued that subsidiarity should lead to central government allocating 
some of its powers to districts. 
Section 32(1) of the LGA provides among other things for the delegation of the powers and 
functions and responsibilities that vest in the Ministry of Local Government to a district 
council.69 In effect, section 32(1) adopts what article 189(2) of the Constitution calls for. 
Before a delegation under section 32(1) of the LGA can take place, all the parties concerned 
                                                 
65 Article 189(2) of the Constitution provides: ‘District councils and the councils of lower local government 
units may, on request by them, be allowed to exercise the functions and services specified in the Sixth Schedule 
to this Constitution or if delegated to them by the Government or by Parliament by law’. 
66 Article 189(4) of the Constitution provides that ‘Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the 
Government may, on request by a district council, assume responsibility for functions and services assigned to 
the district council’. 
67 Oloka-Onyango 2007: 15. 
68 Oloka-Onyango (2007).  
69 Section 32(1) of the LGA provides that ‘A Minister responsible for a Government Ministry may, after 
consultation with the Minister, delegate functions, powers and responsibilities vested in that Ministry to a local 
government council’.  
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must agree to the delegation. Secondly, there must be evidence that adequate resources have 
been made available to the district councils in order to fund the delegated mandates. Lastly, 
the delegation must be brought to the public’s knowledge.70 
Table 8 shows that most of the services that are decentralised to district councils are in fact 
connected to central government competencies as shown in the right column. What the three 
tables suggest is that neither the district councils, nor the central government have exclusive 
powers. There is such a high degree of overlap between the powers of the central government 
and the powers of the district council that it is perhaps better to speak of sharing powers.71  
5. The district council’s governance instruments 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Three, three local government governance tools were discussed. These were: 
legislative, executive and administrative powers. The term ‘legislative power’ was defined 
with reference to local governments’ ability to make laws so as to legally give effect to their 
functional mandate. The term ‘executive powers’ was defined with reference to the ability to 
initiate and to execute local government policies. Lastly, it was argued that local governments 
should be vested with administrative power and a discretionary power to choose whom to hire 
and to determine who manages the local governments’ resources.72 What follows is the 
                                                 
70 Section 32(2)(a), (b) & (c) of the LGA. In addition, the Minister of Local Government must send the 
instrument of delegation to the district council. The Minister must gazette or advertise the instrument of 
delegation in the local media at the expense of the Ministry of Local Government, and must affix a copy thereof 
in a conspicuous place on or near the outer door of the relevant district council’s office.  
71 Kabumba 2007: 33. 
72 See Chapter Three § 3.6. 
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examination of the district council’s governance tools in executing their mandates against the 
backdrop of the above mentioned principles.  
5.2 District council powers to make laws 
Article 180(1) of the Constitution provides that a district council ‘shall have legislative ... 
powers to be exercised in accordance with this Constitution’. In theory an institution that 
possesses the power to make laws also determines how executive powers are exercised and by 
whom.73 Thus, article 180(1) of the Constitution seeks to state the role of the council in a 
district and determines that the district council may exercise legislative authority in the 
district. The article implies that as long as the district council’s laws do not contradict the 
Constitution, they are as valid as any national laws. A district council ordinance may apply to 
the whole district, or part thereof, or to a person practising a given profession in a district.74 
A district council ordinance may create offences for breach of any of the regulations 
thereunder,75 prescribe fines or a term of imprisonment,76 forfeiture and destruction.77 In 
addition, a district council ordinance may provide for the suspension or cancellation of a 
permit or licence,78 and/ or provide for recovery of a fine or expenses thereunder by way of a 
                                                 
73 Lindseth 2004: 1354. 
74 Section 42 of the LGA. 
75 Section 40(a) of the LGA. 
76 Section 40(b) of the LGA. 
77 Section 40(c) of the LGA. 
78 Section 40(d) of the LGA. 
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civil action.79 Further, a district ordinance may provide for a fee or a charge or full cost 
recovery, under section 38 of the LGA.80  
The district council power to make laws is a novel power that in fact evinces local autonomy. 
Indeed, as recommended by the Odoki Commission, ‘[t]he district council should be the 
supreme political organ in the district, with powers to make policies, pass laws’ (emphasis 
added).81 It is argued that the Commission’s recommendation is what in fact article 180(1) of 
the Constitution adopted 
Article 79(2) of the Constitution,82 read in isolation of article 180(1) of the Constitution, may 
lead to a conclusion that the district council may not exercise its legislative authority on any 
of the delegated functions without its conferment by Parliament. Such a conclusion is 
misleading. It is argued that even if the district council’s legislative role under article 180(1) 
of the Constitution may be of a delegated kind, it is a unique power that must be interpreted to 
serve the purpose of decentralisation.83  
It is argued that under the authority of article 180(1) of the Constitution, the district council 
may exercise its legislative authority on any of the competencies under the Sixth Schedule of 
the Constitution, and Part I of the Second Schedule of the LGA.What this ultimately means is 
that under the Constitution, Parliament cannot legislate exhaustively on all shared 
                                                 
79 Section 40(e) of the LGA. 
80 Section 41 of the LGA. 
81 See the Odoki Commission Report para. 18.98: 499. 
82 Article 79(2) of the Constitution provides: ‘Except as provided in this Constitution, no person or body other 
than Parliament shall have power to make provisions having the force of law in Uganda except under authority 
conferred by an Act of Parliament.’ 
83 See the detailed discussion of the distinction between the two terms in Chapter One. 
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competencies with a district council. The Constitution instructs Parliament to be cognisant of 
the principle of subsidiarity while exercising its legislative mandate.84 
In addition to being limited to certain functional areas, the district council is limited by the 
requirement to obtain the Attorney-General’s certification and by the prescripts with regard to 
procedures as set out in legislation. 
5.2.1 Attorney-General’s certification 
The Constitution provides that the exercise of the district legislative powers has to be in 
conformity with the Constitution.85 This means that the district council may only pass laws 
that do not violate any of the provisions of the Constitution. 
Section 38(1) of the LGA repeats the constitutional provisions relating to the district councils’ 
authority to make laws. The only addition made by the LGA is that in addition to conforming 
to the Constitution, the district council laws must conform to ‘any laws made by 
Parliament’.86 The LGA provides that an ordinance enacted by a district council must be 
certified by the AG. The role of the AG is to determine its compatibility with the Constitution 
or any other laws made by Parliament.87 For instance, the AG is mandated to determine if the 
district council’s proposed Bill derogates from or contravenes the existing law or 
Constitution. In such instances, the proposed Bill must be sent back to the district council 
within 90 days for modification or appropriate action.88 Regulation 21 of Part IV of the Third 
                                                 
84 Article 176(2)(b) of the Constitution. 
85 Article 180(1) of the Constitution. 
86 Section 38(1) of the LGA.  
87 Section 38(2) of the LGA. 
88 Section 38(3) of the LGA. 
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Schedule of the LGA implies that the AG may suggest an amendment to a district council 
Bill. In which case, the proposed amendment to the Bill by the AG must then be effected 
before it can be signed into a district council ordinance and/or gazetted.89 
The Constitution provides for the office of the Attorney-General as the principal legal advisor 
to the central government. He or she must be a person qualified to practice as an advocate of 
the High Court for ten years. The AG is a cabinet minister appointed by the President, with 
the approval of Parliament. Amongst his or her core functions are ‘to give legal advice and 
legal services to the Government on any subject’. The AG is possessed of the requisite 
competency to determine whether a district council Bill derogates from or contravenes the 
existing law or Constitution or not. His or her role is therefore technical in nature. 
Despite the fact that the role of the Attorney-General in the exercise of the district council 
legislative power may be considered technical in nature, it is argued that it amounts to an 
unjustified intrusion. The provision for the blanket intervention by the Attorney-General in all 
cases of the exercise of the district council’s legislative power under Regulation 21 of Part IV 
of the Third Schedule of the LGA is invalid in light of the provisions of article 180(1) of the 
Constitution that vests original legislative powers to the district council. In any case, it is not 
for the AG to determine whether a given district council ordinance is invalid or not. The only 
authority that is vested with the power to determine the validity or invalidity of any law, 
including a proposed district council ordinance, is the Constitutional Court.90 
                                                 
89 See Regulation 21 of Part IV of the Third Schedule of the LGA. 
90 Article 137(1) of the Constitution. 
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5.2.2 Procedural limitations 
The LGA circumscribes the manner in which district councils should adopt laws. Every 
member of a district council has the discretion to introduce a Bill for an ordinance.91 Hence, 
before its publication, a Bill for an ordinance must be introduced, debated and carried by way 
of motion.92 In essence, before a motion for a district council Bill can be carried, district 
councillors must deliberate on it. The Bill is then signed into law and promulgated into the 
gazette. 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 See Regulation 15 of Part IV of the Third Schedule of the LGA. 
92 See Regulation 20 of Part IV of the Third Schedule of the LGA. 
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Figure 6: District council's legislative processes 
 
Source: Adopted from article 180(1) of the Constitution, sections 30-42 of the LGA and Reg. 21 of Part IV to 
the Third Schedule to the LGA. 
5.3 The district council’s administrative powers 
5.3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Three, three personnel systems for decentralisation were discussed. These were the 
separate, the unified and the integrated personnel systems. It was argued that whereas a 
separate personal system is preferred, in practice, a hybrid of both systems is usually adopted 
Bill introduced by a councillor Bill limited to jurisidictional and residual authority 
Bill checked for derogations from 
the Constitution and Acts of 
Parliament. Certificate for 
compliance granted by the AG. 
The AG has the discretion to 
amend the Bill before sending the 
it to the district council 
Bill signed into by-law by the 
district chairperson 
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in order to mitigate the risks associated with a separate personnel system.93 At the inception 
of decentralisation in Uganda, the discretion to make managerial decisions was vested in the 
Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs).The CAOs were subjected to district council political 
scrutiny and accountability.94 However, in 2010, constitutional changes were adopted 
resulting in limited political control by the district council elected political leaders of the 
district staff. The constitutional changes have adopted a unified personnel system for all the 
senior managers in the district council.95 As previously argued, accountability as a broader 
term incorporates legal constraints that minimise a public administrators’ discretion and fiscal 
constraints that reflect fiduciary responsibility.96 As distinguished from political 
accountability, which places emphasis on regular, free and fair elections for political leaders, 
administrative accountability is based on the discretion of the local council to hire, fire and 
discipline its own staff.97 
The discussion below examines the extent of district council administrative autonomy against 
the backdrop of the theory discussed in Chapter Three which calls for local government’s 
discretion to hire and control its own staff.98  
5.3.2 The district council Chief Administrative Officer 
The Constitution provides for the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO),99 and vests a 
discretion in Parliament to determine, among other things, his or her functions.100 In order to 
                                                 
93 See Chapter Three § 3.7.3. 
94 Hubert & Andersen 1993: 10. 
95 See Articles 188(2) and 200(4) of the Constitution. 
96 Callahan 2007: 113. 
97 Report on the Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System 1987: 75. 
98 Chapter Three § 3.7.4.1. 
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qualify to be appointed as a CAO, a person must have a university degree101 and a diploma in 
public administration or development studies from a recognised institution.102 He or she must 
have ten years working experience103 and must be of a high moral calibre.104 
5.3.3 Functions of the CAO 
The functions and role of the CAO can be divided into five categories. These are: finance; 
staff administration; implementation of district council policies; advisory; and law and order. 
5.3.4 Finance 
The LGA provides that the CAO is the district council accounting officer.105 The description 
of the CAO as the chief accounting officer of the district council presupposes that he or she 
has the duty to answer all questions relating to financial management in the district. This view 
finds support in the district council financial and accounting regulatory framework as 
provided for under the Local Government (Financial and Accounting) Regulations 
(LGFAR).106 These Regulations are applicable to all financial transactions and business in 
                                                                                                                                                        
99 Article 188(1) of the Constitution. 
100 Article 188(3) of the Constitution. 
101 Section 63(2)(a) of the LGA. 
102 Section 63(2)(b) of the.LGA. 
103 Section 63(2)(c) of the.LGA. 
104 Section 63(2)(d) of the.LGA. 
105 See sections 90(1) and 64(1) of the LGA. The term ‘accounting officer’ is defined under Regulation 3(1) of 
the LGFAR to mean ‘the accounting officer under section 64 of the Act and in relations to an urban council 
means the accounting officer under section 65(2) of the Act’. 
106 See generally the Local Government (Revenue Regulations) (LGFAR) Statutory Instrument No. 243-16, the 
Local Governments (Financial and Accounting) Regulations (LGFAR) Statutory Instrument No 2007 No. 25 
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every district council.107 The CAO must ensure that there are proper systems in place for 
efficient revenue generation that minimises financial loss. Hence, the CAO has the duty to 
maintain a budget desk which bolsters proper and efficient systems in budgeting and 
budgetary controls, revenue collection, and accounting and financial control.108 
Accounting officers in public administration ‘have a special responsibility and leadership role 
in ensuring that the principles of compliance, prudence, and probity are observed in 
administration’.109  
5.3.5 Staff administration 
The LGA states that the CAO is the head of administration and public service in the district 
council.110 This position involves determining when to recruit staff by declaring a position 
vacant; ensuring that only competent staff are recruited; 111 and establishing a framework for 
evaluating staff performance.112 
The CAO is mandated to supervise, monitor and co-ordinate the activities of district councils’ 
employees and departments to ensure accountability in the management of service delivery.113 
The CAO is equally tasked with the role of developing capacity for development and 
                                                                                                                                                        
and The Local Governments Financial and Accounting Manual 2007 issued under sections 78(2) and 175 of the 
LGA. 
107 Regulation 2 of the LGFAR. 
108 Regulation 7(1)(b) of the LGFAR. 
109 Oliver 2009: 243. 
110 Section 64(1) of the LGA. 
111 Regulation 4(2) of the LGFAR. 
112 Regulation 7(1)(c) of the LGFAR. 
113 Section 64(2)(c) of the LGA. 
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management of planning functions in a district.114 This is done by supervising and co-
ordinating activities of all delegated services and the officers charged with the performance of 
the delegated services.115 
5.3.6 Implementation of lawful district council policies 
The CAO is also responsible for the implementation of all lawful decisions of the district 
council.116 The CAO’s role here helps to separate the district council’s policy-making process 
from the technocrats’ translation of policies into action. The separation of policy-makers from 
policy implementers improves efficiency and reduces the possibility of conflict of interest. 
The question then becomes: must a CAO implement unlawful policies of the district council? 
In the South African case of Manana v King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality, the court 
rejected the argument that only valid and lawful resolutions of the municipal council could be 
obeyed by its municipal manager. It held that once a municipal council has taken a decision it 
can only be challenged by its officials in courts of law. As an alternative, the court stated that 
an officer who disgrees with a municipal council’s decision may apply to the council to either 
have the decision rescinded or reconsidered.117 According to the court, ‘it would be conducive 
to disorderly public administration if officials were entitled to choose between executing or 
not executing a duly adopted resolution of the council depending upon their belief as to its 
validity – whether or not the belief is well-founded.’118 
                                                 
114 Section 64(2)(d) of the LGA. 
115 Section 64(2)(e) of the LGA. 
116 Section 64(2)(a) of the LGA. 
117 Manana v King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality [2011] 3 All SA (SCA) para. 21. 
118 Manana case para. 22. 
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This case was therefore decided on the need to uphold the rule of law, rather the validity of 
law. Applying the reasoning used in the Manana case to section 64(2)(a) of the LGA, it is 
argued that the CAO has the obligation to implement all district council policies without 
selection. He or she must implement all policies even if such policies ultimately discriminate 
against women, the elderly, people with disabilities or an ethnic minority group within a 
district. It is open to him or her to convince the district council to either rescind or alter its 
decision. It is also open to the CAO, as decided in Manana case, to challenge such a policy in 
a court of law. 
5.3.7 Advisory role of the CAO 
The CAO must give guidance to district councils and their departments on relevant laws and 
policies.119 In addition, the CAO has an advisory administrative role to the district council.120 
The words ‘guidance’ and ‘advisory’ are a common feature. The assumption is that the CAO 
is highly skilled in financial management and public administration and able to give credible 
guidance to the district council. His or her guidance may relate, for instance, to how best to 
raise district council revenue.121 The term ‘guidance’ denotes the supervision of an activity or 
duty for proper results.122 In legal terms, it means that a person or an officer merely seeks 
                                                 
119 Section 64(2)(b) of the LGA. 
120 Section 64(2)(h) of the LGA. 
121 Regulation 4(1) of the LGFAR. 
122 Simon 2008: 1561. 
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advice from another highly skilled person or authority, whose advice the former is not obliged 
to take.123 
The question may arise whether the CAO may become liable for giving poor or wrong advice. 
Under the law of tort, expert advice from especially skilled persons may give rise to a duty of 
care on the basis of which a civil action could result in case of harm. The test is: that a skilful 
person should give reasonable advice which persons with similar skills would ordinarily have 
given.124 This may mean that a CAO, as an especially skilled person in public administration 
or accounting, should only give advice that is reasonably acceptable by other people in the 
same profession. Should the CAO give advice that is fundamentally erroneous he or she may 
be sued for negligence. This view finds favour in Regulation 10 of the LGFAR that calls on 
all public officers to adopt prudent financial and accounting measures while handling district 
council finances.125 
5.3.8 Law and order 
The CAO assists in the maintenance of law and order and security in the district.126 The 
obligation to keep law and order suggests that the CAO should have instruments of coercion, 
such as district council police, courts, and prisons. However, the police force, prison services 
                                                 
123 See Roland Kakooza Mutale v Attorney General Application No 665/2003 arising out of HCCA No. 
40/2003. 
124 Simon 2008: 1561. 
125 See also section 174 of the LGA which renders local government political or administrative officers 
personally liable for financial losses incurred by local governments on account of malpractice or negligence. 
126 Section 64(2)(i) of the LGA. 
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and judiciary are centralised.127 In the absence of these three instruments of coercion, it may 
be difficult for the CAO to fulfil the above obligations. It is recommended that the CAO 
should be able to prosecute offenders, employ and direct security services to maintain order in 
the district.  
5.4 Background to the centralised appointment of CAOs  
Before 2005, district councils used to appoint all district staff through their respective District 
Service Commissions. The powers of the DSC have been limited by an amendment to the 
Constitution,128 to the effect that it no longer empowers the DSC to appoint the CAO. The 
CAO is now centrally appointed by the Public Service Commission.129 Before the amendment 
to the Constitution, the procedure to remove a CAO was similar to that for removing the 
chairperson of a district council.130 There is little evidence to suggest that a separate personnel 
                                                 
127 Tusasirwe 2007: 32. See also para. 2 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, which lists ‘Defence, security, 
maintenance of law and order’ as competencies of the central government. 
128 Article 188(2) of the Constitution provides: ‘Notwithstanding articles 176(2) and (3) and 200 of this 
Constitution, the Public Service Commission shall appoint persons to hold or act in the office of chief 
administrative officer and deputy chief administrative officer, including the confirmation of their appointments 
and the exercise of disciplinary control over such persons and their removal from office’. Article 172 of the 
Constitution generally provides for the prerogative of the President to appoint persons in public service, other 
than members of the DSC. Articles 176(2) and (3) of the Constitution provide for the principles of devolution of 
powers to lower orders of government with emphasis on grassroot democratic control of the decision-making 
process. 
129 Section 55(1A) of the LGA. 
130 See Gladys Aserua Orochi 8. Two common features in the procedure for the removal of the district 
chairperson were the tribunal procedure and the medical board procedure. The only difference between the 
removal of the district council chairperson and the removal of the CAO was the role of the DSC that was 
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system of district council staff in the past registered great success in Uganda’s 
decentralisation.131 It is conceded that the procedure to remove the CAO before the 
constitutional amendment presented numerous challenges. For instance the procedure was 
prone to political manipulation, exhibition of nepotism, enormous costs, and unprecedented 
delays. 
The question as to who appoints district council staff under the Constitution therefore raises 
the following questions: first, why is it not the district council that appoints its own staff 
directly; and secondly, why is it the PSC, and not the DSC that appoints all the senior district 
council employees? It is argued that the CAO and other district staff should ordinarily be 
directly appointed by the district council.132 Since the CAO is now directly appointed by the 
Public Service Commission (PSC), article 176(2)(f) of the Constitution has been rendered 
redundant. 
The rationale for the present unified personnel system for CAOs centres on two main 
grounds: the shortage of skilled human resources in many district councils and the need to 
uniformly promote efficiency in the service delivery sectors of all district councils. 
According to Steiner, there is a shortage of qualified and skilled human resources in the 
district council civil service, with high deficiency levels in areas such as accounting, planning, 
engineering, teaching and health.133 The latest Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions 
                                                                                                                                                        
mandated to effect the decision of either the tribunal or medical board. A further difference was that since the 
CAO was not a political officer, he or she could not be subject to recall by the electorate. 
131 Reddy (1999: 44) cited in Isingoma & Red 2006: 102. 
132 Section 67(1) of the LGA. 
133 See Steiner 2006: 14. Although Steiner’s study is contradicted by Ts’oele and Goldman, whose research 
findings reveal an abundance of qualified and skilled staff in many district councils. 
 
 
 
 
387 
 
Chapter 7: District Councils’ Powers and Functions 
and Performance Measures for Local Governments 2009 also paints a somewhat bleak 
picture for district councils. The report sought among other things to examine the ability of 
district council’s staff to utilise the central government transfers. The report relied on the 
district council’s staff capacity to comply with financial and accounting guidelines. Linking 
central government transfers to the quality of district council administrative performance, the 
report found evidence of a dysfunctional system administration.134 These findings also find 
support in the views expressed by Lubanga, who ascribes the failure of district councils to 
develop a suitable career development path for district council administration staff to poor 
human resource management.135 
Clearly, the above findings suggest a lack of skills. The central government may argue that 
the centralisation of the CAO sought to address deficiencies in skilled human resource in 
district councils by ensuring that highly skilled CAO can be transferred from one district 
council to another through the country. 
There were problems with the appointment of CAOs by the DSC. The problems related to the 
supervision of CAOs and the cumbersome procedure for their removal.136 In addition, a 
separate personnel system had no in-built mechanisms to ensure that district council staff 
moved from one administrative position to another. The effect was that the district staff was 
de-motivated, which led to under-performance.137 Furthermore, there were constant 
                                                 
134 See the Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments 
2009: Synthesis Report March 2010: 8. 
135 Lubanga 1998: 93. 
136 See Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review): Findings and Recommendations 2003: 9-
110. 
137 Kakumba 2008: 100. 
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allegations of nepotism in the recruitment process that resulted in the recruitment of 
inefficient and incompetent staff, two examples of which will be discussed below.138 The 
most notorious example is the case of Gladys Aserua Orochi v Kabale District Government, 
where Kabale district council paid an enormous amount in damages and litigation costs as a 
result of flouting the rules of procedure in dismissing a CAO.139 In this case, the purported 
allegation against the CAO by the Kabale district council was ironically that the CAO had 
followed the right procedures in awarding a tender for the supply of services, a fact that must 
have angered those members of the district council with vested interests in the tender 
process.140 It is worth noting that even when the Kabale district council was ordered by the 
tribunal headed by a high court judge to re-instate the CAO, the order was ignored.141 It is 
noted that M/s Aserua Orochi comes from the northern part of the country, far from the 
                                                 
138 Makara 2009: 140. 
139 See Gladys Aserua Orochi v Kabale District Government CHC Civil Suit No 0093 of 2003. See also the 
cases of Tommy Obongo Ojok v Apac District Local Government HCT-02-CV-CS-0015-2005 and Onywello 
Ceaser V Pader District Local Government HCT-02-CV-CS-009-2007, which had similar illegal conduct of 
members of the district council. In this case the court awarded a total of 127,440,952 (one hundred and twenty-
seven million) Ugandan shillings or approximately 72,823 dollars (seventy two thousand eight hundred and 
twenty three dollars) at the then exchange rate of 1: 1750. In addition, the entire sum carried a court interest rate 
p.a. from 12 August 1999, till payment in full, excluding sh. 10,000,000 (ten million shillings), which was 
awarded as general damages. This award excluded the costs. It is also noted that the CAO had been dismissed 
on 30 January 1999 and obtained judgment on 6 February 2009. In this case, the decision was based on section 
69 of the LGA that catered for the tribunal. This procedure was abolished long before the 2005 constitutional 
amendment in that the CAO would be removed from office upon a two-third resolution of the members of a 
district. 
140 Gladys Aserua Orochi 8. 
141 Gladys Aserua Orochi 2. 
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Kabale district, which is in the south-western part of the country. It is probable that the 
leaders of the Kabale district council looked at her as a ‘foreigner’, in spite of her experience 
and good managerial skills. 
In Tommy Obongo Ojok v Apac District Local Government, the CAO sued the Apac district 
council for wrongful termination of his contract of employment.142 The Apac district council 
had appointed the CAO even though the CAO was not eligible for the job, because of his 
previous bad record in another district where he had serviced in the same capacity. At the 
interview, the information regarding his retirement was brought to the attention of the 
interviewing panel. At the trial, the issue was whether Mr Ojok had been validly employed.143 
There was evidence that the central government, threatened to withhold financial support 
from the Apac district council if Mr Ojok’s appointment was not rescinded.144 
The High Court held that since the circumstances of his retirement (Mr Ojok had been retired 
in the public interest) had been brought to the attention of the interviewing panel, his 
subsequent appointment was valid. The termination of the contract was, therefore, 
unlawful.145 The High Court noted that the decision to dismiss the CAO based on a fear that 
central government funding would be withheld, was invalid. The High Court noted that under 
the provisions of section 58 of the LGA, ‘the Apac District Service Commission ought to 
have carried out its work independently without being subjected to the direction or control of 
any person or authority’.146 It is argued that the court was wrong insofar as it validated the 
                                                 
142 Tommy Obongo Ojok 1. 
143 Tommy Obongo Ojok 6. 
144 Tommy Obongo Ojok 6. 
145 Tommy Obongo Ojok 7. 
146 Tommy Obongo Ojok 6 
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appointment of a CAO whose personal integrity, competency and experience is legally 
questionable. 
The point here is that, given that people with a proven history of misconduct could be 
appointed even when the evidence of misconduct had been brought to the attention of the 
district appointing authority, the introduction of a unified personnel system may be justified. 
It is argued that the previous separate personnel system of the CAO was prone to elite 
capture.147 The CAO’s job approval or job security was dependent upon his or her willingness 
to succumb to local politicians’ corrupt behaviour. 
This case points to the inadequacies of the DSC in appointing qualified staff qualified staff 
and the central government’s manipulation of the appointment process of senior district 
managers. 
5.4.1 Current law on disciplining the CAO 
In Chapter Three it was argued that local government administrative autonomy includes not 
only the power to appoint local government employees, but also the power to exercise 
discretion in determining the terms and conditions of local government staff.148 Arguably, 
such a power includes the discretion to confirm appointments, to exercise disciplinary control, 
and to remove them from office.149 In terms of article 188(1) of the Constitution, the CAO is 
                                                 
147 Chapter Two 2.3.2.3. See also Makara 2009: 143. 
148 Chapter Three § 3.7.4.1. 
149 Stanton 2009: 47. 
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now subject to disciplinary control by the PSC under article 166(1)(b) of the Constitution.150 
This is despite the provision of articles 176(2) and (3) and 200 of the Constitution which 
envisage the exercise of discretion over all persons employed in the district by the district 
council, through the DSC as the appointing authority. In the section below, the legal 
framework of the Public Service Commission (PSC) is discussed. 
5.4.2 Public Service Commission and its role 
The PSC is an independent constitutional body151 composed of a chairperson, a deputy 
chairperson and seven other members appointed by the President with the approval of 
Parliament.152 Members of the PSC serve for a term of four years but are eligible for 
reappointment.153 The function of the PSC is to advise the President before appointing any 
public officers; to appoint, promote and exercise disciplinary control over persons holding 
public offices; and to review the terms and conditions of service, standing orders, training and 
qualifications of public officers. The PSC is mandated to deal with all matters connected with 
personnel management and development of the public service and to guide and coordinate 
district service commissions (DSCs), including hearing and determining grievances from 
persons appointed by DSCs.154 Parliament is obliged to ensure that the PSC makes regulations 
                                                 
150 Article 166(1) (b) of the Constitution provides: ‘Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the 
functions of the Public Service Commission include: to appoint, promote and exercise disciplinary control over 
persons holding office in the public service of Uganda as provided in article 172 of this Constitution’ 
151 Article 165(2) of the Constitution. 
152 Article 165(2) of the Constitution. 
153 Article 1657(7) of the Constitution. 
154 Article 166(1) (c) of the Constitution. 
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in order to execute its mandate.155 The Uganda Public Service Standing Orders, F – r 13 
provides that ‘It is the Appointing Authority who has the power to remove a public officer 
from office.’156 What this ultimately means is that a CAO can only be removed from office by 
the President on the recommendation of the PSC.157  
5.4.3 Assessment 
The fact that the CAO are now centrally appointed and controlled infringes on the 
constitutional autonomy of the district councils. It is argued that role of the PSC in the 
appointment of the CAO points to the resurgence of the recentralisation phenomenon, and is 
thus a threat to the constitutional value of decentralisation.158 In the past, the power of the 
DSC to remove administrative staff, including the CAO, on the recommendation of a district 
council, was testimony to the real powers the district councils wielded. The appointment of 
the CAOs by the PSC and not by a DSC presents additional challenges to district councils’ 
administrative autonomy. 
As a result of the amendment to the Constitution, the district councils no longer have control 
over the heads of administration in a district. The CAOs now pay allegiance to the central 
government, as had been the case prior to the 1995 Constitution. In fact, the CAOs are 
practically employees of the central government (and not of the district councils). The CAOs 
may choose to ignore the district councils’ development priorities. 
                                                 
155 Article 168(4) of the Constitution. 
156 Cited as the Uganda Public Service Standing Orders 2010. 
157 Article 167(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
158 See ‘Mukwaya, Lukooya clash over removal of CAO’ New Vision available at 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/19/713884 (accessed on 23 March 2010). 
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The unified personnel system in which CAOs are no longer subject to the disciplinary control 
of the DSC and the district councils is a disguised form of recentralisation159 The 
constitutional value of decentralisation lies in the district councils’ ability to determine their 
own development needs through a democratic process. It is argued that the unified personnel 
system for CAOs contradicts the principles on which decentralisation is based under article 
176 of the Constitution. In the words of one of the CA delegates: ‘[i]f you give people 
political power and you do not give them administrative capacity to put their decisions into 
effect, you are in a way giving them byoya bya nswa’.160  
While commenting on the proposed amendment that resulted in the promulgation of article 
188(2) of the Constitution, the Commission on Constitutional Review had in fact reasoned 
that there was no need to have centrally appointed CAOs because adequate provision for 
checks on the appointment of the CAOs already existed. 161 In the section below, the legal 
framework of the DSC, a body that the Commission on Constitutional Review had referred to 
is examined. 
6. Appointment and dismissal of other district council staff 
Article 176(2)(f) of the Constitution states that persons employed by district councils must be 
employees of the district council.162 This means that any person employed in the district 
                                                 
159 Tusasiwe 2007: 37. 
160 See Proceeding of the Constituent Assembly Official Report 1994: 3825 para. 2 per Hon Amanya Mushega. 
The expression byoya bya nswa in Uganda’s political talk literally means ‘empty power’. 
161 See the Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review): Findings and Recommendations 2003: 
9-113 para. 9.6.5. 
162 As one of the principles applied to district council system Article 176(2)(f), ‘persons in the service of local 
government shall be employed by the local governments’. 
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council must be appointed by the district council itself. The Constitution calls on every 
district council to establish a DSC as the appointing authority.163 The power of the district 
councils to control staff promotes efficiency and accountability by ensuring that local 
communities through their elected representatives can exert pressure on local managers, hence 
improved service delivery. Other than waiting for central government action in cases of non-
performance and indiscipline, the DSC can take disciplinary measures such reprimand, issue a 
warning to or even a dismiss a district council staff member. The problem is that although all 
the district council staff are subject to the direction of council, they are responsible to the 
CAO.164 In the discussion below, the composition and role of the DSC is examined. 
6.1 The District Service Commission (DSC) 
The Constitution provides for the DSC in every district,165 whose membership is composed of 
‘a chairperson and such other members as the district council shall determine, at least one of 
whom shall represent urban authorities and all of whom shall be appointed by the district 
council’.166 Members of the DSC are appointed by the district council on the recommendation 
of the district council’s executive committee, and approved by the Public Service 
Commission (PSC).167 The Constitution provides that members of the DSC should be of high 
moral character and proven integrity.168 The Constitution further provides the term of office 
of members of a DSC to be a period of four years, although the members of a DSC are 
                                                 
163 Article 198(1) of the Constitution; section 54(1) of the LGA. 
164 Section 67(3) of the LGA. 
165 Article 198(2) of the Constitution. 
166 Article 198(2) of the Constitution. 
167 See article 198(2) of the Constitution; section 54(2) of the LGA. 
168 Article 198(3) of the Constitution. 
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eligible for re-appointment for one more term.169 It is noted that under article 166(1)(c) of the 
Constitution, all the appointment decisions of the DSC can be appealed against to the PSC. 
The LGA in part repeats the provisions of the Constitution regarding the composition of the 
DSC. The LGA also states that the number of members of the DSC must not exceed four, 
excluding the chairperson.170 The LGA further provides that one-third of the members of the 
DSC should be women, and that at least one member of the DSC must be a person with a 
disability. 171 
The LGA provides additional criteria for membership of the DSC, such as ordinary residence 
in the district, an advanced qualification or its equivalent, and extensive work experience.172 
The Constitution provides for the removal of a member of the DSC by the district council’s 
executive committee in consultation with the PSC and with the approval of the district 
council.173 The Constitution lists three grounds upon which a member of the DSC can be 
removed from office: inability to perform their functions, arising from physical or mental 
incapacity; misbehaviour or misconduct; and incompetence.174 
                                                 
169 Article 198(4) of the Constitution. 
170 Section 54(2A)(a) of the LGA. 
171 Section 54(2A)(b) of the LGA. 
172 Section 56(1) of the LGA. 
173 Article 198(6) of the Constitution. 
174 Article 198(6) of the Constitution; section 54(4) of the LGA. 
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While the Constitution does not mention the independence of the DSC, section 58 of the LGA 
vouches for its independence175 subject to the provisions of article 166(2) of the 
Constitution.176 The exclusion of MPs, district councillors or a member of an executive body 
of a political party or organisation from eligibility for appointment to the DSC, manifests its 
independence.177 
6.2 The role of the PSC vis-à-vis the DSC 
In Chapter Three it was argued that local government administrative autonomy ensures that 
local council staff as technical bureaucrats are able to make decisions free from central 
government influence.178 The role of the DSC is discussed below in the context of its ability 
to appoint and discipline district council staff, free from the central government control. First, 
members of the DSC are appointed by the district council with the ‘approval’ of the PSC.179 
The key words under article 198(2) of the Constitution are ‘with the approval of’. The word 
‘approve’ as used in article 198(2) of the Constitution means to ‘officially accept as 
                                                 
175 Section 58(1) of the LGA provides: ‘Subject to article 166(1)’ (d) of the Constitution, the district service 
commission shall be independent and shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority’. 
Article 166(1)(d) of the Constitution provides for the guidance and monitoring role of the PSC over the DSC. 
176 Article 166(1)(d) of the Constitution provides that ‘[i]n the exercise of its functions, the Public Service 
Commission shall be independent and shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority; 
except that it shall take into account government policy relating to the public service’. 
177 Section 56(2) of the LGA. 
178 Chapter Three § 3.7.3. 
179 Article 198 (2) of the Constitution provides that ‘[t]he district service commission shall consist of a 
chairperson and such other members as the district council shall determine, at least one of whom shall represent 
urban authorities and all of whom shall be appointed by the district council on the recommendation of the 
district executive committee with the approval of the Public Service Commission.’ 
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satisfactory’.180 However the word ‘approval’ should be contextualised. The word ‘approval’ 
is intended to ensure that there must be conformity with official standards established by the 
PSC in the appointment of civil servants, without the PSC necessarily controlling the actual 
appointment process, an interpretation that accords with subsidiarity.181 The second issue 
relates to the obligation on the district council’s executive committee to consult the PSC 
before removing any of the members of the DSC under article 198(2) of the Constitution. The 
key phrase as used under article 198(6) of the Constitution is ‘after consulting with’ the PSC. 
This phrase implies that unless the opinion of the PSC is sought, the removal of any of the 
members of the DSC from office by the district local council would be invalid. 
The initial interpretation of article 198(6) of the Constitution may suggest that the requirement 
to consult the PSC by the executive committee of the district council is mandatory. In 
practice, the PSC seems to consider the word ‘approval’ as if it has the power to control the 
appointment process, a position that is clearly erroneous.182 However, on a closer scrutiny of 
article 198(6) of the Constitution, the use of the word ‘may’ reveals a discretionary power as 
the district council’s executive committee is merely to consult with the PSC.183 It is argued 
that all that is required of the DSC is to seek advice from the PSC, which advice can be taken 
                                                 
180 Kavanagh 2002: 52. 
181 Article 198(5) of the Constitution. 
182 See the Public Service Commission Annual Report 2010-2011: 10. It is argued that the numerous appeals 
from the DSC decisions that the PSC handles concerning ‘irregularities in appointment process and procedures’, 
shows a paternalistic and domineering pattern towards to the DSC.  
183 Kavanagh (2002: 247) define the word ‘consult’ to mean to seek information or advice from (someone, 
especially an expert or professional). This implies that the obligation of a district local government council’s 
executive committee to consult the PSC should only arise when in the view of the district local government 
council’s executive committee, the DSC does not have the ability to guide itself.  
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or rejected. The other argument is that it would be foolhardy to simply ignore the advice of 
the PSC which in fact sets the standards of public employment. It can be argued that the 
intrusive role of the PSC allows for the phenomenon of ‘recentralisation’ to creep into every 
aspect of district council administration, given the narrow constitutional and legislative 
mandate of DSCs.184 
However, the power that vests in the PSC to approve the terms and conditions of the DSC and 
the obligation on the district council to consult that PSC before a member of the DSC can be 
removed from office may generally guard against what is generally referred to as ‘elite 
capture’ of local staff. The need to consult the PSC before the district council’s executive 
committee may remove a member of the DSC from office reduces the possible victimisation 
of members of the DSC by the local politicians.185 
Earlier in this chapter, the appeal function of the PSC against the appointment decisions of the 
DCS was highlighted.186 In the discussion below, the appeals rate against the decisions of the 
DSCs is examined. It is argued that the number of the appointment decisions that are either 
upheld or overturned by the PSC is indicative of the fact that the DSCs are conducting 
themselves reasonably and responsibly. It attenuates the argument that DSCs need to be 
protected from elite capture. If the large number of overturned appointment decisions is 
scrutinised, it reveals incompetence and abuse in a very small number of district councils. 
 
                                                 
184 Makara 2009: 142. 
185 Makara 2009: 141. 
186 See § 7.5.4.2. 
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Figure 7: Performance of DSCs in 26 district councils in Uganda 
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Figure 8: Appeals from Bududa and Manafwa Districts 
 
Adopted from the Public Service Commission Annual Report 2010-2011: 10-11. 
 
The above two tables show that from 1 July 2010 – 30 June 2011 the PSC received a total of 
141 appeal cases from 26 DSCs. This number includes three cases from former Kampala City 
Council and 1 from Kamwenje Town Council. Of these cases, 53 appeals succeeded while 83 
appeals were rejected. Five cases were under review. In fact, one DSC of Manafwa district 
council had 81 of its decisions appealed against at the PSC. Of the 81 from Manafwa district 
council’s DSC, 21 cases succeeded while 60 cases were rejected, with only one pending 
review.1 Bududa district council’s DSC presents another interesting case: it had 19 of its 
decisions appealed against to the PSC. Of these, 12 succeeded, while only seven failed. It is 
noted that Manafwa and Bududa districts are new districts, whose capacity-building may be 
very limited.2 In my view, the above figures do not show evidence of incompetency and abuse 
                                                 
1 See the Public Service Commission Annual Report 2010-2011: 10-11. 
2 See the detailed discussion on the creation of new districts in Uganda in Chapter Five §32.4. Manafwa and 
Bududa districts were created in 1999 and 2006 respectively. 
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of the recruitment process by the DSCs. On the contrary, Figure 7 demonstrates the ability of 
the DSC to appoint district staff independently, given the low appeal rate against DSC 
decisions. Instead Figure 8 illustrates the intrusive nature of the PSC in the decisions of the 
DSC. The apparent success-rate of appeals against DSC decisions is noted in newly created 
districts that may not have acquired the requisite capacity. It is argued that the large number 
of overturned appointment decisions in very small number of district councils point towards 
the need for specific interventions in those localities, rather than a blanket instrument of 
intrusion across all districts. 
6.3 Assessment 
As already mentioned, the central government appointment of the CAO, on the one hand, and 
its subtle control of the DSC through the intrusive role of the PSC, on the other, undermines 
decentralisation. This subtle control is revealed in five ways: 
• First the PSC guides and coordinates all the activities of the DSCs;  
• Secondly, appeals from appointment decisions of the DSCs are heard and determined 
by the PSC;  
• Thirdly, the PSC is vested with the disciplinary control of all members of the DSCs as 
any public officers; 
• Fourthly, the PSC must approve all the appointments of members to the DSC; and 
• Lastly, the district council executive committees must consult the PSC before 
removing from office any of the members of the DSC.  
It is argued that the district council’s discretion to appoint and discipline staff under article 
176(2)(f) of the Constitution flows from the district council executive power under article 
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180(1). Articles 188(2) and 198(2) which centralised the appointment and discipline of the 
CAO therefore contradict the intended purpose of decentralisation. To the extent that these 
two constitutional provisions have the effect of undermining the district council’s discretion 
to appoint, discipline and dismiss its senior managers, they create an ambiguity that can only 
be remedied by a constitutional amendment. 
7. Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter has highlighted the importance attached to the sharing of 
powers between the central government and local government. After highlighting the limited 
mandate that vested in the district administrations in the past, the chapter points out that the 
1995 Constitution vaguely defines district powers and functions. The vagueness with which 
the Constitution defines district councils’ power and functions ultimately causes an overlap. It 
is argued that the overlap may easily confuse the local electorate in that they may not easily 
know which order of government is responsible for poor service delivery. The chapter 
therefore purposely interprets the powers and functions of district councils. The chapter finds: 
• First, that there is an urgent need to clearly define the district councils’ competencies 
in order to avoid the possibility of overlap of their functions with the central 
government’s roles. 
• Secondly that the centralisation of senior district senior managers that ultimately limits 
the district councils’ discretion to fire and hire them is unjustified and should be 
reconsidered.  
• Thirdly, that the central government subtle control of the DSC through the intrusive 
role of the PSC limits the developmental role of district councils. 
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• Lastly, that the limited legislative space accorded to the district councils undermines 
their developmental and democratic role and argues that their legislative role should 
be complimentary of, and not subservient to, the central government.  
In the next chapter, the district councils’ fiscal powers are examined against the backdrop of 
their narrow functional, legislative and administrative powers. 
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8. CHAPTER EIGHT 
DISTRICT COUNCIL FINANCES 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter Three it was argued that local governments should have the discretion to determine 
and manage their ‘own revenue’ in order to match their functional mandates with finances. 
The phrase ‘own revenue’ was defined with reference to the discretionary power to raise 
revenue through different sources and the discretion to spend it.3 What follows is an 
assessment of Uganda’s district councils’ revenue raising autonomy. 
1.1 Constitutional legal framework  
Article 176(2)(d) of the Constitution provides that ‘there shall be established for each local 
government unit a sound financial base with reliable sources of revenue’. The Constitution 
therefore suggests that the existence of strong district councils is dependent on a ‘sound 
financial base with reliable sources of revenue’.4 The Constitution seems to suggest that 
district councils should have a strong financial base in order to fulfil their roles.5 Under the 
Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, taxation is a central government competency. In fact, the 
                                                 
3 See Chapter Three § 3.7.1. 
4 Article 176(2)(d) of the Constitution. 
5 Article 152(2) of the Constitution provides: ‘Where a law enacted under clause (1) of this article confers 
powers on any person or authority to waive or vary a tax imposed by that law, that person or authority shall 
report to Parliament periodically on the exercise of those powers, as shall be determined by law.’ 
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Constitution prohibits the imposition of any tax unless authorised by an Act of Parliament.6 
The question then is: do district councils have original power to raise revenue? In very clear 
terms, article 192 provides: ‘Parliament shall by law provide (a) for the taxes that may be 
collected by a local government for or on behalf of the Government for payment into the 
Consolidated Fund;’ and that ‘(b) for a local government to retain for the purposes of its 
functions and services, a specified proportion of the revenues collected for or on behalf of the 
Government from the district.’ 
Article 192 seems to suggest that Parliament is merely under an obligation to allow district 
councils to collect taxes on behalf of the central government and to retain a portion thereof. At 
this point it may appear that no original taxing powers vest in district councils. However, 
article 191(1) of the Constitution grants original taxing authority to the district councils. It 
provides: ‘Local governments shall have power to levy, charge, collect and appropriate fees 
and taxes in accordance with any law enacted by Parliament by virtue of article 152 of this 
Constitution.' 
The words ‘by virtue of article 152 of this Constitution’ used in article 191(1) of the 
Constitution, suggests that even if taxation is a competency of the central government, 
Parliament is implored to delegate the authority to impose a tax. The Constitution lists 
specific taxes which district councils may levy and spend, with a discretion by Parliament to 
expand the list.7  The district councils have the authority as per the Constitution to exercise 
                                                 
6 Article 152(1) of the Constitution provides that ‘No tax shall be imposed except under the authority of an Act 
of Parliament.’ 
7 Article 191(2) of the Constitution provides, ‘The fees and taxes to be levied, charged, collected and 
appropriated under clause (1) of this article shall consist of rents, rates, royalties, stamp duties, cess, fees on 
registration and licensing and any other fees and taxes that Parliament may prescribe.’ 
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their original taxing authority, but they must exercise it in accordance with the statute.  8 It is 
argued that district councils have original constitutional taxing powers under article 191(1) of 
the Constitution. The district council taxing power is neither diminished by article 151(1) of 
the Constitution, nor limited by article 152(2) of the Constitution. The two articles are merely 
ancillary to the need for a strong financial base that is established under article 176(2)(d) of 
the Constitution. The Constitution instructs Parliament to strengthen the district council taxing 
power, and not to weaken it. 
1.2 Statutory framework 
The LGA operationalises articles 191(1) and (2) of the Constitution. It vests the district 
council with the discretion to exercise its taxing authority as provided under the Constitution. 
It provides: ‘Local governments may levy, charge and collect fees and taxes, including rates, 
rents, royalties, stamp duties and registration and licensing fees and fees and taxes that are 
specified in the Fifth Schedule to this Act’.9 
The Fifth Schedule of the LGA includes categories of taxes for district councils. These taxes 
are in addition to what is specified under article 191(2) of the Constitution and section 80(1) 
of the LGA. In fact, the Schedule is open-ended in that any other taxes not included in the 
Schedule may be included by Parliament.10 Thus, in addition to what is added to the already 
constitutionally specified taxes and those under the Fifth Schedule of the LGA, Parliament 
enacted other district council taxes. 
                                                 
8 Article 191(1) of the Constitution. 
9 Section 80(1) of the LGA. 
10 Section 2 of the LGAA. 
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2. Four types of district council taxes 
Several types of local government taxes under the LGA are discussed below, namely property 
rates;11 hotel and service taxes12 and the now suspended graduated tax. These four types are 
discussed because they account for vast majority of district council revenue. Further, the 
discussion explains how the central government is not responding adequately to the 
Constitution’s instruction to ensure that the fiscal autonomy of the district council is 
protected. 
2.1 Property taxation 
2.1.1 Introduction 
Local government property taxes are a common source of local government revenue.13 
According to Bird and Slack, 
the extent to which local governments have control over property taxes is often an important 
determinant of the extent to which they are able to make autonomous expenditure decisions. 
The level, design and control of property taxation are thus critical elements in effective 
decentralization policy in many countries.14 
A key debate on property taxes in many countries is the extent to which central governments 
should interfere with the determination of property tax rates by local governments.15 In 
                                                 
11 See the Local Government Rating Act (LGRA) of 2005. 
12 Section 1 of the LGAA. These two taxes were introduced by the Local Governments (Amendment) Act No 
2/2008 (LGAA). 
13 Article 191(3) of the Constitution. 
14 Bird & Slack 2003: 1. 
15 Bird & Slack 2003: 33. 
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Chapter Two, the common narrative that central governments distribute wealth better than 
local governments was challenged.16 In Chapter Three, it was shown that the success of 
decentralisation depends on local governments’ discretion to raise and spend revenue.17 It is 
against this background that the district council property tax in Uganda is assessed. 
The Constitution does not provide specifically for property rates as a form of district council 
tax. It only provides for ‘...rents, rates, royalties as part of the taxes to be levied by the district 
government.18 Arguably, rents, rates and royalties may be linked to the interest in the property 
but are not necessarily a form of a tax. The description of rents, rates and royalties as district 
council taxes is therefore problematic. This is because rents, rates and royalties relates to user 
rights from land which are quite distinct from property, service and hotel taxes. The above 
distinction ultimately limits the potential tax yield from property service and hotel taxes.  In 
addition, as already mentioned, the district council’s authority to levy taxes is regulated by an 
Act of Parliament.19 
2.1.2 Rateable property 
The LGRA provides for district council property rates.20 The LGRA defines the term 
‘property’ as ‘immovable property and includes a building (industrial or non-industrial) or 
                                                 
16 See Chapter Two § 2.3.1.3. 
17 See Chapter Three §3.7.1. 
18 Article 191(2) of the Constitution.  
19 Articles 152 and 191(1) of the Constitution. 
20 The long title to the LGRA states the object of the law: ‘An Act to provide for the levy [sic] of rates on 
property by local governments within their areas of jurisdiction; to provide for the valuation of property for the 
purpose of rating; to provide for the collection of the rates; to repeal the Local Government Rating Act and to 
provide related matters’. 
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structure of any kind, but does not include a vacant site’. The term ‘rate’ is defined as ‘a rate 
on property levied by a local government’. 21 
The LGRA identifies three kinds of property that are subject to a local government tax rate: 
‘commercial building’, ‘industrial building’ and ‘non-industrial building’. A commercial 
building under the LGRA is defined with reference to a business purpose, while an industrial 
building is defined with reference to an industrial purpose, for example, factory mills ‘and 
other premises of similar character’. On the other hand, a non-industrial building is defined 
with reference to its non-industrial use.22 As long as the building is no longer used for 
industrial purposes then it cannot be subject to property tax. 
Only properties in urban areas are subject to the property rate unless such a property, even if 
located in a rural area, is for commercial use.23 This means that a commercial building which 
is located outside an urban area is subject to property taxation. However, a residential 
building that is located outside an urban area is not subject to property tax.24 It is argued that 
the above provision limits the ability of rural district councils to generate revenue from 
property tax. It narrows the scope for property taxation in rural areas. 
The LGRA provides for exempted properties specified in the Second Schedule.25 These are: 
any of the official residences of the President;26 any official residence of a traditional or 
                                                 
21 Section 1 of the LGRA.  
22 Section 1 of the LGRA.  
23 Sections 3(3) & (4) of the LGRA. 
24 Section 3(5) of the LGRA. 
25 Section 5 of the LGRA.  
26 Paragraph 1 of Part I the Second Schedule of the LGRA. 
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cultural leader as defined by article 246 of the Constitution;27 an exclusive place of public 
worship; and a residence of a religious leader.28 The LGRA also exempt any property 
exclusively used as a cemetery or for cremation.29 In addition, property used exclusively for 
charitable or education institutions (of a public character and supported by endowments or 
voluntary contributions) is exempted.30 A detailed critique on these exemptions is offered 
later in this chapter.31 
A property owner is personally liable for the payment of a property rate. Given the diverse 
forms of land ownership in Uganda, most of which is unregistered, and given the fact that 
most of the land interests are not easy to register, it is difficult to ascertain who the real owner 
is.32 In cases where the name of the property owner is not known to a district council, the 
obligation to pay falls on the person in occupation.33 
2.1.3 Determination of rates 
It is mandatory for every district council to levy property rates at a rate determined by it on 
the rateable value of any property within its area of jurisdiction.34 As explained above, the 
words ‘any property within its area of jurisdiction’ exclude residential buildings in rural 
                                                 
27 Paragraph 2 of Part I the Second Schedule of the LGRA. 
28 Paragraph 3 of Part I the Second Schedule of the LGRA.  
29 See paragraph 4 of Part I the Second Schedule of the LGRA. 
30 See paragraph 5 of Part I the Second Schedule of the LGRA. 
31 See Chapter Eight § 8.2.3.2. 
32 See section 3 of the Land Act 16 of 1998, which provides for customary land, freehold, mailo land and 
leasehold as forms of interest in land. 
33 Sections 7(1) & (2) of the LGRA.  
34 Section 3(1) of the LGRA.  
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areas.35 The expression ‘rateable value’ means the ‘net annual rental value of a property 
ascertained in accordance with the Act’.36 However, the central government determines a 
threshold value (two thousand shillings, approximately US80 cents) below which no property 
taxation may apply. It also determines a ceiling: property taxation may not exceed 12 per cent 
of the rateable value of the property. It is argued that these thresholds are very rigid and 
therefore not legally unjustifiable, but certainly inappropriate for a decentralised system. A 
district council may levy a property rate below the minimum of two thousand shillings 
(approximately US 80 cents) or beyond 12 per cent of the rateable value of the property.37 
A district council may reduce the payment of rates on any given property; say for specific 
groups of property owners such as the elderly. However, reduction of the payment of the rate 
of any property has to be determined by the Minister of Local Government.38 The question 
then becomes: if the Minister determines when to reduce the property rate, can it be argued 
that district councils have autonomy over property rates? It is argued that because the law has 
determined who is to determine the rate, the question of who reduces or remits that property 
tax should fall within the ambit of the district council.39 It is argued here that the power to 
reduce or remit property taxes would enhance the district council’s ability to effect 
                                                 
35 Section 3(5) of the LGRA. 
36 Section 1 of the LGRA. 
37 Section 3(1) of the LGRA 
38 Section 6 of the LGRA.  
39 For instance, in a South African case, CDA Boerdery (Edms) Bpk en Andere v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality (526/05) [2007] SCA 1, [2007] SCA 1 (RSA) (6 February 2007), the Supreme Court held that 
given the new status of local government, it was no longer necessary to seek the consent of the provincial 
premier to increase the property rates. 
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redistribution within the district area. It is argued that the Ministers powers are arbitrary and 
therefore unconstitutional. 
2.2 Hotel taxation 
The discussion below examines the contribution of hotel tax to the district council revenue. A 
district government hotel tax is a tax levied on all hotels and lodging room occupants, and is 
collected and paid by hotel owners.40 The obligation of the hotel is to collect the tax from the 
occupant and remit it to the district council on a monthly basis.41Different hotel categories 
attract different sets of hotel rates.42 
Income from hotel tax has to be spent in specific areas. These areas are described in general 
terms as ‘basic local services’, such as sanitation, education, health, and construction and 
maintenance of roads in the area of jurisdiction.43 In Chapter Two it was argued that local 
governments should be empowered to manage local resources given that they can better 
match goods to local preferences than the central government.44 The strictures placed by 
section 80(1a)(c1) of the LGA on expenditure decisions making by the district councils limits 
the district council’s budgeting freedom and therefore limits the district council’s discretion to 
prioritise its expenditure decisions. 
                                                 
40 Section 80(1a)(a) of the LGA as amended by the LGAA. 
41 Section 80(1a)(b1) of the LGA as amended by the LGAA. See also the Fifth Schedule Part II Regulation 7 of 
the LGA as amended by the LGAA. See the Fifth Schedule Part II Regulation 8 of the LGA as amended by the 
LGAA. Any district government hotel tax that is collected and unremitted to the district council at the end of the 
financial year attracts a surcharge of 40%. 
42 See Part II of the Fifth Schedule of the LGA as amended by the LGAA. 
43 Section 80(1a)(c1) of the LGA as amended by the LGAA. 
44 See Chapter Two § 2.3.1.1. 
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2.3 Service taxation 
2.3.1 Overview 
In 2008, Parliament introduced a new form of income tax known as district government 
service tax. The LGA in its amended form introduces taxation of the following categories of 
persons: (a) all persons in gainful employment; (b) professionals; (c) business persons; (d) 
commercial farmers producing on a large scale.45  
The LGAA provides a long list of persons considered to be practising professional 
businessmen and women. The list even includes petty traders and self-employed persons.46 
Further, the LGAA exempts from service tax persons serving in the armed forces, diplomatic 
missions accredited to Uganda,47 unemployed persons, peasants, persons engaged in 
subsistence or occasional economic activity, petty food vendors, boda boda cyclists,48 petty 
artisans, the jua kalis, and people living in abject poverty.49 
                                                 
45 Section 80(1a)(b) of the LGA as amended by the LGAA. See also Part III of the Fifth Schedule Regulation 
9(11) of the LGAA. If a person is taxed under any one of the categories, he or she cannot be taxed under any 
other. 
46 Sections 80(2b)(1)(b), (c) and (d) of the LGA as amended by the LGAA. 
47 See the Fifth Schedule Part II Regulation 1(2) of the LGA as amended by the LGAA. 
48 The term boda boda refers to the motorcycle ‘taxis’ that are used in many towns in Uganda as a means of 
transport. It derives its name from cross-border illicit trade between Kenya and Uganda where the smugglers use 
workers known as ‘Border Porters’ as their secret conduits. The Luhyas, one of Kenya’s ethnic groups, 
mispronounced the word ‘porter’ as boda instead. 
49 See the Fifth Schedule Part II Regulation 1(3) of the LGA as amended by the LGAA. The term ‘jua kari’, 
although not defined by the Act generally, refers to people who do odd jobs such as loading farm produce and 
other merchandise onto lorries. 
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The above list is a clear example of over-regulation of district council revenue sources by the 
central government. As already argued, local governments should be vested with the 
discretion to raise and spend their revenue.50 It is argued here that the district council should 
have had the discretion to determine which categories of people are exempted.  
2.3.2 Critique 
In Chapter Three it was argued that local governments should be vested with the discretion to 
determine their sources of revenue and how to spend it in order to be able to fund their 
mandates.51 It is argued that the above mentioned constitutional and legal framework does not 
strike an adequate balance between the need for fiscal autonomy and moderate supervision of 
taxation. The LGRA vests district councils with the discretion to determine tax rates. 
However, the central government determines the parameters within which taxation may 
occur.52 The above provision, commonly referred to as ‘capping’,53 may in fact limit the 
ultimate tax yield achieved from the district council tax. Bird & Slack, however, argue that 
the capping of property rates ensures that local authorities do not impose unduly high property 
rates that might result in economic distortions. According to the authors, unfair tax 
competition as a result of low property rates may unfairly influence business decision-making 
in a given area, and thus negatively affect the level of investment in others.54 Thus, ‘[o]ne 
way to minimize such undesirable tax competition is for the central government to set 
                                                 
50 See Chapter Two § 2.3.1.1 and Chapter Three § 3.7.1 
51 See Chapter Three §3.7.1. 
52 See Chapter Two § 2.3.1. 
53 Bird & Slack 2003: 33. 
54 Bird & Slack 2003: 36. 
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minimum tax limits’.55 Local governments may only exercise their discretion to reduce or 
increase their tax rates within a clearly defined threshold. 
Arguably, the determination of the rateable properties by the central government narrows the 
district council tax base, hence reducing the tax yield from property tax. The common 
assumption is that district councils know best which properties and services should be taxed 
and which should be exempted. For example, a specific district councils’ policy may relate to 
the promotion of local tourism. In such cases, they should be able to decide whether hotels or 
casinos should enjoy tax exemption.56 
However, it is equally arguable that vesting district councils with the discretion to determine 
which properties and services to subject to tax and which ones to exempt, might lead to 
income inequities amongst local governments.57 
Further, the central government policy may seek to promote national development goals 
through universal education or charity. In such cases it should be able to exempt education-
related properties or charitable organisations. Whereas the central government may justifiably 
determine and/or exempt categories of properties to be taxed, it must be done in terms of 
national development goals. An examination of the current determination of and the 
exemption from property rates shows that the central government minimally considers the 
developmental role of district councils. 
                                                 
55 Bird & Slack 2003: 39. 
56 Bird & Slack 2003: 10. This argument is valid on the assumption that the district councils are better suited to 
determine development priorities than the central government 
57 Bird & Slack 2003: 39. 
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The trend towards undermining fiscal autonomy is further explained by the unilateral 
suspension of a major revenue source for district councils, the graduated tax.58 This is 
discussed in the next paragraphs.  
2.4 Graduated taxation 
2.4.1 Overview 
This section will explain that, although graduated tax is legally one of the district council’s 
sources of revenue, it was suspended in 2005 by the President.59 
Graduated tax in Uganda started as a form of poll tax in the colonial period, and was levied on 
every able-bodied working male adult and formally employed female adult.60 Graduated tax 
was assessed on a scale determined by the district council, as advised by the Local 
Government Financial Commission (LGFC).61 Graduated tax as a source of district council 
revenue has always been controversial. It was a form of forced revenue extraction, which was 
highly repressive and exploitative.62 Graduated tax had a high level of evasion, especially by 
high income tax payers.63 Ironically, studies showed that at the height of 2005, graduated tax 
contributed about 70% of the districts’ own revenues.64 Graduated tax contributed an 
                                                 
58 Ssewanyana & Okidi 2008: 4. 
59 See the 2005/2006 Budget Speech by the Minister of Finance p 47.  
60 Ssewanyana & Okidi 2008: 4. 
61 Regulation 3 of the LGRR. The detailed discussion of LGFC is made in Chapter Nine. 
62 Uganda Government, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System 1987: 93 para. 
242.  
63 Ssewanyana & Okidi 2008: 21. 
64 Kjær 2005: 1. 
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estimated 10% of district councils’ budget, marking a 0.9 % share of GDP.65 Graduated tax 
had no clear criteria upon which the assessment of a taxpayers’ scale was based. Besides, the 
determination of an individual’s income (and sometimes his or her age) in Uganda is usually 
based on estimates that are prone to statistical errors.66 It did not matter whether a male or 
female resident was in fact 18 years old or not, given the use of the word ‘apparent’ in 
Regulation 2 of LGRR. This means that if a tax collector formed an opinion that someone 
looked like an 18 year old, then they would have to pay tax irrespective of whether they were 
in fact younger. 
There is also evidence to show that graduated tax was highly inequitable, with a higher tax 
burden on people with low incomes than people with high incomes.67 Graduated tax also 
relied mainly on penal sanctions for enforcement. For instance, the liability for the offence of 
non-payment of graduated tax was strict, in that the onus of proving that payment had been 
made was on the tax defaulter.68 Graduated tax had a higher incident of tax avoidance, and as 
a result many graduated defaulters were imprisoned.69 
While there may thus have been good reasons to revisit the graduated tax, the actual decision 
was informed by political opportunism and was thus poorly executed. The decision to suspend 
graduated tax was prompted by the desire of the ruling party to forestall a private opposition 
                                                 
65 Ssewanyana & Okidi 2008: 21. Regulation 2 of the LGRR. 
66 Emwanu 2008: 1. 
67 Ssewanyana & Okidi 2008: 15; Chen, Matovu, & Reinikka-Soininen (2001). 
68 Regulation 10(3) of the LGRR. For example, non-payment of the tax attracted a term of imprisonment or a 
fine not exceeding double the amount of the tax due. 
69 Makara 2009: 289. 
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member’s Bill that sought to abolish it.70 In the 2001 election the opposition made the 
abolition of graduated tax an electoral issue on the grounds that it was an archaic and despotic 
way of raising district council revenue.71 The President wrote to the Vice-President, asking 
him to suspend graduated tax within five months from the date of the letter.72 
Notwithstanding the suspension of graduated tax by the President, it is still legally part of the 
district councils’ sources of revenue. 
2.4.2 An assessment of the suspension of graduated tax 
Chapter Two linked fiscal decentralisation to accountability. It was argued that because local 
governments directly generate their revenue from local citizens, they may spend money with a 
higher degree of discipline that minimises waste, which in turn advances development. Thus, 
whenever locally elected leaders fail to honour their electoral pledges to the local citizens, at 
the next election they are likely to face the wrath of voters or even a recall. 
It is argued that had Parliament properly exercised its role in regulating graduated tax, the tax 
could have been reformed instead of being suspended. Politics rather than good economics 
seemed to have played a significant role in suspending graduated tax, with no prudent 
                                                 
70 The private member’s Bill advanced three main reasons: (1) it is a form of poll tax that was associated with 
exploitative colonial rule; (2) it targeted poor people; and (3) it was highly prone to corruption. See also Makara 
2009: 289. 
71 Makara 2009: 289.  
72 See ‘Re-centralisation weakens the decentralisation process’ available at http: //www.ms.dk/sw94813.asp 
(accessed 14 November 2011). 
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financial considerations.73 It is argued that reforming graduated tax policy was preferable to 
outright suspension.74 
Furthermore, it would have been for the district council and not the central government to 
determine whether graduated tax was oppressive or not. The political fallout arising from the 
unpopularity of graduated tax would have been felt by the district councils and not the central 
government. The manner in which the central government suspended graduated tax 
constituted a violation of articles 152 and 191(2) and was a direct infringement of article 
176(2) of the Constitution. 
For instance, the table below shows that in the years 2003/4, the total amount of property tax 
income generated by all district councils in the country was Shs. 6,788,407 compared to Shs. 
36,526,446 that was generated from graduated tax during the same financial year. In the 
2004/5 financial year, property tax generated Shs. 3,525,779 compared to Shs. 60,038,704 
generated from graduated tax over the same period. In the 2005/6 financial year, property tax 
generated Shs. 26,716,387 compared to Shs. 10,865,871 from graduated tax over the same 
period. In the 2006/7 financial year, property tax generated Shs. 37,817,156 while graduated 
tax collection declined to a paltry Shs. 4,429,273. In 2011, property tax generated Shs 
31,557,087,952. Between the 2007/8 and 2010/11 financial years, no revenue was generated 
from graduated tax.75  
                                                 
73 Makara 2009: 312. 
74 Ssewanyana & Okidi 2008: 23. 
75 The Local Government Finance Commission (LGFC) Fiscal Databank. 
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Table 9: Aggregate revenue 
Financial year property tax (Shs.) graduated tax (Shs.) 
2003/4 6,788,407 36,526,446 
2004/5 3,525,779 60,038,704 
2005/6 26,716,387 10,865,871 
2006/7 37,817,156 4,429,273 
2011 31,557,087,952  
Source: Adopted from the Local Government Finance Commission (LGFC) Fiscal databank 
 
Figure 9 shows how much graduated tax contributed to district councils revenue before it was 
suspended. It also shows how the contributions from business licences (or service taxes), 
which should have been compensated for the revenue loss occasions by the suspension of 
graduated tax, did not in fact replace the revenue lost. In essence, the table illustrates that 
district councils depend mainly on revenue sources categorised as ‘others’. What is 
categorised as ‘others’ mainly refers to revenue from the central government in the form of 
transfers. 
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Figure 9: Trends in district council revenue generation before and after abolition of graduated tax 
 
Source: Fiscal decentralisation budget release performance - FY 2008/09 volume I, issue 3. 
 
The table below shows the dependency on intergovernmental transfers and it also shows that 
district councils consistently raise less revenue than planned.  
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Table 10: District councils' revenue and expenditure for 2012/13 financial year 
D
is
tri
ct
 c
ou
nc
il 
District Councils’ Total 
Revenue 
District Councils’ Own 
Revenue 
% Share of 
District 
Councils’ Own 
Revenue against 
Total Revenue 
Budgeted  Actual  (%) Budgeted  Actual   (%) Budgete
d  
Actua
l  
    
 
377,998,13
3 
276,927,77
6 
73.3
% 
25,380,24
6 
22,854,45
7 
90.0
% 
6.7% 6.0% 
         
Source: Adopted from the Local Government Finance Commission (LGFC) Fiscal 
databank. These figures are in Uganda shillings and include central government transfers, 
donations, and district councils’ ‘own’ revenues. 
 
In Chapter Two, the argument was that local government should have the discretion to 
determine who pays the tax and the power to spend the revenue derived therefrom. This 
would likely make communities ensure that local leaders justify their actions to the 
electorate.76 The central government’s intrusive role in district councils’ fiscal autonomy and 
the overdependence of the district councils on intergovernmental fiscal transfers undermines 
                                                 
76 See Chapter Two § 2.3.1.2. See also generally Oates (1972). 
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the ability of decentralisation to enforce accountability, a crucial element necessary for local 
development. The result is that the local electorate may not easily vote out district councils’ 
elected leaders in cases of poor service delivery. It is also argued here that the over-regulation 
of district councils’ taxing authority discourages district councils from pursuing more 
methods of raising local revenue. The effect of low district council revenue-generating 
capacity is the overdependence on central government transfers,77 which is further discussed 
below. 
3. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers  
As noted in Chapter Two, most revenues accrue to central governments, resulting in local 
governments’ dependence on intergovernmental fiscal transfers.78 Intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers are important because of their ability to redistribute, something that is crucial for 
local development. It was also argued in Chapter Three that intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
may limit the exercise of local government discretion and potentially discourage local 
government revenue mobilisation and investment.79 Thus, in order to harness the benefits of 
fiscal transfers while at the same time mitigating its dangers, the process of transfers should 
be inclusive and aim at redistribution of resources.80 As noted in Chapter Five, the Odoki 
Commission made strong recommendations for financially independent local governments.81 
The discussion below demonstrates that this recommendation was never seriously considered 
by the CA. 
                                                 
77 Chapter Three § 3.7.7. 
78 Chapter Two § 2.3.1.3 
79 Chapter Three § 3.7.7. 
80 Chapter Three § 3.7.8. 
81 See Chapter Five § 5.1.2.7.  
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3.1 Three types of central government transfers 
Every year, the President has to address Parliament, proposing the amount of money to be 
paid out of the Consolidated Fund as unconditional grants, conditional grants and equalisation 
grants.82 It is noted that the president is advised by the LGFC.83 
The Constitution spells out three types of central government fiscal transfer: (i) unconditional 
grants, (ii) conditional grants, and (iii) equalisation grants.84  
3.1.1 Unconditional grants 
An unconditional grant is the minimum grant that the central government pays to the district 
council to deliver decentralised services.85 According to the Constitution, unconditional 
grants serve to deliver decentralised services and, unlike other grants, are distributed 
according to a specific formula.86 The formula considers the previous financial year’s 
transfer, inflationary trends and the cost of running services.87 Unconditional grants account 
                                                 
82 See Article 193 of the Constitution and section 83(1) of the LGA. Article 153(1) of the Constitution defines 
the term Consolidated Fund’ with reference to ‘all revenues or other monies raised or received for the purpose 
of, or on behalf of, or in trust for the Government.’ 
83 See Chapter Nine § 9.6.2. 
84 See Article 193(1) of the Constitution. 
85 See Article 193 (2) read together with the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 
86 See Article 193(2) of the Constitution. The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution offers a further explanation 
for unconditional grants: ‘an unconditional grant is equal to the sum of wage and non-wage components. 
Therefore, the wage components should be adjusted for the wage increase, if any, while the non-wage 
component is adjusted to the changes in the general price levels’. 
87 See Regulation 55(1) of the LGFR. 
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for a smaller percentage of the central government transfers. Conditional and equalisation 
grants account for a larger percentage.88  
3.1.2 Conditional grants 
Conditional grants are payments which are made by central government and can only be spent 
subject to conditions specified in the agreement between the central government and district 
councils.89 Strictly speaking, they are not considered part of district council revenue.90 In fact, 
conditional grant funds must be separated from other sources of district council revenue in a 
district council’s budget.91 In addition, conditional grants are accounted for on conditions 
agreed to between the central government and district council.92  
                                                 
88 Wash & Ottenoeller 2004: 196. According to (Wash & Ottenoeller 2004: 196), in 1997/98 financial year, 
unconditional grants to district councils accounted for 24% of the district fiscal transfers while conditional 
grants accounted for 76% of district fiscal transfers. There were no equalisation grants to districts. In the 
financial year 1998/9 unconditional grants to district councils accounted for 23% of all fiscal transfers, while 
conditional grants accounted for 78% of all fiscal transfers to district councils. There were also no equalisation 
grants. In the financial years 1999/2, unconditional grants accounted for 17% of all fiscal transfers to district 
councils while conditional grants accounted for 83% of all fiscal transfers to the district councils. Equalisation 
grants accounted for a mere 05% of all the fiscal transfers to district councils. In 2000/1 financial year, 
unconditional grants accounted for 15% of all fiscal transfers to district councils while conditional grants 
accounted for 78% of all fiscal transfers to district councils. Equalisation grants accounted for a paltry 0.8% of 
all fiscal transfers to the district councils. 
89 See Article 193(3) of the Constitution. 
90 See Regulation 55(1) of the LGFR. 
91 See Regulation 55(2) of the LGFR. 
92 See Regulation 55(3) of the LGFR. 
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3.1.3 Equalisation grants 
Equalisation grants are payments made to district councils by the central government as a 
form of subsidy for least developed districts. The purpose of equalisation payments from 
central government is to ensure uniform delivery of specific services.93 For example, the 
central government must ensure that education or health services are uniformly delivered in 
every district in the country. Hence district councils with low incomes must be supplemented 
with equalisation grants in order to deliver those services. Equalisation grant transfers depend 
on the degree of economic disparity between the district and the national average standard of 
a particular service.94 
3.2 Critique  
Ugandan analysts argue that district councils are too dependent on conditional grants. They 
argue that the conditional grant is a form of subtle re-centralisation aimed at reversing the 
gains of devolution of powers to district councils.95 The figure below shows the trend of 
central government transfers from 1997 to 2014. The trend reveals a stagnation in equalisation 
grants, a fluctuation in unconditional grants, and a steady increase in conditional grants. 
Implicitly, the figure demonstrates that district councils depend, to a large extent, on central 
government transfers, rather than their ‘own revenue’. The trend also shows a dramatic 
decline in graduated tax, a source of tax, as explained above, in the past accounted for about 
70% of district councils’ revenues.96 
                                                 
93 See Regulation 55(4) of the LGFR. 
94 See Article 193(4) of the Constitution. 
95 Tusasirwe 2007: 31. 
96 Kjær (2005). 
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Figure 10: Impact of abolition of graduated tax on district council revenue autonomy 
 
Source: Local Government Financial Commission (LGFC) Fiscal databank 2014. UCG refers to the 
unconditional central grants, GTC, refers to the graduated tax, EQG refers to the equalisation grants, while CG 
refers to the conditional grants. 
 
For instance, the Rukungiri district budget in the 2010/2011 financial year indicates that the 
central government funded about 98% of the budget, while the district council’s own revenue 
contribution was 1.6% of the budget.97 The Rukungiri district council’s dependence on the 
central government transfers compares well in general to central government transfers to 
district councils throughout the country.98 It is argued that the consequence of the suspension 
                                                 
97 The New Vision 24 June 2010 available at http: //ww w.newvision.co.ug/D/8/ 18/723830. 
98 In her 2011-2012 Uganda budget speech, para. 36, the Minister of Finance states:  
Transfers to Local Governments for purposes of meeting the local government wage bill and recurrent and 
development expenditures have continued to increase over the years. During the year, total local government 
transfers are projected to amount to Shs 1,525 billion compared to Shs 1,461 billion in the previous year. Of the 
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of graduated tax has been over-dependence by the district councils on central government 
grants. This trend undermines the district councils’ political autonomy. It is also a direct 
infringement of article 176(2)(d) of the Constitution that instructs for a sound financial base 
for district councils. 
Shah argues that Uganda’s system of intergovernmental transfers offers a significant potential 
to reduce the trade-offs between district council autonomy and accountability while furthering 
access to locally preferred goods. The above view is based on three assumptions: the 
existence of district council planning and budgeting autonomy; the maintenance of proper 
accounting rules; and the ability to supervise engineering works.99 It argued that the district 
council capacity to monitor the general provision of services is highly limited given the low 
educational qualifications of most councillors.100 Besides, central government’s own 
assessment on the performance of district councils shows serious weakness in adhering to 
basic accounting and financial management rules.101 The contribution of the transfers system 
in deepening a developmental and accountable decentralised system is therefore very much 
limited by the district councils’ institutional weaknesses.  
In principle, articles 176(2)(d) and 194(4)(b) of the Constitution envisage a flawless 
engagement process between the central government and the LGFC in the fiscal transfer 
                                                                                                                                                        
total district local government transfers this year, Shs 360 billion is for development expenditure, Shs 248 
billion for non-wage recurrent expenditures and Shs 960 billion for salaries and wages.  
For instance in the 2012/13 Financial Year, the central government contribution of the district councils’ revenue 
was 94% compared to the district councils’ own revenue contribution of 6%. 
99 Shah 2010: 13. 
100 Singiza & De Visser 2011: 12. 
101 The AAMC&PMLG Synthesis Report 2010: 9-52. 
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system. However, in practice, there is little evidence to suggest any meaningful engagement 
with district councils in the determination of the formulae used in the central government 
transfers.102 The failure by the LGFC to lobby for greater autonomy in the determination of 
district council tax rates or the identification of stable district council tax bases, such as 
electricity, water tariffs and trading licences, to its inability to meaningfully engage the central 
government on serious financial matters.103  
In spite of the advisory role of the LGFC, the central government retains the discretion to 
determine the amount of money that is allocated to the district councils.104 Thus, Shah’s 
examination of Uganda’s intergovernmental transfer system is very much presumptive. For 
instance, the author’s assessment is built on the assumption that first, district councils are able 
to adhere to proper accounting rules and secondly that district councils have the requisite 
competency to execute their proper oversight functions in the utilisations of the 
intergovernmental transfers. This view is, however disputed by the Uganda government’s 
own assessment report on the performance of the district councils.105  
4. Concluding remarks 
This Chapter has outlined the difficulties that district councils face to raise own revenue. The 
district councils’ financial difficulties are linked to the misunderstanding on the part of the 
central government as to what the Constitution provides regarding the true financial powers of 
district councils, and what is enacted under the LGA. Thus, the district councils’ taxing 
powers become intertwined with and finally dependent on the central government. The 
                                                 
102 Article 194(4)(b) of the Constitution. See also Makara 2009: 183. 
103 Lambright 2011: 119-20. 
104 Article 194(4)(c) of the Constitution. 
105 The AAMC&PMLG Synthesis Report 2010: 9-52. 
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narrowed district councils’ financial space ultimately detracts from the overall point of 
decentralisation in Uganda. 
It is submitted that the following are critical for Uganda’s district councils’ revenue: 
• First, the district council’s narrow discretion in determining the tax thresholds and 
exemptions ultimately lowers the overall district council tax yields. 
•  Secondly, the policy behind the suspension of graduated tax was wrong and calls for 
its immediate reconsideration and possibly its reinstatement 
• Thirdly, the fact that conditional grants account for the majority of the central 
government transfers limits the district councils’ discretion to initiate their own 
development agenda. 
• Fourthly, the existing fiscal transfer systems have the ability to improve service 
delivery and ensure accountability. However, many district councils have so far failed 
to adhere to the basic rules of accounting and financial management. This limits the 
ability of these grants to mitigate the dangers that may be associated with the district 
councils’ autonomy.  
The chapter therefore calls for immediate reform of the LGA to bring it in conformity with 
the Constitution that calls for a sound financial base for district councils. The next chapter 
assesses whether the disadvantages associated with devolution are adequately mitigated by 
sound intergovernmental relations between central government and district councils.  
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9. CHAPTER NINE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN UGANDA 
1. Intergovernmental relations in Uganda 
In Chapter Three it was argued that intergovernmental relations (IGR) can be categorised as 
both ‘soft edge’ and ‘hard edge’. It was argued that the ‘hard edge’ IGR refers mainly to 
supervision, while ‘soft edge’ IGR refers to co-operation. It was further argued that the 
approach to IGR depends on the nature of the decentralisation of powers and functions to the 
local governments. Where decentralisation takes the form of delegation, ‘hard edge’ IGR will 
be pronounced. On the other hand, where decentralisation takes the form of devolution, the 
soft edge IGR becomes more important.1  
It is argued in this chapter that, by and large, IGR in Uganda are grounded in supervision i.e. 
the hard edge’ to IGR, because of the deliberate misunderstanding by the central government 
of the exact nature of district council powers and functions.  
This chapter examines the regulation of district councils’ institutions, elections, powers and 
functions. The chapter also describes the central government monitoring instruments of 
district councils and questions whether the regulation and monitoring thereof serves the 
overall objective of decentralisation. Lastly the chapter assesses the role of cooperation as a 
means of mitigating some of the weaknesses associated with regulation and monitoring in a 
decentralised system of government.  
                                                 
1 See Chapter Three §3.8.3.  
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2. Supervision through regulation 
2.1 Regulation of district council institutions, elections, powers and 
functions  
In Chapter Three, three criteria for the supervision of local governments were noted. These 
were: predictability; respect for local government autonomy; and proportionality.2 The 
discussion below questions whether the supervision of district council institutions, elections, 
powers and functions through regulation fulfils these criteria. 
The central government’s regulation of district councils’ powers is unpredictable. First, 
district council powers and functions are vaguely defined in that the Constitution provides for 
district councils’ residual functions from the long list of central government powers. 
Furthermore, the Constitution introduces the doctrine of incidental powers, which creates a 
legal dilemma because what the LGA provides as the delegated functions of district councils 
overlap with the exclusive list of central government competencies. Although Chapter Seven 
offered a strict interpretation of the doctrine of incidental powers,3 it remains the case that the 
regulation of district councils’ functions is not predictable.  
There is not one single court judgement that deals with the regulation of a district council’s 
institutions, elections, governance or powers by the central government. The attitude appears 
to be that central government can create as many districts as it deems fit. In addition, the 
central government regulation of district council elections has tended to favour the central 
government’s political interests rather than the need to promote grassroots democracy. 
                                                 
2 Chapter Three §3.8.4. 
3 Chapter Seven §7.4.2. 
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Further, in the absence of the courts’ guidance, district council powers have been considerably 
limited, leaving little room for innovation.  
In Chapter Five, it was noted that district councils are unilaterally created or altered.4 The 
constitutional and LGA criteria are more often than not circumvented to serve central 
government’s political purposes. The manipulation of district council institutions through the 
proliferation of many districts is facilitated by the absence of an independent body to 
rationally consider either splitting an old district or merging more than one. Further, there is 
no specific injunction on Parliament to seek all the stakeholders’ views before a new district is 
created. Unfeasible districts that have been created with no tangible benefits to local 
communities and the political stalemate arising from the central government control of former 
KCC are clear examples of an unpredictable regulation of district council institutions.5  
In any case, the creation of many districts and the centralisation of Kampala city have not 
been in line with the overall objective of decentralisation. Whereas the common narrative has 
been that creating many districts is linked to the desire to bring democracy and development 
closer to local communities, there is evidence that creating many districts increases the burden 
on tax-payers.6 In any case, the political stalemate in Kampala city seems to have undermined 
the development and democratic prospects of the majority of the people in Kampala. It is 
argued that the regulation of district council institutions is not achieving its intended purpose. 
                                                 
4 Chapter Five §5.3.3. 
5 Chapter Five §5.3.11. 
6 Chapter Five §5.3.11. 
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In Chapter Six, it was pointed out that district councils are exclusionary to certain social 
groups such as ethnic minorities.7 It is argued here that part of the reason why district council 
elections are exclusionary and less competitive is that the determination of district council 
constituencies is not predictable. For instance, whereas Parliament determines district council 
boundaries, it is the Electoral Commission which determines district council constituencies. 
Moreover, the adoption of the first-past-the-post electoral system is not only confusing but 
unpredictable. The result has been that district council electoral outcomes are not legitimate, 
which undermines the goal of decentralisation.8 The regulation of district council elections is 
employed to achieve dominance of the ruling party, results in intolerance of the expression of 
difference points of view, and disrespect of district councils’ autonomy. The regulation of 
district council elections that exclude ethnic minorities therefore works against the democratic 
and developmental objectives of district councils. 
 It is further argued that the central government plays an intrusive role in relation to the 
legislative and administrative powers of district councils. The central government has the 
discretion to legislate on all the delegated functions of the district councils and in this way 
may intrude into the district councils’ legislative space. The fact that central government 
appoints the district council’s CAO and controls the decision-making process of the DSC 
reveals the extent of its disregard for district council autonomy.  
                                                 
7 Chapter Six §6.8.3. 
8 Chapter Six §6.8. 
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3. Monitoring of district councils 
As argued in Chapter Three, monitoring is a form of supervision aimed at promoting and not 
controlling local governments.9 In the discussion below, the monitoring roles of Parliament, 
the Minister of Local Government/Line Ministries, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG), 
the Inspector General of Government (IGG) and the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) 
are examined to determine whether the monitoring role of these institutions is predictable and 
respects the autonomy of district councils and, whether their supportive role is proportional to 
the purpose of decentralisation as discussed in Chapter Three.10  
3.1 Role of Parliament  
Parliament plays a critical role in monitoring local governments’ accounts. In order to 
effectively perform its oversight functions, the Constitution calls upon Parliament to establish 
different committees. The Constitution mandates Parliament to determine the powers, 
composition and functions of the Parliamentary committees that may be established.11 
3.1.1 Committee on Local Governments Accounts  
On the instruction of article 90 of Constitution, 12 different committees of Parliament are 
established, including a 20 member Committee on Local Government Accounts.12 The 20 
members of this committee are appointed on the basis of a party’s proportional membership in 
the House. Subject to Rule 134(6) of the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure, the chairperson 
                                                 
9 Chapter Three § 3.9.2. 
10 Chapter Three §3.8.4. 
11 Article 90 of the Constitution. 
12 See Rule 131(1) of the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure 2006. 
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and deputy chairperson of the Committee on Local Government Accounts have to be 
members of the official opposition party in Parliament.13 This is to ensure that their reports 
are free from the ruling party’s political control. In my view, the above provision is a highly 
commendable as it safeguards the oversight role of Parliament from political manipulation. 
Article 90(2) of the Constitution provides for Parliament to make the rules of procedure and 
specify its own powers and functions. 
The Parliamentary Committee on Local Government Accounts has the power to summon any 
person holding public office to submit memoranda or appear before it to give evidence. In 
addition, the Committee has the powers of the High Court insofar as it may summon 
witnesses and order the production of documents.14  
The Committee has the power to examine the audited accounts showing the appropriation of 
sums granted by Parliament to district councils. Most public accounts committees of 
Parliament have vigorously scrutinised different public accounts and in some cases ensured 
that monies lost are recovered. On a number of occasions the Committee detected the 
misappropriation of district council finances by district council administrators and responded 
by making recommendations, threatening to arrest officials or withhold district council funds 
to ensure compliance with central government guidelines on public accountability.15 
                                                 
13 Article 90 of the Constitution provides for the appointment of the different committees of Parliament 
necessary for the discharge of its functions. Pursuant to Article 90, Rule 155 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Parliament of Uganda, 2006. 
14 Article 90(3)(c) of the Constitution. 
15 Goodluck & Wasswa ‘Katuntu clashes with Kabale district chief’ The New Vision 25 May 2010 available at 
http: //www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/18/720751. Nalugo M ‘MPs order arrest of ex-Kampala officials’ The Daily 
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However, given the fact that those parliamentary committees are dominated by the ruling 
party members, credible recommendations involving high profile politicians often not result 
in recovery of lost government monies.16 The central government may be tempted to ‘over-
monitor’ district councils by using the Committee, for example, to withhold central 
government transfers to district councils.17 However, the fact that the Committee’s chair and 
deputy chair are members of the opposition minimises the possibility political manipulation 
on the part of the central government. In any case, it is Parliament and not the central 
government that may order the withholding of central government transfers.18 
3.2 Monitoring by the Minister of Local Government/Line Ministries 
3.2.1 Legal basis 
Article 176(2)(a) of the Constitution calls upon the central government to mutually interact 
with district councils in their developmental and democratic roles.19 Arguably, the 
Constitution envisages that the central government may put in place appropriate operating 
guidelines in order to determine which particular powers and functions may be efficiently 
performed by district councils and which ones may not. In that respect, an obligation on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Monitor 7 July 2010 available at http: //www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/953510/-/x20py7/-
/index.html. 
16 The New Vision,’ Nine corruption scandals to look back’ available at 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/mobile/Detail.aspx?NewsID=637209&CatID=1 (accessed on 13, June 2014 
17 See detailed discussion on the central government transfers in Chapter 8 § 8.3.12.  
18 See Chapter Five § 5.2.2.1. 
19 Article Article 176(2)(a) of the Constitution provides ‘....the system shall be such as to ensure that functions, 
powers and responsibilities are devolved and transferred from the Government to local government units in a 
coordinated manner’. See also § 9.5.1 of this chapter. 
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central government to co-ordinate district council powers and functions through central 
government agencies such as, the Minister of Local Government (and line ministries) is 
inferred. Section 1(1)(k) of the LGA defines the term ‘Minister’ as the ‘minister responsible 
for local government’.20  
3.2.2 Mandate 
The role of the Ministry of Local Government/Line Ministries is to inspect, provide technical 
assistance, and to establish operating standards for the delivery of services by district 
councils.21 
There are numerous instances where the Minister of Local Governments/Line Ministries will 
monitor district councils. For example, in respect of the process for removal of senior political 
leaders, the Minister of Local Government ‘must be satisfied’ that the procedures for 
removing district council elected leaders have been complied with.22 In addition, the Minister 
of Local Government ‘must ensure’ that district council by-laws are certified by the Attorney-
General, and adopted by following the prescribed procedure within the district council’s 
legislative residual authority.23 Further, the Minister of Local Government/Line Ministries 
                                                 
20 However, section 2 of the Interpretation Act Cap 3 expands on the definition of the term ‘Minister’ to mean 
any minister of the central government. Arguably, then, the term ‘Minister’ includes line ministries. 
21 See sections 95 & 97 of the LGA.  
22 See section 11(6C), 14(2A)(4) and 68 of the LGA.  
23 See section 38 of the LGA. Section 38 of the LGA requires the legislative powers of district council to be 
subject to ‘any other laws made by Parliament’. Among other limitations, the LGA requires the Attorney-
General through the Minister of Local Government to certify that any proposed district council by-law be 
consistent with the Constitution ‘and any other law enacted by Parliament’ before it can have any legislative 
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‘must ensure’ that the central government policies,24 audit25 and procurement rules26 are 
complied with. For instance, under section 97 of the LGA, the central government is called 
upon to ‘monitor and coordinate Government initiatives and policies as they apply to local 
governments’, including the provision of advisory services, technical support and 
establishment of minimum standards of service delivery. Further, section 98 of the LGA 
empowers the central government ministries to inspect district councils’ books of accounts so 
as to foster the rule of law, good governance, and to eliminate corruption and abuse of office. 
Section 94F (1) of the LGA also mandates the Minister of Local Government to determine 
sanctions for contravening procurement rules under the LGA. These may include a penalty, 
forfeiture and or compensation, severe reprimand, interdiction, dismissal, and dissolution of 
contracts committee.27 
The words ‘must be satisfied’ import notions of compulsion and control into the role of the 
Minister which is quite distinct from a supportive role. A type of ‘monitoring’ whose aim is to 
ensure that central government policies are complied with connotes intrusive supervision and 
little respect for district council autonomy. The ultimate result of the above ministerial 
monitoring is that the central government policies must always prevail. 
                                                                                                                                                        
force. Arguably, the LGA’s limitation of district councils’ legislative powers is open to challenge as it 
automatically dilutes district councils’ constitutional legislative powers. See also section 39 of the LGA. 
24 See sections 96 and 97 of the LGA. 
25 See section 98(2) of the LGA. 
26 See section 94(F) of the LGA. 
27 Sections 94F (2) and (3) of the LGA 
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There is an obligation on the Minister of Local Government/Line Ministries while exercising 
their monitoring mandate to promote and foster respect for the rule of law.28 Thus, monitoring 
that involves the usurpation of the district councils’ powers and functions would be unlawful. 
In addition, monitoring by the Minister of Local Government/Line Ministries must be geared 
towards the promotion of natural justice: in other words, it must be fair, just and promote 
good governance. Transparency and accountability ought to be respected in any act of 
monitoring by the Minister of Local Government/Line Ministries. It is argued that rather than 
enhance transparency and accountability, monitoring by ministries has in fact tended to 
undermine the good governance practices in district councils. For example, the education 
department guidelines on the use of the universal primary education (UPE) funds to district 
councils call for, among other things, timely provision of accountability and participatory 
formulation of UPE budgets 29 when those very guidelines were susceptible to local political 
manipulations and non-adherence to proper accounting rules.30 In the discussion below, the 
role of other state agencies are also examined.  
3.3 The role of the OAG, the IGG, etc. as monitoring tools 
Section 98(1) of the LGA31 highlights the role of ‘other State organs’ in inspecting and 
monitoring district councils. Investigative organs such as the Office of the Auditor General 
                                                 
28 See section 97 of the LGA. 
29 See Ministry of Education and Sports Guidelines; policy, planning and roles and responsibilities of 
stakeholders in the implementation of Universal Primary Education (UPE) for district and urban councils 
Kampala: Ministry of Education and Sports 2008:10. 
30 Nambalirwa 2010:34-37. 
31 Section 98(1) of the LGA provides: ‘The inspection of local governments by line Ministries and other State 
organs authorised by the law shall promote adherence to the law and without limiting the generality of the 
 
 
 
 
 
441 
 
Chapter 9: Intergovernmental Relations in Uganda 
(OAG), the Inspector General of Government (IGG), and the police, on the one hand, and the 
Resident District Commissioner (RDC), on the other, come into the picture. 
The legal basis and mandate of each of the organs are examined below. 
3.4 Office of the Auditor General 
The Constitution provides that the OAG is headed by the Auditor General, appointed by the 
President with the approval of Parliament.32  
The mandate of the OAG is to audit and report on all public accounts, including district 
councils.33 The role of the OAG is to conduct financial and value-for-money audits in respect 
of any project involving public funds by district councils, and report to Parliament annually.34 
In terms of regulation 171 of the Local Government Financial and Accounting Regulations 
(LGFAR), the OAG is required to submit a copy of report to Parliament, the Minister of 
Finance, the Minister of Local Government, the district council to which the audit relates, the 
district council Public Accounts Committee, the Local Government Finance Commission, the 
IGG, and the RDC. 
                                                                                                                                                        
foregoing shall – (a) promote and foster adherence to the rule of law and principles natural justice and good 
governance; (b) foster the elimination of corruption and abuse of office.’ 
32 Articles 163(1) and 163(2)(a) of the Constitution. The Auditor General must be a qualified accountant of not 
less than 15 years’ standing and of high moral character and proven integrity. 
33 Article 163(3)(a) of the Constitution. 
34 Article 163(3)(b) of the Constitution; Annual Report of the Auditor General for the Year Ended 30 June 2009 
Volume 3 Local Authorities p 7-47. 
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The OAG is obliged to ensure that the district council financial and accounting regulations are 
complied with.35 As already mentioned, section 97 of the LGA places an obligation on the 
central government to provide technical support to district councils by establishing the 
minimum standards of service delivery. So within the context of section 97 of the LGA, it is 
argued that the role of the OAG is to provide support to district councils in the areas of 
accountability and good governance. 
3.4.1 Practice of OAG auditing district council accounts 
In the year ending 30th June 2013, the Office of the Auditor General carried out financial 
audits in 111 district councils. The financial audits included the audit opinions of the previous 
2010/2011 2012/2013 audit years.36 According to the audit report, unqualified audit opinions 
on district councils increased from 36% from in 2009/2010 to 45% in 2010/2011, dropped to 
32 % in 2011/2013 and then increased slightly to 37.4 in 2012/2013. In 2009/2010, qualified 
opinions decreased from 62% to 50% in 2010/2011, increased again 62% in 2011/2012, and 
decreased again to 60% in 2012/2013. It is noted that the disclaimer to these audit opinions 
increased from 4% in 2010/2011, increased to 5% in 2011/2012 and reduced to 2.3% in 
2012/2013. At the same time, the adverse audit opinions remained unchanged between 
2010/2011 and 2011/2012 at 1% but reduced to 0.3% in 2012/2013.37 
                                                 
35 Regulation 5(1) of the LGFAR. 
36 Office of the Auditor General 2013:2. 
37 Office of the Auditor General 2013:3. According to (Garner 2009:1202), an unqualified audit report refers to 
an audit opinion made with minimal hindrances, stating that the financial statements of an entity fairly represents 
a true picture of its books of accounts and confirms that a business entity complied with generally accepted 
accounting principles and laws.  
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The audit report also documents district councils’ procurement anomalies and poor 
accountability of funds. For example, the audit report shows that of all UGX.18, 264,166,478 
worth of procured goods and services, 51.4% breached contract procedures, 35% showed 
contract management weaknesses, 10.7% lacked contract files, while 2.8% worth of procured 
good and services were altered without authorisation.38 In addition the report shows that out 
of UGX. 17,040,364,920 monies spent, 49% was categorised as ‘outstanding administrative 
advances’, 31.4% was categorised as ‘incompletely vouched expenditure’, 12.6% was 
categorized as ‘doubtful expenditure’, while 7% was categorised as ‘un vouched 
expenditure’.39  
Arguably the above audit report is a useful instrument for intergovernmental accountability in 
that evidence of culpability on the part of district administrators or district political leaders 
may trigger a criminal investigation resulting into prosecution in the courts of law. The more 
pertinent question becomes whether such an audit report may be used by local citizens and 
civil society to hold district councils’ accounting officials and local political leaders 
accountable? 
It is argued that the above instruments may be a useful tool for enforcing local accountability 
in that local citizens can use evidence of financial abuse and impropriety as presented by the 
audit report in district councils to, either recall their representatives, or cause the impeachment 
of district council chairpersons. The risk of backlash with the central government in the recall 
process of district councillors, and the onerous procedure of removing the district council 
                                                 
38 Office of the Auditor General 2013:8. 
39 Office of the Auditor General 2013:9. 
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chairpersons from office was discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 40 It is unlikely that the audit 
reports may be a reliable instrument to enforce local democratic accountability in a district 
council. Civil societies may rely on the audit reports on district councils to create public 
awareness on the extent of financial abuse and mismanagement in district councils. Arguably, 
public awareness on the district councils’ financial abuse and mismanagement has the 
potential to translate into ‘protest votes’ against elected district council leaders in future 
elections. The limited number of civil society organisations in district councils through the 
country and their minimal interaction with local communities41 limits their ability to use audit 
reports to enforce accountability in district councils. 
3.5 The Inspector General of Government 
3.5.1 Legal basis 
The Constitution provides for the IGG and deputy IGG who are appointed by the President 
with the approval of Parliament.42 The Inspectorate of Government Act (IGA) provides for 
the Inspectorate of Government (IG), consisting of the IGG and two Deputy Inspectors 
General.43 The IGA provides for ten functions of the IGG.44 
                                                 
40 See detailed discussion on the vacation of district council political office bearers in Chapter Six § 6.8 and 
6.10.3. 
41 See Lambright 2011: 246-254. 
42 Article 223(5) of the Constitution. The IGA repeats the provisions of Article 233(5) of the Constitution in 
relation to the qualifications, appointment and term of office of the IGG. See sections 3(3), (4), and (5) and 4(3) 
of the IGA. The IGG must be qualified to be appointed as a High Court judge. The IGG must be a Ugandan, of 
high moral character, proven integrity, considerable experience, demonstrated competence, and high calibre in 
the conduct of public affairs 
43 Section 3(1) of the Inspectorate of Government Act (IGA) cited as Act 5 of 2002.  
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3.5.2 Mandate 
The IGA establishes the office of the IGG with the mandate to inspect instances of corruption 
and misuse of power by government officials. The mandate of the IGG is to ensure adherence 
to the rule of law, combating corruption and abuse of office, and promoting fair, and efficient 
governance in public offices.45 The Constitution bestows on the IGG the powers to supervise 
and investigate malpractices by officers and leaders irrespective of whether they are employed 
in the public service.46 In addition, the IGG has the mandate to educate members of the public 
‘about the values of constitutionalism’. The IGG reports to Parliament once every six 
months.47 
Under the Leadership Code Act (LCA), the IGG may receive complaints relating to a breach 
of the Leadership Code of Conduct,48 and is mandated to ‘inquire into, or cause the complaint 
to be inquired into’.49 Specifically, the IGG has powers to investigate officers and leaders of 
district councils or committees in order to ‘enforce the Leadership Code of Conduct’.50 As 
mentioned earlier, the LCA generally provides for the minimum standard of behaviour or 
                                                                                                                                                        
44 Section 8(1) of the IGA. 
45 Article 225(1) of the Constitution; Section 14(6) of the IGGA; section 29 of the LCA. 
46 Articles 225(2) and 226 of the Constitution. Article 230(1) provides: ‘The Inspectorate of Government shall 
have power to investigate, cause investigation, arrest, cause arrest, prosecute or cause prosecution in respect of 
cases involving corruption, abuse of authority or of public office.’ Additionally, Article 233 of the Constitution 
provides for the Leadership Code of Conduct as the main instrument for enforcement of good behaviour by 
every public leader, and bestows the obligation to enforce the Code on the IGG. 
47 Article 231 of the Constitution. 
48 Section 18(1) of the LCA. 
49 Section 18(2) of the LCA. 
50 Sections 9(k) & 8(1)(d) of the IGA. 
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conduct of leaders and defines a ‘leader’ as ‘a person holding any of the government offices 
specified in the First Schedule to this Code’.51 The LCA also defines ‘Government’ to include 
a district council.52 In enforcing the Leadership Code of Conduct, the IGG receives and 
examines complaints and instances of corrupt practice that breach of the Leadership Code of 
Conduct. The IGG must also investigate and report on any alleged ‘high handed, outrageous 
and infamous or disgraceful conduct’ of a leader.53 This implies that the IGG decision is 
political rather than quasi-judicial one. 
3.5.3 The role of the IGG under the Leadership Code Act. 
The LCA provides that once the inquiry is completed, the IGG is obliged to report the 
outcome of the inquiry to the ‘authorised person’ requiring such person to implement his or 
her decision.54 The term ‘authorised person’ is defined by section 2 of the LCA to mean ‘a 
person or body authorised by law to discipline the leader in relation to whom the expression is 
used’. The above provision suggests that the monitoring role of the IGG can amount to an 
intervention, given that, over and above his or her power of inquiry, she must also demand 
that the outcome of her inquiry is implemented by disciplining officer. Yet existing 
jurisprudence discussed below, suggests that the monitoring role of the IGG does not include 
a power to intervene in district councils. 
                                                 
51 Section 2(1) of the LCA. 
52 Section 2(1) of the LCA. 
53 Section 3 of the LCA. Section 2(1) of the LCA defines ‘Minister’ to mean ‘the Minister responsible for ethics 
and integrity’. 
54 Section 19(1) of the LCA. 
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3.5.4 The High Court’s approach to the role of the IGG 
Faced with numerous complaints against district councils by members of the public,55 the 
IGG’s initial response has tended to exceed the monitoring mandate of the Inspectorate of 
Government. In its most controversial recommendation, the IGG directed a Municipal 
Council to dismiss an elected political official. This recommendation was challenged in the 
High Court in the case of Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala v The Inspector General of 
Government and Others.56 
 In this case, the Jinja Municipal Council’s resolution, which adopted the IGG’s report and 
recommendations, and the interdiction/suspension of the Municipal Mayor was challenged. 
The main grounds of the application were that the Mayor was by a resolution of Jinja 
Municipal Council removed from office despite the existence of two court orders restraining 
them from implementing the recommendations of the IGG. There was evidence that the IGG 
in fact pressurised Jinja Municipal Council to implement its recommendations.57 
The High Court restated the oversight role of the powers of the IGG in its investigative and 
inquiry powers over public bodies such as district councils. The view of the High Court was 
that in a judicial review the court’s role is to ensure that a lawful authority is not abused by 
unfair treatment.58 The High Court was ‘concerned with the process by which the decision 
                                                 
55 The Inspectorate of Government Report to Parliament July–December 2007 p 8. 
56 Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala v The Inspector General of Government and others Miscellaneous 
application No.28 of 2009. 
57 Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala p 10. 
58 Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala p 12. 
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was reached – whether the decision making authority exceeded it powers, committed an error 
of law, committed a breach of natural justice etc.’59 
The High Court concluded that it was inappropriate, illegal and oppressive of the IGG to 
pressurise Jinja Municipal Council to implement her decision to remove the Mayor from 
office contrary to an existing court order.60  
The High Court nullified the resolution of the Jinja Municipal Council to remove the Mayor 
and set aside the report of the IGG.61 
3.5.5 Comment 
The judgement generally reviewed and nullified the decision of the IGG to remove an elected 
official of a municipal council. The decision demonstrates that the monitoring of district 
councils must follow the law to the letter. It also shows that institutions that monitor district 
councils have to be checked by independent bodies to guard against abuse of their monitoring 
powers. In an earlier decision of the Constitutional Court on the powers of the IGG, a 
different approach was followed adopted to the effect that the IGG has no powers at all to 
remove an elected office bearer from office. 62 However, it is argued that the correct position 
is that the IGG cannot recommend an elected district leader to vacate office.  
                                                 
59 Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala p 17. 
60 Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala p 16. 
61 Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala p 27. 
62 See John Ken-Lukyamuzi vs. The Attorney General and Another Constitutional Court Petition No. 19 of 2006 
- 3/26/2007. 
 
 
 
 
449 
 
Chapter 9: Intergovernmental Relations in Uganda 
3.6 Case study of the monitoring role of the IGG in respect of district councils 
The IGG has made numerous interventions in district councils. In fact, according to the IGG 
report of 2007, out of a total of 991 complaints received by the IGG in 2007, 16.9% related to 
local government leaders, i.e. district chairpersons, CAOs, RDCs, CFOs and district 
councillors. In the same report, 6.7% of the complaints related to Municipal Councils/Town 
Councils, 4.4% of the complaints related to other lower councils, and 2.1% of the complaints 
related to subcounty chiefs. Thus, district councils generally had a combined share of 30.1% 
of the number of complaints.63 The IGG report found widespread poor accountability of 
funds, shoddy construction work, poor maintenance of facilities, and use of false accounting 
systems that had long been abolished.64 The big number of the complaints received by the 
IGG indicates two things: one the one hand, the big number of complaints reported to the IGG 
show a considerable level of public trust in the institution of the IGG to address corruption 
related cases. On the other hand, the ever increasing number of complaints reported to the 
IGG demonstrates its institutional weakness to fight corruption and abuse of office, but 
mainly used by the central government as an instrument of intervention in district councils. 
The following discussion assesses the monitoring role of the RDC in the district councils.  
3.7 The role of the of Resident District Commissioner (RDC) 
The history and metamorphosis of the office of the RDC have already been examined.65 
During the CA debates, various reasons were advanced for and against the constitutional 
status of the office of the RDC. While it was clear that suspicion remained as to the true 
                                                 
63 The Inspectorate of Government Report to Parliament July–December 2007 p 9. 
64 The Inspectorate of Government Report to Parliament July–December 2007 p 10. 
65 See Chapter Four § 4.9.3. 
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essence of the office of the RDC, the consensus was that there was need for a bridge to link 
the district councils with the central government.66 In this part of the chapter, the role of the 
RDC is analysed not only as a ‘link’ between the central government and district councils, but 
also as a means to oversee district councils’ service delivery.67 
3.7.1 Mandate 
The primary function of the RDC is ‘to monitor the implementation of central and local 
government services in the district’.68 In addition, the Constitution vests the President with the 
discretion to assign to the RDC any other functions with the approval of Parliament.69 
The RDC represents the President in a district;70 co-ordinates central government’s services in 
a district. 71 Further, the RDC advises the chairperson of the district ‘on matters of national 
importance’, such as plans and programmes in the district. 72 In addition, the RDC monitors 
and inspects the activities of a district council73 and educates local communities about the 
                                                 
66 CA debates p 3962-84. 
67 Azfar, Kahkonen, and Meagher 2001: 49. See also Article 203(2) of the Constitution and Section 70(2) of the 
LGA. The LGA provides that the qualifications of a RDC, as a central government employee, must be similar to 
those of a Member of Parliament. A RDC must be a citizen of Uganda. He or she must be beyond reproach, with 
considerable experience and demonstrated competency. The RDC is appointed by the President. 
68 Article 203 (3)(a) of the Constitution. Azfar et al in Bardhan et al 2006: 231. 
69 Article 203 (3)(c) of the Constitution. 
70 Section 71(1)(a) of the LGA. 
71 Section 71(1)(b) of the LGA. 
72 Section 71(1)(c) of the LGA. 
73 Section 71(1)(d) of the LGA. 
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central government’s programmes.74 Further, the RDC may advise the chairperson of a 
district council to cause special audits and investigations by both the police and the OAG.75 
The RDC may also prompt the IGG to investigate instances of mismanagement or abuse of 
office.76 The RDC checks whether a district council follows central government policies and 
therefore ensures that a district council’s policies tows the central government line.77  
3.7.2 Assessment of the RDC as an instrument of monitoring 
The RDCs have kept most local governments’ elected leaders under constant watch.78 
Whereas the existing legal framework appears to grant the RDC the requisite competency to 
perform their monitoring functions, a closer examination of the credentials and track records 
of many RDCs indicates a clear misunderstanding of the true essence of monitoring. 
It is submitted that a number of RDCs do not have the appropriate qualifications to carry out 
their proper oversight functions, a concern voiced by the donor community (development 
partners), civil society, and the media in Uganda.79 Unfortunately, the reality is that in most 
cases the criteria for appointment of any person as a RDC is limited to their political 
                                                 
74 Section 71(2)(a) of the LGA. 
75 Section 71(2)(b) and (c) of the LGA.  
76 Section 71(2)(d) of the LGA. It is noted that under the Constitution the OAG and the IGG are independent 
and are therefore not subject to directives from any person. 
77 Section 71(2)(e) of the LGA. 
78 Kiyaga and Olum 2009: 30.  
79 Matsiko M and Mubatsi A ‘New Districts and the Paradox of Taking Services to the People’ The Independent 
17 May 2010, available at http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/news/news-analysis/79-news-analysis/2916-
new-districts-and-the-paradox-of-taking-services-to-the-people. 
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‘credentials’ and support for the ruling party.80 Hence, the focus of the RDC is on political 
support mobilisation for the ruling party, rather than carrying out oversight functions.81 The 
result has been that increasingly the RDC is viewed as an instrument of central government 
hegemony in district councils, rather than as an instrument of monitoring as part of IGR.82 For 
example the RDCs are now politically encouraged to ‘vet guests on radio talk shows to take 
care of security in their jurisdiction … if RDCs “sufficiently” suspect a guest is going to make 
statements with a negative bearing on security, they should block such a speaker from 
accessing a radio.’83 
Thus, the RDCs are used as instruments for curtailing individual civil liberties in district 
councils, rather than for monitoring district council performance. In the past, a district council 
was vested with the power to recommend to the President the removal of a RDC from 
office.84 The current Constitution, it its amended form,85 no longer includes the power of the 
                                                 
80 See Amos Twinomujuni v The Attorney General & Another (CIVIL Suit No. 0413 Of 2005) [2009] UGHC 
145 (23 January 2009), where the RDC was sued by a Court of Appeal judge for alleging that the judge shared 
money from suits against the government with opposition politicians. See also ‘Abaramuzi n’enkomba za DP-
RDC Mwesigye’ Orumuri Newspaper 5-7 July 2004. See also Azfar, Kahkonen, and Meagher 2001: 55. 
81 See Oloka-Onyango (2007: 39), who explains that the fact that RDCs are no longer civil servants but 
politicians implies that their functions are no longer technical in nature but rather of a political kind. See also 
Rtd.Col.Dr.Kizza Besigye v Electoral commission, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (Election Petition No.1 Of 2006) 
[2007] UGSC 24 (31 January 2007) per Justice Odoki, CJ, where the Chief Justice condemned the partisan role 
of RDCs in Presidential elections.  
82 Azfar in Bardhan 2006: 234. 
83 Mulondo E ‘RDCs can vet radio talk show guests, says minister’ The Daily Monitor 24 September 2010, 
available at http: //www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/1017132/-/cnli3ez/-/index.html (accessed 25 
September 2010). 
84 Section 73 of the LGA. 
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district council to recommend the removal of a RDC by the President, emphasising the central 
government’s control of the RDC’s actions in a district council. It is argued that if the RDC is 
to monitor the implementation of the central government’s and district council’s service 
delivery, s/he must have the requisite skills and experience to do so. It is recommended that 
the academic qualifications of the RDC should be increased to that of a degree. 
3.8 Reporting systems in local government 
The legal basis for the provision of reporting on the district councils’ performance is found in 
section 97(1)(d) of the LGA, which calls for the establishment of the minimum standards of 
service delivery by every sector ministry. In addition, section 98 of the LGA calls for the 
promotion of the rule of law, good governance, and elimination of corruption through 
monitoring and inspection of district councils by line ministries.86  
Three policy documents form the basis of reporting systems in local government in Uganda. 
These are:  
• the Decentralisation Policy Strategic Framework;87  
• the revised Framework for Monitoring and Evaluation88 within the context of the Joint 
Annual Review of Decentralisation (JARD);89 and  
                                                                                                                                                        
85 Article 203 of the Constitution. 
86 See also generally the LG (FA) R SI 243-15. 
87 Ministry of local Government Decentralisation Policy Strategic Framework (2006). 
88 The Revised Framework for Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of the Future of JARD (2008), Local 
Government International Consultancy Division. 
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• the Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local 
Governments (AAMC&PMLG) or the penalty/reward reporting scheme.90  
These policy documents lay down parameters of reporting by district councils to the central 
government. 
3.8.1 Reporting under the decentralisation policy framework  
The legal basis for the DPSF is found in the eight directive principles of the state discussed in 
Chapter Seven.91 The DPSF is a collection of different development policy interventions in 
decentralisation. It provides a mechanism for coordination through improved systems and 
effective reporting mechanisms on decentralization in line with national development 
priorities. The DPSF is located in the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP),92 which is 
Uganda’s development strategy designed along the lines of United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (UNMDGs).93 The PEAP is founded on five principles: (i) micro-
economic discipline; (ii) improved productivity through competitiveness; (iii) peace-building 
                                                                                                                                                        
89 See the Joint Annual Review of Decentralisation (JARD) 2009 under the theme: ‘Meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals and Targets: The Critical Role of Local Governments’, available at 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/526/538/703831 (accessed 20 April 2010). 
90 The Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments 
(AAMC&PMLG) Synthesis Report 2010. 
91 Chapter Seven §7.2.2. 
92 The Ministry of Finance and Planning and Economic Development Poverty Eradication Action Plan (2004/5-
2007/8). 
93 The UNMDGs benchmarks are: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; to achieve universal primary 
education; to promote gender equality and empowerment of women; to reduce child mortality; to improve 
maternal health; to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; to promote sustainable development of the 
environment; and to develop a global partnership for development.  
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and disaster management; (iv) human rights and democracy; and (v) human development 
through education.94 Under the DPSF, these principles are reporting indices of compliance for 
every district council. The adoption of the PEAP principles in the DPSF arose from the need 
for a simple, coherent mechanism for assessing district council performance.  
The DPSF was published 10 years after the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution.95 The 
DPSF is the first comprehensive policy document for decentralisation in Uganda. Between 
2006 and 2009, reporting under the DPSF was on a yearly interval. The fact that there is no 
specific interval under which reporting under the DPSF must take place renders its 
contribution to monitoring district councils rather unpredictable and difficult to assess. 
3.9 Joint review of decentralisation  
The decentralisation DPSF calls on different district council stakeholders to jointly assess the 
performance of the district councils. On the basis of the DPSF, a joint review penal was 
established of key decentralisation stakeholders, comprising Ministries, Departments and 
Agencies (MDAs), Local Governments (LGs), Local Government Associations (LGAs), Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Development 
Partners and the Private Sector. It is noted that the JARD is not legally provided for. It is 
argued that the legal status of the JARD may pose challenges for reporting on district councils 
given that the donor countries (development partners) and NGOs are not the authorised 
oversight institutions under the LGA. 
Under JARD, it is the role of the Minister of Local Government/line ministries to assess 
whether the performance of a district council is in line with DPSF/PEAP benchmarks. JARD 
                                                 
94 The Decentralisation Policy Strategic Framework (2006) Ministry of Local Government, Kampala p 4-5. 
95 Chapter Seven §7.1.3. 
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members must determine the common challenges that affect district councils’ performance in 
the light of the five principles of PEAP.96 
The tasks carried out by JARD panel include the following: to assess the implementation of 
the decentralisation policy and review the performance of various stakeholders; to identify the 
challenges facing district councils’ and propose viable solutions; to identify strategies to 
monitor and refine the implementation of the decentralisation policy; review the impact of 
other government policies on the decentralisation programme.97  
3.9.1 Penalty/reward scheme 
The joint review on the performance of district council is a corrective measure geared towards 
motivating district councils. The annual assessment of district councils is used by the central 
government to release funds meant for poverty reduction and simultaneously enhancing 
district councils’ ability to spend and raise revenue. The central government is then able to 
determine whether district councils are able to comply with the central government financial 
management and accounting rules. At the same time, district councils are vested with a 
discretion to spend central government grants according local development priorities.98 
                                                 
96 See JARD 2009. 
97 See JARD 2009 under the theme: ‘Meeting the Millennium Development Goals and Targets: The Critical 
Role of Local Governments’. See also The Revised Framework for Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of the 
Future of JARD (2008), Local Government International Consultancy Division p 9. 
98 The AAMC&PMLG Synthesis Report 2010: 16. 
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District councils’ AAMC&PMLG is a penalty/reward scheme that is used to assess the 
performance of district councils annually.99 Under this scheme, all district councils are 
annually examined in relation to common performance criteria adopted by an ad hoc National 
Assessment Team (NAT). Although the Ministry of Local Government is the leading agency 
of the assessment process, members of the NAT are drawn from district councils, line 
ministries, government institutions, and civil societies.100  
The AAMC&PMLG measures the extent of compliance with the legal provisions relating to 
district councils, the district councils’ capacity to manage development funds, the level of 
district capacity building; the ability of a district council to promote good administrative and 
service delivery practices; the ability of the district council to meet national sector specific 
targets and standards; and the level of a downward accountability and closer co-ordination.101  
As already stated, the penalty/reward scheme is the system of assessment where the NAT 
annually assesses the performance of district councils. The outcome of the performance is 
then used to reward or penalise districts by either, releasing more or withholding 
intergovernmental funding.  
The NAT’s performance measure may either be ‘reward’, ‘static’, or ‘penalty’. District 
councils that efficiently utilise the funds under PEAP are rewarded with more funds in the 
next financial year while districts that fail to utilise the PEAP funds are penalised with a 
                                                 
99 The AAMC&PMLG Synthesis Report 2010: 7. According to the executive summary of this report, the annual 
assessment of local governments is now in its ninth year. At its commencement, the main focus was on 
implementation of phase I of the LGDP. 
100 The AAMC&PMLG Synthesis Report 2010: 6. 
101 See the Objectives of the AAMC&PMLG Synthesis Report 2010: 8. 
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reduction in the amount of funds in the next financial year.102 It is argued that the Uganda’s 
penalty/reward scheme is similar to what Shah describes as an output-based grant system 
(performance‐oriented transfers). The output-based grant system is now common in what is 
generally referred to as the new public management (NPM) framework that places emphasis 
on performance.103 According to Shah, 
[s]uch a managerial focus reinforces joint ownership and accountability of the principal and 
the agent in achieving shared goals by highlighting terms of mutual trust.104 
The scheme provides incentives for good performance and sanctions for poor performance. 
There is evidence that highly performing districts have in the past been rewarded with more 
central government funds.105  
3.9.2 Penalty/Reward scheme findings 
The discussion below illustrates annual compliance with the minimum conditions of 
performance by district councils in Uganda in 2009 on the one hand, and their cumulative 
trend of compliance with the minimum conditions of performance over a period of three 
years, on the other. The aim of presenting the above information is to show that whereas few 
district councils have complied with minimum conditions, a smaller number of districts 
councils have totally failed to comply with the minimum conditions. Further, the information 
shows that between 2006 and 2008, district councils’ compliance with the minimum 
                                                 
102 The AAMC&PMLG Synthesis Report 2010: 19 
103 Shah 2010: 5. 
104 Shah 2010: 6. 
105 Lambright 2011: 39. 
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conditions drastically declined, but stabilised between 2008 and 2009. The stabilisation in the 
performance demonstrates the positive contribution of the penalty/reward scheme.  
For instance, of the performance of 80 districts, 13 municipalities, five city divisions and 
1006 subcounties and town councils from 2006 to 2009 shows a less than average level of 
performance.106 Of the 80 district councils assessed, only 42% were rewarded with more 
funds for good performance, 30% were static, meaning there was no improvement and hence 
no funding was extended to them, while 28 % were penalized meaning that they were subject 
withholding of their funds. Of the 13 municipal councils assessed, 44% were rewarded, 22% 
were static, and 34% were penalised. Of all the subcounty councils assessed, only 23.1% were 
rewarded, 9.2% were static, and 67.7% were penalised. Of the 37 municipal divisions 
assessed, 54% were rewarded, 26.6% were static, and 24.4 % were penalised.  
For political reasons, the central government rarely penalises district councils by withholding 
funds due to underperformance.107 Thus, the practical relevancy of the penalty/reward scheme 
in ensuring that the existing financial management accounting and accounting rules are 
complied with is very much limited by the central government. It is argued that part of the 
reason why of the central government has not withheld the funds under the scheme is because 
the central government uses the scheme to promote cooperation rather than to penalise and 
thus destabilise the relationship. For instance, the decision to withhold funds on account of 
failure to comply with mutually agreeable targets may damage the much needed cooperation 
between the central government and the penalised district council(s). 
                                                 
106 See MOLG Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments 
2009: Synthesis Report March 2010. 
107 Azfar, Livingston & Meagher in Bardhan 2006: 232. 
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Figure 11: Percentage performance of district, municipal, subcounty and divisions (2006-2009) 
 
Source: MOLG Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments 
2009: Synthesis Report pp 9-52. 
 
A comparison may be made between the district councils compliance with the minim 
conditions in 2009 with the trend of performance of a period of the previous three years. The 
overall performance of district councils over a period of three years indicates that compliance 
with the minimum conditions was at 82 % in 2006. The findings also indicate a sharp decline 
in compliance with the minimum conditions to 50% in 2007. In 2008 the district council’s 
compliance with minimum conditions declined to 34%, although it improved in 2009 to 
61%.108 
                                                 
108 See MOLG Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments 
2009: Synthesis Report March 2010 p 9. 
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The overall performance of district councils over a period of three years indicates that 
compliance with the minimum conditions was at 82 % in 2006. The findings also indicate a 
sharp decline in compliance with the minimum conditions to 50% in 2007. In 2008 the district 
council’s compliance with minimum conditions declined to 34%, although it improved in 
2009 to 61%.109 
Table II: Performance trends in district councils 
Figure 12: Performance trends in district councils 
 
Source: MOLG The Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local 
Governments 2009: Synthesis Report p 12. 
 
                                                 
109 See the Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments 
2009: Synthesis Report March 2010 p 9. 
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3.9.3 Assessment  
Lambright argues that the performance of district councils in Uganda is directly related to the 
degree of central government supervision and finds no evidence that stringent central 
government supervision of a district council leads to an improvement in the district council’s 
performance. On the contrary, district councils with few administrative links to the centre 
performed extremely well.110 It is argued here that the intrusive monitoring role of the above 
institutions in part explain the poor performance of many district councils in Uganda.  
Arguably, Uganda’s penalty/reward scheme, as observed by Shah, is an honest example of 
results-based intergovernmental finance that is capable of minimising trade-offs between 
district councils’ autonomy and accountability in service delivery.111 The absence of any legal 
basis for the penalty/reward scheme may discredit it as a subtle means of control of district 
councils by the central government. 
Kugonza and Namara in principle agree with the observations of Shah. However, the authors 
find that the information on district council performance is misleading for a few reasons. 
First, the penalty/reward scheme focuses on ‘workload and cost measures (which are 
relatively easy to collect and apply) and not on the results of service delivery, such as quality 
of service and achievement of goals and standards’.112 Second, the penalty/reward scheme 
lacks a commitment to the principal elements of openness. In other words, the indicators of 
good performance were not clearly and transparently stated to the districts councils in 
advance. The authenticity and usefulness of the information relied on to reward or penalise a 
                                                 
110 Lambright 2011: 107-10. 
111 Shah 2010: 13. 
112 Kugonza & Namara 2012: 4. See also Lambright (2011: 39), who adopts a similar criticism of the scheme. 
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district council is questionable. Moreover, according to the authors, the ‘irregular releases and 
arbitrary budget cuts’ for district councils that performed well in the earlier stages of the 
scheme seemed to have demotivated many other district councils.113 Third, there are 
allegations that some of the figures on the district councils’ performance were tampered with 
by the assessors. The alleged fraud in the scheme fundamentally undermined its credibility. It 
is also argued that creation of many districts weakened the inbuilt district council capacity to 
comply with future benchmarks.114  
Reiterating the criteria established in Chapter Three on supervision115 it is argued that the 
reporting systems discussed above are unpredictable, do not respect the autonomy of district 
councils and go beyond the intended purpose of reporting. For instance, the DPSF was 
published in 2006. It is difficult and potentially confusing for district councils to link the 
DPSF to the current legal framework on decentralisation that came into existence in 1995. 
This confusion is not mitigated by the unclear role the various members of the JARD. In any 
case, because it is prone to manipulation, the penalty/reward scheme may undermine the 
autonomy of the district councils.  
4. Interventions in district councils 
In Chapter Three, the importance of interventions in district councils by the central 
government was highlighted. It was argued that, despite the fact that an intervention in a 
district council may appear oppressive by its nature, it is an inevitable and temporary 
                                                 
113 Kugonza & Namara 2012: 4. 
114 Kugonza & Namara 2012: 15-16. 
115 Chapter Three §3.8.4. 
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corrective measure.116 As a rule, it was argued that intervention in local governments should 
be predictable, respect the autonomy of local government and must be proportional to the 
perused objective.117 In the discussion below, the legal framework governing the central 
government interventions in district councils is examined. 
4.1 Intervention by presidential assumption of a local government’s powers 
Article 202(1) of the Constitution provides for the assumption of the executive and legislative 
powers of a district council by the President. Three main grounds for the assumption of 
executive and legislative powers are given. 
4.2 Grounds for Intervention  
The first ground of intervention is under Article 202(2)(a) of the Constitution. The President 
may intervene on the request of a district council as long as it is in the public interest. It is 
argued that even when the President is requested to intervene, the autonomy of the district is 
not diminished. The word ‘request’ does not imply that a district council can, without strong 
reasons, abdicate its constitutional, political, and developmental roles to the central 
government. 
The second ground of intervention by the President in a district council is upon the declaration 
of a state of emergency in a district or in Uganda. Article 202(2)(b) of the Constitution 
regulates the manner in which a state of emergency can be declared: 
• the President must only declare a state of emergency in consultation with the 
Cabinet and with the approval of Parliament; 
                                                 
116 See Chapter Three §3.9.3. 
117 See Chapter Three §3.9.3. 
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• there must be a threat of war or external aggression, a threat to the security or 
economic life of the country, or part thereof, an insurgency, or a natural disaster; 
• a state of emergency may be declared where conditions exist that warrant taking 
measures to secure ‘public safety, the defence of Uganda and the maintenance of 
public order’. For instance, the outbreak of a civil war or a highly contagious 
disease may trigger a Presidential intervention in a district council; and 
• where the developmental needs of the district council warrant an intervention, such 
as failure to deliver ‘supplies and services essential to the life of the 
community’.118 For example where a district council is unable to provide rural 
roads, or rural ambulance services so that local pregnant women are unable to 
attend access antenatal services, an intervention therein should be justified.  
The third ground of intervention by the President is a district council is where there is 
‘extreme difficulty or impossibility’ for the district local government to function.119 The 
phrase ‘extreme difficulty or impossibility’ is open to various interpretations. The word 
‘extreme’ denotes exceptional circumstances, a severe situation.120 
The word ‘difficulty’ implies an element of a serious situation.121 In other words, the 
exceptional circumstances on which the President has to base his or her intervention in a 
district council have to be of such a nature that something serious may happen in the district 
council. The word ‘impossibility’ implies an element of restraint on the part of a district 
                                                 
118 Article 110(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
119 Article 202(1)(a), (b) & (c) of the Constitution. 
120 Kavanagh 2002: 409. 
121 Kavanagh 2002: 325. 
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council to exercise its powers and perform its functions.122 The use of ‘or’ between the words 
‘difficulty’ and ‘impossibility’ suggests that the exceptional circumstances need not be of 
both a difficult and serious nature. Once it is proven that exceptional circumstances are of a 
‘difficult’ nature, there is no need for determining that the exceptional circumstances are of an 
‘impossible’ kind. 
An intervention must be predictable, respect the autonomy of local governments and be 
proportional. Instances such as maladministration, incompetence, ethnically based violence, 
natural calamities such as famine and civil war, qualify to be described as ‘extreme difficulty 
or impossible’ so as to legally justify an intervention. Although Article 202 of the 
Constitution does not provide any helpful insights, the Odoki Report gives a hint of what the 
phrase ‘extreme difficulty or impossibility’ could mean: ‘widespread corruption, abuse of 
office, gross financial mismanagement, breakdown of law and order, and activities which 
threaten national unity or sovereignty of the country.’ 123 It is noted that a threat to 
‘sovereignty’, as recommended by the Odoki Report, is not a sufficient and adequate 
definition because it is linked to an act of aggression against the state for which a district 
council may not be responsible.  
4.3 Consequence of intervention 
As will be explained below, an intervention in a district council places an onerous financial 
burden on the central government and radically limits a district council’s political autonomy.  
Section 100 of the LGA repeats verbatim the provisions of Article 202(1) of the Constitution. 
Two additional conditions are provided for under section 100A of the LGA. First, once the 
                                                 
122 Kavanagh 2002: 580. 
123 Odoki Commission p 515 para 18.170. 
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political authority of a district council has been assumed by the President, the central 
government must finance all decentralised services from the national budget that are allocated 
to a district council vote ran by the CAO.124 Secondly, for the period that the President 
assumes the district council’s political authority, the central government’s conditional grant to 
it must be ‘utilised under the supervision of the permanent secretary for local 
governments.’125 This means that where the President intervenes in a district council, the 
central government’s grants to a district council that is subject to intervention are in fact 
retained and re-channelled through a specific budget vote controlled by the central 
government accounting officer.  
It is argued that the above provision amounts to a ‘bailout’. Conventional wisdom in the 
literature on intergovernmental financing is that bailouts provide the wrong incentive and 
suggest that district councils can expect to receive ‘easy money’ from the central government 
as long as they perform poorly.126 Not only does the promise of a bail-out provide the wrong 
incentive, it also seems to go against the intentions of the penalty/reward scheme. Ordinarily, 
financial incentives should be given to districts that perform exceptionally well and not those 
that have failed to perform their functions. 
Where the unexpired term remaining for the district council leaders is more than 12 months, 
the President must order fresh elections. 127 This means that there is no need for conducting 
fresh elections where the remaining term of office is less than 12 months.  
                                                 
124 Section 100A (2) of the LGA. 
125 Section 100A (2) of the LGA. 
126 De Visser 2005: 25. 
127 Article 202(4)(b)(i) of the Constitution. 
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4.4 Checks and balances 
The President’s intervention in a district council is generally limited to 90 days. The 
President’s period of intervention in a district council may be extended beyond 90 days with 
the approval of if Parliament.128 However, it is the role of Parliament to determine if 
circumstances have indeed changed to end the intervention.129 It is noted that that even if 
conditions existed justifying the continuation of a presidential intervention is a district 
council, Parliament cannot extent a Presidential intervention in a district council beyond 12 
months (one year). This is an essential safeguard that is aimed at protecting the integrity of a 
district council. 
4.5  Assessment  
Since 1995, the President has never invoked his powers to intervene in any district council. 
Clearly, the two-decades-old civil war in northern Uganda, which has been described as 
‘social torture’,130 would have been legitimate grounds for the President to take over most 
district councils’ powers in that part of the country, on the basis of Article 202(1)(b) of the 
Constitution. It is argued that the presidential interventions in district councils have been 
conducted outside the above legal framework. For instance, the central government generally 
allocates funds and human resources to the districts in northern Uganda region, the districts in 
the Karamoja region and the districts in ‘the Luweero Triangle’ region, districts that lack the 
requisite financial ability and human resource capacity necessary to deliver essential services 
                                                 
128 Article 202(3) of the Constitution. 
129 Article 202(4)(b) of the Constitution. 
130 Dolan 2009: 39. 
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to their local communities as a result of civil wars and historical economic imbalances.131 It is 
maintained that preferential treatment of districts in the above three regions is evidence that 
the legal framework on presidential intervention in district councils has not been complied 
with. 
The nature of the intervention in district councils by the central government is assessed under 
the criteria of predictability, respect of district council autonomy and proportionality.132 It is 
argued that it is not clear to district councils when the central government is permitted to 
intervene in their affairs. For example, for two decades, the central government did not 
intervene in many northern Uganda districts, yet those districts had failed to deliver the 
essential services such as primary education, primary healthcare and the rural ambulance 
services. Moreover the fact that intervention in a district council may result into a ‘bailout’ 
suggests that an intervention is not every time intended to support district councils, but rather 
to address, underlying political questions like in the case of war torn district in Uganda. The 
fact that fresh district council elections must be conducted where the remaining term after the 
intervention is more than 12 months is a feature that demonstrates respect for district 
councils’ autonomy. 
                                                 
131 These districts have special development programs under the Prime Minister’s office with specific dockets of 
the Minister of State for Northern Uganda, the Minister of State for Luwero Triangle and a full cabinet Minister 
for Karamoja Affairs. See GoU (Office of the Prime Minister) Second Northern Uganda social action fund 
(NUSAF2) operations manual 2010 covering 40 districts and GOU Luwero Rwenzori Development Programme 
(LRDP) 2012/2013 covering 40 districts from Central and Western Uganda. The main objective of these 
development programs is to address the post-war socio-economic challenges in these districts.  
 
132 See Chapter Three §3.8.4. 
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5. Co-operative government 
In Chapter Three, it was argued that cooperation as a feature of IGR manifests a collective 
exercise of power for the common good. It was argued that cooperation operates on the 
assumption that decentralisation can only succeed if national policies are sensitive to local 
preferences and priorities. Cooperation is therefore built on the interconnectedness of both the 
central government and local governments.133 
5.1 The constitutional framework 
The Constitution imposes an obligation on the state to foster national unity, peace and 
stability.134 In addition, there is an obligation on the state to promote a culture of co-
operation, appreciation, tolerance, and respect.135 Although the ‘culture’ of co-operation is 
confined to ‘customs, traditions and beliefs’, it is argued that the above obligation can be 
expansively interpreted.  
In addition, there is a constitutional obligation to nurture institutions and procedures that aim 
to solve conflicts ‘fairly and peacefully’.136 Article 176(2)(a) of the Constitution, calls for 
cooperation (commonly referred to as the co-ordinate principle in federal countries), between 
the central government and district councils in the pursuits of the country’s development 
objectives.137 
                                                 
133 Chapter Three § 3.8.5.1. 
134 See the NODPSP No.2 (i). 
135 See the NODPSP No.2 (ii). 
136 See the NODPSP No.2 (iii). 
137 See Hills (1998: 815) & De Villiers (1994: 431), who discuss the co-ordinate theory in federalism. 
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6. Instruments of co-operative government in Uganda 
There are many instruments of IGR that are linked to cooperation in Uganda. These are: the 
Uganda Local Governments Association (ULGA), the Local Government Financial 
Commission (LGFC), Intergovernmental Agreements, and Integrated Development Plans 
(IDP). Each of these instruments shall be analysed below. 
6.1 Uganda Local Governments Association  
The Constitution does not provide for organised local governments. Hence, the legal status of 
the ULGA is not very clear. The only place in the Constitution where role of the ULGA is 
found is Article 194(2) of the Constitution. Under this article, organised local governments 
must nominate four members to the LGFC.138 The legislative status of the ULGA can be 
located in the Companies Act, 139 and the Trustees (Incorporation) Act, as a registered trustee, 
just like any other incorporated trust.140 This means that by and large the LGA is governed by 
                                                 
138 During the CA debates at p 3927, it was suggested that the nomination of members by the district councils 
(under Article 194(2) of the Constitution) to the LGFC would be made by ‘some kind of trade union of local 
governments’. In South Africa, for instance, section 163 of the Constitution expressly provides for organised 
local governments as forums for consultation in the legislative process, and mandates Parliament to make 
provision for the procedure by which they may carry out their constitutional mandate. Further, section 3(3) of the 
Systems Act provides for the object of organised local government:  
For the purpose of effective co-operative government, organised local government must seek to— 
(a) develop common approaches for local government as a distinct sphere of government; 
(b) enhance co-operation, mutual assistance and sharing of resources among municipalities; 
(c) find solutions for problems relating to local government generally; and 
(d) facilitate compliance with the principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations. 
139 See sections 1(g) and 3(2)(b) of the Companies Act Cap 110. 
140 See section 1(3) of the Trustees Act Cap 164 and section 1(3) of the Trustees Incorporation Act Cap 165. 
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the Companies Act as a non-profitmaking incorporated trust. The ULGA derives its mandate 
from the voluntary adoption of its Constitution by the member local government councils.141 
The ULGA consists of all the local governments of Uganda and their affiliate organisations 
and professional bodies.142 The mandate of the ULGA is to promote unity and efficiency in 
local government. In addition, the ULGA is mandated to create a forum for the discussion of 
matters of mutual interest. Further, the ULGA has the duty to prepare reports to members and 
stakeholders dealing with matters affecting local government.143 Arguably, the duty to prepare 
reports is linked to the ULGA ability to conduct research for the benefits of members and 
stakeholders. 
The ULGA’s critical areas of focus have been district council financing, sectoral policies, 
capacity building, and democracy.144 For example, the ULGA raised concerns about the 
absence of guidelines for multiparty politics in district councils,145 poor remuneration of 
                                                 
141 Article 3(1) of the ULGA Constitution. 
142 Article 3(2), (3), (4) and (5) of the ULGA Constitution. Under Article 3(5) of the ULGA Constitution the 
Association of District Speakers (UDICOSA), the Association of Chief Administrative Officers (ALGAOU), 
and the Association of Chief Finance Officers (CFO’s) are listed as affiliate members. 
143 See generally article 2 of the ULGA Constitution; Article 2(2)(a) of the ULGA Constitution. 
144 See the achievements of the ULGA, available at http://www.ulga.org/achievements.html. It could be implied 
that whenever the ULGA makes submissions on local government finances, it is against the backdrop of Articles 
194(2) & (4) of the Constitution dealing with the LGFC. These Articles provide for four members of the 
Commission as nominees of the local governments, while carrying out its advisory role. Moreover, the OAG 
must give a copy of it reports under section 87(3)(f) of the LGA to the LGFC.  
145 The ULGA Corporate Strategic Plan p 14. 
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district councillors, Value Added Tax (VAT) arrears, and the increasing domestic debt of 
district councils.146 
In its advocacy role, the ULGA has for example made a detailed submission to Parliament on 
the challenges created by the establishment of RGs and the fear of ‘recentralisation’.147 
The role and extent of the ULGA in ensuring effective participation is crucial to co-operative 
governance.148 At a thematic level the ULGA seeks to limit centrally imposed targets for 
service delivery by complementing them with locally driven ones. The ULGA also seeks to 
develop a mechanism for oversight and scrutiny, such as the district council anti-
competitiveness and anti-corruption strategies.149 
The role of the ULGA in peace building can be seen from the special attention that it accords 
to the local governments in areas emerging from conflict. For example, the ULGA’s strategic 
plan proposes to increase flexibility in grants to Northern Uganda and to promote peace 
efforts in areas emerging from conflicts.150 
The ULGA seems to have made these significant contributions to cooperative governance 
despite the existence of serious legal impediments arising from its obscure legal status. 
                                                 
146 See the achievements of the ULGA, available at http://www.ulga.org/achievements.html. 
147 See the ULGA submission of issues on the Constitution (Amendment) No.2 Bill of 2005 to the Parliamentary 
Sessional Committee on Public Services and Local Government May 2005 p 6-7; the ULGA Corporate Strategic 
Plan p 13. 
148 The ULGA Corporate Strategic Plan p 16. 
149 The ULGA Corporate Strategic Plan p 21. 
150 The ULGA Corporate Strategic Plan p 13. 
 
 
 
 
474 
 
Chapter 9: Intergovernmental Relations in Uganda 
As long as the ULGA depends on voluntary membership and the goodwill of the central 
government for its existence, its contribution will remain limited. The views expressed by 
ULGA may never been taken into account by both the central government and district 
councils. A legally recognised ULGA is helpful in that its opinions and recommendations 
may be considered by both the central government and district councils. It is recommended 
that the LGA should be amended to provide for a principle of consultation with organised 
local governments. 
6.2 The Local Government Finance Commission (LGFC) 
The Constitution calls for the establishment of a seven member LGFC by the President. 
Under the Constitution, four of the seven members have to be nominated by district councils 
in the country.151 Members of the LGFC are vested with the power to elect from amongst 
themselves a chairperson and a vice-chairperson. In theory, members nominated by the 
ULGA have control of the Commission.152  
The LGFC is mandated to advise the President on the distribution of revenue between the 
different orders of government and the allocation of funds from the Consolidated Fund.153 
The LGFC also considers and recommends to the President potential district council revenue 
sources.154 In addition, the LGFC advises district councils on appropriate ‘tax levels to be 
levied by local governments’.155 It is not clear what the phrase ‘tax levels’ means. It may refer 
                                                 
151 Article 194(1) of the Constitution. 
152 Article 194(2) & (3) of the Constitution. 
153 Article 194(4)(b) of the Constitution. 
154 Article 194(4)(c) of the Constitution. 
155 Article 194(4)(d) of the Constitution. 
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to district council tax rates and taxable income. It probably refers to the question as to what is 
an appropriate tax burden on district council residents. Thus, the LGFC may advise the central 
government on the rate of district council property tax or on the determination of the district 
council residents’ incomes that should be subject to taxation or exempted. 
In the CA debates the LGFC was considered as an ‘arbiter’ between the central government 
and district councils and as a ‘lobbying’ and ‘negotiating body’ for district councils.156 What 
came out of the CA debates was that it had to be independent and act as a link between the 
central government and the district councils, while avoiding the fray of politics.157 Given that 
the majority of the members of the LGDC are the ULGA’s nominees, the assumption here is 
that the LGFC represents the district councils’ interests. The LGFC therefore provides a 
mechanism through which district councils can engage the central government on matters of 
district council revenue generation and sharing.  
An assessment of the LGFC should be viewed in relation to its two critical roles: as a 
platform on which the central government and district councils can discuss matters of mutual 
interest, on the one hand, and as a lobbying group for district councils, on the other. There is 
no tangible evidence that the LGFC is taken seriously by the central government. Other than 
carrying out a study to expand district councils’ revenue sources, the LGFC has been 
unsuccessful in lobbying for more autonomy in the determination of district council tax rates 
or the identification of stable district council tax bases, such as electricity, water tariffs and 
trading licences, to mention but a few. The approach adopted by the LGFC in making a case 
for reinstatement of the graduated tax as a source of district council revenue has so far borne 
                                                 
156 CA debates p 3920. 
157 CA debates p 3920-1. 
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no fruit.158 Its ability to build consensus and mutual respect between the two orders of 
government is therefore limited. 
6.3 Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) 
In Chapter Three it was argued that decentralisation is crucial for prioritising the 
developmental needs of local communities. Development needs, the argument went, are better 
identified by the local communities, rather than dictated by local governments or imposed on 
them by central government. The Chapter called for joint plans between the central 
government and district councils.159 In the discussion below, legal framework for district 
councils’ joint plans is examined. 
6.3.1 Constitutional framework 
Planning is a central government competency.160 According to the National Objectives and 
Directive Principles of State Policy (NODPSP), the Constitution directs the state ‘to adopt an 
                                                 
158 For example, in 2007 district council leaders, through the LGFC, boycotted a National Budget Consultative 
meeting organised by the Ministry of Finance, protesting against non-remittance of Graduated Tax 
Compensation Funds. The district council leaders were not happy that the then Minister of Finance, Dr Ezra 
Suruma, had deliberately ignored ‘their concerns and [the LGFC] refused to meet with the ministry again until 
the issue was resolved’. See Andrew Bagala ‘District Bosses Storm out of the Government Meeting’ The Daily 
Monitor 7 December 2007, cited in Lambright (2011: 119-20). 
159 See Chapter Three §3.10.2. 
160 Article 125 of the Constitution. See also the Sixth Schedule which makes reference to Article 189 of the 
Constitution: Item 13 of the Sixth Schedule states that functions and services for which Government is 
responsible include ‘[m]aking national plans for the provision of services and coordinating plans made by local 
governments’. In Chapter Seven, it was argued that not all the powers under the Sixth Schedule are exclusive to 
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integrated and co-ordinated planning approach’.161 It is argued that the words ‘integrated and 
coordinated’ as used by the Constitution directs the central government to consider district 
council plans before the central government plans are adopted. In turn, district councils are 
obliged to ensure that before any district council’s plans are forwarded to the National 
Planning Authority, the lower council’s plans are incorporated therein.162 
6.3.2 Legislative framework 
On the basis of the principles that follow from Articles 176(2)(b)163 and 190 of the 
Constitution, section 36 of the LGA was enacted. Section 36(1) of the LGA provides that the 
exercise of the district local government planning powers is vested in the district planning 
committee and planning units. A district local government planning committee is chaired by 
the COA and consists of the heads of department of the district and any members co-opted by 
the COA. Section 36(2) of the LGA provides that the role of the district planning committee 
is to co-ordinate and integrate all the sectoral plans of the lower local governments before any 
such plans can be presented to the district local government council. 
                                                                                                                                                        
the central government, which clearly makes planning a local government competency that is shared with the 
central government.  
161 NODPSP para 12(1). 
162 Article 190 of the Constitution. 
163 Articles 176(2)(b) provides  
‘decentralisation shall be a principle applying to all levels of local government and, in particular, from higher to 
lower local government units to ensure peoples’ participation and democratic control in decision making’. 
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6.4 District councils planning cycles 
District council plans in Uganda take the form of public investment plans (PIP). District 
council plans must sufficiently consider the interest of both private and public sector 
demands. All district council plans essentially follow six phases, namely (1) identification, (2) 
screening and selection, (3) preparation, (4) appraisal, (5) implementation and monitoring, 
and (6) project evaluation and ex-post evaluation of a project.164 It is argued that all the 
district plans follow the same cycle. 
                                                 
164 Henry K Decentralised District Development Planning: A Guide to Development Planning p 1-4. 
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Figure 13: Planning cycle of district councils 
 
First, the identification of projects involves defining its objectives and the means to achieve 
those objectives. In theory, local communities should be involved in the process of identifying 
particular projects. The reasoning here is that identification of projects should match local 
preferences. Secondly, a district council project must be screened. The process of screening a 
project helps to ensure that the priorities are agreed upon. At this stage the merits and 
demerits of the project are considered by the Technical Planning Committee and the 
respective district council standing committee. Thirdly, the district council project must be 
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standing committees and lower councils. It is important at this stage to ascertain the source of 
funding.  
Fourthly, the district council project must be implemented and monitored. It is the role of 
district councils, the TPCs, and the Executive Committees to implement and monitor district 
council projects.165 At this stage, workplans are presented and resources mobilised for the 
project. No project can be implemented unless the district council has approved the budget.166  
Fifthly, district council projects must be appraised. At this stage, the performance reports are 
prepared and analysed with the aim of altering of the project design, if necessary. Finally, the 
district council project must be evaluated by district councils, the TPCs, the district council 
standing committees, the external support agencies (ESAs), donors (commonly referred to as 
development partners), NGOs, interest groups and central government. At this stage, 
performance reports are examined, possible changes in project design may be mooted, and 
ideas can be generated for new projects.167  
It is argued that within the broader framework of IGR, the above planning cycle must be 
linked to the central government oversight role in ensuring that future district council plans 
result into improved service delivery. 
                                                 
165 Section 17(a) of the LGA. 
166 Article 191(1) of the Constitution and Section 82(1) of the LGA 
167 Henry K Decentralised District Development Planning: A Guide to Development Planning p 5. 
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6.4.1 Assessment 
The office of the COA has been described in Chapter Seven.168 An important aspect of the 
COA is that s/he is a technical civil servant in the district and the accounting officer that 
chairs the technical planning team in every district council. So the question here is: to what 
extent do district councils exercise their discretion to initiate their development plans through 
the CAO since the central government directly appoints the CAO? It is argued that a centrally 
appointed CAO may, in certain instances, ignore local priorities in the design of district plans. 
In practice, the design of district council plans through the office of the CAO reveals central 
government hegemony in the IDP. In any case district council discretion to prioritise their 
plans is limited by budget ceilings imposed by the central government.169 For example, as 
discussed in Chapter Eight, district councils depend on central government conditional to 
fund their functions.170 These grants have detailed guidelines for their use and the amount 
thereof is determined by the respective ministries, with little input from the district councils. 
The district councils are, in theory, prohibited from adopting budgets for education, primary 
health care or rural roads that exceed the conditional grants.171 Lambright, however, finds 
little evidence that district councils that violated the budget ceilings were penalised by the 
central government.172  
                                                 
168 Chapter Seven §7.5.6.2. 
169 Azfar et al in Bardhan et al 2006: 226. For example, according to the Local Government Financial and 
Accounting Regulations (LGAFR), a district council cannot spend more than 15% of its annual local revenue on 
the allowances and salaries of the district council officials. 
170 See Chapter Eight §8.3.2. 
171 Lambright 2011: 126-7. 
172 Lambright 2011: 127. 
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The intergovernmental utility of planning system is undermined by two major factors. First, 
district councils depend primarily on conditional grants which leave little room for local 
discretion to be deployed in these local plans. Secondly, district councils’ ability to raise their 
own revenue is very much limited by the overregulation of their taxing power by the central 
government. In effect, the district planning system is actually centrally directed. 
6.5 Dispute resolution mechanisms in IGR 
In Chapter Three, it was argued that given the central government regulation of local 
governments, conflicts are bound to emerge. If these conflicts are not well managed they may 
undermine the intended objective of decentralisation. It was also pointed out that the practice 
in other countries has been that courts will not entertain an intergovernmental dispute unless 
efforts have been made by the state organs involved to resolve them amicably outside the 
mainstream adjudication systems.173  
There is no specific provision for an intergovernmental dispute resolution mechanism in 
Uganda. Yet there is evidence that there are numerous instances of intergovernmental disputes 
in Uganda’s decentralised system. For instance, conflicts have arisen in areas such as district 
councils’ law-making process,174 district council budget processes, the allocation of central 
government fiscal transfers and the district councils’ taxing discretion. A case in point is the 
unilateral suspension of graduated tax by the President.175 Conflicts have arisen in the 
creation of districts, especially in the determination of district boundaries, in cases where 
                                                 
173 Chapter Three §3.10.5.  
174 Chapter Seven §7.5.2. 
175 Chapter Eight §8. 2.3.2. 
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ethnic tensions are rife in particular areas,176 and the unilateral central government 
intervention in conflicts between the district speakers and district council chairpersons.177 
Further, intergovernmental disputes have arisen on the correct procedure for removing elected 
leaders from district councils178 and in the appointment and disciplining of the CAO.179 
The absence of intergovernmental dispute resolution mechanisms is in part explained by the 
overregulation of district council institutions, powers and functions that provides little 
incentive for finding alternative ways to resolve disputes. The majority of intergovernmental 
conflicts are referred to courts with all the attendant financial inconveniences and disruptions 
to the delivery of services.180 Where recourse to court is not considered viable, these 
intergovernmental disputes are either managed by the Ministry of Local Government or 
personally resolved by the President. Intergovernmental disputes appear to be resolved 
through the centralised party structure. It can be argued that the central government is 
therefore the final arbiter on any intergovernmental conflict.  
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined IGR in Uganda from two main angles: supervision and co-
operation. As argued at the outset of the chapter, supervision is considered the ‘hard edge’ of 
IGR, while co-operation is considered the ‘soft edge’. In answering the question whether the 
framework and practice of supervision in Uganda comply with the criteria of predictability, 
                                                 
176 Chapter Five §5.3.3. 
177 Chapter Six §6.12.2. 
178 Chapter Six §6.7.4.4. 
179 Chapter Seven §7.5.6.4. 
180 See the Hajji Mohammed Baswari Kezaala cases discussed in Chapter Six §6.9.4.6. 
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respect for autonomy and proportionality, as provided in Chapter Three, it is reiterated that 
they do not. For instance, there is clear evidence of overregulation of the district council 
institutions, powers and functions. Besides, the monitoring of district councils, which is open 
to abuse, seems to clog the political space of district councils. As noted, whereas the OAG is 
an important instrument to enforce accountability in district councils, the ability of many 
district councils to use its reports in order to demand more accountability is limited by lack of 
skills by the majority of district councillors. In addition, as was discussed, the monitoring role 
of IGG in district councils is inclined to an intervention, a weakness that undermines the role 
of monitoring in IGR. Lastly, the use of RDCs to monitor district councils is limited by their 
skills deficiencies as well as their inclination towards enforcing of central government 
policies and limiting local civil liberties rather than to monitor service delivery. Some writers 
argue that institutions such as the OAG, the IGG and RDC are ‘external control and 
accountability mechanisms’ in district councils.181 This is misleading as they are in fact part 
of IGR.182 It is argued that the central government uses the above organs to ‘force’ district 
councils to be more accountable to the electorate.183  
Further, in answering the question whether the practice of cooperation in Uganda’s 
decentralisation system complies with the criteria given in Chapter Three, it is also argued 
that it does not. The muted roles of the LGFC and the ULGA (essential institutions of 
cooperation in IGR) do not support a finding of cooperation in Uganda’s decentralised system 
of government. Instead the chapter presents evidence of the central government’s subtle 
control of the district council plans, as merely a loose form of cooperation in Uganda’s IGR. 
                                                 
181 Kakumba & Fourie 2008: 122; Shah 1997: 15-16. 
182 Azfar, Kahkonen, and Meagher 2001: 49. 
183 Kakumba & Fourie 2008: 123. 
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It is maintained that the absence of formal mechanisms for intergovernmental dispute 
resolution has also resulted in the clogging of the mainstream courts with district council 
cases that that are political in nature, which ordinarily would have been resolved through IGR. 
The absence of formal mechanism of intergovernmental dispute resolution has therefore 
added more strain to an already struggling system of decentralisation in Uganda that require 
immediate legal reform. 
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10. CHAPTER TEN 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Introduction 
Building on the emerging international soft law on decentralisation, the thesis has argued that 
decentralisation has become a focal point for reforming developing states, especially those 
emerging from conflict. A crucial element in the argument of this thesis is that ethnicity is an 
important sociological and constitutional question in the devolution of power in multi-ethnic 
countries such as Uganda and that the exclusion of ethnicity in the devolution process 
typically has dire consequences. 
The thesis’s central argument is that for successful decentralisation as a state reform strategy, 
developing countries should consider protecting the integrity of decentralising measures by 
constitutionally recognising local governments, establishing an independent boundary 
demarcation system, designing an adequate local government electoral model and recognising 
the role of traditional leaders. Secondly, developing countries should vest local governments 
with a clear functional authority and with the discretion to exercise an adequate degree of 
fiscal and administrative autonomy. Lastly, developing countries must provide for an 
equitable system of intergovernmental transfers and a sound system of intergovernmental 
relations.  
The thesis has argued that in theory decentralisation is good for development, democracy and 
the accommodation of diversity, and therefore the institutions, powers and functions of local 
government must be designed to achieve these goals.  
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2. Has decentralisation failed in Uganda? 
The thesis finds that decentralisation, as a state reform measure in Uganda, has neither failed 
nor succeeded. The Ugandan government’s own assessment of the decentralisation seems to 
come to a similar conclusion. On the scale of 1-10, Uganda’s decentralisation scores an 
average of 5.7 points.1 The description of Uganda’s legal and institutional architecture on 
decentralisation began with an overview of the historical development of local government. 
The decentralisation program in Uganda was initiated by the military government formed 
after a five-year guerrilla war that formally ended in 1986, but in reality continued in the 
northern part of the country until 2010. Thus, decentralisation in Uganda may be considered a 
political and military strategy of the victorious against the vanquished. It is likely that some of 
the district council institutions were adopted with a military culture that places emphasis on 
‘order and discipline’, rather than on consultation and dialogue.2 
The brief findings were that post-independence political instability and economic 
underdevelopment are explained by over-centralisation of state power that limited the right of 
local communities to participate in the decision-making process. Thus, the new constitutional 
order that recognises district councils desired to reform the nature of the state in Uganda, and 
to establish a democratic state geared at improving the material well-being of local 
communities.  
The thesis argued that decentralisation is predicated on the idea of social freedom and 
democratic governance. However, there is little evidence that the devolution of power to 
                                                 
1 See the Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments 2009: 
Synthesis Report March 2010 p 9. 
2 Makara 2009: 64. 
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district councils has significantly changed the nature and character of post-independence 
Uganda. For instance, the available research shows that the quality of political freedoms in 
Uganda is below average and is not different from many other developing countries that are 
described as ‘partly free’, ‘undemocratic’ or ‘not fully democratic’.3 Decentralisation is also 
associated with improvement in the material well-being of local communities as a result of 
improvement in the delivery of local services. However, the mapping of poverty in Uganda by 
Emwanu in 2008, covering 52 districts over the period 2002 to 2005, shows mixed results. On 
one hand, the study shows a marked decline in the incidence of poverty nationally from 39% 
to 31%,4 but at the same time, rural districts in the northern parts of the country have higher 
poverty levels of 64.9% when compared with rural districts in western Uganda of 21.4%. In 
addition, the districts in the northern parts of the country have a higher poverty gap of 23.5% 
compared to the poverty gap of 4.52% in districts in the western parts of the country.5  
                                                 
3 See Oloka-Onyango 2007: 24. See also Freedom House Report 2011 available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2011/uganda (accessed 13 June 2012). In the 2012 Freedom 
House report, Uganda is conspicuously excluded from the 115 countries in the world that are described as 
‘Electoral Democracies’. 
4 Emwanu 2008: 6. It is noted that as of 2011, Uganda had 112 districts, implying that the above poverty 
mapping percentage figures have considerably changed. See also Singiza & De Visser (2011: 4-5), who discuss 
the effect of creating many districts in Uganda. 
5 Emwanu 2008:7. Emwanu et al (2008: 4) explain that the ‘[p]overty gap (IP), provides information on the 
depth of poverty. It captures the average expenditure shortfall, or gap, for the poor in a given area to reach the 
poverty line. It measures the poverty deficit of the population or the resources that would be needed to lift all the 
poor in that area out of poverty if one were able to perfectly target cash transfers towards closing the gap.’ 
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These figures are in accord with the latest 2010 report on the performance of local 
governments throughout the country.6 The poverty mapping figures in 52 districts, and the 
continued evidence of administrative malady, underpin the fact that the economic efficiency 
and fiscal discipline that are associated with decentralisation have not translated into the 
improved material well-being of the majority of the people at grassroots level. The thesis, on 
account of the above figures, in no way finds that decentralisation as a system of government 
has failed. Rather, the thesis maintains that serious flaws in the legal and policy framework 
have contributed to the low rating levels of decentralisation as a system of government in 
Uganda. The irony is that a quick glance at Uganda’s legal and policy framework on 
decentralisation reflects a genuine desire to transform the country’s democratic and economic 
path by engaging local communities. However, a detailed, critical study of Uganda’s 
decentralisation system reveals institutional failure that demands immediate reform in order to 
harness the real benefits of decentralisation.7 As Aung San Suu Kyi’ warns, ‘The most 
difficult time in any transition is when we think that success is in sight … . Then we have to 
be very careful that we’re not lured by the mirage of success’.8 
3. Essential findings 
Even though the 1995 Constitution bestowed a new status on district councils at the inception 
of decentralisation, there was not a concomitant comprehensive policy providing for a 
rationale for devolving power to lower orders of government. The policy void in the new 
                                                 
6 See the Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments 2009: 
Synthesis Report March 2010 p 8. 
7 The Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments 2009: 
Synthesis Report March 2010 p 8. 
8 Kuhnhenn ‘Obama to people of Myanmar: America “is with you”’ Associated Press 19 November 2012. 
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constitutional status of local governments partly explains why there has been exponential 
growth in numerous district councils with little tangible rise in the material well-being of the 
local communities that district councils were intended to serve.  
3.1 Local government Institutions 
As was argued in Chapter Three, an independent boundary demarcation body in the 
demarcation process is vital to ensure that the process is free from political manipulation. It 
was further argued that a boundary demarcation process must be more transparent and 
participatory for the communities concerned.9 It is recommended that Article 179(4) of the 
Constitution of Uganda should be amended to provide for an independent body to demarcate 
district boundaries. This body should be able to operate free from political influence. Any 
proven attempt at political influence should be subject to criminal prosecution and possible 
legal sanction. Secondly, the amendment should include a provision for public hearings and 
objections from stakeholders and members of the public so that the wishes of the people are 
heard before a new district is created. 
One of the major critique of Uganda’s decentralisation is what is generally considered the 
‘recentralisation phenomenon’, particularly that of the former Kampala City Council. The 
recentralisation phenomenon is also apparent in the centralisation of all district councils’ 
senior managers. Further, the suspension of the district council graduated tax are also cited as 
evidence of the recentralisation phenomenon. 
The thesis finds an urgent need to strengthen the autonomy of district councils in order to 
limit the excesses of state power. For instance, if district councils are to serve as instruments 
                                                 
9 Singiza & De Visser 2011: 33. 
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of peace, they should be strengthened enough to compete with the central government in order 
to mitigate the dangers associated with a highly centralised state. Further, district councils, as 
local institutions of democracy should seek to build consensus with the central government 
under a broader umbrella of a nation state and not to antagonise it. Testing whether Uganda’s 
district councils’ institutional design promotes democratic governance, the thesis finds that 
there is a fair environment in which democratic governance can take root. However, the wall-
to-wall institutional design of district councils, together with the proliferation of district 
councils, creates weak lower orders of government that are dependent on central government, 
with little ability to check the excesses of state power. 
The institutional design of Uganda’s district councils reveals the following: the Buganda 
Kingdom’s demand for special federal status was rejected on account of threatening the nation 
state of Uganda, yet many district councils have been created mainly on the basis of ethnicity. 
This suggests that the promotion of ethnicity at lower orders of government does not 
necessarily threaten the integrity of the nation state, as was argued with respect to the 
Buganda Kingdom. It is argued that the Buganda Kingdom should be awarded a special 
federal status, a status that poses no risk to Uganda‘s sovereignty. The thesis therefore 
rearticulates the Buganda Kingdom’s quest for special federal status through strong district 
councils. It is argued that, the Buganda Kingdom’s special federal status within Uganda 
presents no incentive for secession, as long as there are strong district councils within it.  
3.2 Local democracy 
The general argument has been that the success of decentralisation lies in the 
acknowledgement of district councils as deliberative democratic assemblies for local 
communities. The thesis finds that all district council political office bearers are elected by 
local citizens with the provision for revoking their mandate. This is an essential feature that 
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protects their constitutional democratic autonomy and integrity. In this respect, when local 
democracy is viewed through the prism of periodic elections only, then in that narrow sense 
there is a semblance of democratic government as a crucial element in determining local 
communities’ preference.10 
 
Essentially, district councils as deliberative assemblies are grounded in the idea of free and 
fair elections that are inclusive and transparent. This view is based on the assumption that 
elected community representatives ensure that district council political leaders constantly 
justify their actions to local communities through their elected representatives. The finding of 
the thesis is that the quality of district council elections presents outcomes that are antithetical 
to grassroots democracy given the allegations (proven and unproven) of election malpractice. 
Besides, the legal framework seems to have resulted in people with no skills being elected to 
district councils. Inevitably, district councils are dominated by councillors with almost no 
skills and are therefore incapable of demanding critical explanation on behalf of communities 
from the national and district political leaders.  
It is noted that district councils are the supreme political authority within the jurisdiction of 
every district council. On the other hand, the directly elected district council chairperson is the 
political head of every district council. The apparent absence of clear political authority in a 
district council may be potentially dangerous for a local democracy. It is reiterated that the 
absence of a clear and dominant political authority in a district council is a recipe for political 
conflicts in a district council. 
In addition, whereas provision is made for the political participation of different social groups, 
such as women, the youth and the elderly, traditional leaders are constitutionally excluded 
                                                 
10 Oloka-Onyango 2007: 17. 
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from participation in politics, specifically district councils. Furthermore, ethnic minorities are 
not recognised as a special interest group in district councils. District councils are supposedly 
founded on inclusive democratic principles. An electoral system that does not make any 
special effort to afford ethnic minority representation amounts to political discrimination and 
violates these principles. It is also noted that the exclusion of traditional rulers from district 
councils is based on a misconception that traditional leaders are inherently undemocratic and 
divisive. 
District councils were originally are grounded in the ideology of ‘non-party democracy’, 
which is in practice undemocratic. In fact, in 1993, when the decentralisation legislation was 
enacted, multiparty political activities had been banned for seven years. The promulgation of 
the 1995 Constitution further sealed the fate of political pluralism, in that from 1995 to 2005 
political parties were constitutionally excluded from competing for any political office. 
Notwithstanding the 2005 constitutional amendment that provided for political pluralism, the 
thesis finds that ideologically Uganda’s decentralisation is still infused with the single-party 
political doctrine that is intolerant towards alternative political opinions.11 
3.3 Local government powers 
One of the critical findings of the thesis is that district council administrative technocrats are 
protected from direct control of district council elected leaders. On the one hand, the 
separation of senior district council managers from district council political control ensures 
that district council technocrats are free from district council political manipulation. On the 
other hand, the thesis questions the decision to re-centralise the appointment of senior district 
council managers. The thesis finds that the re-centralisation of the district council senior 
                                                 
11 Oloka-Onyango 2007: 10-11, 24-5. See also Francis & James 2003: 327. 
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administrators makes it politically impossible for district councillors to seriously demand 
explanations from district council technocrats. Ultimately, the thesis finds that the absence of 
district council political control over its senior managers means that district councils can no 
longer determine their own developmental priorities. 
The thesis also highlights the importance of sharing powers and functions between orders of 
government. Placing emphasis on the emerging international soft law on decentralisation, the 
thesis makes a case for clearly defined powers to devolve to district councils on the principle 
of subsidiarity. The thesis notes that the powers and functions that devolve to Uganda’s 
district councils are not only vague, but contradict the emerging soft law and existing 
literature on decentralisation. 
The thesis finds that the Constitution provides for a detailed list of central government 
exclusive competencies under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. In additional item 29 of 
the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution has the open ended effect in that any of the residual 
district councils’ competencies that are incidental to the execution of the central government 
competencies automatically reverts to the central government. Lastly, the Sixth Schedule of 
the Constitution then seems to suggest that Parliament will prescribe and detail the residual 
functions of district councils from a very narrow list. 
It is noted that the manner in which Parliament prescribes the district councils powers and 
functions ultimately causes an overlap of central government and district council functions. 
This has rendered parts of the legislative scheme for district powers unconstitutional and 
subject to constitutional challenge in court. Arguably, the 1995 Constitution offers room for 
constitutional litigation to purposefully add meaning to the real powers and functions of 
district councils in order to protect the integrity of district councils in Uganda. 
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Testing the nature of powers and functions that devolve to district councils, the thesis finds 
that vaguely defined district council powers narrow the political space of district council 
legislative and executive powers. The thesis also finds that vaguely defined district council 
functions makes it difficult for local communities to demand explanations from specific 
orders of government.  
3.4 Intergovernmental relations 
The thesis’s examination of the nature of intergovernmental relations (IGR) in Uganda’s 
decentralisation shows that district councils are institutionally over-regulated. A clearest 
example is the suspension of district graduated tax by the President by a mere letter without 
considering the views of district councils. The relationship between central government and 
district councils is characterised by too much supervision and monitoring, with little emphasis 
on co-operation and mutual respect. The thesis argues that the success of decentralisation 
hinges on the adoption of both supervision and co-operation as important tools for IGR. 
Preferably, the thesis maintains, emphasis should be placed on co-operation as a means of 
promoting a culture of dialogue necessary for grassroots democracy.  
In summary, the findings of this study concern a political environment that in many ways is 
nostalgic of a highly centralised state.12  
4. Recommendations  
It is argued that the findings of this study are important for further institutional reform of 
district councils in Uganda. It is also argued that the study offers lessons to other multi-ethnic 
countries (especially those emerging from conflict) that desire to adopt devolution through 
                                                 
12 Tusasirwe 2007: 31-32. 
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decentralisation as means of consensus building. The thesis has highlighted opportunities as 
well as serious shortcomings in the legal framework for decentralisation, with an emphasis on 
practical suggestions for reform. There are as follows: 
• That decentralisation is an appropriate state reform measure for less-developed 
countries, especially those emerging from conflict. 
• That a wall-to-wall institutional design of district councils is inappropriate for 
multi-ethnic countries, especially for ethnic groups with a unique history; hence a 
specially crafted form of asymmetrical decentralisation is highly recommended. 
• That there is no international legal obligation to adopt decentralisation as a state 
reform measure, but there is a trend, evident in many international declarations and 
ministerial statements, that suggests that decentralisation as a system of 
government could in the near future become an international norm.  
• That democracy, development and accommodation of diversity are the main 
principles on which a good decentralised system should be predicated.  
• The success of decentralisation, however, hinges on six critical features. These are: 
(a) integrity of local government institutions; (b) functional local government 
authority; (c) adequate fiscal autonomy; (d) administrative autonomy; (e) equitable 
intergovernmental transfers; and (f) sound intergovernmental relations. 
• Parliament should revisit the important role of traditional leaders in district 
councils. For example, the Constitution and the LGA should be amended so as to 
ensure that traditional leaders are included in district council structures by lifting a 
ban on traditional leaders from participating in elections.  
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• That in order to establish ‘functional district councils’, the institutions, functions 
and powers of district councils must serve the purpose of grassroots democracy, 
development and accommodation of diversity by ensuring the promotion of 
democratic citizenship; improvement of efficiency in public service delivery 
systems, and protecting territories of communities. 
• That the failure of decentralisation to promote democratic governance and improve 
the material well-being of many communities in Uganda points to the need for 
further reform. 
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